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Political power sharing in post-conflict democracies

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Chelsea Johnson employs data from the Varieties of Democracy project to test arguments about the pernicious institutional effects of political power-sharing settlements in post-conflict democracies

Image courtesy of interviewee. September 12, 2024

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This video discusses the impact of political power-sharing agreements in post-conflict democracies, primarily focusing on Lebanon and comparing it to situations in Sub-Saharan Africa. It begins by recounting the explosive event in Beirut in 2020, which resulted from long-term governmental negligence and sparked widespread protests, linking this to historical power-sharing arrangements that have led to governmental paralysis and corruption.

The narrative examines the Taif Agreement from 1989, which established a power-sharing system in Lebanon. While it ended violence at the time, it has since been criticized for causing gridlock and increasing corruption. The speaker then shifts their focus to Sub-Saharan Africa, where many nations democratized in the early 1990s, leading to an increase in civil wars and necessitating new power-sharing arrangements.

This video further delves into the theoretical frameworks of accountability within democratic systems—both vertical (elections) and horizontal (checks and balances)—and contemplates the adverse effects associated with power-sharing systems, notably the reduced motivation of politicians to appeal to voters and the potential for corruption when former warlords gain political power.

Despite these concerns, the speaker notes that some power-sharing arrangements—particularly transitional ones—can yield positive outcomes, such as improved electoral quality and greater inclusivity for marginalized groups. Therefore, they argue that while criticism exists around power-sharing, it can facilitate peace and pave the way for better democratic practices over time, suggesting that these arrangements can evolve to enhance accountability as conditions stabilize post-conflict. They advocate for more nuanced discussions about power-sharing to understand its varied impacts across different contexts.

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Here are five key points from the video regarding political power-sharing arrangements and their implications for democratic quality:

1. **Origins of Political Issues**: The speaker discusses the failure of the Lebanese government to address safety concerns surrounding a large stockpile of ammonium nitrate, which ultimately led to a devastating explosion in 2020. This incident triggered widespread protests and highlighted deep-rooted issues stemming from historical power-sharing agreements made to end the Lebanese civil war.

2. **Power-Sharing Agreements**: The video explains the Taif Agreement of 1989, which established a power-sharing arrangement between Lebanon's religious factions, allocating government positions in a manner that aimed to balance power. However, over time, this system has been criticized for contributing to governmental paralysis and corruption, as it creates gridlock and entrenches political elites without accountability.

3. **Impact on Democracy**: The speaker suggests that while power-sharing solutions may temporarily resolve conflict and provide representation, they can also lead to anti-democratic tendencies. This is evident in cases where entrenched elites prioritize self-interest and corruption over the rule of law and good governance.

4. **Comparative Analysis in Africa**: The speaker aims to analyze post-conflict democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa and how political power-sharing affects democratic quality. Findings indicate that power-sharing can either lead to improvements in vertical accountability (responsiveness of elected officials to voters) or perpetuate corruption and a decline in the rule of law, depending on whether the arrangements are transitional or constitutionalized.

5. **Optimism and Caution**: The findings suggest a mixed picture: while constitutionalized power-sharing often results in negative outcomes like increased corruption, transitional arrangements have shown better results in terms of accountability and democratic practice. The analysis emphasizes the need for nuanced discussions around the effects of political power-sharing to understand its varied impacts in different convideos.

These points encapsulate the central arguments and findings discussed in the video regarding the complexities and implications of political power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict settings.

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Here are some key quotes from the video:

1. **Background and Inspiration:**
- "The inspiration for this project for me was the explosion that happened in Beirut a few years ago. I'm sure you remember, it was major international news."

2. **Impact of the Explosion:**
- "Hundreds of people died, billions in property damage...it left around 30,000 people in Beirut homeless."

3. **Government Negligence:**
- "The cargo had been sitting there for six years since being confiscated...the government had done nothing about it despite repeated letters being written from the port authorities."

4. **Political Convideo:**
- "The government's failure to act...has its roots tracing back to this power sharing deal struck 30 years earlier to sort of bring an end to Lebanon's 15 year civil war."

5. **Political Power Sharing:**
- "This settlement, the Taif agreements from 1989, was really successful in bringing an end to the violence at the time...but, you know, 30 years down the line, it's now being blamed by voters for this perceived government paralysis."

6. **Consensus on Power Sharing:**
- "These kinds of power sharing solutions may be a necessary evil to resolve conflict, but there's an inherent trade off and inherent sort of anti-democratic quality."

7. **Democratization in Africa:**
- "...this is also a really useful testing ground for these kinds of questions...three out of four countries in Africa democratized in the early 1990s."

8. **Trade-offs in Democracy:**
- "There's a trade off in any democracy between representativeness and accountability."

9. **Vertical vs Horizontal Accountability:**
- "You have these vertical accountability...linkages between voters and the politicians who represent them...but we also have these horizontal mechanisms of accountability."

10. **Findings on Political Power Sharing:**
- "Some of the pessimism about the effects of political power sharing on the quality of democracy have some merit, especially when it comes to measures of horizontal accountability."

11. **Corruption and Self-Enrichment:**
- "They have seen significant increases in levels of corruption...if you put...former rebel leaders into guaranteed positions of power...they might engage in self enrichment."

12. **Optimism about Political Power Sharing:**
- "Countries that have implemented these kinds of solutions...have seen huge improvements in vertical accountability compared to those that have not."

13. **Inclusion and Participation:**
- "Political power sharing has actually had a hugely positive effect on...the inclusion and participation of broader segments of society."

14. **Key Takeaway:**
- "Putting in place these kinds of institutional guarantees that the elites of different groups will have privileged access to power...makes them more willing to give up their weapons."

15. **Transitional Power Sharing:**
- "Transitional power sharing bargains might actually be sort of the best of both worlds because they create this discreet payoff for...rebel elites...and put...a limit on the amount of time the warlords are in politics."

These quotes encapsulate the main themes and arguments presented in the video, focusing on the interplay between political power sharing, accountability, and democracy, especially in post-conflict settings.

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Here are some articles that are similar in theme or content to the video you , which discusses the socio-political convideo of the Beirut explosion, political power-sharing arrangements, and their implications for democracy, particularly in post-conflict societies:

1. **"Power-Sharing Agreements: A Double-Edged Sword?"** - This article explores the impact of power-sharing agreements in post-conflict situations, evaluating both the benefits (like peacekeeping) and drawbacks (such as promoting corruption and inefficiency in governance).

2. **"The Aftermath of the Beirut Blast: Governance and Accountability Issues"** - A detailed analysis of the political failures that contributed to the Beirut explosion and the subsequent public unrest, linking it to the broader challenges of governance in Lebanon.

3. **"Power Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Lessons from Africa"** - This article compares various power-sharing models implemented in African nations after civil conflict and assesses their long-term effects on democratic institutions and accountability.

4. **"Corruption in Transitional Governments: Case Studies from Syria and Lebanon"** - An examination of how transitional governments, particularly in conflict zones, often fail to address systemic corruption and the implications for democratic governance.

5. **"Democracy and Corruption: The Case of Lebanon"** - This piece explores the relationship between democratic processes and corruption in Lebanon, emphasizing how political elites exploit power-sharing arrangements for personal gain.

6. **"Explaining Political Gridlock: The Impact of Ethno-Religious Power Sharing"** - A critical look at how power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic and religious identities can lead to political paralysis, drawing parallels with the Lebanese model.

7. **"The Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: Insights from Lebanon"** - Discusses how civil society movements in Lebanon have emerged in response to governance failures post-explosion and their influence on political change.

8. **"Transitional Justice and Political Reform: The Case of Post-Civil War Lebanon"** - This article analyzes how transitional justice mechanisms can help or hinder political reform in post-civil war societies, using Lebanon as a case study.

These articles might provide deeper insights into the themes of governance, accountability, power-sharing, and their consequences in post-conflict environments, similar to the content of the video you .

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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A bit of background, in terms of the inspiration

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for this project for me, was the, explosion

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that happened in Beirut a few years ago.

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I'm sure you remember, it was major international news.

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Um, there was a sort of cargo storage, several tons

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of ammonium nitrate in the Port of Beirut, which exploded

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around August, 2020.

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Um, you know, hundreds of people died,

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billions in property damage.

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Um, I think it left around 30,000 people in Beirut homeless.

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And it set out this, set off this sort of wave

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of protests in Lebanon, against government negligence.

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Uh, because, you know, the, the cargo had been sitting there

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for six years since being confiscated.

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Uh, and the government had done nothing about it despite

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repeated letters being written from the port authorities,

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customs officials, local communities, neighborhoods,

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surrounding the port, about safety concerns.

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Um, and, you know, so, you know,

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what was really striking

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to me when I was reading these news reports, was that,

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you know, they were interviewing people involved in the

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protests, people, in local neighborhoods.

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And people kept, sort of bringing up this idea that,

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the government's failure to act,

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to prevent the explosion has its roots tracing back

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to this power sharing deal that was struck 30 years earlier,

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to sort of bring an end to Lebanon's 15 year civil war.

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Uh, so the idea was essentially, that,

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an an attempt to sort of shift power away from the ruling,

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Christian Maronite minority,

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and, towards, what had become a, Muslim

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majority in the country.

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So there was a sort of, 50 50 allocation

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of seats in parliament

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and in the, executive cabinet,

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the president would be a Christian,

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but the prime minister

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and the speaker of, of the house would be Muslim

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and significant, powers, in, the, in terms of,

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you know, the executive branch and,

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and in terms of government were shifted towards,

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the Prime Minister and away from the president.

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Um, so this, settlement, the Taif agreements,

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from 1989, was really successful in bringing an end

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to the violence at the time.

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It's known as a sort of pillar of mutual coexistence

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between Lebanon's, three

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ethno religious com communities.

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Um, but, you know, 30 years down the line,

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it's now being blamed by voters

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for this perceived government paralysis.

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So, you know, in order to get any major decisions done,

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you need an agreement between this sort of trifecta

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of president, prime minister,

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and speaker, which results in a lot of gridlock.

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And, you know, people are also pointing

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to the increase in corruption and graft.

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Essentially, what you have was former warlords

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who led the different ethno religious militias associated

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With Lebanon's various political parties

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during the war being cemented as party leaders.

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Uh, and they only come from really a handful

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of powerful elite families in Lebanon, right?

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So what this was, bringing to mind for me is this,

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consensus in academic work, that these kinds

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of power sharing solutions may be a necessary evil

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to resolve conflict, but there's an inherent trade off

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and inherent sort of anti-democratic, quality.

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Um, and this is echoed in a, in a

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and, you know, a lot of,

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academic work on democratization.

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So I thought it would be really interesting

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to test this sort of puzzle on this larger sample of,

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post-conflict democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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So, you know, this is my area of regional expertise,

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but it's also a really useful testing ground

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for these kinds of questions.

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Um, you know, because, three out

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of four countries in Africa democratized in the early 1990s.

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So right around the same time, 36 out

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of 48 countries in the region are holding their first

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multi-party elections.

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Um, this sort of sets off a sort of spike in civil wars

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that we see in the region.

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So different subnational groups are competing against each

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other at the ballot box, over power for the first time.

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There's no longer a dictator in power to use repression

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to sort of stamp down on violence.

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So see a spike in the frequency of civil wars by the end

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of the 1990s, early two thousands,

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these are increasingly being resolved through these kinds

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of political power sharing bargains

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and attempt to sort of reform the democratic system,

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in order to reduce, tendencies, for violence.

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So the question then is, you know,

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what's happened in the decades since, do this sort of

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negative expectations that we have about the pernicious

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effects of political power sharing on the quality

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of democracy, sort of bear out in the data,

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academic work on, democratic quality.

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Uh, democratic consolidation, tends to, look at,

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two different categories or mechanisms of accountability.

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So you have these vertical accountability, kind

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of linkages between voters

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and the politicians who represent them, right?

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This is also referred to as electoral accountability.

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So how responsive are elected officials to the demands

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of their constituents, that sort of thing.

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Uh, but we also have these horizontal

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mechanisms of accountability.

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So checks and balances between different branches

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of government, the degree

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to which government institutions

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or agencies are able to place effective constraints,

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especially on the exercise of executive power.

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Okay? So, two different, forms

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of accountability at work in, you know,

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what we would think of as a good democracy.

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Um, and there's this sort

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of consensus in the democracy literature

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that there's a trade off in any democracy

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between representativeness and accountability.

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You increase one, you improve one,

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and that's gonna have sort of knock on effects,

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in the other category.

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So when it comes to a political power sharing system,

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what you have is guaranteed representation

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of the political elites representing different social groups

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in various levers of, power, right?

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Various sort of positions

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of political decision making at the national level.

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So the argument is that this means that,

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politicians don't have to mobilize a majority

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of votes in order to win office.

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Uh, the idea is that they are less incentivized to appeal

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to voters to sort of invest in good policies,

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the kinds of things that would get them elected and so on.

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So, my work in general, I should say,

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you know, sort of tries to complicate

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or add nuance to, the sort of

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what we mean when we say

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or talk about political power sharing.

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Um, so not every power sharing formula, that

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or solution to resolve,

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an armed conflict looks the same in every country.

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There's a huge amount of variation, in terms of,

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you know, what these kinds of, arrangements,

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actually look like.

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And because of that, you know, I don't think

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that we should expect them

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to have the same impact on the quality of democracy

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in all places to the same degree.

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And we certainly shouldn't expect them

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to affect the different sort of mechanisms

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of accountability in the same way.

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Uh, so I think it's important, to try to sort

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of disaggregate that,

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and think about, different things,

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that might be going on.

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My, analysis here relies on this really exciting new

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data that we have, coming out of the Varieties

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of Democracy Project, which is,

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based at the University of Gutenberg.

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Um, so they provide, this,

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this huge array of, coatings

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of, different various, sort

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of institutional elements

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that we might associate with democracy.

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And they, they rely on, surveys of country experts

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to give a score across dozens, if not hundreds of indicators

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for every country for every year, over time.

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So, really, this makes the data

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that we had on democratic quality across countries,

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before this look quite crude by comparison,

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because it allows us to do several things.

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One, it allows us to sort of aggregate all

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of these different indicators,

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into a much more sensitive, index,

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that really reflects much more of a spectrum

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of democratic ness, than we ever had before.

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And we can pick and choose based on

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how do we actually define democracy?

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What does democracy mean to us?

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What do we mean when we are using that term,

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Right? Um, instead

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of just sort of a catchall kind of,

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umbrella concept.

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Uh, the other advantage is that then we can disaggregate

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how we measure democracy according

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to these very specific indicators,

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getting at different kinds of institutional elements.

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So, taking vertical accountability just

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as one example, right?

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I can disaggregate according to,

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the cleanliness of elections, right?

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So how free and fair elections are,

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how responsive are politicians, to voters?

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How, sort

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of institutionalized is the political party system?

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How active and robust is civil society?

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How participatory, is the system?

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How much are women empowered and, and involved and, and,

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and so on, a across, as I say, dozens of different,

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indicators we might be interested in.

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Uh, and I can do the same of course

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for horizontal accountability as well.

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So the idea is, is essentially,

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I use a statistical technique that allows me to determine to

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what extent, changes in these different measures

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of accountability are associated with the implementation

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of a political power sharing solution to

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conflict, while sort

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of holding all other potential effects on

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accountability constant, right?

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We want to control for things like economic growth

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and, how decentralized the system is,

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and all these other things that might have an in independent

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effect on, accountability or the quality of democracy.

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The basic idea is, what I wanna do is, is look at all

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of the post-conflict democracies in,

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in Sub-Saharan Inca, right?

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There's about 25 or 30 of them,

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and I can compare changes across time

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and the quality of democracy, different measures

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of accountability among those countries

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that have implemented, political power sharing system

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at the end of their civil war.

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To those that did not, I think that there are,

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a few results of the analysis that I think,

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are quite interesting.

10:57.125 --> 11:01.345
So, on the one hand, there is something to suggest

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that some of the pessimism about, the effects

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of political power sharing on the quality of democracy,

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have some merit, especially when it comes to measures

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of horizontal accountability.

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So among post-conflict democracies in the region

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that implemented, political power sharing, reforms,

11:19.335 --> 11:24.015
some sort of, constitutionalized arrangement,

11:24.805 --> 11:26.815
they have seen increases,

11:26.815 --> 11:29.255
significant increases in levels of corruption.

11:30.115 --> 11:33.175
And they also haven't seen the same improvements

11:33.315 --> 11:34.415
in the rule of law.

11:34.415 --> 11:36.695
They haven't really kept up with improvements,

11:36.695 --> 11:38.535
in the rule of law that we've seen in the rest

11:38.535 --> 11:40.255
of the region over the past few decades.

11:41.725 --> 11:43.945
That's, you know, not surprising.

11:44.085 --> 11:48.855
We would expect that if you, put, these sorts of,

11:49.075 --> 11:52.295
former rebel leaders into guaranteed positions of power

11:52.325 --> 11:54.045
that are actually actually quite lucrative,

11:54.315 --> 11:57.285
they might engage in self enrichment, right?

11:57.905 --> 12:01.285
Um, so for one example, the, leader of the,

12:01.425 --> 12:05.565
the RUF rebellion in, Sierra Leone at the end

12:05.565 --> 12:08.965
of Sierra Leone civil War in 2001, fo Sanko was

12:09.755 --> 12:14.285
appointed as chairman of the country's, commission on,

12:14.505 --> 12:15.725
diamonds, right?

12:15.785 --> 12:17.805
An incredibly lucrative kind of position.

12:18.185 --> 12:21.485
Uh, and, you know, similarly, other arrangements,

12:21.925 --> 12:25.445
allocate cabinet positions to leaders of former rebellions

12:25.445 --> 12:28.725
or their representatives positions like, minister

12:28.725 --> 12:30.005
of Defense or interior.

12:30.545 --> 12:32.645
All of these provide these opportunities

12:33.025 --> 12:34.685
for kickbacks, essentially, right?

12:34.705 --> 12:38.765
You exchange access to a mining concession

12:39.025 --> 12:42.765
or a lucrative defense contract in exchange for a kickback

12:42.955 --> 12:45.525
that goes directly into the offshore secrecy account

12:45.665 --> 12:47.525
of whatever political leader is, is holding

12:47.525 --> 12:48.805
that position at the time.

12:49.425 --> 12:51.485
Not hugely surprising,

12:51.505 --> 12:53.365
and we also probably wouldn't expect

12:53.395 --> 12:55.485
that these people would then willingly

12:55.485 --> 12:58.125
or voluntarily implement reforms that would

12:59.515 --> 13:01.675
increase the constraints on their ability

13:01.735 --> 13:04.195
to engage in this kind of rent seeking behavior by,

13:04.195 --> 13:06.395
for example, increasing the independence

13:06.935 --> 13:09.195
or, the powers of the courts.

13:09.195 --> 13:11.435
There is something to be said there, clearly.

13:12.735 --> 13:15.075
On the other hand, I think there's two reasons,

13:15.075 --> 13:17.515
that we might be a little bit more optimistic.

13:18.255 --> 13:22.995
Um, for one thing, this negative impacts, in terms

13:22.995 --> 13:24.675
of horizontal accountability scores

13:24.675 --> 13:27.675
that I've just described, is really limited to

13:28.235 --> 13:29.435
a very specific subset

13:29.655 --> 13:32.155
of political power sharing, bargains.

13:32.175 --> 13:34.915
And that is those where these,

13:35.035 --> 13:36.995
formulas are constitutionalized,

13:36.995 --> 13:39.235
they're enshrined in the constitution in a way

13:39.235 --> 13:40.235
that looks really similar to

13:40.235 --> 13:42.795
what I described in Lebanon at the beginning.

13:43.695 --> 13:45.635
Um, we see a similar sort of,

13:46.035 --> 13:49.595
solution in places like Mozambique, Burundi,

13:49.605 --> 13:53.555
where 20, 30 years on, we see much higher levels,

13:53.575 --> 13:54.955
of corruption,

13:55.175 --> 13:57.515
and, you know, really poor scores in terms

13:57.515 --> 13:58.795
of the rule of law, and so on.

13:59.175 --> 14:01.435
On the other hand, a huge number

14:01.435 --> 14:03.715
of political power sharing bargains,

14:03.935 --> 14:07.275
in the African region were actually transitional in nature.

14:07.575 --> 14:10.315
Uh, so they were essentially, sort of

14:11.155 --> 14:12.155
temporary coalitions

14:12.155 --> 14:13.955
or unity governments that were inclusive

14:14.015 --> 14:17.995
of former warring parties, that were only designed,

14:17.995 --> 14:20.515
to sort of oversee, transitional period,

14:20.655 --> 14:23.875
and then expire once post-conflict elections were held.

14:24.215 --> 14:26.195
And in fact, in those countries,

14:26.295 --> 14:29.075
we actually see really marked improvements in horizontal

14:29.075 --> 14:30.475
accountability over the long term.

14:30.695 --> 14:33.635
So improvements in judicial constraints,

14:33.635 --> 14:34.915
improvements in the rule of law

14:34.915 --> 14:36.195
and lower levels of corruption.

14:37.375 --> 14:39.755
So the second thing I think, that's,

14:39.755 --> 14:42.715
looking a bit more positive here has to do with the,

14:42.815 --> 14:45.115
the relationship between political power sharing

14:45.415 --> 14:46.995
and measures of vertical accountability.

14:47.455 --> 14:50.795
Uh, so what I actually have found is that in any, you know,

14:50.795 --> 14:53.295
Any way that you define or measure political power

14:53.295 --> 14:56.415
sharing, countries that have implemented these kinds

14:56.415 --> 14:59.295
of solutions to civil war have seen huge improvements,

14:59.395 --> 15:01.855
in vertical accountability compared to those that have not.

15:01.955 --> 15:04.615
So, especially when it comes to things like the cleanliness

15:04.615 --> 15:08.175
of elections, you know, it, it makes sense

15:08.175 --> 15:12.335
that if you provide sort of guaranteed seats for the elites

15:12.335 --> 15:14.175
of different social groups so that, you know,

15:14.175 --> 15:17.975
they don't have to manipulate elections in order to win,

15:18.175 --> 15:21.775
a majority, we're gonna see less vote rigging, vote buying,

15:22.235 --> 15:24.735
the use of violence to intimidate supporters

15:24.735 --> 15:26.735
of opposition, political parties, and so on.

15:27.355 --> 15:30.095
Uh, so that's, you know, something to be positive about.

15:30.845 --> 15:33.175
Also, in terms of inclusion

15:33.235 --> 15:35.575
and participation of broader segments

15:35.575 --> 15:38.175
of society in Sub-Saharan Africa, it seems

15:38.175 --> 15:40.415
that political power sharing has actually had a hugely

15:40.655 --> 15:42.055
positive effect on that.

15:42.315 --> 15:44.735
And I think looking back at a lot of the academic work,

15:44.735 --> 15:47.295
suggesting that that might not be the case,

15:47.295 --> 15:49.855
what I find is that the focus has really been on a small

15:49.855 --> 15:52.375
subset of potentially really unique cases such

15:52.375 --> 15:54.615
as Northern Ireland after the Belfast agreement.

15:55.115 --> 15:58.455
Uh, and in fact, you know, in, in, in Africa at the onset

15:58.455 --> 16:02.335
of democracy, broader, inclusion of society coming out

16:02.335 --> 16:05.015
of that sort of authoritarian period was the,

16:05.215 --> 16:06.415
the bar was quite low.

16:06.915 --> 16:09.415
And, what the data suggests is that countries

16:09.415 --> 16:12.095
that implemented political power sharing, potentially

16:12.095 --> 16:14.815
because they see, you know, there, there's less need

16:14.835 --> 16:17.775
for elite meddling in the electoral system,

16:17.885 --> 16:21.335
there's been a significant increase in the inclusion

16:21.335 --> 16:24.255
and participation of women and other minority groups.

16:24.615 --> 16:27.895
I think for me, the, the sort of key takeaway of this study,

16:28.235 --> 16:31.895
is that a lot of the criticism that exists around,

16:31.895 --> 16:34.455
political power sharing, in terms

16:34.455 --> 16:36.415
of its effects on democracy,

16:36.555 --> 16:38.575
is unfounded, for a few reasons.

16:38.995 --> 16:42.215
Um, you know, putting in place these kinds of institutional

16:42.735 --> 16:43.815
guarantees that the elites

16:43.815 --> 16:46.815
of different groups will have privileged access to power,

16:47.555 --> 16:48.615
which they are

16:48.615 --> 16:51.095
otherwise willing to fight for with violence,

16:51.865 --> 16:54.015
makes them more willing to give up their weapons.

16:54.595 --> 16:55.775
Um, and it's difficult

16:55.775 --> 16:57.775
to have a well-functioning democracy in the midst

16:57.775 --> 17:00.615
of a civil war, or at least the ongoing threat

17:00.735 --> 17:02.335
that another conflict will break out.

17:02.835 --> 17:07.815
So this might mean sacrificing some democratic purity,

17:08.005 --> 17:11.175
some competitiveness, for the sake of peace.

17:11.755 --> 17:15.095
It may mean that these political elites, continue

17:15.095 --> 17:16.855
to engage in self enrichment

17:17.115 --> 17:20.335
and stand in the way of improvements in the rule of law.

17:20.995 --> 17:23.735
Uh, but it also means that without this constant threat

17:23.735 --> 17:26.615
of violence, democracy can progress in other

17:26.615 --> 17:28.015
important sort of areas.

17:28.355 --> 17:32.895
So over a, number of peaceful election cycles,

17:32.995 --> 17:37.215
we see elections becoming cleaner, freer from manipulation,

17:37.325 --> 17:40.415
even if they are relatively less, competitive.

17:40.755 --> 17:42.895
We see them becoming more participatory

17:43.155 --> 17:45.855
and inclusive of, of broader segments of society.

17:46.675 --> 17:49.480
Um, and I think the other important thing to emphasize here,

17:49.480 --> 17:53.245
because it's sort of consistent with my larger, body

17:53.245 --> 17:57.165
of scholarship and my research agenda, is

17:57.195 --> 18:00.565
that there's a need to be a bit more precise when we talk

18:00.565 --> 18:02.845
about political power sharing, in general.

18:03.465 --> 18:06.725
Um, and especially to distinguish between the kinds of

18:07.325 --> 18:09.085
constitutionalized systems that we see in Lebanon

18:09.825 --> 18:12.485
and, these other, potentially more common

18:13.215 --> 18:17.015
transitional bargains, that that, that we often see,

18:17.015 --> 18:19.815
in Sub-Saharan Africa, similar to the one I described,

18:19.815 --> 18:21.375
in Sierra Leone a bit earlier.

18:21.595 --> 18:23.175
So, transitional,

18:23.265 --> 18:26.495
power sharing bargains might actually be sort of the best

18:26.495 --> 18:29.695
of both worlds because they, they create this sort

18:29.695 --> 18:34.255
of discreet payoff for, rebel elites,

18:34.565 --> 18:36.975
that makes them more willing to hand over their weapons

18:37.595 --> 18:41.335
and disarm, you know, this, sort of willingness

18:41.355 --> 18:44.935
to allow for a little bit of, of corruption

18:45.235 --> 18:49.735
and rent seeking, in exchange, for buy-in

18:50.195 --> 18:53.415
to, a war to democracy transition, right?

18:53.475 --> 18:56.655
And they act as this sort of sunset flaws that,

18:56.805 --> 18:59.695
naturally put places a limit on the amount

18:59.695 --> 19:02.415
of time the warlords are in politics, right?

19:02.415 --> 19:04.535
Because the, the transitional bargain

19:04.955 --> 19:06.175
has an expiration date.

19:06.675 --> 19:10.135
Uh, and once it is dissolved, we can eventually,

19:10.155 --> 19:12.735
see marked improvements across all measures of,

19:12.735 --> 19:15.255
democratic accountability that we might,

19:15.535 --> 19:15.895
actually care about.

"Power Sharing and Governance: Lessons from the Beirut Explosion and Its Implications for Post-Conflict Democracies"

00:00:00 - A bit of background, in terms of the inspiration for this project for me, was the, explosion that happened in Beirut a few years ago. I'm sure you remember, it was major international news. there was a sort of cargo storage, several tons of ammonium nitrate in the Port of Beirut, which exploded around August, 2020. you know, hundreds of people died, billions in property damage. I think it left around 30,000 people in Beirut homeless. And it set out this, set off this sort of wave of protests in Lebanon, against government negligence. because, you know, the, the cargo had been sitting there
00:00:45 - and the government had done nothing about it despite repeated letters being written from the port authorities, customs officials, local communities, neighborhoods, surrounding the port, about safety concerns. and, you know, so, you know, what was really striking to me when I was reading these news reports, was that, you know, they were interviewing people involved in the protests, people, in local neighborhoods. And people kept, sort of bringing up this idea that, the government's failure to act, to prevent the explosion has its roots tracing back to this power sharing deal that was struck 30 years earlier,
00:01:29 - so the idea was essentially, that, an an attempt to sort of shift power away from the ruling, Christian Maronite minority, and, towards, what had become a, Muslim majority in the country. So there was a sort of, 50 50 allocation of seats in parliament and in the, executive cabinet, the president would be a Christian, but the prime minister and the speaker of, of the house would be Muslim and significant, powers, in, the, in terms of,
00:02:06 - and in terms of government were shifted towards, the Prime Minister and away from the president. so this, settlement, the Taif agreements, from 1989, was really successful in bringing an end to the violence at the time. It's known as a sort of pillar of mutual coexistence between Lebanon's, three ethno religious com communities. but, you know, 30 years down the line, it's now being blamed by voters for this perceived government paralysis. So, you know, in order to get any major decisions done, you need an agreement between this sort of trifecta of president, prime minister, and speaker, which results in a lot of gridlock.
00:02:50 - to the increase in corruption and graft. Essentially, what you have was former warlords who led the different ethno religious militias associated With Lebanon's various political parties during the war being cemented as party leaders. and they only come from really a handful of powerful elite families in Lebanon, right? So what this was, bringing to mind for me is this, consensus in academic work, that these kinds of power sharing solutions may be a necessary evil to resolve conflict, but there's an inherent trade off and inherent sort of anti-democratic, quality.
00:03:31 - and, you know, a lot of, academic work on democratization. So I thought it would be really interesting to test this sort of puzzle on this larger sample of, post-conflict democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa. So, you know, this is my area of regional expertise, but it's also a really useful testing ground for these kinds of questions. you know, because, three out of four countries in Africa democratized in the early 1990s. So right around the same time, 36 out of 48 countries in the region are holding their first multi-party elections. this sort of sets off a sort of spike in civil wars that we see in the region. So different subnational groups are competing against each

"Examining Political Power Sharing: Accountability and Democratic Quality in Post-Conflict Societies"

00:04:16 - There's no longer a dictator in power to use repression to sort of stamp down on violence. So see a spike in the frequency of civil wars by the end of the 1990s, early two thousands, these are increasingly being resolved through these kinds of political power sharing bargains and attempt to sort of reform the democratic system, in order to reduce, tendencies, for violence. So the question then is, you know, what's happened in the decades since, do this sort of negative expectations that we have about the pernicious effects of political power sharing on the quality of democracy, sort of bear out in the data,
00:04:56 - democratic consolidation, tends to, look at, two different categories or mechanisms of accountability. So you have these vertical accountability, kind of linkages between voters and the politicians who represent them, right? This is also referred to as electoral accountability. So how responsive are elected officials to the demands of their constituents, that sort of thing. but we also have these horizontal mechanisms of accountability. So checks and balances between different branches of government, the degree to which government institutions or agencies are able to place effective constraints,
00:05:39 - Okay? So, two different, forms of accountability at work in, you know, what we would think of as a good democracy. and there's this sort of consensus in the democracy literature that there's a trade off in any democracy between representativeness and accountability. You increase one, you improve one, and that's gonna have sort of knock on effects, in the other category. So when it comes to a political power sharing system, what you have is guaranteed representation of the political elites representing different social groups in various levers of, power, right?
00:06:20 - of political decision making at the national level. So the argument is that this means that, politicians don't have to mobilize a majority of votes in order to win office. the idea is that they are less incentivized to appeal to voters to sort of invest in good policies, the kinds of things that would get them elected and so on. So, my work in general, I should say, you know, sort of tries to complicate or add nuance to, the sort of what we mean when we say or talk about political power sharing.
00:07:03 - or solution to resolve, an armed conflict looks the same in every country. There's a huge amount of variation, in terms of, you know, what these kinds of, arrangements, actually look like. And because of that, you know, I don't think that we should expect them to have the same impact on the quality of democracy in all places to the same degree. And we certainly shouldn't expect them to affect the different sort of mechanisms of accountability in the same way. so I think it's important, to try to sort of disaggregate that, and think about, different things, that might be going on. My, analysis here relies on this really exciting new
00:07:44 - of Democracy Project, which is, based at the University of Gutenberg. so they provide, this, this huge array of, coatings of, different various, sort of institutional elements that we might associate with democracy. And they, they rely on, surveys of country experts to give a score across dozens, if not hundreds of indicators for every country for every year, over time. So, really, this makes the data that we had on democratic quality across countries,

"Assessing Democratic Accountability: Disaggregating Indicators in Post-Conflict Democracies"

00:08:28 - because it allows us to do several things. One, it allows us to sort of aggregate all of these different indicators, into a much more sensitive, index, that really reflects much more of a spectrum of democratic ness, than we ever had before. And we can pick and choose based on how do we actually define democracy? What does democracy mean to us? What do we mean when we are using that term, Right? instead of just sort of a catchall kind of, umbrella concept. the other advantage is that then we can disaggregate how we measure democracy according
00:09:07 - getting at different kinds of institutional elements. So, taking vertical accountability just as one example, right? I can disaggregate according to, the cleanliness of elections, right? So how free and fair elections are, how responsive are politicians, to voters? How, sort of institutionalized is the political party system? How active and robust is civil society? How participatory, is the system? How much are women empowered and, and involved and, and, and so on, a across, as I say, dozens of different, indicators we might be interested in.
00:09:47 - for horizontal accountability as well. So the idea is, is essentially, I use a statistical technique that allows me to determine to what extent, changes in these different measures of accountability are associated with the implementation of a political power sharing solution to conflict, while sort of holding all other potential effects on accountability constant, right? We want to control for things like economic growth and, how decentralized the system is, and all these other things that might have an in independent effect on, accountability or the quality of democracy.
00:10:30 - of the post-conflict democracies in, in Sub-Saharan Inca, right? There's about 25 or 30 of them, and I can compare changes across time and the quality of democracy, different measures of accountability among those countries that have implemented, political power sharing system at the end of their civil war. To those that did not, I think that there are, a few results of the analysis that I think, are quite interesting. So, on the one hand, there is something to suggest that some of the pessimism about, the effects of political power sharing on the quality of democracy,
00:11:10 - of horizontal accountability. So among post-conflict democracies in the region that implemented, political power sharing, reforms, some sort of, constitutionalized arrangement, they have seen increases, significant increases in levels of corruption. And they also haven't seen the same improvements in the rule of law. They haven't really kept up with improvements, in the rule of law that we've seen in the rest of the region over the past few decades. That's, you know, not surprising. We would expect that if you, put, these sorts of,
00:11:52 - that are actually actually quite lucrative, they might engage in self enrichment, right? so for one example, the, leader of the, the RUF rebellion in, Sierra Leone at the end of Sierra Leone civil War in 2001, fo Sanko was appointed as chairman of the country's, commission on, diamonds, right? An incredibly lucrative kind of position. and, you know, similarly, other arrangements, allocate cabinet positions to leaders of former rebellions or their representatives positions like, minister of Defense or interior.

"Political Power Sharing: Examining Corruption, Accountability, and Democratic Progress in Post-Conflict Societies"

00:12:33 - for kickbacks, essentially, right? You exchange access to a mining concession or a lucrative defense contract in exchange for a kickback that goes directly into the offshore secrecy account of whatever political leader is, is holding that position at the time. Not hugely surprising, and we also probably wouldn't expect that these people would then willingly or voluntarily implement reforms that would increase the constraints on their ability to engage in this kind of rent seeking behavior by, for example, increasing the independence or, the powers of the courts. There is something to be said there, clearly.
00:13:15 - that we might be a little bit more optimistic. for one thing, this negative impacts, in terms of horizontal accountability scores that I've just described, is really limited to a very specific subset of political power sharing, bargains. And that is those where these, formulas are constitutionalized, they're enshrined in the constitution in a way that looks really similar to what I described in Lebanon at the beginning. we see a similar sort of, solution in places like Mozambique, Burundi, where 20, 30 years on, we see much higher levels,
00:13:55 - and, you know, really poor scores in terms of the rule of law, and so on. On the other hand, a huge number of political power sharing bargains, in the African region were actually transitional in nature. so they were essentially, sort of temporary coalitions or unity governments that were inclusive of former warring parties, that were only designed, to sort of oversee, transitional period, and then expire once post-conflict elections were held. And in fact, in those countries, we actually see really marked improvements in horizontal accountability over the long term. So improvements in judicial constraints,
00:14:34 - and lower levels of corruption. So the second thing I think, that's, looking a bit more positive here has to do with the, the relationship between political power sharing and measures of vertical accountability. so what I actually have found is that in any, you know, Any way that you define or measure political power sharing, countries that have implemented these kinds of solutions to civil war have seen huge improvements, in vertical accountability compared to those that have not. So, especially when it comes to things like the cleanliness of elections, you know, it, it makes sense that if you provide sort of guaranteed seats for the elites of different social groups so that, you know,
00:15:18 - a majority, we're gonna see less vote rigging, vote buying, the use of violence to intimidate supporters of opposition, political parties, and so on. so that's, you know, something to be positive about. Also, in terms of inclusion and participation of broader segments of society in Sub-Saharan Africa, it seems that political power sharing has actually had a hugely positive effect on that. And I think looking back at a lot of the academic work, suggesting that that might not be the case, what I find is that the focus has really been on a small subset of potentially really unique cases such as Northern Ireland after the Belfast agreement.
00:15:58 - of democracy, broader, inclusion of society coming out of that sort of authoritarian period was the, the bar was quite low. And, what the data suggests is that countries that implemented political power sharing, potentially because they see, you know, there, there's less need for elite meddling in the electoral system, there's been a significant increase in the inclusion and participation of women and other minority groups. I think for me, the, the sort of key takeaway of this study, is that a lot of the criticism that exists around, political power sharing, in terms of its effects on democracy,

"Navigating the Balance: Political Power-Sharing as a Pathway to Peace and Democratic Progress"

00:16:38 - you know, putting in place these kinds of institutional guarantees that the elites of different groups will have privileged access to power, which they are otherwise willing to fight for with violence, makes them more willing to give up their weapons. and it's difficult to have a well-functioning democracy in the midst of a civil war, or at least the ongoing threat that another conflict will break out. So this might mean sacrificing some democratic purity, some competitiveness, for the sake of peace. It may mean that these political elites, continue to engage in self enrichment
00:17:20 - but it also means that without this constant threat of violence, democracy can progress in other important sort of areas. So over a, number of peaceful election cycles, we see elections becoming cleaner, freer from manipulation, even if they are relatively less, competitive. We see them becoming more participatory and inclusive of, of broader segments of society. and I think the other important thing to emphasize here, because it's sort of consistent with my larger, body of scholarship and my research agenda, is
00:18:00 - about political power sharing, in general. and especially to distinguish between the kinds of constitutionalized systems that we see in Lebanon and, these other, potentially more common transitional bargains, that that, that we often see, in Sub-Saharan Africa, similar to the one I described, in Sierra Leone a bit earlier. So, transitional, power sharing bargains might actually be sort of the best of both worlds because they, they create this sort of discreet payoff for, rebel elites, that makes them more willing to hand over their weapons
00:19:15 - to allow for a little bit of, of corruption and rent seeking, in exchange, for buy-in to, a war to democracy transition, right? And they act as this sort of sunset flaws that, naturally put places a limit on the amount of time the warlords are in politics, right? Because the, the transitional bargain has an expiration date. and once it is dissolved, we can eventually, see marked improvements across all measures of, democratic accountability that we might, actually care about.

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