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Do you know what motivates academic scientists and engineers to engage in commercial activities? New research reveals how desires for recognition, challenge, money, and impact drive patenting differently across life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering, highlighting the need for nuanced understanding in policy and management.

Image courtesy of interviewee. November 21, 2024

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This video discusses concerns about the relationship between academic research and commercialization, particularly following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. in 1981. This video legislation allowed universities to own patents for inventions developed with federal funding, aiming to encourage academics to contribute to society through commercial applications of their research. However, this shift raised important questions about the motivations of academics and potential negative consequences for fundamental research and knowledge sharing.

Key concerns included the possibility that academics might prioritize applied research over basic research due to the incentives created by commercialization. Additionally, there was fear that academics would hesitate to share their findings to maintain patent secrecy, which is crucial for scientific progress. The discussion encompasses differing norms between academia and industry, with academics often seeking respect and recognition, while firms prioritize confidentiality to protect commercial interests.

This video also explores the motivations behind academics' participation in commercialization, referencing a study that evaluated various motives, including career advancement, income, intellectual challenge, and social impact. Ultimately, it was found that academics who patent their research are most motivated by contributions to society rather than financial gain or career progression.

The results indicate that the relationship between academics and commercialization is complex and field-specific, with those in life sciences motivated by the potential for social impact through their discoveries. The discussion goes on to suggest that academic research does not necessarily suffer from this commercialization; in many cases, researchers who patent their work have continued to produce high-quality scholarly work.

The narrative concludes by emphasizing the need to understand the implications of commercialization on academic research on a case-by-case basis, considering the incentives at play while recognizing that successful commercialization can enhance societal benefits through the development of new products and services.

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Here are five key points from the video regarding the issues surrounding academia and commercialization of research:

1. **DU Amendment and Intellectual Property Ownership**: The DU Amendment of 1981 allowed for the ownership of intellectual property generated by universities using government funding to default to the universities, with potential disincentives for both academics and institutions to commercialize their research findings, especially in fields like the sciences and medicine.

2. **Concerns About Shift from Basic to Applied Research**: Critics raised concerns that the emphasis on commercialization could lead academics to prioritize applied research over basic research, potentially stifling foundational knowledge that contributes to societal advancements.

3. **Diverging Motives Between Academics and Industry**: The incentives and norms of academia (where scholars seek eminence and peer recognition through research dissemination) differ from those of industry (where firms seek to protect intellectual property). This disparity could hinder collaboration and the transfer of knowledge between the two sectors.

4. **Motives Behind Patenting**: A study found that the primary motive for academics to patent their work was often driven by a desire for social impact rather than financial gain or career advancement. This suggests that many researchers in fields like life sciences see patents as necessary for advancing their discoveries in a way that benefits society at large.

5. **Impact of Opportunity Costs in Different Fields**: The study indicated that the opportunity costs of engaging in commercial work vary by academic field. Fields with high potential for commercial application (like engineering and applied sciences) showed a greater alignment between academic work and commercialization, while those in physical sciences were less likely to pursue such paths due to the perceived negative impact on career advancement.

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Here are some key quotes and phrases extracted from the video that capture the main themes and concerns discussed:

1. **Concerns on Academic Contributions**:
- "There's a lot of concerns in the United States and abroad about ... the ability and willingness of academics to contribute through their research to commercial development."

2. **The Bayh-Dole Amendment**:
- "One concern voiced in the literature ... is the DU Amendment in the United States, roughly about 1981, which permitted a default ownership of intellectual property generated by universities with government funding."

3. **Disincentives to Commercialization**:
- "It was thought that that a disincentive to both the individual academics and academic institutions to take this knowledge and incorporate it to benefit society."

4. **Global Competition**:
- "The setting for the LAC was that the United States was being beaten in global competition...with the thought in Congress ... sitting on the metaphorical shelf of American universities that can be used to the advantage of American society."

5. **Technology Transfer Offices**:
- "Universities began to develop their technology transfer offices ... dedicated to commercialization of university-based knowledge and dedicated to the patenting of that knowledge."

6. **Concerns on Research Direction**:
- "What you may be doing with such an act is increasing the incentives of academics to move their concerns away from upstream research more toward applications."

7. **Disclosure and Sharing of Knowledge**:
- "If academics become concerned about commercialization, they're going to not be as willing to disclose their research findings."

8. **Incentives in Academia**:
- "The real objective of academics and their careers is the achievement of eminence... required disclosure ... required the sharing."

9. **Motives Behind Commercialization**:
- "What motivated academics ... was contributing to society, social impact."

10. **Career Advancement vs. Social Impact**:
- "The more upstream you go, the motive of career advancement... was negatively associated with patenting."

11. **Opportunity Costs for Academics**:
- "The opportunity costs of pursuing these sorts of work might not be as salient as some had thought."

12. **Impact of Patenting on Research**:
- "The patenting of highly commercializable science did not dampen the diffusion of the knowledge across firms."

13. **Discussion on Ownership of Intellectual Property**:
- "The default ownership of intellectual property originating from academia should not reside with the university. It should reside with the professor."

14. **Speculations on Research Directions**:
- "My instinct is in answering your question, ... can I say that upstream research, less upstream research? I can't speak to that."

15. **Importance of Knowledge Transfer**:
- "This knowledge must ultimately lead to social impact ... through the commercial sphere that this actually will benefit society."

These quotes highlight the discussion about the intersection of academia and commercial interests, the implications of the Bayh-Dole Act, and various motivations driving academic researchers in their work and patenting activities.

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Is a lot of concerns in the United States

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and abroad about, essentially the, the, the ability,

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and willingness of, academics to,

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contribute, through their research

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to commercial development and so on.

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Uh, and there, there's also, there are also controversies,

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surrounding that.

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So, one, one

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concern voiced in the literature, geez,

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well over 25 years ago now, is that to the extent,

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and the, the, these are concerns that were in the context

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is, is the DU Amendment in the United States,

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roughly about 1981, the act was passed,

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which, basically permitted as a, a, a default,

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ownership of intellectual property generated

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by universities, with government funding and so on.

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Would, now read down to the, ownership

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by the universities before that,

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if there was government funding,

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which is common in the sciences

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and the medical fields, et cetera, though

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that intellectual property would read down

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to the government, okay?

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And it was thought that that

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provided a disincentive, to,

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both the individual academics

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and academic institutions to take this knowledge

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and, incorporate it into,

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co commercializable goods services, et cetera, that could,

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benefit society.

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I mean, think of, you know, the origin of many drugs

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and so on that, that come out of universities.

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And there was concern about that.

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And, and the setting for the LAC was

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that the United States was being, beaten

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in global competition, particularly at

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that time in the mid late seventies,

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by the Japanese.

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And the thought in Congress at that time was, my gosh,

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there's all this, you know, valuable knowledge,

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sitting on the metaphorical shelf of American universities

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that can be used to the advantage of, of,

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of society, of American society,

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and increase the competitiveness

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of the American economy in this global system.

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Now. So they passed this,

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and it did have a profound effect.

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Universities began to, de develop their,

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what are called technology transfer offices,

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and that goes by different names

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and different settings, et cetera.

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But, these were, were offices, dedicated

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to commercialization of university based, knowledge

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and dedicated to the patenting of that knowledge as a means

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of, you know, know commercialization.

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Okay? And, and fostering that.

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Now, this raised some concerns. Okay?

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Uh, 2, 2, 2 concerns that were raised by, couple

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of academics, named Partha Desta

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and Paul David, were that, you know,

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what you may be doing with, with such an act

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is increasing the incentives of academics

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to move their concerns, their efforts downstream,

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so away from upstream research more toward applications.

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And that will sort of throttle, the, the stream,

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the basic research that that is the foundation, not, not

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of all, but of a good deal of, of, you know,

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knowledge benefiting society, et cetera, the, the other,

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and that, you know, it was the incentive system

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that was doing that.

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The other concern that was voiced was, well,

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if academics become concerned about commercialization,

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they're going to, not be as willing

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to disclose their research findings.

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They'll wanna keep it private, certainly

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until it's patented, they won't disclose.

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And, and a lot of what, allows science to advance

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is the sharing of knowledge and the fair

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and the rapid dissemination of findings, et cetera.

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Okay? At the, at the same time though, work that I had done

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before, and, and others, suggested

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in, in fact, you know, the other side of this is, is that

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academics and industry might not work too well together,

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because academics, when they come up with something new,

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a new finding, et cetera,

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they wanna climb the tallest mountain

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and tell the world about it.

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For firms, no, they do want

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to, you know, ke keep this, as private

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and as protected a as possible.

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So there was this other concern that, you know,

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this is actually going to be a fairly difficult

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to bridge the, the norms

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and incentives of these two worlds incentives in academia.

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And this was described actually by a, a sociologist, decades

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before Robert Merton, where, his view was that, well,

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the real objective of academics

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and their careers is the achievement of eminence.

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What does that mean? That means, the,

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earning the respect of their academic, peers,

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and that that was key.

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And to be able to do that required disclosure, okay?

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And required the sharing and, and,

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and, that this, would throw

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sand in the gears, of, of,

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developing close ties between academia

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and academics in gen, in particular, and,

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and industry, which had a very different set of incentives.

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Okay? So that's the broad context,

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and those are the different concerns

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and themes that we're bouncing around.

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But all of this assumed that the motives of academics,

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basically, it assumed,

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and Merton assumed, that academics were sort

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of, if you to, to put it o too simply,

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cut from the same cloth that they were all characterized

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by the same motives and so on.

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And, and, and we came along

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and said, you know, we don't know.

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We're not sure, just from our own understanding

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of these relationships, the motives

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of academics may differ.

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Uh, and, and, and consequently, the activities

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and, and likelihood of academics, you know,

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either disclosing their research

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or changing their research agendas in the face

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of these sorts of incentives, et cetera, is a much more,

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complicated question in our view.

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Thus, we, we wanted to explore the relationship between

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the motives of individual academics,

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and, then essentially the degree, the

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to which they undertake commercialization activity,

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our measure of that, of that activity, not a great one,

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but it's what's available.

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It was the, it was, you know, did they,

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did they generate e essentially, knowledge,

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which was, which was patented by their universities.

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So that's the measure. And our measure

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of the motives was taken by a, survey conducted

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by the National Science Foundation in 2002, 2003 or so,

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and actually a couple of waves where they, asked

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academics, PhD academics.

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There were 2000 respondents roughly in the

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sample that we looked at.

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You know, what do you value in your career?

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And, and, and we focused on four particular, motives.

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Um, you know, do you, do you, value career advancement,

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which is, reasonable enough?

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Um, certainly, do you, how much, you know, relative

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to income, you know, money, versus,

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in, in a career, do you look forward?

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Do you enjoy, what, how important is challenge,

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intellectual challenge?

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And then how important is the notion of, contributing

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to society of social impact?

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So those were the motives that we explored,

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and we explored a across three.

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We, we, we just grouped, the fields of academia

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together, in just, just,

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you know, very coarsely.

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Um, we had engineering on the one hand, life sciences,

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and then, physical sciences.

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And in engineering, we bunched within that, the,

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the applied sciences as well, like material science,

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computer science, et cetera.

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Uh, and, and so we looked at these relationships

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between the activities, the commercialization activities

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as reflected in patenting, et cetera, and,

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and their motives, you know,

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including various controls, et cetera.

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And this was, by the way, this was not a, a study

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assessing causality.

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Certainly it was correlational, okay?

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We, we really, we, we could, we, you know, again,

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yes, it's a correlational, study of sorts.

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We did these analysis within fields, okay?

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Separately, within each of these three broadly,

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defined fields.

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And, and, and, and, and perhaps, and, and,

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and let me tell you a little bit about

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our, our theory as well.

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It, that it, that the behavior of academics with regard

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to commercialization, our view would not be conditioned only

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by their motives, okay?

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It would also be conditioned by the opportunity costs

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of doing commercial work, okay?

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Because it is true that in academia, particularly

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during the time period we were looking at,

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I think this is loosened up, it, it,

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it since then a bit,

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but, it, you know, again, it it's your publications.

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It's, the, the letters, review letters

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that are written by, you know, other scholars to

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that would affect your promotion

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and so on and, and so forth.

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So, if you were engaging in commercial work, okay,

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or very applied work that could lead to commercialization,

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and that that was not consistent

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with academic work in your field, the opportunity of cost of

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that could be quite high.

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Okay? But that differs across fields.

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Say if you are in, you know, basic physics,

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that's gonna be pretty high.

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On the other hand, if you are in, computer science

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and fields of engineering,

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where normal research in academic research would really be

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involved, often in, addressing very tangible issues

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and problems that that could well have,

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commercial value.

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So in such fields, we postulated

211
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that the opportunity cost in those

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fields would be much lower.

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Whereas the opportunity cost, I mean,

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00:11:22.335 --> 00:11:25.255
to pick an extreme example, astronomy, right?

215
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The opportunity cost of pursuing,

216
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commercial work there might be rather high.

217
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Okay? Uh, that, that, you know, or, or,

218
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or, well, it's no longer the case,

219
00:11:36.675 --> 00:11:38.775
but some subfields in mathematics, et cetera,

220
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would probably, not lend themselves to,

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you know, obvious,

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00:11:46.495 --> 00:11:47.975
commercial application, et cetera.

223
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So this notion of opportunity cost play also plays a role.

224
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So you have motives. What, and what are motives, by the way?

225
00:11:54.715 --> 00:11:56.885
Motives are, are what you want, right?

226
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Those are, the, the, the, your, your objectives,

227
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your preferences for various outcomes.

228
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And here we had four, as I said, whether it's income, a work

229
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that's challenging, a desire to contribute

230
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to society or simply to advance in your career,

231
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those are the motives we were talking about,

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versus these opportunity costs.

233
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Now, with that as background,

234
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we can start talking about the results

235
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and what we actually found.

236
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So perhaps the most notable finding is that the,

237
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those, academics who tended to patent the most,

238
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what were they motivated by?

239
00:12:38.435 --> 00:12:41.695
It was not income. It wasn't even career advancement.

240
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Uh, so clearly,

241
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and I ha I can stare at the,

242
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the findings right here.

243
00:12:46.915 --> 00:12:51.215
Um, it was, contributing to society, social impact.

244
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And this was also consistent with some interviews

245
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that we've done and, and,

246
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and some, some quotes, et cetera from,

247
00:12:58.835 --> 00:13:00.295
and that's pretty interesting.

248
00:13:00.405 --> 00:13:02.775
Okay? That's a, that's a different take

249
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because, you know, historically, the, the norms of,

250
00:13:06.765 --> 00:13:09.375
patenting, you know, you're, that that's actually gonna,

251
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that that won't benefit society.

252
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But in fact, what it appears to be, what appeared

253
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to be the case to us is that academics in the life sciences

254
00:13:19.775 --> 00:13:23.775
realized to get their, say if they, they, they,

255
00:13:23.885 --> 00:13:28.335
they identify a promising drug candidate, for whatever,

256
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Alzheimer's, you know, different forms

257
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of cancer, et cetera.

258
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That, that, that, in fact,

259
00:13:37.905 --> 00:13:41.225
academics in those fields have now come to understand that

260
00:13:41.285 --> 00:13:44.105
for companies to pick those inventions up

261
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and actually, develop them,

262
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because most of the expense in drug development,

263
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I, I mean, it's enormous.

264
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You know, the, the cost

265
00:13:53.425 --> 00:13:56.425
of developing a new drug is well over a billion dollars at,

266
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at this point that academics came to realize that yes,

267
00:14:01.525 --> 00:14:05.185
the, that, to provide appropriate incentive

268
00:14:05.285 --> 00:14:08.025
or sufficient incentive for the companies, right,

269
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to take these, discoveries

270
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and actually, develop them, you know,

271
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do the preclinical research,

272
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but especially to run them through the clinical trials,

273
00:14:18.245 --> 00:14:20.465
et cetera, that they had to believe

274
00:14:20.465 --> 00:14:22.625
that they were protected, okay?

275
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That the intellectual property was protected.

276
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And we think that academics came to understand that.

277
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And so, so they saw then patents,

278
00:14:31.045 --> 00:14:34.305
and the patenting of their work as, quite consistent,

279
00:14:34.845 --> 00:14:37.945
but not, not con inconsistent with social impact,

280
00:14:37.945 --> 00:14:41.425
but quite consistent with social impact, okay?

281
00:14:41.885 --> 00:14:44.505
Not always the case. It depends on circumstances.

282
00:14:44.735 --> 00:14:48.025
Patents are not, so prominent in other industries.

283
00:14:48.085 --> 00:14:52.405
In fact, from other work that I've done, in, in,

284
00:14:52.545 --> 00:14:56.485
in decades past, we, we've, know that

285
00:14:56.835 --> 00:15:00.725
that patents, are most effective in,

286
00:15:00.745 --> 00:15:02.605
in just a small handful of industries.

287
00:15:02.625 --> 00:15:06.965
But, and notably, pharmaceuticals, as well

288
00:15:06.965 --> 00:15:08.925
to, in, in many segments

289
00:15:09.205 --> 00:15:11.605
of medical devices in other industries, not

290
00:15:11.605 --> 00:15:14.605
because it's fairly easy to invent around patents, okay?

291
00:15:15.065 --> 00:15:17.605
But in those industries, the firms had to be assured

292
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of their ability to protect their,

293
00:15:19.675 --> 00:15:21.045
this intellectual property

294
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before they were going to sink hundreds of millions

295
00:15:23.565 --> 00:15:25.805
of dollars and more into their development.

296
00:15:26.225 --> 00:15:30.525
So social impact in, in, in, was the, key thing,

297
00:15:30.545 --> 00:15:34.245
and, and I'll get to some implications of that in a moment,

298
00:15:34.385 --> 00:15:36.645
but what we also found, which was interesting,

299
00:15:37.345 --> 00:15:41.605
we nev we if in the physical sciences, so the more upstream,

300
00:15:41.825 --> 00:15:44.365
you know, physics, e even chemistry, we,

301
00:15:44.365 --> 00:15:46.205
which surprised me a little bit,

302
00:15:47.345 --> 00:15:49.075
that we didn't find any motive

303
00:15:50.275 --> 00:15:51.715
positively associated with patent.

304
00:15:52.375 --> 00:15:55.635
We found a motive negatively associated with patent,

305
00:15:56.415 --> 00:15:58.555
the motive of career advancement.

306
00:15:58.585 --> 00:16:01.395
What we were being told is, yes, it would appear

307
00:16:01.395 --> 00:16:03.355
that in the physical sciences doing

308
00:16:04.195 --> 00:16:07.915
commercially oriented work, would, would,

309
00:16:07.965 --> 00:16:09.635
would actually, that,

310
00:16:09.635 --> 00:16:11.875
that the perception was it would hurt your career.

311
00:16:12.335 --> 00:16:15.395
So, again, consistent with our notion that those fields

312
00:16:15.485 --> 00:16:18.475
where opportunity costs of pursuing these sorts

313
00:16:18.475 --> 00:16:22.115
of objective is very high, a a

314
00:16:22.175 --> 00:16:26.115
and that there was no offsetting,

315
00:16:26.215 --> 00:16:30.035
or compensating advantage, then that would a actually,

316
00:16:30.135 --> 00:16:34.715
the prospect of doing that was not looked upon,

317
00:16:34.975 --> 00:16:37.675
all that well by, by, by academics.

318
00:16:37.675 --> 00:16:40.715
So in other words, we were looking at, at academics

319
00:16:40.715 --> 00:16:42.075
who had actually patented.

320
00:16:42.735 --> 00:16:44.355
And what appeared to be the case is

321
00:16:44.385 --> 00:16:47.435
that the way they answered the, the questionnaire, the res,

322
00:16:47.435 --> 00:16:50.435
from, from NSF appeared to suggest

323
00:16:50.945 --> 00:16:53.155
that they thought maybe that, you know, again,

324
00:16:53.155 --> 00:16:55.195
this is speculation, but perhaps they thought

325
00:16:55.195 --> 00:16:58.355
that this actually did not help them advance their academic,

326
00:16:58.615 --> 00:16:59.755
careers.

327
00:17:00.015 --> 00:17:03.475
And then also consistent with this notion of opportunity,

328
00:17:04.015 --> 00:17:06.075
cost be being important.

329
00:17:06.695 --> 00:17:10.395
Um, then let's think about the fields that are,

330
00:17:10.895 --> 00:17:12.195
if you will, co who,

331
00:17:12.195 --> 00:17:16.195
whose normal academic work would be closest to,

332
00:17:16.195 --> 00:17:17.595
practical applications

333
00:17:17.735 --> 00:17:21.755
and thus, commercial applications, of

334
00:17:21.755 --> 00:17:23.115
what we call the engineering field.

335
00:17:23.115 --> 00:17:24.195
So applied sciences

336
00:17:24.195 --> 00:17:28.335
and engineering, that, that the, the,

337
00:17:29.265 --> 00:17:33.055
these, these guys actually look pretty much like their,

338
00:17:33.265 --> 00:17:34.695
their peers, okay?

339
00:17:35.085 --> 00:17:38.815
That the, motives that they rated, most highly,

340
00:17:38.945 --> 00:17:43.095
those who patented, rated motives most highly of,

341
00:17:43.235 --> 00:17:47.455
both, in fact,

342
00:17:47.455 --> 00:17:48.575
career advancement.

343
00:17:49.105 --> 00:17:52.685
So it was not inconsistent in those fields to, to do

344
00:17:53.205 --> 00:17:54.205
commercially oriented work

345
00:17:54.385 --> 00:17:57.285
and also intellectual challenge, which is, you would think

346
00:17:57.285 --> 00:17:59.205
that that's sort of a, a, a motive

347
00:17:59.205 --> 00:18:00.725
that cuts across all fields.

348
00:18:01.105 --> 00:18:04.085
But in other words, they saw a challenge in developing these

349
00:18:04.085 --> 00:18:05.285
practical applications

350
00:18:05.285 --> 00:18:07.525
and so on, which, which is consistent with

351
00:18:07.525 --> 00:18:10.765
what you might think of, for many of the fields of,

352
00:18:11.445 --> 00:18:13.285
engineering and, and applied sciences.

353
00:18:13.545 --> 00:18:15.685
So these motives were, were, so,

354
00:18:15.685 --> 00:18:18.045
what was interesting was the fact that that

355
00:18:18.555 --> 00:18:20.645
what motivated academics, that that clearly,

356
00:18:21.115 --> 00:18:23.245
when you talk about this issue of commercialization

357
00:18:23.245 --> 00:18:27.325
and the trade-offs associated with, with, this kind

358
00:18:27.325 --> 00:18:31.285
of work, it, it, it's, you should not paint academics

359
00:18:31.285 --> 00:18:32.325
with one brush.

360
00:18:32.515 --> 00:18:35.365
What we're talking about here are, are, are the,

361
00:18:35.425 --> 00:18:37.445
the differences,

362
00:18:38.145 --> 00:18:41.165
across motives within each of these fields

363
00:18:41.475 --> 00:18:45.885
that motivated the academics there to, to either pursue,

364
00:18:46.295 --> 00:18:49.325
commercial work as reflected in our, you know,

365
00:18:49.705 --> 00:18:53.565
cr proxy variable of patenting activity, or, or not.

366
00:18:54.095 --> 00:18:57.445
Let's go back to the context that I, laid out

367
00:18:57.445 --> 00:19:01.165
before of these concerns that academics,

368
00:19:01.305 --> 00:19:03.965
who engaged in this kind of work would be,

369
00:19:04.035 --> 00:19:08.955
more reluctant to, disclose their work prominently,

370
00:19:09.095 --> 00:19:10.875
at least not until it was patented,

371
00:19:10.875 --> 00:19:12.715
and the, the intellectual property was,

372
00:19:12.775 --> 00:19:14.515
was buttoned down, if you, if you will.

373
00:19:15.055 --> 00:19:17.835
Uh, and, and, and let's go to the other concern that,

374
00:19:18.295 --> 00:19:22.875
if they're pursuing, if they, if they are pursuing,

375
00:19:23.295 --> 00:19:27.035
kind of commercially oriented work, this is going

376
00:19:27.035 --> 00:19:29.235
to distract them from their, their,

377
00:19:29.595 --> 00:19:30.795
research mission, okay.

378
00:19:30.825 --> 00:19:33.795
That they should otherwise be pursuing for, you know,

379
00:19:33.795 --> 00:19:34.835
for benefit of society.

380
00:19:34.835 --> 00:19:37.115
Well, it suggests that in, in a number

381
00:19:37.115 --> 00:19:39.195
of very important fields, okay?

382
00:19:39.895 --> 00:19:42.395
Uh, and this is, this is consistent with some

383
00:19:42.395 --> 00:19:44.915
of the other literature, that,

384
00:19:44.975 --> 00:19:49.655
and I'll discuss that briefly, that no,

385
00:19:49.925 --> 00:19:52.455
that th this isn't, you know, in the engineer,

386
00:19:52.455 --> 00:19:54.975
what I call broadly engineering applied sciences.

387
00:19:54.975 --> 00:19:57.135
This is utterly consistent, okay?

388
00:19:57.645 --> 00:19:59.895
With the kind of work that they might be doing

389
00:19:59.895 --> 00:20:03.335
otherwise, so that that sort of trade off might not be

390
00:20:03.335 --> 00:20:07.495
as salient, a, a a as some had had thought.

391
00:20:08.155 --> 00:20:12.845
Um, so because there, there really was, a, a lot

392
00:20:12.845 --> 00:20:14.645
of concern over by Dole

393
00:20:14.645 --> 00:20:16.765
and the kinds of incentives that it would put in place

394
00:20:16.945 --> 00:20:19.725
and should that be, restricted,

395
00:20:19.725 --> 00:20:21.725
should it be rolled back, et cetera.

396
00:20:22.145 --> 00:20:24.725
So clearly from that perspective, certainly

397
00:20:24.725 --> 00:20:27.325
for those fields, less of a concern and,

398
00:20:27.345 --> 00:20:31.805
and some other literature, as well, done by,

399
00:20:32.265 --> 00:20:36.365
sbe and, and others suggested that those

400
00:20:37.005 --> 00:20:40.645
academics who, who did, you know,

401
00:20:41.225 --> 00:20:42.965
pursue patenting and, and,

402
00:20:43.065 --> 00:20:45.285
and, other commercial activity,

403
00:20:45.715 --> 00:20:48.605
that their research productivity was not suffering at all.

404
00:20:48.905 --> 00:20:52.365
In fact, though this may reflect a bit of a selection,

405
00:20:52.425 --> 00:20:54.605
phenomena, that many of the academics

406
00:20:54.605 --> 00:20:57.165
who were the most prolific patenters were also the most

407
00:20:57.205 --> 00:20:58.285
prolific scholars.

408
00:20:59.145 --> 00:21:03.885
So, that now I, that relationship is, is not causal

409
00:21:03.885 --> 00:21:07.365
by any means, but that's an interesting observation.

410
00:21:07.495 --> 00:21:09.125
Again, can't,

411
00:21:09.335 --> 00:21:11.565
can't make anyone circumspect about the

412
00:21:11.565 --> 00:21:12.725
concerns over the trade-off.

413
00:21:12.745 --> 00:21:17.475
On the other hand, our, our, discussion of,

414
00:21:17.755 --> 00:21:19.195
physical sciences would suggest, well,

415
00:21:19.605 --> 00:21:22.755
maybe those trade-offs do apply in some

416
00:21:22.755 --> 00:21:23.995
of the physical sciences,

417
00:21:24.135 --> 00:21:26.955
but then the question is, is, well, how important is that?

418
00:21:27.015 --> 00:21:30.915
What's the extent of, of this kind of activity and,

419
00:21:30.915 --> 00:21:33.315
and what the particular trade-offs are?

420
00:21:33.735 --> 00:21:37.235
But in other words, what, what it's suggesting is that,

421
00:21:37.815 --> 00:21:42.395
the, the trade-offs, should be thought about,

422
00:21:43.175 --> 00:21:45.635
on a field by field basis, right?

423
00:21:45.975 --> 00:21:49.395
But with some understanding of the, of the different fields.

424
00:21:49.455 --> 00:21:53.155
And when you go to something like, the,

425
00:21:53.255 --> 00:21:57.515
the life sciences where we, you know, where social impact,

426
00:21:57.515 --> 00:21:59.635
where, where contribution to society is,

427
00:21:59.655 --> 00:22:01.235
is the most salient motive.

428
00:22:02.135 --> 00:22:05.875
Wow. Well, you know, what that could imply is

429
00:22:05.875 --> 00:22:08.595
that those academics are, are, are still, are,

430
00:22:08.685 --> 00:22:11.675
would be quite happy to share their results

431
00:22:11.735 --> 00:22:13.075
and disclose their results,

432
00:22:13.215 --> 00:22:17.555
and are not that concerned about their own income ability

433
00:22:17.655 --> 00:22:21.435
to, to gain personal advantage from, from, you know,

434
00:22:21.435 --> 00:22:23.155
their commercially oriented work.

435
00:22:23.455 --> 00:22:25.995
Though, though,

436
00:22:26.145 --> 00:22:28.075
that raises another interesting question,

437
00:22:28.335 --> 00:22:32.435
but the firms are concerned, as I said a moment ago,

438
00:22:32.495 --> 00:22:34.555
and in some other work that we've just done.

439
00:22:35.015 --> 00:22:38.515
So we, we have a, I have another paper with a couple of con,

440
00:22:38.815 --> 00:22:41.955
colleagues, well, actually a PhD student and a,

441
00:22:41.955 --> 00:22:43.875
and a colleague here at Duke.

442
00:22:44.335 --> 00:22:46.815
Um, it, it, the title

443
00:22:46.875 --> 00:22:49.495
of the paper is Measuring the Commercial Potential

444
00:22:49.495 --> 00:22:53.935
of Science, and we use, machine learning models, okay.

445
00:22:54.635 --> 00:22:57.535
Uh, to assess the commercial potential, not

446
00:22:57.615 --> 00:22:59.335
of a patent, but of an article.

447
00:22:59.965 --> 00:23:01.295
Okay? Okay.

448
00:23:01.805 --> 00:23:03.375
Will, what's the likelihood

449
00:23:03.375 --> 00:23:07.655
that this article will contribute to a,

450
00:23:08.085 --> 00:23:09.295
essentially a a,

451
00:23:09.415 --> 00:23:12.495
a a a commercializable product process downstream?

452
00:23:12.885 --> 00:23:16.295
Okay? And, you know, we use million.

453
00:23:16.915 --> 00:23:19.295
It is a big data project, a machine learning project,

454
00:23:19.675 --> 00:23:21.575
and really quite, quite exciting.

455
00:23:21.955 --> 00:23:24.095
But one of the findings from that, we,

456
00:23:24.115 --> 00:23:26.415
we applied this model and said,

457
00:23:26.755 --> 00:23:30.975
and tried to apply it to this question of just patenting.

458
00:23:32.015 --> 00:23:35.475
Uh, so this, the privatization, if you will,

459
00:23:35.475 --> 00:23:38.995
of academic science in the form of patents, does

460
00:23:39.025 --> 00:23:42.355
that restrict the diffusion of that knowledge in society

461
00:23:42.655 --> 00:23:43.915
to society's detriment?

462
00:23:44.385 --> 00:23:48.285
Okay? And we, with this measure, what we're able to do

463
00:23:49.065 --> 00:23:52.085
is compare the diffusion, the use of this patents

464
00:23:52.585 --> 00:23:55.765
as reflected whether the, the, the, the,

465
00:23:55.785 --> 00:24:00.005
the patents are cited in, in patents, in firm's, patents,

466
00:24:00.025 --> 00:24:02.165
not university's patents in firm's patents.

467
00:24:02.225 --> 00:24:04.845
If this restricts diffusion across,

468
00:24:05.225 --> 00:24:07.285
we looked at the question, does it restrict diffusion

469
00:24:07.285 --> 00:24:08.765
of this knowledge even across firms?

470
00:24:09.065 --> 00:24:10.485
No, let's say, and, and,

471
00:24:10.505 --> 00:24:15.185
and what we found was that, the,

472
00:24:15.605 --> 00:24:18.225
the patenting, again, this is correlational

473
00:24:18.415 --> 00:24:21.505
that the patenting of commer

474
00:24:21.685 --> 00:24:24.865
of highly commercializable science, okay?

475
00:24:25.805 --> 00:24:29.765
Uh, compared to other academic

476
00:24:31.175 --> 00:24:33.805
comparably, commercializable science, right?

477
00:24:33.875 --> 00:24:35.485
It's not patented. 'cause most

478
00:24:35.485 --> 00:24:38.085
of the commercializable science in universities doesn't go

479
00:24:38.085 --> 00:24:40.245
through, tech transfer office.

480
00:24:40.385 --> 00:24:41.645
It is not patented.

481
00:24:41.745 --> 00:24:44.485
It gets out to, to firms through articles

482
00:24:44.545 --> 00:24:46.245
and so on, through other channels.

483
00:24:46.245 --> 00:24:48.565
And that's very important to understand. Okay?

484
00:24:49.065 --> 00:24:50.485
So, so we compared this

485
00:24:50.505 --> 00:24:53.445
and said, okay, if you patent this piece

486
00:24:53.445 --> 00:24:58.245
of commercializable science, is that cited by, fewer

487
00:24:58.465 --> 00:25:03.125
or more firms than comparably commercializable science

488
00:25:03.155 --> 00:25:06.165
that is not patented from,

489
00:25:06.425 --> 00:25:09.405
an unnamed major research university, okay?

490
00:25:09.405 --> 00:25:12.285
Where, which is where we had our data,

491
00:25:12.585 --> 00:25:16.285
and the answer is it was actually, the number

492
00:25:16.285 --> 00:25:20.085
of firms that cited the science was greater

493
00:25:20.785 --> 00:25:24.285
for the science that was patented versus the science

494
00:25:24.285 --> 00:25:27.725
that was not, we do not know why,

495
00:25:30.505 --> 00:25:34.365
but we, we, so in other words, this concern to, to,

496
00:25:34.385 --> 00:25:37.245
to our minds, the, the, the, the and,

497
00:25:37.485 --> 00:25:39.045
and frankly, in terms of this debate,

498
00:25:39.245 --> 00:25:41.045
I was probably on the other side of this debate.

499
00:25:41.285 --> 00:25:44.645
I was agnostic. I, I play, when I do my research, we, we,

500
00:25:44.785 --> 00:25:47.045
you know, as I tell all my PhD students, you,

501
00:25:47.225 --> 00:25:48.405
you play it as it lays.

502
00:25:48.485 --> 00:25:50.565
I mean, you just, you know, whatever it is, it is,

503
00:25:50.785 --> 00:25:52.605
and you just use the most rigorous methods,

504
00:25:52.785 --> 00:25:55.725
the best data you can use, and so on and so forth.

505
00:25:56.025 --> 00:25:58.965
It appeared that, that for some reasons, again,

506
00:25:58.965 --> 00:26:01.645
that we don't know that the patenting of that,

507
00:26:01.665 --> 00:26:04.805
of these findings, again, controlling for all kinds

508
00:26:04.805 --> 00:26:09.335
of things, did not,

509
00:26:09.395 --> 00:26:12.855
dampen the, the diffusion of the, of that knowledge

510
00:26:12.915 --> 00:26:14.975
of across firms.

511
00:26:15.275 --> 00:26:20.255
In the nineties, what you had was just a, just a, a,

512
00:26:20.575 --> 00:26:22.895
a ballooning of the number of tech transfer offices,

513
00:26:23.375 --> 00:26:25.935
a across universities in the United States.

514
00:26:25.995 --> 00:26:29.295
And as you probably know, a lot of European nations.

515
00:26:29.295 --> 00:26:33.975
And by, you know, and England, is very concerned with,

516
00:26:34.075 --> 00:26:37.215
you know, issues around commercialization of,

517
00:26:37.275 --> 00:26:40.175
of academic research and throughout Europe, et cetera.

518
00:26:40.475 --> 00:26:42.735
And many, nations have taken the

519
00:26:42.735 --> 00:26:47.245
By, by do, by do, amendment as a, as a model

520
00:26:47.825 --> 00:26:49.285
to try to get the incentives right.

521
00:26:49.605 --> 00:26:54.295
Although that as well is, is, is, is

522
00:26:54.295 --> 00:26:56.215
that the right, is that the right structure?

523
00:26:56.625 --> 00:27:01.255
There was a publication in the, a ER,

524
00:27:01.795 --> 00:27:06.095
couple of years ago that suggested no, the,

525
00:27:06.675 --> 00:27:09.135
default ownership of, of,

526
00:27:09.335 --> 00:27:12.895
intellectual property originating from academia should not

527
00:27:12.895 --> 00:27:13.975
reside with the university.

528
00:27:13.995 --> 00:27:16.735
It should reside with the professor, okay?

529
00:27:17.155 --> 00:27:20.015
In, in American universities, it is the university

530
00:27:20.115 --> 00:27:23.455
and the professor get, gets some, if there are,

531
00:27:23.595 --> 00:27:28.535
if there are, are, if there are earnings,

532
00:27:28.675 --> 00:27:31.735
income, implications, the, the,

533
00:27:32.435 --> 00:27:35.295
the professor gets, typically in the US a share,

534
00:27:35.295 --> 00:27:40.015
maybe 25, maybe 30%, maybe a third or so university owns it.

535
00:27:40.015 --> 00:27:43.055
And that's up to the, the university to, to how much,

536
00:27:43.395 --> 00:27:45.575
you know, they, they're, they're going to share, et cetera.

537
00:27:46.035 --> 00:27:48.975
But, there, they found looking, doing an experiment,

538
00:27:49.055 --> 00:27:52.135
I think it was for Norway, that actually what the,

539
00:27:52.135 --> 00:27:55.415
what was what's called professors privilege, seemed

540
00:27:55.415 --> 00:27:56.815
to seem to work better.

541
00:27:56.875 --> 00:27:58.895
So there are a lot of discussions here, what kind

542
00:27:58.895 --> 00:28:01.255
of mechanism, what kind of incentive mechanism would,

543
00:28:01.465 --> 00:28:02.775
would, would, would work best.

544
00:28:02.835 --> 00:28:05.775
But the common one is, I think what we see here with our,

545
00:28:05.835 --> 00:28:07.255
with by do.

546
00:28:07.315 --> 00:28:08.815
But to get to your point,

547
00:28:09.585 --> 00:28:11.865
I can say there's certainly a lot more commercial activity,

548
00:28:12.685 --> 00:28:16.425
coming out of universities, o over, you know,

549
00:28:16.845 --> 00:28:18.425
the past, several decades.

550
00:28:19.125 --> 00:28:23.585
And, and then my, my instinct, is

551
00:28:24.645 --> 00:28:25.825
in answering your question,

552
00:28:25.965 --> 00:28:29.745
and this is speculation, have we, can I say that

553
00:28:29.745 --> 00:28:34.465
that has, led to more,

554
00:28:35.465 --> 00:28:37.905
upstream research, less upstream research?

555
00:28:38.185 --> 00:28:39.225
I can't speak to that.

556
00:28:39.245 --> 00:28:42.345
My hunch is that it's had relatively little effect,

557
00:28:43.245 --> 00:28:47.585
but that it is true that even funding agencies,

558
00:28:47.645 --> 00:28:49.905
no less governments have become more

559
00:28:49.905 --> 00:28:54.185
and more concerned with, the ability of this knowledge

560
00:28:54.325 --> 00:28:58.225
to, translate, to transfer to the commercial sphere.

561
00:28:58.225 --> 00:29:01.585
Because at the end of the day, it's

562
00:29:01.585 --> 00:29:05.785
through commercialization that this know of some form

563
00:29:06.175 --> 00:29:08.505
that this knowledge will ultimately has a,

564
00:29:08.565 --> 00:29:10.385
social impact, right?

565
00:29:10.845 --> 00:29:14.105
It has to show up in the form of, new services,

566
00:29:14.365 --> 00:29:16.825
new products, new capabilities, et cetera.

567
00:29:17.205 --> 00:29:19.105
And it, and that's, well, not always.

568
00:29:19.105 --> 00:29:21.105
Sometimes it's via government action, but,

569
00:29:21.105 --> 00:29:23.665
but for the most part, it's, you know,

570
00:29:23.665 --> 00:29:24.745
through the commercial sphere

571
00:29:24.775 --> 00:29:27.185
that this actually will benefit society.

572
00:29:27.195 --> 00:29:28.825
Again, think of the drug industry.

573
00:29:28.965 --> 00:29:30.505
You know, it's, it's,

574
00:29:32.815 --> 00:29:34.545
once this is embodied in drugs

575
00:29:34.615 --> 00:29:37.545
that companies will make money from that, that, that,

576
00:29:37.605 --> 00:29:41.445
that's, you know, it benefits,

577
00:29:42.955 --> 00:29:45.365
society and obviously the companies as well,

578
00:29:45.465 --> 00:29:48.925
and they're all issues there about access

579
00:29:48.985 --> 00:29:51.725
and pricing associated with patenting, et cetera.

580
00:29:51.725 --> 00:29:54.365
That, but which isn't all, you know,

581
00:29:54.365 --> 00:29:55.685
that those are complicated questions.

582
00:29:56.125 --> 00:29:59.085
'cause with patenting also comes the ability,

583
00:29:59.425 --> 00:30:02.565
to charge high prices, which, you know, basically,

584
00:30:02.805 --> 00:30:07.125
excludes a lot of people, from, availing themselves

585
00:30:07.225 --> 00:30:08.325
of, of these therapies.

586
00:30:08.425 --> 00:30:12.665
And that's certainly not a, that is not a social good

587
00:30:12.725 --> 00:30:13.905
by any, by any stretch.

Concerns Over Academic Contributions to Commercial Development

00:00:00 - Is a lot of concerns in the United States and abroad about, essentially the, the, the ability, and willingness of, academics to, contribute, through their research to commercial development and so on. and there, there's also, there are also controversies, surrounding that. So, one, one concern voiced in the literature, geez,

00:00:34 - and the, the, these are concerns that were in the context is, is the DU Amendment in the United States, roughly about 1981, the act was passed, which, basically permitted as a, a, a default, ownership of intellectual property generated by universities, with government funding and so on. Would, now read down to the, ownership

00:01:05 - if there was government funding, which is common in the sciences and the medical fields, et cetera, though that intellectual property would read down to the government, okay? And it was thought that that provided a disincentive, to, both the individual academics and academic institutions to take this knowledge and, incorporate it into,

Commercialization of Academic Research and Its Societal Impact

00:01:39 - benefit society. I mean, think of, you know, the origin of many drugs and so on that, that come out of universities. And there was concern about that. And, and the setting for the LAC was that the United States was being, beaten in global competition, particularly at that time in the mid late seventies, by the Japanese. And the thought in Congress at that time was, my gosh,

00:02:10 - sitting on the metaphorical shelf of American universities that can be used to the advantage of, of, of society, of American society, and increase the competitiveness of the American economy in this global system. Now. So they passed this, and it did have a profound effect. Universities began to, de develop their, what are called technology transfer offices,

00:02:40 - and different settings, et cetera. But, these were, were offices, dedicated to commercialization of university based, knowledge and dedicated to the patenting of that knowledge as a means of, you know, know commercialization. Okay? And, and fostering that. Now, this raised some concerns. Okay? 2, 2, 2 concerns that were raised by, couple

Impact of Commercialization on Academic Research Dynamics

00:03:13 - and Paul David, were that, you know, what you may be doing with, with such an act is increasing the incentives of academics to move their concerns, their efforts downstream, so away from upstream research more toward applications. And that will sort of throttle, the, the stream, the basic research that that is the foundation, not, not

00:03:47 - knowledge benefiting society, et cetera, the, the other, and that, you know, it was the incentive system that was doing that. The other concern that was voiced was, well, if academics become concerned about commercialization, they're going to, not be as willing to disclose their research findings. They'll wanna keep it private, certainly until it's patented, they won't disclose.

00:04:19 - is the sharing of knowledge and the fair and the rapid dissemination of findings, et cetera. Okay? At the, at the same time though, work that I had done before, and, and others, suggested in, in fact, you know, the other side of this is, is that academics and industry might not work too well together, because academics, when they come up with something new,

Bridging the Gap: Academic Aspirations vs. Corporate Secrecy

00:04:47 - they wanna climb the tallest mountain and tell the world about it. For firms, no, they do want to, you know, ke keep this, as private and as protected a as possible. So there was this other concern that, you know, this is actually going to be a fairly difficult to bridge the, the norms and incentives of these two worlds incentives in academia. And this was described actually by a, a sociologist, decades

00:05:21 - the real objective of academics and their careers is the achievement of eminence. What does that mean? That means, the, earning the respect of their academic, peers, and that that was key. And to be able to do that required disclosure, okay? And required the sharing and, and, and, that this, would throw sand in the gears, of, of,

00:05:52 - and academics in gen, in particular, and, and industry, which had a very different set of incentives. Okay? So that's the broad context, and those are the different concerns and themes that we're bouncing around. But all of this assumed that the motives of academics, basically, it assumed, and Merton assumed, that academics were sort of, if you to, to put it o too simply,

Exploring Academic Motives and Commercialization

00:06:23 - by the same motives and so on. And, and, and we came along and said, you know, we don't know. We're not sure, just from our own understanding of these relationships, the motives of academics may differ. and, and, and consequently, the activities and, and likelihood of academics, you know, either disclosing their research or changing their research agendas in the face

00:06:56 - complicated question in our view. Thus, we, we wanted to explore the relationship between the motives of individual academics, and, then essentially the degree, the to which they undertake commercialization activity, our measure of that, of that activity, not a great one, but it's what's available. It was the, it was, you know, did they,

00:07:28 - which was, which was patented by their universities. So that's the measure. And our measure of the motives was taken by a, survey conducted by the National Science Foundation in 2002, 2003 or so, and actually a couple of waves where they, asked academics, PhD academics. There were 2000 respondents roughly in the sample that we looked at. You know, what do you value in your career?

Exploring Academic Motives: Career Advancement vs. Contribution

00:07:59 - you know, do you, do you, value career advancement, which is, reasonable enough? certainly, do you, how much, you know, relative to income, you know, money, versus, in, in a career, do you look forward? Do you enjoy, what, how important is challenge, intellectual challenge? And then how important is the notion of, contributing

00:08:29 - So those were the motives that we explored, and we explored a across three. We, we, we just grouped, the fields of academia together, in just, just, you know, very coarsely. we had engineering on the one hand, life sciences, and then, physical sciences. And in engineering, we bunched within that, the, the applied sciences as well, like material science,

00:08:59 - and, and so we looked at these relationships between the activities, the commercialization activities as reflected in patenting, et cetera, and, and their motives, you know, including various controls, et cetera. And this was, by the way, this was not a, a study assessing causality. Certainly it was correlational, okay? We, we really, we, we could, we, you know, again, yes, it's a correlational, study of sorts.

Motives and Opportunity Costs in Academic Commercialization

00:09:33 - Separately, within each of these three broadly, defined fields. And, and, and, and, and perhaps, and, and, and let me tell you a little bit about our, our theory as well. It, that it, that the behavior of academics with regard to commercialization, our view would not be conditioned only by their motives, okay? It would also be conditioned by the opportunity costs

00:10:02 - Because it is true that in academia, particularly during the time period we were looking at, I think this is loosened up, it, it, it since then a bit, but, it, you know, again, it it's your publications. It's, the, the letters, review letters that are written by, you know, other scholars to that would affect your promotion and so on and, and so forth. So, if you were engaging in commercial work, okay,

00:10:36 - and that that was not consistent with academic work in your field, the opportunity of cost of that could be quite high. Okay? But that differs across fields. Say if you are in, you know, basic physics, that's gonna be pretty high. On the other hand, if you are in, computer science and fields of engineering, where normal research in academic research would really be

Exploring Opportunity Costs and Motives in Academic Research

00:11:08 - and problems that that could well have, commercial value. So in such fields, we postulated that the opportunity cost in those fields would be much lower. Whereas the opportunity cost, I mean, to pick an extreme example, astronomy, right? The opportunity cost of pursuing, commercial work there might be rather high. Okay? that, that, you know, or, or,

00:11:36 - but some subfields in mathematics, et cetera, would probably, not lend themselves to, you know, obvious, commercial application, et cetera. So this notion of opportunity cost play also plays a role. So you have motives. What, and what are motives, by the way? Motives are, are what you want, right? Those are, the, the, the, your, your objectives, your preferences for various outcomes. And here we had four, as I said, whether it's income, a work

00:12:11 - to society or simply to advance in your career, those are the motives we were talking about, versus these opportunity costs. Now, with that as background, we can start talking about the results and what we actually found. So perhaps the most notable finding is that the, those, academics who tended to patent the most,

Academics' Social Impact Over Personal Gain

00:12:38 - It was not income. It wasn't even career advancement. so clearly, and I ha I can stare at the, the findings right here. it was, contributing to society, social impact. And this was also consistent with some interviews that we've done and, and, and some, some quotes, et cetera from, and that's pretty interesting. Okay? That's a, that's a different take because, you know, historically, the, the norms of,

00:13:09 - that that won't benefit society. But in fact, what it appears to be, what appeared to be the case to us is that academics in the life sciences realized to get their, say if they, they, they, they identify a promising drug candidate, for whatever, Alzheimer's, you know, different forms of cancer, et cetera. That, that, that, in fact,

00:13:41 - for companies to pick those inventions up and actually, develop them, because most of the expense in drug development, I, I mean, it's enormous. You know, the, the cost of developing a new drug is well over a billion dollars at, at this point that academics came to realize that yes, the, that, to provide appropriate incentive or sufficient incentive for the companies, right,

Understanding Patents and Social Impact in Academic Research

00:14:11 - and actually, develop them, you know, do the preclinical research, but especially to run them through the clinical trials, et cetera, that they had to believe that they were protected, okay? That the intellectual property was protected. And we think that academics came to understand that. And so, so they saw then patents, and the patenting of their work as, quite consistent, but not, not con inconsistent with social impact, but quite consistent with social impact, okay?

00:14:44 - Patents are not, so prominent in other industries. In fact, from other work that I've done, in, in, in decades past, we, we've, know that that patents, are most effective in, in just a small handful of industries. But, and notably, pharmaceuticals, as well to, in, in many segments of medical devices in other industries, not because it's fairly easy to invent around patents, okay?

00:15:17 - of their ability to protect their, this intellectual property before they were going to sink hundreds of millions of dollars and more into their development. So social impact in, in, in, was the, key thing, and, and I'll get to some implications of that in a moment, but what we also found, which was interesting, we nev we if in the physical sciences, so the more upstream, you know, physics, e even chemistry, we, which surprised me a little bit,

Perceptions of Commercialization and Career Impact in Physical Sciences

00:15:50 - positively associated with patent. We found a motive negatively associated with patent, the motive of career advancement. What we were being told is, yes, it would appear that in the physical sciences doing commercially oriented work, would, would, would actually, that, that the perception was it would hurt your career. So, again, consistent with our notion that those fields where opportunity costs of pursuing these sorts

00:16:22 - and that there was no offsetting, or compensating advantage, then that would a actually, the prospect of doing that was not looked upon, all that well by, by, by academics. So in other words, we were looking at, at academics who had actually patented. And what appeared to be the case is that the way they answered the, the questionnaire, the res, from, from NSF appeared to suggest

00:16:53 - this is speculation, but perhaps they thought that this actually did not help them advance their academic, careers. And then also consistent with this notion of opportunity, cost be being important. then let's think about the fields that are, if you will, co who, whose normal academic work would be closest to, practical applications and thus, commercial applications, of

Motivations of Academics in Applied Sciences and Engineering

00:17:23 - So applied sciences and engineering, that, that the, the, these, these guys actually look pretty much like their, their peers, okay? That the, motives that they rated, most highly, those who patented, rated motives most highly of, both, in fact, career advancement. So it was not inconsistent in those fields to, to do

00:17:54 - and also intellectual challenge, which is, you would think that that's sort of a, a, a motive that cuts across all fields. But in other words, they saw a challenge in developing these practical applications and so on, which, which is consistent with what you might think of, for many of the fields of, engineering and, and applied sciences. So these motives were, were, so, what was interesting was the fact that that what motivated academics, that that clearly, when you talk about this issue of commercialization

00:18:27 - of work, it, it, it's, you should not paint academics with one brush. What we're talking about here are, are, are the, the differences, across motives within each of these fields that motivated the academics there to, to either pursue, commercial work as reflected in our, you know, cr proxy variable of patenting activity, or, or not.

Concerns Over Academic Disclosure and Commercial Research Impact

00:18:57 - before of these concerns that academics, who engaged in this kind of work would be, more reluctant to, disclose their work prominently, at least not until it was patented, and the, the intellectual property was, was buttoned down, if you, if you will. and, and, and let's go to the other concern that, if they're pursuing, if they, if they are pursuing, kind of commercially oriented work, this is going

00:19:29 - research mission, okay. That they should otherwise be pursuing for, you know, for benefit of society. Well, it suggests that in, in a number of very important fields, okay? and this is, this is consistent with some of the other literature, that, and I'll discuss that briefly, that no, that th this isn't, you know, in the engineer, what I call broadly engineering applied sciences. This is utterly consistent, okay?

00:19:59 - otherwise, so that that sort of trade off might not be as salient, a, a a as some had had thought. so because there, there really was, a, a lot of concern over by Dole and the kinds of incentives that it would put in place and should that be, restricted, should it be rolled back, et cetera. So clearly from that perspective, certainly for those fields, less of a concern and, and some other literature, as well, done by,

Academic Patenting and Research Productivity: Analyzing Trade-offs

00:20:37 - academics who, who did, you know, pursue patenting and, and, and, other commercial activity, that their research productivity was not suffering at all. In fact, though this may reflect a bit of a selection, phenomena, that many of the academics who were the most prolific patenters were also the most prolific scholars. So, that now I, that relationship is, is not causal

00:21:07 - Again, can't, can't make anyone circumspect about the concerns over the trade-off. On the other hand, our, our, discussion of, physical sciences would suggest, well, maybe those trade-offs do apply in some of the physical sciences, but then the question is, is, well, how important is that? What's the extent of, of this kind of activity and, and what the particular trade-offs are? But in other words, what, what it's suggesting is that,

00:21:43 - on a field by field basis, right? But with some understanding of the, of the different fields. And when you go to something like, the, the life sciences where we, you know, where social impact, where, where contribution to society is, is the most salient motive. Wow. Well, you know, what that could imply is that those academics are, are, are still, are,

Assessing the Impact of Patenting on Academic Knowledge Diffusion

00:22:11 - and disclose their results, and are not that concerned about their own income ability to, to gain personal advantage from, from, you know, their commercially oriented work. Though, though, that raises another interesting question, but the firms are concerned, as I said a moment ago, and in some other work that we've just done. So we, we have a, I have another paper with a couple of con,

00:22:41 - and a colleague here at Duke. it, it, the title of the paper is Measuring the Commercial Potential of Science, and we use, machine learning models, okay. to assess the commercial potential, not of a patent, but of an article. Okay? Okay. Will, what's the likelihood that this article will contribute to a, essentially a a,

00:23:12 - Okay? And, you know, we use million. It is a big data project, a machine learning project, and really quite, quite exciting. But one of the findings from that, we, we applied this model and said, and tried to apply it to this question of just patenting. so this, the privatization, if you will, of academic science in the form of patents, does that restrict the diffusion of that knowledge in society

Patenting and Knowledge Diffusion in Commercial Science

00:23:44 - Okay? And we, with this measure, what we're able to do is compare the diffusion, the use of this patents as reflected whether the, the, the, the, the patents are cited in, in patents, in firm's, patents, not university's patents in firm's patents. If this restricts diffusion across, we looked at the question, does it restrict diffusion of this knowledge even across firms? No, let's say, and, and, and what we found was that, the,

00:24:18 - that the patenting of commer of highly commercializable science, okay? compared to other academic comparably, commercializable science, right? It's not patented. 'cause most of the commercializable science in universities doesn't go through, tech transfer office. It is not patented. It gets out to, to firms through articles and so on, through other channels.

00:24:49 - So, so we compared this and said, okay, if you patent this piece of commercializable science, is that cited by, fewer or more firms than comparably commercializable science that is not patented from, an unnamed major research university, okay? Where, which is where we had our data, and the answer is it was actually, the number

Impact of Patenting on Knowledge Diffusion

00:25:20 - for the science that was patented versus the science that was not, we do not know why, but we, we, so in other words, this concern to, to, to our minds, the, the, the, the and, and frankly, in terms of this debate, I was probably on the other side of this debate. I was agnostic. I, I play, when I do my research, we, we, you know, as I tell all my PhD students, you,

00:25:48 - I mean, you just, you know, whatever it is, it is, and you just use the most rigorous methods, the best data you can use, and so on and so forth. It appeared that, that for some reasons, again, that we don't know that the patenting of that, of these findings, again, controlling for all kinds of things, did not, dampen the, the diffusion of the, of that knowledge of across firms. In the nineties, what you had was just a, just a, a,

00:26:23 - a across universities in the United States. And as you probably know, a lot of European nations. And by, you know, and England, is very concerned with, you know, issues around commercialization of, of academic research and throughout Europe, et cetera. And many, nations have taken the By, by do, by do, amendment as a, as a model to try to get the incentives right. Although that as well is, is, is, is

Intellectual Property Ownership in Academia: Beyond University Control

00:26:56 - There was a publication in the, a couple of years ago that suggested no, the, default ownership of, of, intellectual property originating from academia should not reside with the university. It should reside with the professor, okay? In, in American universities, it is the university and the professor get, gets some, if there are, if there are, are, if there are earnings,

00:27:32 - the professor gets, typically in the US a share, maybe 25, maybe 30%, maybe a third or so university owns it. And that's up to the, the university to, to how much, you know, they, they're, they're going to share, et cetera. But, there, they found looking, doing an experiment, I think it was for Norway, that actually what the, what was what's called professors privilege, seemed to seem to work better. So there are a lot of discussions here, what kind

00:28:01 - would, would, would work best. But the common one is, I think what we see here with our, with by do. But to get to your point, I can say there's certainly a lot more commercial activity, coming out of universities, o over, you know, the past, several decades. And, and then my, my instinct, is in answering your question, and this is speculation, have we, can I say that

Balancing Commercialization and Social Impact in Research

00:28:35 - upstream research, less upstream research? I can't speak to that. My hunch is that it's had relatively little effect, but that it is true that even funding agencies, no less governments have become more and more concerned with, the ability of this knowledge to, translate, to transfer to the commercial sphere. Because at the end of the day, it's

00:29:06 - that this knowledge will ultimately has a, social impact, right? It has to show up in the form of, new services, new products, new capabilities, et cetera. And it, and that's, well, not always. Sometimes it's via government action, but, but for the most part, it's, you know, through the commercial sphere that this actually will benefit society. Again, think of the drug industry. You know, it's, it's,

00:29:34 - that companies will make money from that, that, that, that's, you know, it benefits, society and obviously the companies as well, and they're all issues there about access and pricing associated with patenting, et cetera. That, but which isn't all, you know, that those are complicated questions. 'cause with patenting also comes the ability, to charge high prices, which, you know, basically, excludes a lot of people, from, availing themselves