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Strategic Conformity or Anticonformity to Avoid Punishment and Attract Reward

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How do the expectations of rewards or punishments influence our decision to either conform or stand out?

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This video discusses a research study centered around two key questions: the heterogeneity of conformity and the interaction of conformity with rewards and punishments. Conformity is defined as individuals aligning their behavior with others, while anticonformity describes behavior that diverges from both the group and personal preferences. The study finds that anticonformity is relatively rare.

The research examines environments dominated by either rewards or punishments. In reward settings, individuals may strive to stand out, while in punitive contexts, they may conform to avoid negative consequences. The study’s findings indicate that evaluators (those enforcing rewards or punishments) often prefer conformity in punishment contexts and may encourage anticonformity in reward environments, depending on how informative social feedback is.

Different experimental designs were employed to measure these behaviors, including knowledge questions and art taste assessments. Results showed that conformity was most pronounced in knowledge tasks and less so in artistic selections, with minimal anticonformity observed overall.

The researchers concluded that the context determines the necessity for conformity or anticonformity. For instance, in high-stakes environments (like piloting), conformity is crucial, whereas creative fields (like art) may benefit from anticonformity. The study emphasizes the relationship between environmental demands and individual behavior, suggesting a clear link between the nature of the task and the tendency toward conformity or creative expression.

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We were interested in two questions.

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One, refer refers to heterogeneity in conformity.

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And there we were specifically interested whether there are

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also people who specifically are anticon conform.

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And that means in our context, conformity means

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that people do something in the direction

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of others and deviating from their

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own taste, so to say.

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And anticon conformity means that they

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move away from the others, so do something different,

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but also against their own taste.

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So that's essentially the, the, these two behaviors.

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And anticon conformity

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is rarely studied.

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And, actually we find it's also rare in,

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in our study, and I will talk about that later.

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The second question, relates how this interacts

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with reward and punishment.

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And the idea here is that there are environments

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in which reward is dominant,

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and there are environments in which punishment is dominant.

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And that means, for instance, when you

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think about art

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or science, their reward is much more relevant

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because, it's though you are rewarded for good stuff.

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And if you have once in a while a bad paper,

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nobody punishes you for that.

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On the other hand, if you are a driver

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or a pilot, then nobody cares about your best performance.

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But people really care about the worst performance,

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and so you are more likely to be punished for,

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bad performance.

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And, and in that sense, punishment is more,

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much more relevant in this case.

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And generally that's also the case.

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Generally when there is a hiring

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that's more a rewarding environment.

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In the case of a threat of layoffs,

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this is more a punishment situation.

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And the idea is that when there is this,

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this risk of being punished, people try

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to hide while when there is a reward possible, people tried

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to stand out.

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And, this is was kind of our starting point

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with respect to reward and punishment.

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Uh, the idea was that this evaluators, so those

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who exert reward or punishment, we call them evaluators,

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and, they,

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they could target the special ones,

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but this is not the only possibility.

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It's also possible that they care more about

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that they do something similar as what they would do.

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We analyze this theoretically

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and interestingly the same occurs.

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So in the case of punishment,

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There is a shift towards,

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towards conformity.

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If there is a reward, there can be a shift even

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to anticon conformity and less conformity.

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This rule that evaluate this care about what,

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where the people do what they would do

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or decide, decide what they would do.

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This rule has has the implication

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that people try to get the information from,

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from the social feedback.

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So they see what others do.

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And one impact is they learn what others do.

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And when they learn what others do, they,

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they get information about how the, how the taste

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of the evaluator could look like,

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what the evaluator would actually like.

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And this leads to conformity.

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But there is also another effect,

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and that's the selection process

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when you are quite uncertain about the taste

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of the evaluator.

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It's good to be in the majority if punishment applies,

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because then the risk

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to be punishment is shared among more people.

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And when reward is relevant, the, it's good

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to be in a minority

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because then you have a get better chance

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to be selected individually.

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And these two rules interact,

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and in the case of punishment,

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both go in the same direction towards conformity.

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In the case of reward, there is a conflict between the two.

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And it depends on how,

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how informative the social feedback is.

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And when the social feedback is not too informative, it,

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it makes sense even, to be, to,

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be anti anticon conform.

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And one studies conformity.

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So the, the, the first studies on conformity were done

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by Solomon Ash, and he used confederates who did, who took

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strange or very uncommon, unlikely decisions.

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And then when people copy these unlikely decisions,

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he concludes that this must have something to do

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with conformity, that they adjust to the others.

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But that means that those who do are not conform.

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It's not clear whether they intentionally want

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to be different or whether they just,

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are independent.

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And what we wanted,

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we wanted the design in which we can distinguish conformity

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and anticon conformity from independence.

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And as I said, we define conformity as a shift

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of these individual decisions towards the decision

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of a majority and

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otherwise in anticon conformity away from the majority.

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And this is about behavior.

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And ideally, we would like

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to observe the behavior without social feedback and with

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Social feedback, this triggers a lot of consistency.

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And for that reason, we use a slight twist.

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We use triplet of options.

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So we have three options, let's say A, B, and C.

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And we ask people about their choice between A and B,

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and we ask them about P and C without social feedback.

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And then we ask them about A

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and C with social feedback from the decisions between A

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and P and P and C, we derive

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what they would decide in A and C,

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and then we can identify conformity

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and anticon conformity

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as a deviation from this predicted choice.

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So this is our main technique, and we do it in a way.

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So we have all, three people in a group.

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So we can actually quite efficiently,

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conduct this experiment.

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We have different domains in which we,

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conduct these experiments.

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We have knowledge questions, and we have art tastes.

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So that's a different domain.

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Uh, there, in, in the knowledge question,

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there was no specific reward for being correct

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or so in the art taste, they got a postcard of,

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this art piece so that they had an incentive

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to choose something according, to their taste roughly.

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Because we didn't observe that much unconformity,

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we thought it might be necessary

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to have also an environment in which,

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the choice is not so restricted.

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So where kind of creativity is relevant.

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And we designed and color

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creation task in which people could construct colors out of,

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of the RGB cubes.

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So, so they could, mix colors

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and so generate new colors.

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And essentially the same procedures, occurs.

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People,

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decide on a color without social feedback,

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and then they can correct their color with social feedback.

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So that's kind of our main treatment.

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The theoretical model is based on the binary decision.

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And in this model there are a group of three people,

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who, who from which two,

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take the decision unconditionally, this binary decision.

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And one person is informed about the decision of the others,

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and con can condition on what the others do.

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And then an evaluator rewards

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or punished one in the group without knowing

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who took the conditional decision.

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So just selects one of the three people.

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So of course when all three take the same choice,

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it's not a particularly interesting decision.

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So essentially it's interesting whether chooses the minority

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or the majority in this case, because there are three.

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And then we analyze, the situation

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for different preferences of the evaluator.

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So we look at when the evaluator decides based on salience,

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and we investigate when the evaluator

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decides based on the own preference on the own taste.

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And, what we find is then,

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so we have four sit, four situations

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that we have to analyze.

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So there is, so the, it depends on punishment

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and reward and depends on the preference of the evaluator.

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When the evaluator,

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so let's first look at the conditional decision

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in the salient treatment is totally simple.

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In the salient treatment, when there is punishment, you,

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you go with the majority, if this is possible.

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If it's reward, you try to single out.

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So that's simple on that side.

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In the homophily tree, in the homophily situation.

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So if the evaluator decides,

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based on the own preference, how to say,

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then on the punishment situation, it's also, it goes,

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towards, go going with the majority,

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going with the majority.

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Actually there is a slight twist.

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So we also have a preference for the,

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for sticking to the own taste.

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And so you need, if you too,

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if you too much care about your own taste, then

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of course you do not switch,

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in the reward treatment there.

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It depends on a parameter that describes

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how strongly the preferences

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of the different people are correlated,

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which means it depends on how informative the,

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the decision of the others are about the

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preference of the evaluator.

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And if this information is strong,

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then conformity is possible.

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Otherwise anticon conformity is possible.

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That's roughly what we find there,

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and I think that's the most interesting, case.

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We have also analyzed the behavior on the,

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for the unconditional.

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So for the decisions without social feedback,

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they're in all situations with the exception

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of salience rewards,

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people just choose according to that taste.

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In the salience, in the situation

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where salience matters in the reward treatment,

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there are two, two results, two domains.

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So first we find that for the evaluator,

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the own taste was more important than salience.

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So this is, one result.

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Uh, but nevertheless,

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their behavior incentivized

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Conformity in the punishment situation

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and anticon conformity in the, in the reward situation.

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And that's, and it's interesting that we do not observe

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that much anticon conformity in the, in the,

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in the reward situation.

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So that's kind of interesting.

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So there is a tendency, towards, conformity.

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There is also, a difference

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between the different domains.

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So most conformity in, in the domain

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with the questions, less in the situation with taste,

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with the art taste,

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and least in the situation with colors.

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Now, I think what, what, what's interesting,

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let's say as, as a general message for is

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when we relate it to the beginning.

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So what are environments in which

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reward is used and

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what are environments in which punishment is used

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that's actually related to, in, in a reasonable way

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00:12:59.925 --> 00:13:02.055
with conformity and non-conformity.

245
00:13:02.355 --> 00:13:07.295
So I do not want a pilot who is particularly creative

246
00:13:08.075 --> 00:13:09.135
in what he does,

247
00:13:09.675 --> 00:13:12.895
but I want to have an artist who is particularly creative.

248
00:13:13.115 --> 00:13:17.935
And in that sense, the, it, it bends well back

249
00:13:17.935 --> 00:13:21.945
to, so it, it, so it really, the, the environment

250
00:13:22.815 --> 00:13:27.665
fits usually the the need for conformity

251
00:13:27.685 --> 00:13:28.825
or anticon conformity.

252
00:13:28.885 --> 00:13:31.945
And I think that's, the general message we find.

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