Fragile Victory

Key Question Being Explored in This Insight:

James E. Cronin provides the context necessary to understand such diverse challenges as the triumph of Brexit, the election of Trump, the rise of populism, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

View the page of: James E. Cronin

Institution: Boston College

Explore more insights in:

Political Science Political Theory Social Sciences

Media Literacy Toolkit

Faculti's Media Literacy Toolkit helps viewers critically engage with academic insights by analyzing the research context, identifying perspectives, and encouraging thoughtful evaluation.

Critical Questions to Consider ▼

What assumptions does the research make?
Are there alternative perspectives not explored?
What are the limitations of the research method?

Bias and Perspective Awareness ▼

This research comes from Boston College . Reflect on how the institution's academic focus and research partnerships may shape the questions being explored.

Further Reading ▼

Read the Study

James E. Cronin provides the context necessary to understand such diverse challenges as the triumph of Brexit, the election of Trump, the rise of populism, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 12, 2024

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

This video video outlines insights from an author discussing their book on the liberal international order, initially drafted in 2020 but later revised due to significant global events, particularly Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The author reflects on the definition and construction of liberal order, noting that it was not inevitable and has become endangered.

A significant addition was included in the book regarding the consequences of the invasion, which prompted the author to reconsider how to present the topic. They emphasize that today's conflict in Ukraine and past remarks by leaders like Donald Trump have highlighted vulnerabilities within the liberal order.

The book does not draw solely from original archival research but synthesizes existing knowledge from the author's extensive experience. Amid challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the author relied on accessible online resources and open libraries for research.

The author distinguishes between liberalism as a domestic political practice and the wider liberal order, noting their interconnection through historical developments following World War II. They argue that the Cold War shaped the stability of the liberal order, which was characterized by a political consensus against fascism and communism uniting center-left and center-right parties.

However, this stability began to erode in the late 20th century due to economic shifts that led to neoliberal policies causing increased inequality and disenchantment with political arrangements. The post-Cold War era saw new challenges, including the weak integration of former Soviet states into the liberal order.

The author emphasizes the fragility of the current liberal order, affected by neoliberal policies, polarization, and the rise of populist movements; they argue for the need to restore a strong political center. This video video concludes with the notion that countering the rise of the populist right is essential for rebuilding support for liberal democracy, suggesting that the internal contradictions within these populist movements may provide opportunities for critique and opposition.

Language:

Export as PDF

Export as PDF
Here are five key points from the video:

1. **Reassessment of Liberal Order**: The author reflects on how the liberal international order was constructed and emphasizes that it was not inevitable. The 2020 introduction to the book was revised to highlight the significance of Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a critical moment revealing the vulnerabilities of this order.

2. **Convideo of Research**: The book was primarily a synthesis and interpretation rather than original archival research due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which limited traditional academic activities like travel and access to archives. Despite these constraints, the author utilized existing knowledge and resources, including a responsive library and internet access, to complete the book.

3. **Post-War Political Dynamics**: The author discusses how the end of the Cold War and economic changes in the 1970s led to shifts in political stability and policy direction. The rise of neoliberalism resulted in increased inequality and dissatisfaction with political arrangements, contributing to contemporary instability in liberal democracies.

4. **Impact of the Cold War**: The liberal international order was initially defined in opposition to fascism and communism, with political parties uniting against these threats. However, the author notes that the end of the Cold War weakened the political center, allowing more extreme right-wing ideas to gain traction.

5. **Contemporary Challenges and the Future of Liberal Democracy**: The video concludes that the liberal order is fragile and more vulnerable than since its inception. It emphasizes the need for a strong political center to counter the rise of populism and right-wing movements, suggesting that successful resistance will require significant political effort and coherent alternatives to current populist ideologies.

Export as PDF
Here are some key quotes extracted from the video you :

1. **On the Liberal Order**:
- "Instead of describing in an academic way... the liberal international order, I should have been able to simply say... it's not this, it's not what Putin has done. That is the opposite of what liberal order... means."

2. **On the Effects of Ukraine War**:
- "As I wrote that little addendum... I realized what I should have done in the introduction."

3. **On Research Methodology**:
- "This book was mostly a matter of synthesis and interpretation... it deals with liberal order over a wide area in the world and over a long time."

4. **On Covid's Impact**:
- "This is very much a Covid book... travel to archives, visits to libraries... was shut down or impossible during Covid."

5. **On Liberalism vs. Liberal Order**:
- "Liberalism and the post-war liberal order are not the same... one can look for example, at the fact that the international order a more or less secure convideo within which liberal institutions and politics could thrive."

6. **On the Cold War**:
- "In fact, in the book I refer to Liberal order as a Cold War liberal order... the Soviet threat had a very big impact on what went on within that section of the world."

7. **On Polarization**:
- "The weakening of liberal democratic order and politics within countries would have a lot to do with... the changing media environment... which made it the decline of traditional newspapers."

8. **On Political Center Weakening**:
- "What it did most clearly... was that it severed the link between the political center and the right."

9. **On Neoliberalism**:
- "The shift was toward the right, toward what people called market fundamentalism... ultimately led to increased inequality."

10. **On the Future of Liberal Democracy**:
- "Essential to the success and flourishing of liberal order... was a strong political center."

11. **On the Populist Right**:
- "Our best ally... might well be the populist right itself beset, as it is by incoherence and often transparent corruption."

These quotes capture the underlying themes of the discussion surrounding liberalism, international order, and the complexities brought about by recent global events such as the Ukraine war and the COVID-19 pandemic.

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.535 --> 00:05.375
I wanna refer to begin to the introduction in my book,

00:05.645 --> 00:09.695
because that was written in 2020 first

00:10.805 --> 00:15.655
drafted, to explain, what liberal order was

00:15.655 --> 00:18.815
and was not, how it was constructed and was not inevitable,

00:19.435 --> 00:21.015
and why it was endangered.

00:22.115 --> 00:24.095
Now, as the book was about to go to press

00:24.695 --> 00:27.335
a couple years later, Russia invaded Ukraine.

00:28.155 --> 00:32.495
Uh, that's why there's actually an addition to the book.

00:32.985 --> 00:35.095
Right at the beginning. It's a note

00:35.275 --> 00:38.135
to readers about the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

00:39.115 --> 00:43.335
As I wrote that little addendum, I realized

00:43.445 --> 00:45.015
what I should have done in the introduction.

00:45.085 --> 00:49.895
Instead of describing in an academic way, you know, in a,

00:49.895 --> 00:51.895
in, in a historical way,

00:52.315 --> 00:55.975
the liberal international order, I should have been able

00:56.075 --> 00:59.535
to simply say, if I'd written it in 2020,

00:59.715 --> 01:02.455
I'd have simply said, it's not this, it's not

01:02.455 --> 01:03.775
what Putin has done.

01:03.925 --> 01:08.015
That is the opposite of what liberal order, means.

01:08.315 --> 01:11.015
Bodies prescribes, recommends

01:11.475 --> 01:15.335
and to some extent in the past has, has helped to achieve.

01:16.115 --> 01:19.735
Uh, now, today, if I were writing the introduction again,

01:20.235 --> 01:22.575
or introducing the book again,

01:23.335 --> 01:27.135
I would point once again to the ongoing war in Ukraine,

01:27.635 --> 01:30.655
but I'd also point to the, frankly,

01:31.415 --> 01:35.375
represent Hebel comments of Donald Trump about NATO

01:35.475 --> 01:38.815
and inviting Putin to invade,

01:39.075 --> 01:41.455
and the equally irresponsible behavior

01:41.555 --> 01:44.175
of Republicans in Congress responding

01:44.195 --> 01:46.495
to Trump's prompts fragile victory.

01:46.875 --> 01:51.295
The book we're discussing, is, is, is not a product

01:51.295 --> 01:53.255
of original archival research.

01:54.555 --> 01:58.055
Uh, I've done books of that sort for 40 years

01:58.495 --> 02:01.695
and published many of them and done much archival research.

02:02.275 --> 02:06.775
But, but this book, was mostly a matter of synthesis

02:06.775 --> 02:09.535
and interpretation, that

02:10.075 --> 02:12.255
flowed primarily from the nature of the topic.

02:12.835 --> 02:17.175
It deals with liberal order over a wide area in the world

02:17.515 --> 02:18.615
and over a long time.

02:18.915 --> 02:21.015
And, you know, original research to back

02:21.015 --> 02:22.535
that up just wasn't feasible.

02:23.155 --> 02:27.295
The second, unusual condition that shaped the writing

02:27.315 --> 02:29.335
of this book was Covid.

02:30.045 --> 02:31.735
This is very much a covid book,

02:32.315 --> 02:36.455
and what that meant was that, you know, travel to archives,

02:36.595 --> 02:38.975
visits to libraries,

02:39.675 --> 02:43.455
and other normal academic things you do, seminars,

02:43.455 --> 02:44.535
conferences, and so on.

02:45.255 --> 02:48.055
A lot of that was shut down or impossible during Covid.

02:48.795 --> 02:53.175
So, that sort of, that had that, that constrained

02:53.175 --> 02:54.495
what I could and couldn't do.

02:55.035 --> 02:56.975
Uh, during the writing of the book.

02:57.245 --> 03:01.605
However, I have to say that my library, remained open

03:01.745 --> 03:02.885
and helpful throughout

03:02.945 --> 03:06.525
and got me books even when it was closed to people entering.

03:06.985 --> 03:09.565
Uh, and of course, the internet, kept working

03:09.665 --> 03:14.285
and allowed me access to a wide range of material, both

03:15.215 --> 03:18.525
books, articles, of a scholarly sort,

03:18.785 --> 03:20.805
and much more contemporaneous discussions.

03:21.065 --> 03:24.365
So I wouldn't recommend necessarily,

03:24.435 --> 03:27.525
this research strategy to a new graduate student.

03:27.865 --> 03:31.245
Um, but I would say this is

03:31.245 --> 03:33.965
what one does when one has these constraints.

03:34.505 --> 03:37.405
But also when you have, as I have, you know,

03:38.245 --> 03:39.645
a long career doing research

03:39.665 --> 03:43.125
and publishing, it sometimes is possible

03:43.125 --> 03:47.405
to use the cumulative wisdom that you've gained,

03:47.625 --> 03:49.965
to reflect and to analyze and to interpret.

03:50.265 --> 03:51.885
And that's what I try to do in this book.

03:52.255 --> 03:56.845
Liberalism and the post-war liberal order are not the same,

03:57.235 --> 04:00.765
weren't the same, you know, liberalism as,

04:01.405 --> 04:03.805
a political practice domestically is one thing,

04:04.245 --> 04:05.605
a liberal order is another.

04:06.305 --> 04:08.045
Um, what I would say,

04:08.045 --> 04:11.845
however, is that from the beginning, these two kind

04:11.905 --> 04:16.405
of liberalism, liberalism as a, as a practice

04:16.405 --> 04:20.485
of government and a and a liberal order, very much,

04:20.995 --> 04:24.165
came together and they complimented one another

04:24.705 --> 04:27.245
and were, in a sense, premised upon one another.

04:27.825 --> 04:30.565
One can look for example, at the fact that

04:31.425 --> 04:34.645
the international order provided a more

04:34.865 --> 04:39.365
or less secure context, more secure than before, than

04:39.365 --> 04:41.245
before its institution in the 1940s,

04:41.825 --> 04:43.685
within which liberal institutions

04:43.685 --> 04:47.085
and politics could thrive across the west and in Japan.

04:49.105 --> 04:51.125
And in addition, the fact

04:51.125 --> 04:54.485
that the most important power shaping that liberal order,

04:55.025 --> 04:58.925
the United States and Great Britain were liberal democracies

04:59.395 --> 05:02.605
with all their flaws that made them not as liberal

05:02.705 --> 05:06.045
as one would like, suggest the compatibility

05:06.345 --> 05:10.445
of the internal and external dimensions of, of liberalism

05:10.465 --> 05:13.605
and liberal order, setting up that international order

05:14.245 --> 05:17.985
required hard work and creative stateship statesmanship

05:18.925 --> 05:19.945
and the establishment

05:19.945 --> 05:23.665
of stable democratic regimes demanded continued attention

05:24.555 --> 05:26.505
adjustment and tweaking

05:26.725 --> 05:28.665
and effort on the part of

05:29.565 --> 05:32.865
mainly internal political actors in different countries,

05:34.545 --> 05:38.065
facilitating both the setting up of the overall framework

05:38.065 --> 05:39.425
of liberal order,

05:39.645 --> 05:42.185
and the allegiance of various countries to it.

05:42.605 --> 05:47.265
Um, and, the establishment of,

05:47.335 --> 05:51.145
liberal domestic political orders facilitating both

05:51.765 --> 05:53.905
was the Cold War and the Soviet threat.

05:54.805 --> 05:56.745
Uh, in fact, in

05:56.745 --> 05:59.245
The book I refer to Liberal order

05:59.305 --> 06:01.005
as a Cold War liberal order

06:01.065 --> 06:03.325
or a Cold War order,

06:05.225 --> 06:08.365
the Soviet threat, you know, however real or

06:08.365 --> 06:10.845
however exaggerated it might've appeared at any given

06:10.845 --> 06:15.085
moment, had a, had a very big impact on what went on within

06:15.395 --> 06:19.205
that section of the world that's strove to work

06:19.585 --> 06:21.045
as a liberal international order,

06:21.345 --> 06:23.685
and within the different countries that were part of it.

06:24.825 --> 06:28.925
Now, liberal democracy defined itself in the 1940s

06:29.935 --> 06:33.275
as it was being established, as the opposite of fascism

06:33.985 --> 06:35.235
from the 1950s.

06:35.695 --> 06:38.115
It was defined in opposition to the Soviet Union

06:38.255 --> 06:42.195
and all that that implied now in party terms,

06:42.325 --> 06:43.515
party political terms.

06:44.055 --> 06:47.475
The stability of the post-war order was produced

06:47.695 --> 06:51.795
by these contrasts between, you know, democracy,

06:52.445 --> 06:55.635
liberalism and fascism and democratic, democratic liberalism

06:55.735 --> 06:57.075
and the Soviet system.

06:57.895 --> 07:02.395
Um, and more concretely,

07:03.695 --> 07:07.305
the system was supported

07:07.365 --> 07:12.305
and sustained by the political dominance of the center left

07:12.485 --> 07:15.465
and the center, right center, left parties,

07:15.485 --> 07:16.825
center right parties,

07:17.635 --> 07:21.625
often social democratic parties on the left, Christian,

07:21.625 --> 07:23.105
democratic parties on the right,

07:23.725 --> 07:26.865
but other versions of center, left, center right parties.

07:27.375 --> 07:30.515
Basically, I would suggest that

07:31.255 --> 07:33.395
the political dominance of the center, left

07:33.395 --> 07:36.555
and center right parties happened in part

07:36.555 --> 07:41.475
because a shared antipathy dis communism brought the right

07:41.475 --> 07:43.355
and the left together toward the center,

07:43.515 --> 07:44.915
anchored them to the center.

07:45.025 --> 07:48.875
That will be the story up until the 1970s and beyond.

07:49.805 --> 07:53.395
After that, two big changes unsettled

07:53.585 --> 07:56.395
what was a fairly stable, not totally stable.

07:56.395 --> 07:58.275
There was lots of dissent and debate,

07:58.815 --> 08:02.155
but a relatively stable set of political regimes.

08:03.215 --> 08:04.595
The first was the ending

08:05.095 --> 08:08.955
of the long post-war economic boom in the 1970s.

08:09.855 --> 08:11.715
Uh, that boom had an in,

08:11.735 --> 08:14.355
in a sense underpinned political stability

08:14.935 --> 08:16.195
in much of the world.

08:16.975 --> 08:19.395
Uh, we could talk about the reasons for that,

08:19.455 --> 08:22.555
but I think it's fairly acknowledged that that boom came

08:22.555 --> 08:26.155
to an end in the seventies, was replaced by a different kind

08:26.355 --> 08:28.955
of economic regime in the 1980s.

08:30.335 --> 08:33.315
Now, basically, this transformation,

08:33.455 --> 08:35.595
or this shift in the nature of the economy

08:36.355 --> 08:37.435
produced a shift in policy.

08:38.175 --> 08:41.755
Uh, and the shift was toward the right, toward

08:41.985 --> 08:44.115
what people called market fundamentalism

08:44.255 --> 08:46.115
and others called neoliberalism.

08:47.925 --> 08:50.545
And these neoliberal policies, you know,

08:50.545 --> 08:53.545
and we can identify people who brought them, Thatcher,

08:53.545 --> 08:56.805
Reagan, and, and others in alliance,

08:58.935 --> 09:00.735
ultimately led to increased inequality,

09:01.285 --> 09:04.775
less generous social provision, and to the gradual,

09:05.155 --> 09:08.975
and then the much more rapid decline of older industries

09:09.475 --> 09:11.415
and the regions where they were located.

09:12.475 --> 09:15.455
Um, this is, you know, the phenomenon

09:16.125 --> 09:18.935
conjure up when people, we people use the phrase, you know,

09:18.935 --> 09:23.095
the left behind the long-term effect of these

09:24.365 --> 09:26.925
economic effects and social effects was a growing

09:26.925 --> 09:30.245
disenchantment with existing political arrangements,

09:31.425 --> 09:32.565
across the west.

09:33.105 --> 09:36.165
And that's one reason why the kinds of instability

09:36.165 --> 09:38.445
that we fret about today,

09:39.325 --> 09:41.005
transcends one or another country.

09:42.145 --> 09:44.765
Now, the second big event that happened

09:44.775 --> 09:47.685
after the 1970s, in fact, a decade or more

09:47.685 --> 09:50.365
after, was the end of the war.

09:51.595 --> 09:55.005
That meant that the liberal international order could expand

09:55.345 --> 09:58.765
hugely over a whole new set of areas, areas

09:59.325 --> 10:01.605
previously closed off from all of its workings.

10:02.675 --> 10:06.165
That, of course, would entail political

10:06.185 --> 10:10.365
and economic transitions in the former Soviet block.

10:11.695 --> 10:14.425
Neither political transition to democracy

10:14.685 --> 10:17.945
or economic transition to market economies is an easy thing

10:17.945 --> 10:22.185
to achieve and would be hard in any case.

10:23.335 --> 10:28.065
It's also hard for outsiders to, you know, superintendent

10:28.225 --> 10:29.905
and help such transitions along.

10:30.565 --> 10:35.505
But I would suggest that the neoliberal grip on policymaking

10:36.805 --> 10:39.345
and things like lending in the United States

10:39.605 --> 10:43.305
and in international economic institutions ensured

10:43.305 --> 10:47.625
that this process would be undertaken on the cheap, and

10:48.015 --> 10:50.945
therefore, because it was done on the cheap,

10:51.205 --> 10:52.945
not done well at all.

10:53.805 --> 10:56.745
Uh, which means that the, you know, the extension

10:56.745 --> 11:00.625
and expansion of a liberal world order of the 1990s was,

11:01.205 --> 11:04.705
you know, much more fragile than the establishment

11:04.705 --> 11:08.105
and extension of that order in the 1940s and fifties.

11:10.325 --> 11:11.025
Now,

11:15.125 --> 11:17.625
in terms of domestic politics, the end

11:17.625 --> 11:20.545
of the Cold War had other consequences.

11:22.555 --> 11:26.805
What it did most clearly, I would say, was

11:27.635 --> 11:29.885
that it severed the link

11:30.875 --> 11:33.925
between the political center and the right.

11:35.105 --> 11:38.685
In other words, it essentially weakened the center, right,

11:39.505 --> 11:42.965
the center right whole in political competition

11:43.345 --> 11:47.005
and in governance in liberal democracies.

11:48.225 --> 11:52.925
And that freed conservatives or people afraid

11:53.025 --> 11:55.685
Of, you know, losing wealth, power, money

11:56.545 --> 11:59.845
to move much more sharply to the right, they were able

11:59.845 --> 12:03.245
to embrace right wing ideas and movements

12:03.245 --> 12:07.085
and causes that had been anathema in most

12:07.085 --> 12:08.085
of the post-war era.

12:08.985 --> 12:12.445
Uh, and they did that in country

12:12.455 --> 12:14.925
after country, may maybe the earliest

12:15.225 --> 12:19.205
and, possibly clearest evidence came in America,

12:19.505 --> 12:22.805
and it would be supplied by the presidential candidate,

12:22.805 --> 12:24.005
Patrick Buchanan.

12:24.745 --> 12:28.405
Uh, when he told the Republican Convention in 1992

12:28.875 --> 12:32.805
that having won the Cold War, the time was right,

12:33.105 --> 12:35.285
the time was now to move on

12:35.425 --> 12:37.565
to the culture war on the home front.

12:39.345 --> 12:44.045
Now, I think that was a, a kind of a, a marker and,

12:44.145 --> 12:47.565
and, and a kind of call to action to, to, to, to,

12:47.705 --> 12:50.965
in a sense undermine the political stability

12:50.965 --> 12:52.085
that had been created

12:52.265 --> 12:56.565
and had been sustained all during the Cold War in the west

12:56.625 --> 12:58.685
and Western countries, and, and in,

12:59.025 --> 13:02.605
and at least indirectly in the international order.

13:03.385 --> 13:07.125
Uh, and these were the conditions that is the, the effects

13:07.145 --> 13:11.605
of Cold War neoliberalism, the, the, the weakening

13:12.145 --> 13:13.885
of the ties between the right

13:13.945 --> 13:18.005
and the center, hence the weakening of the center, right?

13:18.545 --> 13:21.885
Uh, that really set in motion the processes

13:21.885 --> 13:24.005
that have brought us where we are today.

13:25.185 --> 13:28.685
Now, as you know, I know there are many other things

13:28.685 --> 13:30.965
that went on in the intervening years.

13:31.805 --> 13:35.645
I mean, the most obvious thing is that,

13:35.645 --> 13:38.085
there are a whole set of new challenges

13:39.005 --> 13:42.485
confronting the world, the us the west,

13:43.495 --> 13:48.005
after 2000, you know, beginning with nine 11,

13:48.215 --> 13:52.565
going on to the, disastrous wars in,

13:54.035 --> 13:58.405
Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by the,

13:58.615 --> 14:01.725
great recession of 2007, 2008,

14:02.465 --> 14:04.605
and so on.

14:05.145 --> 14:09.885
Uh, all these things help to put to, to further challenge

14:10.925 --> 14:13.155
liberalism liberal order,

14:13.385 --> 14:15.635
both internationally and domestically.

14:16.375 --> 14:19.755
The weakening of liberal democratic order

14:20.175 --> 14:24.595
and politics within countries would have a lot to do,

14:24.615 --> 14:29.045
in addition to the kind of, well, to the,

14:29.045 --> 14:32.925
to the changing media environment, represented by,

14:33.145 --> 14:36.045
you know, talk radio, Fox News,

14:36.225 --> 14:40.645
and so on, which made it the decline of,

14:40.645 --> 14:41.965
traditional newspapers.

14:42.265 --> 14:45.085
You know, these things all contributed to polarization.

14:45.745 --> 14:47.685
Uh, but the big

14:48.575 --> 14:51.005
major underlying factors were the sort of loosening

14:51.090 --> 14:55.925
Up of the system, in the 1990s due to the combination

14:56.065 --> 14:59.765
of neoliberal triumph and the end of the Cold War.

14:59.905 --> 15:01.245
But the liberal order is fragile

15:01.665 --> 15:05.845
and probably more fragile today than in any time since its

15:05.845 --> 15:07.885
founding in the late 1940s.

15:08.705 --> 15:12.085
The second conclusion, relates

15:12.945 --> 15:17.205
and it's based on the fact that essential to the success

15:17.345 --> 15:20.485
and flourishing of liberal order,

15:20.585 --> 15:24.005
and liberal democracy, was a strong political center,

15:25.305 --> 15:28.605
that implies that protecting its future

15:28.785 --> 15:32.605
or restoring its, its its levels of support,

15:32.785 --> 15:35.125
is largely a matter of domestic politics,

15:35.865 --> 15:39.045
and more specifically, requires the defeat

15:39.145 --> 15:40.485
of the populist, right?

15:40.635 --> 15:43.805
That is to some extent on the rise,

15:43.945 --> 15:48.205
and certainly prevalent a across the democratic

15:48.265 --> 15:50.485
and not so democratic world today.

15:50.825 --> 15:54.125
Now, this mainly requires effort on the part of those

15:54.125 --> 15:58.325
who wish to defeat it, and to propose some, an alternative

15:58.625 --> 16:01.925
and alternatives and to reinforce or liberal alternatives.

16:02.545 --> 16:06.685
And in that struggle, which we're all in the middle of,

16:08.425 --> 16:13.125
our best ally, might well be the populist right itself

16:14.655 --> 16:17.365
beset, as it is by incoherence

16:17.625 --> 16:21.085
and often transparent corruption.

16:21.735 --> 16:23.165
There a contradiction in terms there

16:23.165 --> 16:24.765
between transparent and corruption.

16:25.145 --> 16:26.805
I'm not sure corruption's supposed to be hidden,

16:26.865 --> 16:29.925
but in this case, so much of it is, is not.

16:30.465 --> 16:33.965
Um, but nevertheless, as I suggested, taking advantage

16:33.985 --> 16:36.045
of the flaws and incoherence within

16:36.775 --> 16:40.125
right wing populism requires time, energy,

16:40.125 --> 16:43.685
and resources, which we have to find among ourselves.

Reassessing Liberal Order in Crisis

00:00:00 - I wanna refer to begin to the introduction in my book, because that was written in 2020 first drafted, to explain, what liberal order was and was not, how it was constructed and was not inevitable, and why it was endangered. Now, as the book was about to go to press a couple years later, Russia invaded Ukraine. that's why there's actually an addition to the book.
00:00:35 - to readers about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As I wrote that little addendum, I realized what I should have done in the introduction. Instead of describing in an academic way, you know, in a, in, in a historical way, the liberal international order, I should have been able to simply say, if I'd written it in 2020, I'd have simply said, it's not this, it's not what Putin has done.
00:01:08 - Bodies prescribes, recommends and to some extent in the past has, has helped to achieve. now, today, if I were writing the introduction again, or introducing the book again, I would point once again to the ongoing war in Ukraine, but I'd also point to the, frankly, represent Hebel comments of Donald Trump about NATO
00:01:39 - and the equally irresponsible behavior of Republicans in Congress responding to Trump's prompts fragile victory. The book we're discussing, is, is, is not a product of original archival research. I've done books of that sort for 40 years and published many of them and done much archival research. But, but this book, was mostly a matter of synthesis
00:02:10 - flowed primarily from the nature of the topic. It deals with liberal order over a wide area in the world and over a long time. And, you know, original research to back that up just wasn't feasible. The second, unusual condition that shaped the writing of this book was Covid. This is very much a covid book, and what that meant was that, you know, travel to archives, visits to libraries,
00:02:43 - conferences, and so on. A lot of that was shut down or impossible during Covid. So, that sort of, that had that, that constrained what I could and couldn't do. during the writing of the book. However, I have to say that my library, remained open and helpful throughout and got me books even when it was closed to people entering. and of course, the internet, kept working and allowed me access to a wide range of material, both

Liberalism and the Cold War Order

00:03:18 - and much more contemporaneous discussions. So I wouldn't recommend necessarily, this research strategy to a new graduate student. but I would say this is what one does when one has these constraints. But also when you have, as I have, you know, a long career doing research and publishing, it sometimes is possible to use the cumulative wisdom that you've gained,
00:03:50 - And that's what I try to do in this book. Liberalism and the post-war liberal order are not the same, weren't the same, you know, liberalism as, a political practice domestically is one thing, a liberal order is another. what I would say, however, is that from the beginning, these two kind of liberalism, liberalism as a, as a practice of government and a and a liberal order, very much,
00:04:24 - and were, in a sense, premised upon one another. One can look for example, at the fact that the international order provided a more or less secure context, more secure than before, than before its institution in the 1940s, within which liberal institutions and politics could thrive across the west and in Japan. And in addition, the fact
00:04:55 - the United States and Great Britain were liberal democracies with all their flaws that made them not as liberal as one would like, suggest the compatibility of the internal and external dimensions of, of liberalism and liberal order, setting up that international order required hard work and creative stateship statesmanship and the establishment of stable democratic regimes demanded continued attention
00:05:26 - and effort on the part of mainly internal political actors in different countries, facilitating both the setting up of the overall framework of liberal order, and the allegiance of various countries to it. and, the establishment of, liberal domestic political orders facilitating both was the Cold War and the Soviet threat.
00:05:56 - The book I refer to Liberal order as a Cold War liberal order or a Cold War order, the Soviet threat, you know, however real or however exaggerated it might've appeared at any given moment, had a, had a very big impact on what went on within that section of the world that's strove to work as a liberal international order, and within the different countries that were part of it.

Post-War Order: Stability and Economic Shifts

00:06:29 - as it was being established, as the opposite of fascism from the 1950s. It was defined in opposition to the Soviet Union and all that that implied now in party terms, party political terms. The stability of the post-war order was produced by these contrasts between, you know, democracy, liberalism and fascism and democratic, democratic liberalism
00:06:57 - and more concretely, the system was supported and sustained by the political dominance of the center left and the center, right center, left parties, center right parties, often social democratic parties on the left, Christian, democratic parties on the right, but other versions of center, left, center right parties.
00:07:31 - the political dominance of the center, left and center right parties happened in part because a shared antipathy dis communism brought the right and the left together toward the center, anchored them to the center. That will be the story up until the 1970s and beyond. After that, two big changes unsettled what was a fairly stable, not totally stable. There was lots of dissent and debate,
00:08:03 - The first was the ending of the long post-war economic boom in the 1970s. that boom had an in, in a sense underpinned political stability in much of the world. we could talk about the reasons for that, but I think it's fairly acknowledged that that boom came to an end in the seventies, was replaced by a different kind of economic regime in the 1980s.
00:08:33 - or this shift in the nature of the economy produced a shift in policy. and the shift was toward the right, toward what people called market fundamentalism and others called neoliberalism. And these neoliberal policies, you know, and we can identify people who brought them, Thatcher, Reagan, and, and others in alliance, ultimately led to increased inequality,
00:09:05 - and then the much more rapid decline of older industries and the regions where they were located. this is, you know, the phenomenon conjure up when people, we people use the phrase, you know, the left behind the long-term effect of these economic effects and social effects was a growing disenchantment with existing political arrangements,

Impact of the Cold War on Liberal Order

00:09:33 - And that's one reason why the kinds of instability that we fret about today, transcends one or another country. Now, the second big event that happened after the 1970s, in fact, a decade or more after, was the end of the war. That meant that the liberal international order could expand hugely over a whole new set of areas, areas previously closed off from all of its workings.
00:10:06 - and economic transitions in the former Soviet block. Neither political transition to democracy or economic transition to market economies is an easy thing to achieve and would be hard in any case. It's also hard for outsiders to, you know, superintendent and help such transitions along. But I would suggest that the neoliberal grip on policymaking
00:10:39 - and in international economic institutions ensured that this process would be undertaken on the cheap, and therefore, because it was done on the cheap, not done well at all. which means that the, you know, the extension and expansion of a liberal world order of the 1990s was, you know, much more fragile than the establishment and extension of that order in the 1940s and fifties.
00:11:15 - in terms of domestic politics, the end of the Cold War had other consequences. What it did most clearly, I would say, was that it severed the link between the political center and the right. In other words, it essentially weakened the center, right, the center right whole in political competition
00:11:48 - And that freed conservatives or people afraid Of, you know, losing wealth, power, money to move much more sharply to the right, they were able to embrace right wing ideas and movements and causes that had been anathema in most of the post-war era. and they did that in country after country, may maybe the earliest
00:12:19 - and it would be supplied by the presidential candidate, Patrick Buchanan. when he told the Republican Convention in 1992 that having won the Cold War, the time was right, the time was now to move on to the culture war on the home front. Now, I think that was a, a kind of a, a marker and, and, and a kind of call to action to, to, to, to,

Challenges to Liberal Order and Democracy

00:12:50 - that had been created and had been sustained all during the Cold War in the west and Western countries, and, and in, and at least indirectly in the international order. and these were the conditions that is the, the effects of Cold War neoliberalism, the, the, the weakening of the ties between the right and the center, hence the weakening of the center, right?
00:13:21 - that have brought us where we are today. Now, as you know, I know there are many other things that went on in the intervening years. I mean, the most obvious thing is that, there are a whole set of new challenges confronting the world, the us the west, after 2000, you know, beginning with nine 11, going on to the, disastrous wars in,
00:13:58 - great recession of 2007, 2008, and so on. all these things help to put to, to further challenge liberalism liberal order, both internationally and domestically. The weakening of liberal democratic order and politics within countries would have a lot to do,
00:14:29 - to the changing media environment, represented by, you know, talk radio, Fox News, and so on, which made it the decline of, traditional newspapers. You know, these things all contributed to polarization. but the big major underlying factors were the sort of loosening Up of the system, in the 1990s due to the combination
00:14:59 - But the liberal order is fragile and probably more fragile today than in any time since its founding in the late 1940s. The second conclusion, relates and it's based on the fact that essential to the success and flourishing of liberal order, and liberal democracy, was a strong political center, that implies that protecting its future
00:15:32 - is largely a matter of domestic politics, and more specifically, requires the defeat of the populist, right? That is to some extent on the rise, and certainly prevalent a across the democratic and not so democratic world today. Now, this mainly requires effort on the part of those who wish to defeat it, and to propose some, an alternative and alternatives and to reinforce or liberal alternatives.

Populist Right: An Unlikely Ally?

00:16:08 - our best ally, might well be the populist right itself beset, as it is by incoherence and often transparent corruption. There a contradiction in terms there between transparent and corruption. I'm not sure corruption's supposed to be hidden, but in this case, so much of it is, is not. but nevertheless, as I suggested, taking advantage
00:16:40 - right wing populism requires time, energy, and resources, which we have to find among ourselves.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Research

Policy

Analysis

Data

Originals

Explainers

Podcasts

Faculti

New on Faculti

Idea Explorer

Definition

News Context

Critical Questions and Answers

Research Summaries

Fragile Victory

Media Literacy Toolkit

Critical Questions to Consider ▼

Bias and Perspective Awareness ▼

Further Reading ▼