Popular in Political Science

American Politics

Keeping the Republic

Boston College Marc Landy

British Politics

Entrepreneurial thinking: the politics and practice of policy impact

University of Sheffield Matthew Flinders

Canadian Politics

Parties and Elections: An End to Canadian Exceptionalism?

St. Francis Xavier University James Bickerton

Asian Politics

The Politics of Knowledge in Development

University of Delhi Madhulika Banerjee

American Politics

Fifty years of declining confidence and increasing polarization in trust

University of California Berkeley Henry Brady

American Politics

The Opening Dilemma

Cornell University Richard Bensel

Political Economy

Wait and See?

University of Liverpool Mariaelisa Epifanio

Deproblematizing the Federal–Unitary Dichotomy

View more insights in Social Sciences - Political Science - Middle Eastern Politics

View more figures from American University

View the page of Bashir Mobasher

Read the Study

Next in Middle Eastern Politics

Republic of Dreams: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Struggles, and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan

Nicole Watts

The politics of belonging in Australia

Heba Batainah | University of Canberra

Bashir Mobasher draws on results of an opinion survey about public views in Afghanistan regarding concepts related to federalism.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 20, 2024

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

This video video discusses the politicization and ethnicization of the concepts of federal and unitary states in the context of Afghanistan. It argues that the federal system is often viewed negatively by ethnic groups, particularly by the Pashtun majority, due to fears of disintegration and foreign annexation. Conversely, some minority groups prefer a unitary state for the same reasons, associating it with potential ethno-authoritarian dominance.

The author points out the lack of clear understanding among ethnic groups about federalism and the nuances within decentralization debates. While a growing consensus among scholars favors decentralization as a means of ethnic accommodation, there remains an ongoing debate between segmental and non-segmental federalism designs.

This video video highlights recent global trends where the distinctions between unitary and federal systems are becoming blurred, with many unitary states, like Indonesia and Spain, adopting decentralized structures. This video video shift calls for a reevaluation of how these concepts are applied in practice.

In a study conducted in Afghanistan with over 2,100 respondents, the research found a strong preference across ethnic groups for elected local governance rather than appointed officials, revealing a consensus on certain political institutions regardless of ethnic identity. Furthermore, common identities—national and religious—are considered more important than ethnic identities, suggesting that decentralization does not necessarily threaten national unity.

The author argues for a focus on concrete, institution-based questions rather than politicized terms, proposing that clear discussions about governance preferences could foster consensus among varied groups. Ultimately, the text suggests prioritizing institutional design over the labels of political systems to better address the diverse needs of Afghan society when designing a constitution.

Language:

Export as PDF

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.365 --> 00:03.765
A, well, I have to start with the fact that concept

00:04.025 --> 00:06.885
of federal, in which state has been very much cons

00:07.035 --> 00:09.325
politicized in the context of Afghanistan.

00:09.585 --> 00:13.085
In a way that federal system has been conflated

00:13.715 --> 00:15.605
with disintegration of Afghanistan

00:15.785 --> 00:19.165
and sometimes with the annexation of different part

00:19.165 --> 00:21.565
of the country by the neighboring states.

00:21.865 --> 00:24.965
And the very same time unitary states has also been miscon

00:25.115 --> 00:29.005
centralized in a sense that has been portrayed as a form

00:29.065 --> 00:30.725
of ethno authoritarianism.

00:31.265 --> 00:32.405
So at the same time

00:32.405 --> 00:34.605
that this concept has been miscon conceptualize

00:34.605 --> 00:37.485
and politicized, and has also been,

00:37.965 --> 00:40.205
eth ethnicized in a sense that the elite

00:40.225 --> 00:42.765
of different eth ethnic groups have given different

00:42.765 --> 00:44.125
meanings to these concepts.

00:44.545 --> 00:47.445
If you ask for example, a Ji Zara

00:47.465 --> 00:50.165
or in obe, they don't like

00:51.085 --> 00:53.605
because they think it's a form of the domination

00:53.605 --> 00:55.525
of PTOs on other eth ethnic groups.

00:55.545 --> 00:58.925
So in a way, there has been ethnicized

00:58.925 --> 01:01.045
where different ed ethnic groups have taken different

01:01.285 --> 01:03.125
positions about these different concepts,

01:03.385 --> 01:07.125
but at the same time, they do not necessarily have an ended

01:07.195 --> 01:10.165
knowledge of what these political institutions are.

01:10.225 --> 01:12.765
So for example, if you ask them what is a, for example,

01:12.965 --> 01:14.685
a federal system or you need to system,

01:14.905 --> 01:17.325
you may not get an accurate answer on this topic.

01:17.505 --> 01:20.285
The literature, as I said, is, increasingly

01:21.165 --> 01:23.285
favoring decentralization.

01:23.785 --> 01:27.845
Uh, but there are a lot of scholars who still, believe

01:27.845 --> 01:30.725
that the unitary state is good for the vital societies,

01:30.765 --> 01:34.125
particularly to ensure national unity.

01:34.585 --> 01:37.405
For example, territorial integrity of the states.

01:37.405 --> 01:40.925
They often give the example of, for example, Yugoslavia

01:41.065 --> 01:44.565
and the break of, of, Soviet Union and so on.

01:45.225 --> 01:49.005
But, I believe that a consensus among scholars

01:49.005 --> 01:50.125
of constitutional design

01:50.345 --> 01:53.725
and by society is emerging about the importance

01:53.725 --> 01:56.405
of decentralization for ethnic accommodation.

01:56.665 --> 01:58.445
For example, conservationalists

01:58.545 --> 02:02.485
and central ISTs, which are two important schools of thought

02:03.105 --> 02:04.485
on constitutional design

02:04.585 --> 02:07.285
and vice society, they both prefer decentralization,

02:07.885 --> 02:10.805
although they differ on what kind of federal system

02:11.105 --> 02:14.445
or decentralized status, good for divided society.

02:14.465 --> 02:17.765
So for example, conservationalists prefer segmental

02:17.935 --> 02:19.605
federalism, where the states

02:19.865 --> 02:22.765
and provinces are formed around identities

02:22.785 --> 02:23.925
of different ethnic groups.

02:24.065 --> 02:26.645
So different ethnic groups have their own states

02:26.865 --> 02:28.885
and provinces where,

02:29.005 --> 02:33.205
central ISTs prefer nons segmental federalism, where

02:33.845 --> 02:37.165
identity is not necessarily a determining factor in terms

02:37.165 --> 02:39.125
of the shapes and sizes of different states.

02:39.505 --> 02:42.325
So you can have multiple states from one of the groups

02:42.345 --> 02:44.405
and multiple states for different other ethnic groups.

02:44.665 --> 02:47.925
And their reason is basically that,

02:48.665 --> 02:50.285
the states no longer compete

02:50.285 --> 02:52.365
with each other based on the ethnicity.

02:52.625 --> 02:55.645
For example, in case of Afghanistan, a non segment

02:55.745 --> 02:59.805
of federalism means that a province that competes with pa

03:00.035 --> 03:02.845
with project dominated province will also have to compete

03:02.845 --> 03:05.725
with passion dominated province at the same time

03:05.725 --> 03:08.485
because, for, you know, economic development,

03:08.485 --> 03:10.765
political development and education, other issues.

03:11.275 --> 03:13.575
But there is a couple of things happening around the world

03:13.575 --> 03:16.535
that the literature needs to keep up with.

03:16.835 --> 03:20.095
Uh, one of those thing is the disappearance

03:20.275 --> 03:22.695
of the fine lines and the divergences between

03:23.285 --> 03:27.335
unitary states, and federal political systems be it's

03:27.335 --> 03:29.255
because a lot of countries

03:29.255 --> 03:31.735
that are constitutionally unitary states have

03:31.785 --> 03:33.015
begun to decentralize.

03:33.075 --> 03:36.175
So for example, Indonesia is constitutionally a unitary

03:36.175 --> 03:39.215
state, but it has decentralized considerably.

03:39.755 --> 03:43.135
It has elected governors, it has elected local institutions.

03:43.825 --> 03:46.815
Spain is another really good example where constitutionally,

03:47.115 --> 03:48.575
the country is unitary,

03:48.635 --> 03:51.535
but it has been decentralized to a large extent.

03:51.835 --> 03:53.575
United Kingdom to,

03:53.765 --> 03:55.855
some extent has decentralized as well.

03:56.155 --> 03:58.615
So at the same time, you have examples

03:58.635 --> 04:01.615
of federal systems like Malaysia that are

04:01.795 --> 04:05.415
to some extent trying to centralize some level of power,

04:05.755 --> 04:07.175
to the federal government.

04:07.435 --> 04:10.495
So the fine line is blurring, it's disappearing,

04:10.915 --> 04:13.655
and the concept of federal

04:13.915 --> 04:17.495
and unitary system no longer explains an institutional

04:17.515 --> 04:18.815
design in different countries.

04:19.155 --> 04:20.375
So that's what we need

04:20.375 --> 04:23.855
to take into consideration when we are writing a literature,

04:24.015 --> 04:26.535
a book or a journal about these topics and issues.

04:26.595 --> 04:29.455
And that's what we try to do with our own book, that instead

04:29.455 --> 04:32.415
of focusing on whether Afghanistan needed a federal system

04:32.515 --> 04:36.295
or a nutri system, we focused on underlying institutions

04:36.315 --> 04:40.215
and values that would determine the extent

04:40.315 --> 04:42.775
of centralization or decentralization.

04:42.915 --> 04:47.255
The different ethnic groups preferred surveyed around 2,100,

04:47.605 --> 04:51.495
over 2,100 respondents, from across the country,

04:51.635 --> 04:55.055
34 provinces and different district of different provinces.

04:55.355 --> 04:57.975
And the method we used was snowballing sampling.

04:58.355 --> 04:59.495
Now I have to mention

04:59.565 --> 05:02.015
that I am a co-author for this article.

05:02.275 --> 05:04.455
So the other co-author is Dr.

05:05.045 --> 05:09.415
Kaha, who is an assistant professor at the Seattle Pacific

05:09.505 --> 05:11.695
University in Seattle, Washington.

05:12.035 --> 05:15.735
So we understood that snowballing sampling is,

05:16.035 --> 05:17.335
not random sampling,

05:17.795 --> 05:20.335
or it's not even equivalent to random sampling,

05:20.475 --> 05:22.695
and some random sampling is very much better.

05:23.395 --> 05:25.815
But the problem for us, you order

05:25.835 --> 05:29.935
to conduct a random sampling type of survey research was

05:29.935 --> 05:32.775
because the Taliban were present in different part

05:32.775 --> 05:34.815
of the country, there were security issues.

05:35.275 --> 05:37.015
So we couldn't do random sampling.

05:37.195 --> 05:39.335
And that's why we started with snowballing sampling.

05:40.075 --> 05:42.015
We mobilized around 15 informants

05:42.035 --> 05:44.535
and researchers who did to the survey,

05:45.315 --> 05:47.695
and we people face to face.

05:47.995 --> 05:51.335
Uh, we also send them the survey questions through email.

05:51.755 --> 05:53.615
We have also had a large number

05:53.615 --> 05:57.015
of service con being conducted through food,

05:57.625 --> 05:58.685
phone calls.

05:59.265 --> 06:02.365
So the overall, the the sample represented different,

06:02.405 --> 06:03.605
a ethnic groups proportionally.

06:04.305 --> 06:08.925
Uh, for example, around 40% of the participants were ash

06:09.305 --> 06:11.365
and, the population of ash

06:11.425 --> 06:14.205
and Afghanistan is somewhere around 40%.

06:14.425 --> 06:16.085
So, and the same goes

06:16.085 --> 06:17.725
with all other ethnic groups in the gas.

06:17.945 --> 06:20.045
One of the most important finding we had was

06:20.315 --> 06:25.085
that once you put aside these politicized, abstract

06:25.185 --> 06:27.045
and ambiguous terms like federal

06:27.225 --> 06:31.485
and ary states, then you start to find out

06:31.715 --> 06:34.365
that different ethnic groups do not necessarily deeg

06:34.955 --> 06:36.245
when you're talking about the

06:36.245 --> 06:37.925
institutions, local institutions.

06:37.925 --> 06:40.525
So for example, when we asked them about whether they wanted

06:40.705 --> 06:41.805
an elected governor

06:41.985 --> 06:45.085
or a governor that's being appointed by,

06:45.265 --> 06:48.565
the central government, majority of all ethnical Pastor

06:49.085 --> 06:51.805
Orthodox Azar wanted an elected

06:52.565 --> 06:54.965
governor rather than an appointed governor.

06:54.985 --> 06:57.925
We asked them the same questions about, for example,

06:58.025 --> 07:01.165
the provincial councils, local district councils,

07:01.555 --> 07:03.325
they had almost the same answer

07:03.505 --> 07:06.845
and a concurrent plurality of all ethnic groups preferred

07:06.865 --> 07:09.205
and elected prevention council.

07:09.745 --> 07:11.165
We also asked them, for example,

07:11.255 --> 07:13.005
about distribution of power.

07:13.145 --> 07:16.125
So for example, what decision making authority must be

07:16.325 --> 07:17.885
assigned to the central government,

07:18.025 --> 07:21.005
but what decision making authority must be assigned

07:21.005 --> 07:22.405
to the local government?

07:23.105 --> 07:27.165
And again, we found, that, different,

07:27.165 --> 07:31.085
the groups actually converge on these different issues.

07:31.545 --> 07:35.885
Around 40% of all ethnic groups preferred,

07:36.365 --> 07:37.605
distribution of authorities

07:37.605 --> 07:39.805
between the central government and local government.

07:40.265 --> 07:42.565
Uh, 30 per around 30%

07:42.665 --> 07:45.525
of our participants favored the central government

07:45.525 --> 07:47.525
to make most of the decision around

07:47.525 --> 07:49.205
and around 29%

07:49.225 --> 07:52.205
of the participants favor the local governments

07:52.205 --> 07:53.485
to make most of the decisions.

07:53.585 --> 07:56.445
But generally, you do not see a lot of differences

07:56.445 --> 07:59.125
between different ethnic groups on these different issues.

07:59.665 --> 08:02.325
Mostly we asked them like four types of question.

08:02.345 --> 08:04.285
One of the questions we asked them was about the

08:04.805 --> 08:08.205
satisfaction and with the den central

08:08.585 --> 08:09.965
and local governments

08:09.965 --> 08:12.725
because that political system has, has collapsed

08:12.725 --> 08:13.925
after the tolerant took over.

08:14.825 --> 08:18.045
And generally all ethnic groups, a super majority

08:18.065 --> 08:20.005
of all ed ethnic groups were not satisfied.

08:20.155 --> 08:21.925
Neither would central government

08:22.025 --> 08:24.045
nor would the local institutions.

08:24.545 --> 08:27.085
The second type of question we asked them was whether they

08:27.085 --> 08:28.525
wanted elected offices

08:28.945 --> 08:32.285
and agencies for the local administrations.

08:32.425 --> 08:36.525
And again, there was a concurrent, there was a sort

08:36.525 --> 08:39.085
of consensus among different ethnic groups wanting

08:39.145 --> 08:42.325
to have elected local institutions and bodies.

08:42.745 --> 08:44.325
And the other type

08:44.325 --> 08:47.605
of questions we asked him was basically about some concerns

08:47.635 --> 08:49.965
with regard to decentralization of Afghanistan.

08:49.985 --> 08:53.485
So for example, one of the concern was that decentralization

08:53.625 --> 08:55.880
or federalization of Afghanistan would lead

08:55.880 --> 08:57.280
to disintegration of the country.

08:57.425 --> 08:59.205
So we asked them whether,

08:59.305 --> 09:01.885
we asked them ranked their identities, for example,

09:02.545 --> 09:05.725
and we gave them a number of identities that each aian has

09:06.325 --> 09:08.885
national identity, religious identity, ethnic identity,

09:09.145 --> 09:12.085
and tribal regional identity.

09:12.665 --> 09:15.165
And we asked them to rank them which one is more important

09:15.165 --> 09:17.725
to them than the others, because then it will explain

09:17.745 --> 09:21.925
to us whether people, whether decentralization will lead

09:21.925 --> 09:23.565
to disintegration of the camp shape.

09:23.665 --> 09:27.765
And it seems that religious identity and national identity,

09:27.905 --> 09:30.685
or the most important type of identity for most

09:30.685 --> 09:34.165
of the African, and these are the two unifying identities

09:34.165 --> 09:36.565
because, around 99%

09:36.565 --> 09:38.565
of the African population are Muslims,

09:38.885 --> 09:42.445
national identities all is basically inclusive as well.

09:42.585 --> 09:46.005
So they prefer the inclusive identities more than their

09:46.555 --> 09:50.845
exclusive identities like ethnic ident or tribal identity.

09:51.305 --> 09:55.325
We try to argue in the paper is that there is a way

09:55.345 --> 09:59.365
to depoliticize the process of constitution making.

09:59.435 --> 10:01.485
Obviously when you're talking about federal system

10:01.505 --> 10:04.205
or unitary system, centralization, decentralization,

10:04.545 --> 10:06.805
but their very nature, these are political concepts,

10:07.025 --> 10:09.165
but they can be further politicized

10:09.585 --> 10:12.965
and then given wrong meanings or incorrect

10:12.985 --> 10:15.765
and inaccurate meanings by the political elites

10:15.765 --> 10:16.885
of different ethnic groups.

10:17.545 --> 10:21.365
And one way to depoliticize the process of the choices

10:22.055 --> 10:24.765
among these different political institutions

10:25.225 --> 10:29.525
or systems is that instead of engaging these

10:30.435 --> 10:34.125
ambiguous concepts that are basically abstract

10:34.145 --> 10:35.645
and can be misconstrued

10:35.645 --> 10:39.805
and misunderstood, we can focus on underlying institutions

10:40.705 --> 10:43.845
on more concrete questions, asking people whether they want,

10:43.865 --> 10:47.365
for example, elected governor or appointed governor.

10:47.985 --> 10:50.125
And that is more concrete question

10:50.145 --> 10:51.765
and it's about the institution.

10:52.065 --> 10:53.205
And that's basically

10:53.205 --> 10:55.845
what we did throughout our research project, and

10:55.845 --> 10:57.285
therefore we understood

10:57.285 --> 10:59.645
that then you can actually build consensus

10:59.655 --> 11:00.725
among different ethnics.

11:00.905 --> 11:03.605
And I have to say that Afghanistan is not the only country

11:03.615 --> 11:06.445
where these concepts have been, have been politicized.

11:06.505 --> 11:09.285
And Ethnicized Indonesia is another example.

11:09.705 --> 11:10.925
It least another example.

11:11.065 --> 11:13.285
But you can look at different other countries

11:13.285 --> 11:15.885
that are still struggling with the issue

11:15.905 --> 11:18.005
of deciding these political systems.

11:18.705 --> 11:21.445
Uh, the different ethnic groups have decided different

11:21.705 --> 11:24.245
to the preferred different political systems.

11:24.785 --> 11:25.805
But then again,

11:25.855 --> 11:27.965
these concepts have been miscon conceptualist.

11:28.305 --> 11:32.765
So our argument basically in this paper is that we have

11:32.765 --> 11:36.945
to prioritize more concrete questions on an institutional

11:36.945 --> 11:39.305
designing over an institutional labeling.

11:39.395 --> 11:41.345
First we have to decide, for example,

11:41.345 --> 11:43.985
whether people want elected governance or not.

11:44.035 --> 11:46.345
First, people have to decide whether they,

11:46.455 --> 11:48.545
want more power, so less power and

11:48.605 --> 11:50.185
or what extent of power

11:50.645 --> 11:52.865
for their local institutions. And then we can

11:52.925 --> 11:56.965
Label it, either a unitary state or a federal state

11:56.965 --> 11:59.005
because as I argued earlier,

11:59.735 --> 12:03.925
these concepts have basically lost their impact in terms

12:03.925 --> 12:05.645
of an institutional designer sense

12:05.675 --> 12:08.205
that many countries or unitary states.

12:08.305 --> 12:10.845
But they have decentralized to a considerable extent, some

12:10.845 --> 12:14.365
of them if decentralized more than a federal system

12:14.425 --> 12:15.645
in some other countries.

12:16.105 --> 12:19.885
And therefore, our argument is that we have to prioritize

12:20.815 --> 12:23.235
an institutional designing over labeling

12:23.295 --> 12:24.555
of these political systems

12:24.695 --> 12:27.435
or institutions when we are designing constitution.

Federalism and Ethnic Politics in Afghanistan

00:00:00 - A, well, I have to start with the fact that concept of federal, in which state has been very much cons politicized in the context of Afghanistan. In a way that federal system has been conflated with disintegration of Afghanistan and sometimes with the annexation of different part of the country by the neighboring states. And the very same time unitary states has also been miscon centralized in a sense that has been portrayed as a form of ethno authoritarianism.
00:00:32 - that this concept has been miscon conceptualize and politicized, and has also been, eth ethnicized in a sense that the elite of different eth ethnic groups have given different meanings to these concepts. If you ask for example, a Ji Zara or in obe, they don't like because they think it's a form of the domination of PTOs on other eth ethnic groups. So in a way, there has been ethnicized where different ed ethnic groups have taken different
00:01:03 - but at the same time, they do not necessarily have an ended knowledge of what these political institutions are. So for example, if you ask them what is a, for example, a federal system or you need to system, you may not get an accurate answer on this topic. The literature, as I said, is, increasingly favoring decentralization. but there are a lot of scholars who still, believe that the unitary state is good for the vital societies, particularly to ensure national unity.
00:01:37 - They often give the example of, for example, Yugoslavia and the break of, of, Soviet Union and so on. But, I believe that a consensus among scholars of constitutional design and by society is emerging about the importance of decentralization for ethnic accommodation. For example, conservationalists and central ISTs, which are two important schools of thought on constitutional design
00:02:07 - although they differ on what kind of federal system or decentralized status, good for divided society. So for example, conservationalists prefer segmental federalism, where the states and provinces are formed around identities of different ethnic groups. So different ethnic groups have their own states and provinces where, central ISTs prefer nons segmental federalism, where identity is not necessarily a determining factor in terms
00:02:39 - So you can have multiple states from one of the groups and multiple states for different other ethnic groups. And their reason is basically that, the states no longer compete with each other based on the ethnicity. For example, in case of Afghanistan, a non segment of federalism means that a province that competes with pa with project dominated province will also have to compete with passion dominated province at the same time because, for, you know, economic development,

Evolving Dynamics of Unitary and Federal Systems

00:03:11 - But there is a couple of things happening around the world that the literature needs to keep up with. one of those thing is the disappearance of the fine lines and the divergences between unitary states, and federal political systems be it's because a lot of countries that are constitutionally unitary states have begun to decentralize. So for example, Indonesia is constitutionally a unitary state, but it has decentralized considerably.
00:03:43 - Spain is another really good example where constitutionally, the country is unitary, but it has been decentralized to a large extent. United Kingdom to, some extent has decentralized as well. So at the same time, you have examples of federal systems like Malaysia that are to some extent trying to centralize some level of power, to the federal government. So the fine line is blurring, it's disappearing,
00:04:13 - and unitary system no longer explains an institutional design in different countries. So that's what we need to take into consideration when we are writing a literature, a book or a journal about these topics and issues. And that's what we try to do with our own book, that instead of focusing on whether Afghanistan needed a federal system or a nutri system, we focused on underlying institutions and values that would determine the extent of centralization or decentralization.
00:04:47 - over 2,100 respondents, from across the country, 34 provinces and different district of different provinces. And the method we used was snowballing sampling. Now I have to mention that I am a co-author for this article. So the other co-author is Dr. Kaha, who is an assistant professor at the Seattle Pacific University in Seattle, Washington. So we understood that snowballing sampling is,
00:05:17 - or it's not even equivalent to random sampling, and some random sampling is very much better. But the problem for us, you order to conduct a random sampling type of survey research was because the Taliban were present in different part of the country, there were security issues. So we couldn't do random sampling. And that's why we started with snowballing sampling. We mobilized around 15 informants and researchers who did to the survey, and we people face to face.
00:05:51 - We have also had a large number of service con being conducted through food, phone calls. So the overall, the the sample represented different, a ethnic groups proportionally. for example, around 40% of the participants were ash and, the population of ash and Afghanistan is somewhere around 40%. So, and the same goes with all other ethnic groups in the gas. One of the most important finding we had was

Decentralization Preferences Among Ethnic Groups

00:06:25 - and ambiguous terms like federal and ary states, then you start to find out that different ethnic groups do not necessarily deeg when you're talking about the institutions, local institutions. So for example, when we asked them about whether they wanted an elected governor or a governor that's being appointed by, the central government, majority of all ethnical Pastor Orthodox Azar wanted an elected
00:06:54 - We asked them the same questions about, for example, the provincial councils, local district councils, they had almost the same answer and a concurrent plurality of all ethnic groups preferred and elected prevention council. We also asked them, for example, about distribution of power. So for example, what decision making authority must be assigned to the central government, but what decision making authority must be assigned to the local government?
00:07:27 - the groups actually converge on these different issues. Around 40% of all ethnic groups preferred, distribution of authorities between the central government and local government. 30 per around 30% of our participants favored the central government to make most of the decision around and around 29% of the participants favor the local governments to make most of the decisions.
00:07:56 - between different ethnic groups on these different issues. Mostly we asked them like four types of question. One of the questions we asked them was about the satisfaction and with the den central and local governments because that political system has, has collapsed after the tolerant took over. And generally all ethnic groups, a super majority of all ed ethnic groups were not satisfied. Neither would central government nor would the local institutions.
00:08:27 - wanted elected offices and agencies for the local administrations. And again, there was a concurrent, there was a sort of consensus among different ethnic groups wanting to have elected local institutions and bodies. And the other type of questions we asked him was basically about some concerns with regard to decentralization of Afghanistan. So for example, one of the concern was that decentralization or federalization of Afghanistan would lead
00:08:57 - So we asked them whether, we asked them ranked their identities, for example, and we gave them a number of identities that each aian has national identity, religious identity, ethnic identity, and tribal regional identity. And we asked them to rank them which one is more important to them than the others, because then it will explain to us whether people, whether decentralization will lead to disintegration of the camp shape. And it seems that religious identity and national identity,

Depoliticizing Identity in Constitutional Design

00:09:30 - of the African, and these are the two unifying identities because, around 99% of the African population are Muslims, national identities all is basically inclusive as well. So they prefer the inclusive identities more than their exclusive identities like ethnic ident or tribal identity. We try to argue in the paper is that there is a way to depoliticize the process of constitution making.
00:10:01 - or unitary system, centralization, decentralization, but their very nature, these are political concepts, but they can be further politicized and then given wrong meanings or incorrect and inaccurate meanings by the political elites of different ethnic groups. And one way to depoliticize the process of the choices among these different political institutions or systems is that instead of engaging these
00:10:34 - and can be misconstrued and misunderstood, we can focus on underlying institutions on more concrete questions, asking people whether they want, for example, elected governor or appointed governor. And that is more concrete question and it's about the institution. And that's basically what we did throughout our research project, and therefore we understood that then you can actually build consensus among different ethnics.
00:11:03 - where these concepts have been, have been politicized. And Ethnicized Indonesia is another example. It least another example. But you can look at different other countries that are still struggling with the issue of deciding these political systems. the different ethnic groups have decided different to the preferred different political systems. But then again, these concepts have been miscon conceptualist. So our argument basically in this paper is that we have
00:11:36 - designing over an institutional labeling. First we have to decide, for example, whether people want elected governance or not. First, people have to decide whether they, want more power, so less power and or what extent of power for their local institutions. And then we can Label it, either a unitary state or a federal state because as I argued earlier, these concepts have basically lost their impact in terms
00:12:24 - that many countries or unitary states. But they have decentralized to a considerable extent, some of them if decentralized more than a federal system in some other countries. And therefore, our argument is that we have to prioritize an institutional designing over labeling of these political systems or institutions when we are designing constitution.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Faculti

Popular in Political Science

Keeping the Republic

Entrepreneurial thinking: the politics and practice of policy impact

Parties and Elections: An End to Canadian Exceptionalism?

The Politics of Knowledge in Development

Fifty years of declining confidence and increasing polarization in trust

The Opening Dilemma

Wait and See?

Deproblematizing the Federal–Unitary Dichotomy

Next in Middle Eastern Politics

Guide

Platform and Category Pages

Contact Us

FAQs

What is Faculti?

How do you select interviews?

Interview Process

Page Structure

Popular in Political Science

Guide

Platform and Category Pages

Contact Us

FAQs

What is Faculti?

How do you select interviews?

Interview Process

Accessibility Options

Contrast Adjustment

Text Size Adjustment

Text Spacing Adjustment

Line Height Adjustment

Cursor Size Adjustment

Page Structure Options

Page Structure