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Jonathan Kirshner critiques the flaws of realism’s modern alternatives and demonstrates how classical realism, with insights from thinkers like Thucydides and Hans Morgenthau, can better explain major 20th-century upheavals and today’s global challenges—such as China’s rise, shifting power dynamics, and the end of the US-led postwar order.

Image courtesy of interviewee. October 3, 2024

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The speaker discusses their motivation for writing a book on realism in international relations, primarily driven by intellectual curiosity. They seek to reclaim a broader understanding of realism, which they believe has been largely dominated by structural realism or neorealism, often conflated with realism itself. The speaker criticizes hyper-rationalist theories in international relations, which they feel make flawed assumptions about rationality, similar to those that contributed to the global financial crisis.

The book argues for classical realism, emphasizing that it offers a more comprehensive approach to understanding world politics by factoring in choices, history, and purpose, rather than solely focusing on the distribution of power between states as structural realism does. Classical realism posits that as states become more powerful, they tend to want more, and the historical context significantly shapes their preferences and actions.

The speaker also critiques the practical limitations of realism in guiding foreign policy, noting that realism is more adept at advising against certain actions than providing a singular, effective policy approach. While they acknowledge the complexity and difficulty of applying classical realism, they contend that it allows for a more nuanced understanding of state behavior and the international system compared to the oversimplified view of structural realism.

Finally, they differentiate between structural and classical realism in analyzing the US's position in international politics, arguing that understanding domestic political dysfunction is crucial for assessing the US’s ability to exercise its power, despite its enormous structural capabilities. The overall focus is on the necessity of integrating politics, history, and purpose into the study of international relations.

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Here are five key points from the video:

1. **Motivation for Writing**: The author’s motivation for writing the book stems from intellectual curiosity and a desire to explore and reclaim a broader understanding of realism in international relations, which he believes has been narrowed by the dominance of structural realism or neorealism.

2. **Critique of Structural Realism**: The author criticizes structural realism for being overly simplistic and deterministic, arguing that it fails to account for important variables in international relations, such as purpose, choice, and the historical convideo that influences state behavior.

3. **Emphasis on Classical Realism**: Classical realism offers a more nuanced understanding of world politics by introducing the significance of historical legacies, state preferences, and the political motivations that drive state actions, rather than merely focusing on power distributions.

4. **Political Convideo and Purpose**: The author emphasizes that understanding how states behave requires an analysis of both their relative power and their political objectives. The choices states make are shaped by their historical convideos and intentions, suggesting a need to return to a more politically engaged analysis of international relations.

5. **Limitations of Realism**: The author acknowledges the limitations of realism as a theoretical framework, particularly its capacity to offer prescriptive policy advice. While realism can effectively warn against potential pitfalls in policy, it often lacks a coherent directive for action, thus being more about caution than definitive recommendations.

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Here are some key quotes from the video that encapsulate the main ideas and arguments presented:

1. **Motivation for Writing**:
- "the answer is... intellectual curiosity."

2. **On Realism vs. Neorealism**:
- "I thought realism had been hijacked by the predominant approach to realism, which we can call structural realism or neorealism."
- "I wanted to recapture or reclaim a broader sense of realism."

3. **Critique of Hyper Rationalism**:
- "I came to call hyper rationalist... that made assumptions about rationality that I had been long a critic of."
- "They did... expose why that approach was so extremely unhelpful in explaining world politics."

4. **Purpose of the Book**:
- "I wrote this book sort of to reclaim intellectually realism from the structural realists."

5. **Concept of Oligopolistic Competition**:
- "World politics actually looks a lot more even... than perfect competition, oligopolistic competition... the dominant players can actually shape the nature of the market."

6. **Historical Convideo in Foreign Policy**:
- "From a classical realist perspective, you can't possibly begin to understand the choices that states are making in foreign policy without understanding... the legacy of the first world war."

7. **On the Importance of State Choices**:
- "If state choices matter, then what states want matters... that also means that history matters."

8. **Limitations of Realism**:
- "There is no such thing as a realist foreign policy."
- "Realism is a disposition... there are lots of ways that people from a realist disposition can articulate the way in which the national interest might be advanced."

9. **Classical Realism and Military Use**:
- "The only reason why you would ever use force is to advance a political goal."

10. **Key Takeaways**:
- "The key lesson, the key takeaways, um, are content, purpose, and politics."

11. **The Role of Domestic Political Dysfunction**:
- "Classical realism will look at the United States today and be very much focused on whether its domestic political dysfunction might affect its ability to achieve its goals."

These quotes highlight the primary themes of realism in international relations, the critique of structural realism, the emphasis on political convideo, and the acknowledgment of historical factors in state behavior.

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The video you've appears to be a transcript of a discussion or lecture on realism in international relations, focusing on the distinctions between structural realism and classical realism. Here are some articles and topics that could be considered similar, covering related themes in international relations theory, particularly realism, and critiques of it:

1. **"Realism and International Relations Theory"**
This article would explore the foundations of realism as a theory, tracing its development and key thinkers, alongside critiques and limitations.

2. **"The Evolution of Realism in International Relations"**
This piece would assess how realism has changed from classical realism (e.g., thinkers like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau) to neorealism (structural realism) as articulated by Kenneth Waltz, and the implications for current international policies.

3. **"Rationality in International Relations: A Critique of Hyper-Rationalism"**
An article that critiques hyper-rationalist approaches in international relations similar to the one mentioned in your video, discussing the assumptions of rationality in the convideo of foreign policy decisions.

4. **"Power Dynamics and International Relations: The Role of Domestic Politics"**
This work could examine how domestic political factors influence foreign policies and state behavior in contrast to the purely structural power-focused view.

5. **"Classical vs. Structural Realism: An Analytical Framework"**
An analysis comparing classical realism's focus on state agency, historical convideo, and purpose with the more deterministic views of structural realism.

6. **"The Importance of History in International Relations"**
This article would elaborate on why historical convideo is critical in understanding state behavior, directly connecting to the points about historical legacy made in your video.

7. **"Geopolitical Implications of Rising Powers: A Classical Realist Perspective"**
Discussing the implications of emerging powers such as China from a classical realist angle, touching on the balance of power dynamics as well as potential geopolitical conflicts.

8. **"Revisiting the Balance of Power in Modern International Relations"**
This article would explore how the balance of power concept still applies and has evolved in today’s geopolitics, considering the critiques of both classical and structural realism.

9. **"Realism, Idealism, and Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis"**
This could compare realism with idealism and liberalism in international relations, evaluating how these theories impact policy decisions and state interaction.

10. **"The Role of Ideology in International Politics: Moving Beyond Power"**
An exploration of how ideologies and narratives influence international relations beyond mere power structures, supporting the call for a richer understanding of state behavior and motivations.

These topics would resonate with the discussions found in your video and would provide deeper insights into the debates surrounding realism and international relations.

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Think you asked what motivated me to write the book.

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Um, and the answer is, the best answer,

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which was intellectual curiosity.

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The book is a book about, realism, which is a,

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an approach to the study of international relations.

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And I had long considered myself a realist

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and I was quite interested in exploring realism

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for two reasons in particular.

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One is that I thought realism had been hijacked

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by the predominant approach to realism,

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which we can call structural realism or neorealism.

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And that was only one version of

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how realism can be understood.

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But unfortunately, it came to be seen as synonymous

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with realism so that people tended,

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even professionals then it's a conflate

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structural realism with realism.

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And I wanted to recapture

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or reclaim a broader sense of realism.

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A second motivating factor also had to do with a development

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that was occurring in international relations theory

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that was also relevant to these studies.

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And that was the predominance of a set of theories

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that I came to call hyper rationalist, a set of theories

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that really made assumptions about rationality

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that I had been long a critic of.

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But when I was working on a different book on the global

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financial crisis, I realized that those hyper rationalists

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and international relations theory were making the same

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types of mistakes

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that hyper rationalists in macroeconomic

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theory were, were making.

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And those mistakes actually contributed

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to the global financial crisis.

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And that was a bit of an epiphany for me

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because even though international relations theorists

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of hyper rationality will not cause as much damage

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as the economist's version of it, they did,

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I think expose why that approach was

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so extremely unhelpful in explaining world politics.

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So I wrote this book sort of

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to reclaim intellectually realism from the structural

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realists and to make a contribution

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to international relations theory that also wanted

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to challenge a predominant perspective, which is that

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of the hyper rationalist theorists structural realism,

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which is what classical realism is really pushing back

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against, painted itself into an analytical corner by saying

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that the only way we're allowed to look at world politics is

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to imagine states as quote unquote, like units

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dwelling in anarchy.

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And the only distinguishing feature

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between them is their relative capability.

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So the only variables we're really allowed

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to draw upon is the distribution of power between states

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and also change to the distribution of power between states.

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Now, classical realists share a lot of the dispositions

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of structural realism.

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So classical realists are certainly very attentive

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to questions of the balance of power

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and to the systemic forces generated by the balance of power

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and changes to the balance of power.

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But classical realism recognizes

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that structural realism is hopelessly under determined.

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What do I mean by that?

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What I mean is that structural realism draws on a metaphor

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and the metaphor is of

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Microeconomic theory,

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but they think of it in terms of perfect competition.

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Whereas every actor is a price taker.

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Every actor collectively makes the market,

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but no actor can influence the market.

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But world politics actually looks a lot more even when

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speaking about microeconomics like

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oligopolistic competition, not perfect competition.

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And in oligopolistic competition,

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the dominant players can actually shape the

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nature of the market.

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Their choices matter fundamentally.

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They have the ability to make choices

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and those choices matter tremendously.

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So while they are constrained by the costs presented

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by so-called market forces,

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they nevertheless both shape those forces

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and also their choices in turn can shape those forces.

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So it was the hopeless indeterminacy of structural realism

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that I think led to the need for a revisitation

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of classical realism, which allows us

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to introduce things like purpose.

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What if, if, if state choices matter, then

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what states want matters?

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And so that means content

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and that also means that history matters.

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The relevant historical lessons correctly learned

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or not that are received

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by governments shapes their behavior.

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Let me continue by giving a small example.

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Um, in the interwar period, most of the foreign policies

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of most of the countries involved

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or shaped gr dramatically by the traumatic experience

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of the first World war.

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And from a classical realist perspective,

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you can't possibly begin to understand the choices

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that states are making in foreign policy without

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understanding the legacy, the weight

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of the first world war on their preferences on

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what they want in the world on their purpose.

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And therefore, we need to understand

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how states conceptualize their own understanding

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of their histories, if we're gonna have a better handle on

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what they might want

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and how they're likely

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to behave from a structural realist perspective.

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That is impermissible history does not matter.

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Actors are like act as if they have, that the kind

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of amnesia that that fellow in the movie Memento have,

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or they have absolutely no recall of the past

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and just see what's in front of them and try

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and act rationally accordingly.

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But again, to slip in the rational side of this puzzle,

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actually there are a number of ways

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to act very rationally in response to the same stimuli.

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So again, we need more than the distribution of power,

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and we need more than to simply say actors behave rationally

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because the distribution of power is indeterminate.

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And because there are a number of rational ways

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to pursue the same rational goals.

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So what classical realism introduces, again, is content

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and purpose, history and ideology

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or what we might call broadly politics.

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So the classical realism wants to bring politics back

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to the study of international relations.

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I think classical realism is very helpful, helpful for this

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because classical realism, as I mentioned,

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like structuralism is very attentive, to the balance

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of power and the consequences of a distribution

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and the consequences of changes to it.

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It's just that classical realism tends to add more

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with regard to simply those balance of power variables.

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Classical realism tends to actually emphasize changes

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to the distribution of power as an engine of conflict.

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In world politics, most structural realists most of the time

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tend to focus more simply on the distribution of power.

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Most classical realists most

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of the time are a little more attentive to change

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to the balance of power because they think that

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that will affect what states want.

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And again, we're getting back to this question

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of purpose and not just power.

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And one of the working assumptions of classical realism is

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that as states become more powerful, they tend to want more.

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So classical realism looks at a change into the bounds

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of power, like the rise of China with some concern, not

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because China is necessarily doing anything quote unquote

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wrong, but rather

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because it is a constant challenge in the history

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of world politics, when there's the emergence

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of a new great power in the system

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because that great power will tend to want more,

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whereas other great powers who are perhaps satisfied

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with the status quo will be reluctant

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to accommodate those challenges.

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And so this can often,

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be a very fraught geopolitical situation.

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Uh, having said that, classical realism,

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which is often pessimistic

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and often gloomy nevertheless, is somewhat

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cautious about getting involved in a big confrontation

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with China or seeing the confrontation

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between the US and China.

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In militaristic terms, the challenge really is politics.

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Uh, China wants more political influence

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and the US may be reluctant to see some of

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that political influence, but nevertheless,

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classical realism acknowledges that one must be attentive

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to the balance of power and

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therefore the US needs to reckon with the fact

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that China is going

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to be a more capacious international player.

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Uh, so what does that mean for the United States?

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It means that the focus

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as classical realist George f Kenon emphasized

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during the Cold War is political, that the US needs

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to remain politically engaged in Asia

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to give important countries in Asia the confidence to resist

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what China might demand of them.

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Politically speaking, classical realism is deeply skeptical

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of some of the theories that we see out there associated

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with realism like John Meir Scharmer's theory

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of offensive realism that suggests that China should

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and must engage in a militarized bid for regional hegemony.

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Classical realism is deeply skeptical

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of the underlying logic of that argument

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for reasons we don't need to get into at the moment.

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But nevertheless, as I said,

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classical realism is somewhat pessimistic about the

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consequences of the emergence

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of a new great power in the international system,

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but rather nevertheless conceptualizes the problem

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fundamentally as a political one, not as one

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of an imminent military conflict.

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Although the pessimism of classical realism is such

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that it will not assume that China might not be so foolish

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as to embark upon a bid for militarized deem,

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classical realism just tends to think that

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that would indeed be a ruinous choice for China and

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therefore less likely to be selected than other choices

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as it seeks to ach enhance its political influence

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regionally and in the world.

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I do wanna recognize the limitations,

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of classical realism,

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and I do wanna recognize rec, recognize the limitations

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of realist approaches to world politics more generally,

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which is as policy advocacy, which a lot of people want.

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There are two problems with realism.

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One is that realism, there is no such thing

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as a realist foreign policy.

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People will often say, I have a foreign policy.

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This is what realism tells you to do actually, again,

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because there are multiple rational ways

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to conceptualize the national interest.

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And because there are multiple rational ways to pursue

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that national interest, even if you agree on

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what the national interest is, there will not be one

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singularly correct realist foreign policy, right?

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Realism is a disposition.

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And so there are lots of ways

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that people from a realist disposition can articulate the

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way in which the national interest might be advanced.

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So to look to realism for that one singular policy approach,

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I think is, an illusion.

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So we wanna be cautious about that.

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Another problem with realism historically is

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that it's a much better guide to what not to do

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than to what to do.

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For example, most realist scholars,

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passionately opposed the US war on Iraq in 2003, recognizing

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that it would be a political disaster,

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even if it would be a military cakewalk.

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Most realist scholars were passionately opposed

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to the US involvement in the Vietnam War.

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So realism is really good at saying, don't do

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that foolish thing, don't do that foolish thing.

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But in terms of articulating a vision of what

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to do purposefully

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and actively, realism again, moves in a number

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of different directions and become is less good at pointing

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you toward the exact right thing to do.

11:34.585 --> 11:36.565
So a limitation of realism again is

11:36.565 --> 11:38.325
that it's it's better at telling you what not

11:38.325 --> 11:39.885
to do than what to do.

11:40.345 --> 11:44.115
And I think it's important to acknowledge that a problem

11:44.225 --> 11:48.955
with classical realism is dramatically overstated

11:49.175 --> 11:51.555
by the critics of classical realism.

11:51.855 --> 11:54.365
The critics of classical realism like to say, well,

11:54.365 --> 11:56.005
classical realism just wants

11:56.005 --> 11:58.445
to explain everything everywhere all at once

11:58.585 --> 12:01.405
by introducing every conceivable variable possible.

12:01.625 --> 12:03.925
And that's a caricature, kind of a strong amount

12:03.925 --> 12:07.845
of classical realism by saying that history and politics

12:07.865 --> 12:09.405
and content and choice

12:09.545 --> 12:13.965
and even ideology matter, does mean that it is

12:14.505 --> 12:16.005
harder to look at the world

12:16.005 --> 12:18.005
through a classical realist lens than say

12:18.005 --> 12:20.925
through a structural realist lens, which only has that one

12:20.925 --> 12:22.165
or two variables it can look at.

12:22.265 --> 12:24.445
And then it tries to draw conclusions from them.

12:24.545 --> 12:28.245
But again, as I said, is irretrievably in determinant.

12:29.995 --> 12:34.535
So it is the case that classical realism is not as simple

12:35.455 --> 12:36.715
as structural realism,

12:36.855 --> 12:39.155
and I think that that's a fair critique

12:39.155 --> 12:40.155
of classical realism.

12:40.455 --> 12:42.995
But you know, we have to live in the real world.

12:43.875 --> 12:45.635
Structural realists tout their parsimony,

12:45.635 --> 12:48.795
which they claim is about explaining more with less.

12:49.295 --> 12:51.475
And what I like to say is, well, they've got the

12:51.475 --> 12:53.035
with less down perfectly,

12:53.255 --> 12:55.435
but they're really not telling us more.

12:55.975 --> 12:59.675
And classical realism is not simply throwing a bunch

12:59.675 --> 13:01.755
of variables into a massive stew.

13:02.135 --> 13:06.875
Rather, it is a more disciplined craft of understanding

13:07.185 --> 13:08.635
that there are a range

13:08.855 --> 13:12.595
of analytical tools we can use in international relations

13:12.595 --> 13:15.595
theory to try and explain the world that we see.

13:16.135 --> 13:18.835
And the craft of classical realism is

13:18.835 --> 13:22.275
to understand which tools make the most sense

13:22.295 --> 13:24.715
to deploy in which circumstances.

13:25.135 --> 13:27.675
And as such, it is similar to what,

13:27.675 --> 13:30.235
Charles Kindleberger the economic historian talked about

13:30.345 --> 13:33.475
when he described his work in historical economics,

13:33.665 --> 13:36.795
that it's having a full panoply a toolkit

13:37.385 --> 13:40.115
that the experienced economists can use to introduce,

13:40.115 --> 13:41.315
to describe and explain

13:41.335 --> 13:44.875
and understand better one setting rather than another.

13:45.175 --> 13:47.315
So while there are lots of tools there,

13:47.815 --> 13:49.475
or what we might say, lots of variables

13:49.475 --> 13:52.555
that could be introduced, it's not simply saying, well,

13:52.555 --> 13:54.635
the world is complicated and everything matters.

13:55.095 --> 13:57.075
Rather it's saying, well, we need

13:57.075 --> 13:59.675
to understand the political context

13:59.865 --> 14:03.595
that this problem is taking place within, and that

14:03.595 --> 14:07.275
therefore we can deploy our radical toolkit most effectively

14:07.375 --> 14:09.235
to understand this given situation.

14:09.455 --> 14:11.555
The most important thing,

14:11.615 --> 14:16.475
for classical realism is the emphasis on choice,

14:17.745 --> 14:19.505
politics, and purpose.

14:20.295 --> 14:23.105
That states, that is countries, we call them states

14:23.105 --> 14:24.985
and international relations theory,

14:25.355 --> 14:28.705
especially great powers, have a range

14:29.045 --> 14:31.465
of options available to them

14:31.925 --> 14:33.385
and that those range

14:33.765 --> 14:36.625
of options actually shape the international system.

14:36.925 --> 14:39.945
So if you want to know how states are going to behave,

14:40.565 --> 14:43.585
you can't simply understand their relative power.

14:43.965 --> 14:46.145
You also have to understand their purpose.

14:46.325 --> 14:48.145
And so again, it is a plea

14:48.485 --> 14:51.380
for a more sophisticated understanding of the, the role

14:51.425 --> 14:55.725
of politics in fairly enough world politics.

14:56.265 --> 14:59.685
Um, and again, what that means in terms of conclusions is

14:59.685 --> 15:02.125
that we need to be attentive to politics,

15:02.265 --> 15:03.325
but that we also need

15:03.325 --> 15:05.925
to always be focused on world politics.

15:06.195 --> 15:10.365
It's something of a cliche for many people

15:10.505 --> 15:12.205
who look at world politics to say

15:12.205 --> 15:16.285
that a realist perspective kind of prioritizes the darkness,

15:16.425 --> 15:19.405
the anarchy, the the fact that there's a concern

15:19.505 --> 15:21.125
for the possibility of war,

15:21.665 --> 15:24.925
but realism in any guise does not have this kind

15:24.925 --> 15:28.285
of knee jerk tendency to try and solve problems.

15:28.285 --> 15:30.685
Militarily realism acknowledges

15:30.715 --> 15:33.125
that actors in world politics may try

15:33.125 --> 15:34.805
to solve problems militarily,

15:35.065 --> 15:36.365
and that there were no guarantees

15:36.365 --> 15:39.765
that their behaviors may be restrained, but realists.

15:39.785 --> 15:42.605
And again, all realists here I think understand well

15:42.715 --> 15:43.925
that the introduction

15:43.925 --> 15:48.645
of military force only makes sense in the context of,

15:48.705 --> 15:52.085
and here's that key word again, the political objectives

15:52.105 --> 15:55.245
for which the use of force might be introduced.

15:55.705 --> 16:00.245
So if we wanna understand how we can effectively use

16:00.305 --> 16:03.125
or not deploy military power, we must always,

16:03.225 --> 16:04.685
and this goes back to,

16:04.685 --> 16:06.845
political thinker named K Clausewitz that some

16:06.905 --> 16:09.725
of you may be familiar with, emphasized

16:10.345 --> 16:15.325
as the subordination of the military to the political goal.

16:15.665 --> 16:18.605
The only reason why you would ever use force is

16:18.605 --> 16:19.925
to advance a political goal.

16:20.025 --> 16:21.565
And the only reason why

16:21.785 --> 16:24.645
or the only metric by which you could understand whether

16:24.705 --> 16:28.285
or not that force has been successful is whether it has made

16:28.285 --> 16:30.965
your political goals more likely to be achieved

16:31.225 --> 16:32.885
or less likely to be achieved.

16:33.225 --> 16:36.805
So I think the key lesson, the key takeaways, are

16:37.765 --> 16:41.175
content, purpose, and politics.

16:41.515 --> 16:44.535
Now, there's a, a bit of a pessimistic twist on that

16:44.765 --> 16:47.415
with regard to the contemporary United States.

16:48.075 --> 16:50.935
Uh, a structural realist would look at the United States

16:51.315 --> 16:53.215
and look at its relative power,

16:53.515 --> 16:55.175
and that power is enormous,

16:55.525 --> 16:59.095
very large military gargantuan economy capabilities,

16:59.515 --> 17:01.735
you know, greater than any other state in the system.

17:02.195 --> 17:05.055
But a classical realist would also look at the ability

17:05.515 --> 17:09.975
of the US as a political actor to exercise its power.

17:10.355 --> 17:12.815
And here classical realism would insist

17:12.815 --> 17:14.495
that we be more attentive to

17:15.295 --> 17:18.175
domestic political dysfunction within the United States.

17:18.635 --> 17:20.455
And again, this is, I think, important

17:20.455 --> 17:22.135
for contemporary international politics,

17:22.155 --> 17:24.695
but also calls attention to a big distinction

17:24.725 --> 17:27.535
between classical realism and structural realism.

17:27.805 --> 17:30.535
Classical realism will look at the United States today

17:30.835 --> 17:34.575
and be very much focused on whether its domestic political

17:34.765 --> 17:39.615
dysfunction might affect its ability to achieve its goals

17:39.755 --> 17:42.775
and to advance its political interest on the world stage,

17:43.605 --> 17:47.815
even though its underlying structural power remains

17:48.415 --> 17:49.175
profound and enormous.

Motivations

00:00 - Think you asked what motivated me to write the book. and the answer is, the best answer, which was intellectual curiosity. The book is a book about, realism, which is a, an approach to the study of international relations. And I had long considered myself a realist
00:16 - and I was quite interested in exploring realism for two reasons in particular. One is that I thought realism had been hijacked by the predominant approach to realism, which we can call structural realism or neorealism. And that was only one version of how realism can be understood. But unfortunately, it came to be seen as synonymous with realism so that people tended, even professionals then it's a conflate
00:43 - structural realism with realism. And I wanted to recapture or reclaim a broader sense of realism. A second motivating factor also had to do with a development that was occurring in international relations theory that was also relevant to these studies. And that was the predominance of a set of theories that I came to call hyper rationalist, a set of theories that really made assumptions about rationality that I had been long a critic of.
01:09 - But when I was working on a different book on the global financial crisis, I realized that those hyper rationalists and international relations theory were making the same types of mistakes that hyper rationalists in macroeconomic theory were, were making. And those mistakes actually contributed to the global financial crisis. And that was a bit of an epiphany for me because even though international relations theorists
01:32 - of hyper rationality will not cause as much damage as the economist's version of it, they did, I think expose why that approach was so extremely unhelpful in explaining world politics. So I wrote this book sort of to reclaim intellectually realism from the structural realists and to make a contribution to international relations theory that also wanted to challenge a predominant perspective, which is that of the hyper rationalist theorists structural realism,

State Choices

02:01 - which is what classical realism is really pushing back against, painted itself into an analytical corner by saying that the only way we're allowed to look at world politics is to imagine states as quote unquote, like units dwelling in anarchy. And the only distinguishing feature between them is their relative capability. So the only variables we're really allowed to draw upon is the distribution of power between states and also change to the distribution of power between states.
02:29 - Now, classical realists share a lot of the dispositions of structural realism. So classical realists are certainly very attentive to questions of the balance of power and to the systemic forces generated by the balance of power and changes to the balance of power. But classical realism recognizes that structural realism is hopelessly under determined. What do I mean by that? What I mean is that structural realism draws on a metaphor
02:57 - and the metaphor is of Microeconomic theory, but they think of it in terms of perfect competition. Whereas every actor is a price taker. Every actor collectively makes the market, but no actor can influence the market. But world politics actually looks a lot more even when speaking about microeconomics like oligopolistic competition, not perfect competition. And in oligopolistic competition,
03:23 - the dominant players can actually shape the nature of the market. Their choices matter fundamentally. They have the ability to make choices and those choices matter tremendously. So while they are constrained by the costs presented by so-called market forces, they nevertheless both shape those forces and also their choices in turn can shape those forces. So it was the hopeless indeterminacy of structural realism
03:54 - that I think led to the need for a revisitation of classical realism, which allows us to introduce things like purpose. What if, if, if state choices matter, then what states want matters? And so that means content and that also means that history matters. The relevant historical lessons correctly learned or not that are received by governments shapes their behavior.
04:21 - Let me continue by giving a small example. in the interwar period, most of the foreign policies of most of the countries involved or shaped gr dramatically by the traumatic experience of the first World war. And from a classical realist perspective, you can't possibly begin to understand the choices that states are making in foreign policy without understanding the legacy, the weight of the first world war on their preferences on
04:49 - what they want in the world on their purpose. And therefore, we need to understand how states conceptualize their own understanding of their histories, if we're gonna have a better handle on what they might want and how they're likely to behave from a structural realist perspective. That is impermissible history does not matter. Actors are like act as if they have, that the kind of amnesia that that fellow in the movie Memento have,
05:15 - or they have absolutely no recall of the past and just see what's in front of them and try and act rationally accordingly. But again, to slip in the rational side of this puzzle, actually there are a number of ways to act very rationally in response to the same stimuli. So again, we need more than the distribution of power, and we need more than to simply say actors behave rationally because the distribution of power is indeterminate. And because there are a number of rational ways
05:44 - to pursue the same rational goals. So what classical realism introduces, again, is content and purpose, history and ideology or what we might call broadly politics. So the classical realism wants to bring politics back to the study of international relations. I think classical realism is very helpful, helpful for this because classical realism, as I mentioned, like structuralism is very attentive, to the balance of power and the consequences of a distribution

Geopolitics

06:15 - and the consequences of changes to it. It's just that classical realism tends to add more with regard to simply those balance of power variables. Classical realism tends to actually emphasize changes to the distribution of power as an engine of conflict. In world politics, most structural realists most of the time tend to focus more simply on the distribution of power. Most classical realists most of the time are a little more attentive to change to the balance of power because they think that
06:47 - that will affect what states want. And again, we're getting back to this question of purpose and not just power. And one of the working assumptions of classical realism is that as states become more powerful, they tend to want more. So classical realism looks at a change into the bounds of power, like the rise of China with some concern, not because China is necessarily doing anything quote unquote wrong, but rather because it is a constant challenge in the history
07:17 - of world politics, when there's the emergence of a new great power in the system because that great power will tend to want more, whereas other great powers who are perhaps satisfied with the status quo will be reluctant to accommodate those challenges. And so this can often, be a very fraught geopolitical situation. having said that, classical realism, which is often pessimistic
07:43 - and often gloomy nevertheless, is somewhat cautious about getting involved in a big confrontation with China or seeing the confrontation between the US and China. In militaristic terms, the challenge really is politics. China wants more political influence and the US may be reluctant to see some of that political influence, but nevertheless, classical realism acknowledges that one must be attentive to the balance of power and
08:13 - therefore the US needs to reckon with the fact that China is going to be a more capacious international player. so what does that mean for the United States? It means that the focus as classical realist George f Kenon emphasized during the Cold War is political, that the US needs to remain politically engaged in Asia to give important countries in Asia the confidence to resist what China might demand of them.
08:39 - Politically speaking, classical realism is deeply skeptical of some of the theories that we see out there associated with realism like John Meir Scharmer's theory of offensive realism that suggests that China should and must engage in a militarized bid for regional hegemony. Classical realism is deeply skeptical of the underlying logic of that argument for reasons we don't need to get into at the moment. But nevertheless, as I said, classical realism is somewhat pessimistic about the

Limitations

09:06 - consequences of the emergence of a new great power in the international system, but rather nevertheless conceptualizes the problem fundamentally as a political one, not as one of an imminent military conflict. Although the pessimism of classical realism is such that it will not assume that China might not be so foolish as to embark upon a bid for militarized deem, classical realism just tends to think that that would indeed be a ruinous choice for China and
09:34 - therefore less likely to be selected than other choices as it seeks to ach enhance its political influence regionally and in the world. I do wanna recognize the limitations, of classical realism, and I do wanna recognize rec, recognize the limitations of realist approaches to world politics more generally, which is as policy advocacy, which a lot of people want. There are two problems with realism. One is that realism, there is no such thing
10:03 - as a realist foreign policy. People will often say, I have a foreign policy. This is what realism tells you to do actually, again, because there are multiple rational ways to conceptualize the national interest. And because there are multiple rational ways to pursue that national interest, even if you agree on what the national interest is, there will not be one singularly correct realist foreign policy, right? Realism is a disposition.
10:31 - And so there are lots of ways that people from a realist disposition can articulate the way in which the national interest might be advanced. So to look to realism for that one singular policy approach, I think is, an illusion. So we wanna be cautious about that. Another problem with realism historically is that it's a much better guide to what not to do than to what to do. For example, most realist scholars,
11:00 - passionately opposed the US war on Iraq in 2003, recognizing that it would be a political disaster, even if it would be a military cakewalk. Most realist scholars were passionately opposed to the US involvement in the Vietnam War. So realism is really good at saying, don't do that foolish thing, don't do that foolish thing. But in terms of articulating a vision of what to do purposefully and actively, realism again, moves in a number
11:27 - of different directions and become is less good at pointing you toward the exact right thing to do. So a limitation of realism again is that it's it's better at telling you what not to do than what to do. And I think it's important to acknowledge that a problem with classical realism is dramatically overstated by the critics of classical realism. The critics of classical realism like to say, well, classical realism just wants
11:56 - to explain everything everywhere all at once by introducing every conceivable variable possible. And that's a caricature, kind of a strong amount of classical realism by saying that history and politics and content and choice and even ideology matter, does mean that it is harder to look at the world through a classical realist lens than say through a structural realist lens, which only has that one or two variables it can look at.
12:22 - And then it tries to draw conclusions from them. But again, as I said, is irretrievably in determinant. So it is the case that classical realism is not as simple as structural realism, and I think that that's a fair critique of classical realism. But you know, we have to live in the real world. Structural realists tout their parsimony, which they claim is about explaining more with less. And what I like to say is, well, they've got the
12:51 - with less down perfectly, but they're really not telling us more. And classical realism is not simply throwing a bunch of variables into a massive stew. Rather, it is a more disciplined craft of understanding that there are a range of analytical tools we can use in international relations theory to try and explain the world that we see. And the craft of classical realism is to understand which tools make the most sense
13:22 - to deploy in which circumstances. And as such, it is similar to what, Charles Kindleberger the economic historian talked about when he described his work in historical economics, that it's having a full panoply a toolkit that the experienced economists can use to introduce, to describe and explain and understand better one setting rather than another. So while there are lots of tools there, or what we might say, lots of variables
13:49 - that could be introduced, it's not simply saying, well, the world is complicated and everything matters. Rather it's saying, well, we need to understand the political context that this problem is taking place within, and that therefore we can deploy our radical toolkit most effectively to understand this given situation. The most important thing, for classical realism is the emphasis on choice, politics, and purpose.

Conclusions

14:20 - That states, that is countries, we call them states and international relations theory, especially great powers, have a range of options available to them and that those range of options actually shape the international system. So if you want to know how states are going to behave, you can't simply understand their relative power. You also have to understand their purpose. And so again, it is a plea
14:48 - for a more sophisticated understanding of the, the role of politics in fairly enough world politics. and again, what that means in terms of conclusions is that we need to be attentive to politics, but that we also need to always be focused on world politics. It's something of a cliche for many people who look at world politics to say that a realist perspective kind of prioritizes the darkness, the anarchy, the the fact that there's a concern
15:19 - for the possibility of war, but realism in any guise does not have this kind of knee jerk tendency to try and solve problems. Militarily realism acknowledges that actors in world politics may try to solve problems militarily, and that there were no guarantees that their behaviors may be restrained, but realists. And again, all realists here I think understand well that the introduction
15:43 - of military force only makes sense in the context of, and here's that key word again, the political objectives for which the use of force might be introduced. So if we wanna understand how we can effectively use or not deploy military power, we must always, and this goes back to, political thinker named K Clausewitz that some of you may be familiar with, emphasized as the subordination of the military to the political goal. The only reason why you would ever use force is
16:18 - to advance a political goal. And the only reason why or the only metric by which you could understand whether or not that force has been successful is whether it has made your political goals more likely to be achieved or less likely to be achieved. So I think the key lesson, the key takeaways, are content, purpose, and politics. Now, there's a, a bit of a pessimistic twist on that with regard to the contemporary United States.
16:48 - a structural realist would look at the United States and look at its relative power, and that power is enormous, very large military gargantuan economy capabilities, you know, greater than any other state in the system. But a classical realist would also look at the ability of the US as a political actor to exercise its power. And here classical realism would insist that we be more attentive to domestic political dysfunction within the United States.
17:18 - And again, this is, I think, important for contemporary international politics, but also calls attention to a big distinction between classical realism and structural realism. Classical realism will look at the United States today and be very much focused on whether its domestic political dysfunction might affect its ability to achieve its goals and to advance its political interest on the world stage, even though its underlying structural power remains profound and enormous.

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