Election Integrity in a One-Party Dictatorship

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How did allegations of voter fraud at a 1949 Leningrad party conference spark the Leningrad Affair and reveal the role of elections in Stalin-era governance?

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How did allegations of voter fraud at a 1949 Leningrad party conference spark the Leningrad Affair and reveal the role of elections in Stalin-era governance?

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This video discusses the electoral system of the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, particularly focusing on a pivotal moment in 1948 involving the Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) party organization. Initially, a non-competitive, single-party electoral process had stabilized by the 1930s, granting party leaders a semblance of democratic legitimacy while firmly maintaining control by the Communist Party. However, during World War II, this system broke down. By 1948, amidst a push to regain legitimacy, Leningrad’s party organization conducted an election where a slight dissent emerged: 23 protest votes out of over a thousand cast.

The response from Moscow was severe when Leningrad officials misrepresented the results, falsely claiming a unanimous approval of their leadership. The situation escalated into a scandal, leading to the dismissal and arrest of numerous officials by early 1949, showcasing the tensions between central and local authorities within the Communist Party.

The scenario illustrates the broader dynamics of governance in the Soviet Union, where elections served not as genuine democratic processes but as mechanisms for the central authority to monitor and ensure loyalty from regional officials. The aftermath highlighted how Moscow sought to maintain control and accountability amidst concerns of insubordination and corruption. The author argues that the historical view of a rigid totalitarian regime needs reevaluation, revealing a more nuanced interaction between central authorities and provincial leaders, thus emphasizing the complex reality of authoritarian governance in that era.

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Here are five key points derived from the video regarding the electoral process and political dynamics within the Soviet Union, specifically focusing on the events surrounding the Leningrad party organization in 1948:

1. **Stability of Political System**: In the 1930s, the Soviet Union established a non-competitive electoral process controlled by the Communist Party to provide party leaders with a semblance of legitimacy while maintaining tight control. This system began to break down during WWII due to wartime exigencies but was reinstated by 1948 as party elections resumed to reaffirm local and regional officials' legitimacy.

2. **Scandal and its Consequences**: In December 1948, the Leningrad party organization held elections, resulting in 23 protest votes out of over a thousand. The head of the electoral commission, Tik Kuf, falsely reported a unanimous victory. This deception triggered a significant scandal, leading to the dismissal, arrests, and severe consequences for many local leaders, highlighting the regime’s intolerance for any form of dissent or perceived insubordination.

3. **Elections as Control Mechanisms**: The electoral process in the Soviet system was not a genuine democratic practice but rather a mechanism for validating decisions made in Moscow. Elections served as early warning systems to monitor local officials' performance and maintain loyalty to the central authority, with any signs of dissent viewed as serious challenges to the regime.

4. **Transition from Political Machines to Meritocracy**: The video discusses a shift between the reliance on client-patron networks and a potential move towards a meritocratic system. While local leaders enjoyed some latitude in governance, they had to remain loyal to Moscow and effectively implement the central policies. Any deviation from this loyalty was met with severe repercussions, indicating a rigid authoritarian structure rather than totalitarian control.

5. **Implications for Historical Understanding**: The findings and archival research conducted post-1991 offer new insights into the nature of governance in the Soviet Union. The events in Leningrad illustrate that while the system appeared top-down and authoritarian, there were subtle feedback mechanisms at play from local officials back to the center. This complexity of relations challenges simplistic views of totalitarianism and emphasizes the importance of local governance dynamics in the Soviet political landscape.

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Here are some key quotes extracted from the video, along with their convideoual significance:

1. **"In the 1930s, the system of a non-competitive single party, single candidate, electoral process becomes pretty stable and standardized."**
- This quote highlights the establishment of the electoral system in the Soviet Union, which was designed to function under the strict control of the Communist Party while simulating democratic legitimacy.

2. **"This is done essentially to give party leaders a sense of legitimacy, in a democratic sense, while keeping it very firmly under the control of the Communist Party."**
- It underscores the manipulation of democratic practices to maintain authority and control over political processes.

3. **"The system breaks down because of the wartime emergency, the exigencies of this incredible conflict."**
- This indicates how World War II disrupted established political practices and the structure of party governance.

4. **"In particular, 15 votes are cast against...the head of the electoral commission...tells his fellow members that we're gonna deliver this result unanimously for our party bosses."**
- This moment illustrates the internal manipulation and pressures within party dynamics, shedding light on the lack of genuine electoral fairness.

5. **"This causes a massive scandal when it gets to Moscow because...the Lenn graders are boasting of a unanimous electoral victory."**
- The reaction from Moscow indicates the importance of perceived unity and compliance within party leadership, which was crucial for maintaining the party's image.

6. **"This act of deceiving the Moscow authorities...removing the ability to surveil the local and regional situation...leads to this major purge in 1949."**
- This highlights the consequences of failing to meet Moscow’s expectations, illustrating how dissent or even the appearance of it could lead to severe repercussions.

7. **"Elections were one of several sorts of early warning systems, which the party was using."**
- This points to the dual role of elections as not only a façade of democracy but also as a tool for the central authority to gauge loyalty and control in the provinces.

8. **"It's a top down situation...their consent is engineered from below."**
- This differentiates between genuine democratic processes and the Soviet method of ensuring acceptance of party directives.

9. **"The moment that these local barons and party leaders become wayward... Moscow becomes extremely concerned and views it not only as insubordination, but something tantamount to treason."**
- This encapsulates the rigid intolerance to deviation from the party line, emphasizing the totalitarian nature of the political environment.

10. **"What we would probably call today, a sort of authoritarian politics, not totalitarian control."**
- This suggests a nuanced understanding of governance within the Soviet Union, categorizing it as authoritarian rather than purely totalitarian, presenting a more layered political landscape.

These quotes reflect the central themes of legitimacy, control, manipulation, and the consequences of dissent within the convideo of Soviet electoral processes and governance during the mid-20th century.

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In the 1930s, the system

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of a non-competitive single party, single candidate,

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electoral process becomes pretty stable

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and, and standardized.

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This is done essentially to give, party leaders a sense

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of legitimacy, in a democratic sense,

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while keeping it very firmly under the

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control of the Communist Party.

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During World War ii in the early 1940s,

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the system breaks down

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because of the wartime emergency, the exigencies of,

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of this, incredible conflict.

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And by 19, it's only really by 1948 that the party begins

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to think about reviving his practice

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of party elections at party conferences in order

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to reacquire that sense of legitimacy, for its,

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officials in the local and the regional level.

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So that gets us to 1948, which is, an important year

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for the piece that I wrote, insofar as, it's at

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that time that the Lenn grad party organization,

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which is the third largest in the Soviet Union,

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Len grad is, is known today as St.

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Petersburg. So it's a massive city and region.

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The Leningrad Association Dec Len grad party organization

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decides in 1948, according to the requests of Moscow,

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that it's time to have a major

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conference and a big election.

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It needs to reelect its officials

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to demonstrate their legitimacy.

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And so they do that in, in mid to late December of 1948.

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The really interesting moment here, though, is that

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of over a thousand votes cast

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for these Lenin grad party bosses.

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23 negative na votes are cast,

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protest votes, I guess we could call them.

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In particular, 15 votes are cast against the Second

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Secretary Kapustin.

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Uh, this might not have been a very big deal, I guess,

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historically speaking, except for the fact that the head

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of the electoral commission of this party conference,

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a guy named Tik Kuf, tells his fellow members

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of this electoral commission

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that we're gonna deliver this result unanimously

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for our party bosses in Lenn grad.

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He didn't have to do this apparently, but he did it anyway.

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This causes a massive schedule, scandal when it gets

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to Moscow because of at least two factors.

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First of all, the Lenn graders are representing themselves

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as being in, total control of the situation in Len grad.

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They're boasting of a unanimous electoral victory.

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They're boasting of, of, of, solidarity and,

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and cohesion within the party organization up

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to the very last margin.

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Second of all, at least Tik enough has dared

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to deceive Moscow

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and re report, falsified, vote rigging,

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at this election.

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And so this is a really quite a big major issue.

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Within a month of the breaking of the scandal in January

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of 1949, all the major party officials associated

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with this voting scandal have lost their jobs.

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Six months later, almost all of them are under arrest,

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and by the end of 1950, almost all

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of them have been sentenced to long prison terms,

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and 20 have been shot.

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So it is a really major issue that spirals out of

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what seems like perhaps just a very small hiccup in an

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otherwise pretty well organized Stalinist,

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experience with electoral democracy or democracy.

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I guess if we consider a, one party system

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with no competition

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and, no alternative candidates, I think

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that it's important not to think about this as a,

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as a democratic system in which individuals

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and people in which people are able to,

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select their own leaders.

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Instead, it's a validation system

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or an approval system in which,

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party officials on the local level

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or on the regional level are able to,

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validate decisions made for them in Moscow.

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Te the, te Kuf, the head

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of the Electoral Commission in Leningrad, in December

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of 1948, was attempting to, cheat the system.

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I guess we could simply say, we could say he's trying

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to circum, he's trying to circumvent party controls.

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He's trying to, embellish the reputation

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of leaders who've sustained a bit of a,

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of a protest vote.

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They've sustained some dissent in, in the region

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at the same time, in the, in the central leadership.

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There's great concern then about why,

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the Len graders might be trying to conceal these votes,

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whether where is, if there's smoke, perhaps there's fire.

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This ends up mounting into a major issue, not just

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of insubordination, but something tantamount to treason.

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This is a really interesting sorts of, research,

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which we have only been able to do since 1991.

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Most of this was impossible to do during the Cold War,

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but when the Communist archives opened in 1991,

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it became possible to begin to think about this.

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So how should we think about this in general?

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Why would the Moscow authorities want local

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and regional level, officials to run

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for election in the first place?

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Well, if they want them to demonstrate

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that they can administer effectively

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and, run Moscow's policy on the local

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and regional level, they also want to be sure

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that they can run their own party organizations,

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that they can actually deliver either unanimous votes

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or near unanimity within their, party organizations.

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If they can't, if they either generate nay votes

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or protest votes or any sort of sign of dissent.

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That's something that Moscow is planning on using

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after 1948 as almost a, an early warning system in,

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in order to decide whether leaders need to be replaced,

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whether local or regional investigations need to take place.

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So that's what Moscow is thinking.

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It's trying to, it is trying to make leaders accountable.

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It's really hard to know what te enough was up

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to at the head of that party commission, the,

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the vote counting commission at that, at that,

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party conference.

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He could have either gotten a direct order from local bosses

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or on the regional level bosses who said, we need

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to be reelected unanimously.

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He may have done it on his own, out of a sense

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of being the client of one of these bosses

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and needing to protect those bosses reputation.

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He may have done it on his own.

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He may have also even not understood the democratic process.

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I guess he was a newly appointed official.

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There hadn't been elections in Leningrad for eight years.

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He may have grown up seeing Stalin and Molotov

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and other all union leaders be elected unanimously

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and decide that his leaders too should get a unanimous vote.

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But it almost doesn't matter

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because, the vote for the, the, the, the,

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the feeling from Moscow, the reaction from Moscow was

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so hysterical, so angry, so in temperate

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that the Leonard graders would dare to try

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and falsify, less than optimal, election results.

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And so this act

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of deceiving the Moscow authorities in short,

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circuiting a a,

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early warning system like they had set up,

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removing the ability to surveil the local

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and regional situation, Leningrad was considered

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to be an absolute red flag and,

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and leads to this major purge in

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1949 that I just laid out for you.

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We're learning a lot more about this now than we were able

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to say a generation ago,

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but it seems increasingly clear from the best work in the

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field that the Stalinist administration

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after the war was attempting to create a sort

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of meritocracy,

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mere party appointments wasn't enough anymore.

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Uh, they monitored not only the social origins

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of party leaders that were being appointed in the local

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and regional level, but educational level.

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They also kept very careful track

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of their administrative record.

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Could they deliver the plan?

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Could they implement Moscow's policies?

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Could they communicate ideas successfully

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to their own constituencies when they couldn't,

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they were recalled to Moscow, sent

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through a retraining course and sent somewhere else.

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So there were real sanctions applied to,

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in unsuccessful leaders, which I think can lead us

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to believe that this was an effort

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to create a meritocratic system.

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When Moscow sends investigators to Len grad in early 1949,

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though, to investigate the voter fraud,

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they discovered something completely different.

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They discovered that the local Len grad leaders on the local

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and regional levels had set up big patron client networks.

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They were tolerating limited levels of abuse, of power,

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and even corruption from their underlings in ex in exchange

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for vertical,

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for vertical loyalty within these patron client networks.

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This was a source of great frustration to Moscow.

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Of course, we shouldn't necessarily say

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that Len Grad was more corrupt than any other,

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major industrial center in the, in the country in the 1940s.

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Most major party organizations in most major, locations,

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cities and regions were probably more political machines

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than they were meritocratic operations.

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And it is also really important to note

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that Stalin was probably prepared,

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at least in the short term, to tolerate these political

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machines as long as they were loyal to Moscow

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and delivered the five-year plan.

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The key thing to take away here, though,

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is in this transition from machine to meritocracy,

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the Lenin graders, unfortunately, a wayward,

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they appear insubordinate.

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They appear as if they're prepared to deceive the center,

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and that's where this break deal breaks down.

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If, if Stalin was willing to tolerate

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what some scholars like, Yom Gosky from Manchester

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and Nuke from Oxford have suggested, is sort

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of a sub-state dictatorship.

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If Stalin was willing to tolerate sub-state dictators

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as long as they were obedient to Moscow

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and fulfill the economic plan, the moment that they step out

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of line, they're busted.

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And this is what happens in Len grad

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after the scandals of 1948.

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So previous to 1991, we assume

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that the system worked in a totalitarian sort of fashion

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that, all policy was devised in Moscow.

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It was implemented in the regions on the local

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and the regional level, but

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that very little deviation was tolerated.

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Very little personality was tolerated.

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Uh, the local and regional officials were simply in lockstep

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implementing what was devised and,

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and, promulgated in Moscow, the newest research,

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and again, I'll, I'll, I'll, plug, two

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of the most exciting researchers who are doing some

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of this work these days, Joran, Gosky and Manchester

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and Nuke in Moscow.

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They argue that that old totalitarian model is rather

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simplistic, and that the, top down, authority

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of the state was not sufficient in order to, to,

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a accomplish absolute fulfillment of the plan

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without some leeway being given

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to local and regional bosses.

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So Golitsky and,

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and k Clev new demonstrate in, in their most recent book

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that, there was sort of a deal that was created

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between Moscow and the provinces in which the provinces were

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allowed to, provincial barons

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and bosses were allowed to, enjoy a certain level

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of abuse, of authority, of corruption, of patronage

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and clientelism as long as they were loyal to the center.

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But the key takeaway here again, is that the moment

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that these, local barons and,

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and, party leaders become wayward,

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the moment that they step out of line, the moment

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that they begin to break this implicit deal of loyalty

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in exchange for that, latitude of action,

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Moscow becomes extremely concerned

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and views it not only as insubordination,

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but something tantamount, to treason.

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Uh, so I, I think that that's really the big, that

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that's the way that policymaking changes, that we,

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we should think about the Lenn grad.

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It's worthwhile, maybe mentioning for a moment

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that the Lenn Grets had gone through World War II

254
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and spent almost 900 days in a blockade.

255
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The Lenn grad party organization,

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therefore, had developed its own leadership style during

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that time period, which differed a little bit from

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what was practiced elsewhere.

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But Moscow tolerated it after the war, between 1945

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and 1948, because the Lenon grads were successful at

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delivering the plan at reinforcing the party line.

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It seemed as if they were obedient,

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but they were, this new particular deal of tolerance

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for sub-state dictators was only tolerated up

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until the moment when those dictators begin

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to try and deceive Moscow.

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And that's what appears

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to happen at this December 48 conference.

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And that appears to be the red line across which these,

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these, local

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and regional bosses are not allowed to cross.

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I guess what I've tried to argue in the, in the,

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in the piece that we've looked at for today is

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that elections were one of several sorts

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of early warning systems, which the party was using.

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Something that we probably don't expect,

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when we're casually thinking about the Soviet Union,

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we're used to thinking about the Soviet Union using the

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secret police, the central committee

280
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and Stalin's organizations in the very center of,

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of the political universe of the Soviet Union,

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would send out investigative teams to do audits of local

283
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and regional organizations.

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There are all sorts of bureaucratic structures

285
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and police driven structures that they could use to try

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and keep a hold on the situation, on the local

287
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and regional level, and keep it running in a way which was,

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appropriately centralized for their tastes.

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But I, what I've tried to contribute in this article

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is a new understanding of how elections were also used

291
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as a mechanism of control, a mechanism of surveillance.

292
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It's not at all the sort of democratic functioning,

293
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institution that we might expect.

294
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Uh, of course, it's, it's at first blush, a,

295
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non-competitive single party, single candidate system.

296
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But even more than that,

297
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it's not a grassroots driven democratic system of,

298
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in which you select leaders from below.

299
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Instead, it's a top down situation, scenario in which,

300
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leaders are selected from above.

301
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Their consent is engineered from below,

302
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and then the party monitors the performance

303
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of those officials by means of a whole variety

304
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of different sorts of things, including elections, in order

305
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to ensure that that loyal, capable,

306
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competent people are running party affairs

307
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on the local and regional level.

308
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So it's, it is a demo.

309
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It is an election, but it's not a democratic election.

310
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It is, much more the power of the party

311
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and the state rather than it is anything reminiscent

312
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of people power, I guess.

313
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Um, so I think that's the really big takeaway.

314
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The totalitarian model doesn't appear very competitive.

315
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When we get this close

316
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and use this sort of degree of archival research

317
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and look at case studies like this, the totalitarian model

318
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of absolute authority from above

319
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and absolute obedience from

320
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below doesn't seem to work very well.

321
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Perhaps it's because the,

322
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the officials were poorly educated,

323
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but perhaps it's also because it was a vast country.

324
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And, the ability of the state to,

325
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create a puppet master paradigm in which it would absolutely

326
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control affairs, concerning local and offic and,

327
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and regional officials, just wasn't possible.

328
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And so the, the, the system instead devises

329
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what we would probably call today, a sort

330
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of authoritarian politics, not totalitarian control,

331
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but more, a rigid authoritarian system in which specific

332
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appointees of the center are allowed enough, leeway

333
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to have incentive to continue to enforce central Dictat,

334
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to, bring in the plan.

335
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Uh, this explains a lot of the corruption

336
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that we're beginning to, become aware of

337
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as we dig into the archives.

338
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This explains the patron client networks

339
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that we never imagined existing before.

340
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Um, it looks like a system which is much more organic

341
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and has feedback mechanisms,

342
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not just top down, but bottom up.

343
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It's not the feedback mechanisms

344
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that we'd expect in popular referendums or, or,

345
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or multi-party elections in the West.

346
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But we do see a much more, I guess, living,

347
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organic sense of, of internal Soviet politics.

348
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I've tried to emphasize in our discussion today is

349
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that 23 votes out of a thousand,

350
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shouldn't seem like anything,

351
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and probably Tik enough, the fellow in charge

352
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of the electoral comp, commission at that,

353
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December, 1948 party conference,

354
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he also probably viewed it as, inconsequential, sort

355
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of an ugly way to mar the reputations

356
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of his party leaders, his bosses.

357
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And so therefore, he appears to have been quite determined

358
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to just sort of sweep it under the carpet and,

359
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and hope that nobody noticed the fact

360
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that Moscow did notice.

361
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And the fact that Moscow reacted with such anger,

362
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with such, vitriol to this, to this, instance

363
00:16:29.945 --> 00:16:32.525
of party, vote rigging is important.

364
00:16:32.785 --> 00:16:35.085
And I think it's important for two levels on two levels.

365
00:16:35.085 --> 00:16:36.445
First of all, I think it's important

366
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because, it does indicate

367
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that there was some dissent within the Leonard Guard party

368
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organization in particular in regard to one leader,

369
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Kapustin, the second in command.

370
00:16:46.405 --> 00:16:48.625
That's interesting. It means that there's, there,

371
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there is some discord within a party organization

372
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that we generally consider

373
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to have been pretty high functioning.

374
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Much more important though is the fact, fact,

375
00:16:56.465 --> 00:16:58.145
and this is much more important to Moscow.

376
00:16:58.405 --> 00:17:01.745
Uh, this demonstrates gorlitsky have nuke to be right about

377
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how elections are actually being used.

378
00:17:03.535 --> 00:17:06.585
They're not really differ delivering referendum on leaders

379
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'cause those leaders are gonna be elected anyway.

380
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It's instead a feedback mechanism

381
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or an early warning mechanism to indicate

382
00:17:13.575 --> 00:17:15.425
what is going on in the regional level

383
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and should the party be concerned,

384
00:17:17.985 --> 00:17:19.585
about anything going on out there.

385
00:17:19.965 --> 00:17:24.225
And so the Leonard Gutter's efforts to rig the vote in 1948

386
00:17:24.565 --> 00:17:27.505
and to conceal the fact that there was a fairly small,

387
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but nevertheless distinct protest vote in

388
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that election is really important to the way

389
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that we understand this system.

390
00:17:33.345 --> 00:17:37.465
That the system, was sensitive to feedback from below,

391
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but it was also very, very concerned about falsification

392
00:17:41.285 --> 00:17:44.745
and bad data coming back from appointed officials,

393
00:17:44.935 --> 00:17:46.625
from out in those, in, in,

394
00:17:46.645 --> 00:17:48.825
in those provincial areas. And so, again, I guess I

395
00:17:48.825 --> 00:17:49.925
Will come back to the notion

396
00:17:50.115 --> 00:17:51.845
that elections in the Soviet system,

397
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especially under Stalin, are much less an exercise

398
00:17:54.965 --> 00:17:56.005
of Vox popule.

399
00:17:56.155 --> 00:18:01.005
They're much less, sort of grassroots effort to,

400
00:18:01.265 --> 00:18:03.965
select leaders and much more a,

401
00:18:04.095 --> 00:18:07.205
diagnostic system imposed from above in order

402
00:18:07.445 --> 00:18:09.405
to monitor essentially appointed leaders

403
00:18:09.745 --> 00:18:12.845
and assure, administrative effectiveness on the local

404
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and regional levels.

Legitimacy and Control: The 1948 Leningrad Party Elections

00:00:00 - In the 1930s, the system of a non-competitive single party, single candidate, electoral process becomes pretty stable and, and standardized. This is done essentially to give, party leaders a sense of legitimacy, in a democratic sense, while keeping it very firmly under the control of the Communist Party. During World War ii in the early 1940s, the system breaks down because of the wartime emergency, the exigencies of, of this, incredible conflict. And by 19, it's only really by 1948 that the party begins

00:00:34 - of party elections at party conferences in order to reacquire that sense of legitimacy, for its, officials in the local and the regional level. So that gets us to 1948, which is, an important year for the piece that I wrote, insofar as, it's at that time that the Lenn grad party organization, which is the third largest in the Soviet Union, Len grad is, is known today as St. Petersburg. So it's a massive city and region. The Leningrad Association Dec Len grad party organization

00:01:09 - that it's time to have a major conference and a big election. It needs to reelect its officials to demonstrate their legitimacy. And so they do that in, in mid to late December of 1948. The really interesting moment here, though, is that of over a thousand votes cast for these Lenin grad party bosses. 23 negative na votes are cast, protest votes, I guess we could call them. In particular, 15 votes are cast against the Second

Scandal Unveiled: The Leningrad Electoral Deception

00:01:38 - this might not have been a very big deal, I guess, historically speaking, except for the fact that the head of the electoral commission of this party conference, a guy named Tik Kuf, tells his fellow members of this electoral commission that we're gonna deliver this result unanimously for our party bosses in Lenn grad. He didn't have to do this apparently, but he did it anyway. This causes a massive schedule, scandal when it gets to Moscow because of at least two factors. First of all, the Lenn graders are representing themselves

00:02:12 - They're boasting of a unanimous electoral victory. They're boasting of, of, of, solidarity and, and cohesion within the party organization up to the very last margin. Second of all, at least Tik enough has dared to deceive Moscow and re report, falsified, vote rigging, at this election. And so this is a really quite a big major issue. Within a month of the breaking of the scandal in January

00:02:42 - with this voting scandal have lost their jobs. Six months later, almost all of them are under arrest, and by the end of 1950, almost all of them have been sentenced to long prison terms, and 20 have been shot. So it is a really major issue that spirals out of what seems like perhaps just a very small hiccup in an otherwise pretty well organized Stalinist, experience with electoral democracy or democracy. I guess if we consider a, one party system

Electoral Legitimacy and Party Control in Soviet Politics

00:03:12 - and, no alternative candidates, I think that it's important not to think about this as a, as a democratic system in which individuals and people in which people are able to, select their own leaders. Instead, it's a validation system or an approval system in which, party officials on the local level or on the regional level are able to, validate decisions made for them in Moscow. Te the, te Kuf, the head

00:03:47 - of 1948, was attempting to, cheat the system. I guess we could simply say, we could say he's trying to circum, he's trying to circumvent party controls. He's trying to, embellish the reputation of leaders who've sustained a bit of a, of a protest vote. They've sustained some dissent in, in the region at the same time, in the, in the central leadership. There's great concern then about why,

00:04:17 - whether where is, if there's smoke, perhaps there's fire. This ends up mounting into a major issue, not just of insubordination, but something tantamount to treason. This is a really interesting sorts of, research, which we have only been able to do since 1991. Most of this was impossible to do during the Cold War, but when the Communist archives opened in 1991, it became possible to begin to think about this. So how should we think about this in general? Why would the Moscow authorities want local

Understanding Moscow's Electoral Strategy and Accountability Mechanisms

00:04:46 - for election in the first place? Well, if they want them to demonstrate that they can administer effectively and, run Moscow's policy on the local and regional level, they also want to be sure that they can run their own party organizations, that they can actually deliver either unanimous votes or near unanimity within their, party organizations. If they can't, if they either generate nay votes or protest votes or any sort of sign of dissent.

00:05:17 - after 1948 as almost a, an early warning system in, in order to decide whether leaders need to be replaced, whether local or regional investigations need to take place. So that's what Moscow is thinking. It's trying to, it is trying to make leaders accountable. It's really hard to know what te enough was up to at the head of that party commission, the, the vote counting commission at that, at that, party conference. He could have either gotten a direct order from local bosses

00:05:47 - to be reelected unanimously. He may have done it on his own, out of a sense of being the client of one of these bosses and needing to protect those bosses reputation. He may have done it on his own. He may have also even not understood the democratic process. I guess he was a newly appointed official. There hadn't been elections in Leningrad for eight years. He may have grown up seeing Stalin and Molotov and other all union leaders be elected unanimously and decide that his leaders too should get a unanimous vote.

Election Rigging and the Purge of 1949 in Leningrad

00:06:18 - because, the vote for the, the, the, the, the feeling from Moscow, the reaction from Moscow was so hysterical, so angry, so in temperate that the Leonard graders would dare to try and falsify, less than optimal, election results. And so this act of deceiving the Moscow authorities in short, circuiting a a, early warning system like they had set up, removing the ability to surveil the local and regional situation, Leningrad was considered

00:06:50 - and leads to this major purge in 1949 that I just laid out for you. We're learning a lot more about this now than we were able to say a generation ago, but it seems increasingly clear from the best work in the field that the Stalinist administration after the war was attempting to create a sort of meritocracy, mere party appointments wasn't enough anymore. they monitored not only the social origins of party leaders that were being appointed in the local and regional level, but educational level.

00:07:21 - of their administrative record. Could they deliver the plan? Could they implement Moscow's policies? Could they communicate ideas successfully to their own constituencies when they couldn't, they were recalled to Moscow, sent through a retraining course and sent somewhere else. So there were real sanctions applied to, in unsuccessful leaders, which I think can lead us to believe that this was an effort to create a meritocratic system. When Moscow sends investigators to Len grad in early 1949, though, to investigate the voter fraud,

Patron-Client Networks and Moscow's Frustration

00:07:53 - They discovered that the local Len grad leaders on the local and regional levels had set up big patron client networks. They were tolerating limited levels of abuse, of power, and even corruption from their underlings in ex in exchange for vertical, for vertical loyalty within these patron client networks. This was a source of great frustration to Moscow. Of course, we shouldn't necessarily say that Len Grad was more corrupt than any other, major industrial center in the, in the country in the 1940s.

00:08:29 - cities and regions were probably more political machines than they were meritocratic operations. And it is also really important to note that Stalin was probably prepared, at least in the short term, to tolerate these political machines as long as they were loyal to Moscow and delivered the five-year plan. The key thing to take away here, though, is in this transition from machine to meritocracy, the Lenin graders, unfortunately, a wayward,

00:08:57 - They appear as if they're prepared to deceive the center, and that's where this break deal breaks down. If, if Stalin was willing to tolerate what some scholars like, Yom Gosky from Manchester and Nuke from Oxford have suggested, is sort of a sub-state dictatorship. If Stalin was willing to tolerate sub-state dictators as long as they were obedient to Moscow and fulfill the economic plan, the moment that they step out of line, they're busted. And this is what happens in Len grad after the scandals of 1948.

Totalitarian Control and Local Autonomy in Soviet Governance

00:09:29 - that the system worked in a totalitarian sort of fashion that, all policy was devised in Moscow. It was implemented in the regions on the local and the regional level, but that very little deviation was tolerated. Very little personality was tolerated. the local and regional officials were simply in lockstep implementing what was devised and, and, promulgated in Moscow, the newest research, and again, I'll, I'll, I'll, plug, two

00:09:59 - of this work these days, Joran, Gosky and Manchester and Nuke in Moscow. They argue that that old totalitarian model is rather simplistic, and that the, top down, authority of the state was not sufficient in order to, to, a accomplish absolute fulfillment of the plan without some leeway being given to local and regional bosses. So Golitsky and, and k Clev new demonstrate in, in their most recent book

00:10:30 - between Moscow and the provinces in which the provinces were allowed to, provincial barons and bosses were allowed to, enjoy a certain level of abuse, of authority, of corruption, of patronage and clientelism as long as they were loyal to the center. But the key takeaway here again, is that the moment that these, local barons and, and, party leaders become wayward,

Breach of Loyalty: The Leningrad Conference and Moscow's Response

00:11:00 - that they begin to break this implicit deal of loyalty in exchange for that, latitude of action, Moscow becomes extremely concerned and views it not only as insubordination, but something tantamount, to treason. so I, I think that that's really the big, that that's the way that policymaking changes, that we, we should think about the Lenn grad. It's worthwhile, maybe mentioning for a moment that the Lenn Grets had gone through World War II and spent almost 900 days in a blockade.

00:11:32 - therefore, had developed its own leadership style during that time period, which differed a little bit from what was practiced elsewhere. But Moscow tolerated it after the war, between 1945 and 1948, because the Lenon grads were successful at delivering the plan at reinforcing the party line. It seemed as if they were obedient, but they were, this new particular deal of tolerance for sub-state dictators was only tolerated up until the moment when those dictators begin

00:12:02 - And that's what appears to happen at this December 48 conference. And that appears to be the red line across which these, these, local and regional bosses are not allowed to cross. I guess what I've tried to argue in the, in the, in the piece that we've looked at for today is that elections were one of several sorts of early warning systems, which the party was using. Something that we probably don't expect, when we're casually thinking about the Soviet Union, we're used to thinking about the Soviet Union using the

Understanding Soviet Elections: A Top-Down Approach

00:12:34 - and Stalin's organizations in the very center of, of the political universe of the Soviet Union, would send out investigative teams to do audits of local and regional organizations. There are all sorts of bureaucratic structures and police driven structures that they could use to try and keep a hold on the situation, on the local and regional level, and keep it running in a way which was, appropriately centralized for their tastes. But I, what I've tried to contribute in this article is a new understanding of how elections were also used

00:13:09 - It's not at all the sort of democratic functioning, institution that we might expect. of course, it's, it's at first blush, a, non-competitive single party, single candidate system. But even more than that, it's not a grassroots driven democratic system of, in which you select leaders from below. Instead, it's a top down situation, scenario in which,

00:13:39 - Their consent is engineered from below, and then the party monitors the performance of those officials by means of a whole variety of different sorts of things, including elections, in order to ensure that that loyal, capable, competent people are running party affairs on the local and regional level. So it's, it is a demo. It is an election, but it's not a democratic election. It is, much more the power of the party and the state rather than it is anything reminiscent

Redefining Authority: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism

00:14:09 - so I think that's the really big takeaway. The totalitarian model doesn't appear very competitive. When we get this close and use this sort of degree of archival research and look at case studies like this, the totalitarian model of absolute authority from above and absolute obedience from below doesn't seem to work very well. Perhaps it's because the, the officials were poorly educated, but perhaps it's also because it was a vast country. And, the ability of the state to,

00:14:43 - control affairs, concerning local and offic and, and regional officials, just wasn't possible. And so the, the, the system instead devises what we would probably call today, a sort of authoritarian politics, not totalitarian control, but more, a rigid authoritarian system in which specific appointees of the center are allowed enough, leeway to have incentive to continue to enforce central Dictat, to, bring in the plan.

00:15:15 - that we're beginning to, become aware of as we dig into the archives. This explains the patron client networks that we never imagined existing before. it looks like a system which is much more organic and has feedback mechanisms, not just top down, but bottom up. It's not the feedback mechanisms that we'd expect in popular referendums or, or, or multi-party elections in the West. But we do see a much more, I guess, living,

Vote Rigging and Party Dissent in Post-War Leningrad

00:15:44 - I've tried to emphasize in our discussion today is that 23 votes out of a thousand, shouldn't seem like anything, and probably Tik enough, the fellow in charge of the electoral comp, commission at that, December, 1948 party conference, he also probably viewed it as, inconsequential, sort of an ugly way to mar the reputations of his party leaders, his bosses. And so therefore, he appears to have been quite determined

00:16:15 - and hope that nobody noticed the fact that Moscow did notice. And the fact that Moscow reacted with such anger, with such, vitriol to this, to this, instance of party, vote rigging is important. And I think it's important for two levels on two levels. First of all, I think it's important because, it does indicate that there was some dissent within the Leonard Guard party organization in particular in regard to one leader,

00:16:46 - That's interesting. It means that there's, there, there is some discord within a party organization that we generally consider to have been pretty high functioning. Much more important though is the fact, fact, and this is much more important to Moscow. this demonstrates gorlitsky have nuke to be right about how elections are actually being used. They're not really differ delivering referendum on leaders 'cause those leaders are gonna be elected anyway. It's instead a feedback mechanism or an early warning mechanism to indicate what is going on in the regional level

Understanding Soviet Elections: A Diagnostic System

00:17:17 - about anything going on out there. And so the Leonard Gutter's efforts to rig the vote in 1948 and to conceal the fact that there was a fairly small, but nevertheless distinct protest vote in that election is really important to the way that we understand this system. That the system, was sensitive to feedback from below, but it was also very, very concerned about falsification and bad data coming back from appointed officials, from out in those, in, in,

00:18:12 - Will come back to the notion that elections in the Soviet system, especially under Stalin, are much less an exercise of Vox popule. They're much less, sort of grassroots effort to, select leaders and much more a, diagnostic system imposed from above in order to monitor essentially appointed leaders and assure, administrative effectiveness on the local and regional levels.

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