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The dictator’s dilemma

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Is There Really a Dictator’s Dilemma? Information and Repression in Autocracy

Scott Gehlbach | University of Chicago

Pollster choices vs voters’ decisions

Joshua Clinton | Vanderbilt University

Jose Aleman’s analysis shows that military dictatorships commit extrajudicial violence, while communist dictatorships restrict speech, travel, and affiliation.

Image courtesy of interviewee. January 23, 2024

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This video video discusses the literature surrounding state repression, specifically critiquing its focus on the differences between democratic and authoritarian regimes, while neglecting the variations within authoritarian systems themselves. The author argues that different types of dictatorships (e.g., single-party, military, personalistic) employ various tactics of repression and that understanding these differences is crucial.

A key point made is that governments often respond to dissent in ways that are not directly proportional to the level of dissent observed, suggesting a need for deeper exploration of these varied responses. The discussion includes categories of repression, such as state terrorism, political imprisonment, and preventive oppression, emphasizing that not all forms of repression are used for the same purposes.

The author also highlights the differences in goals and legitimacy between communist and military regimes, arguing that while communist regimes tend to be more preventive in their repression, military regimes employ more blunt and often violent tactics due to their often illegitimate status in the eyes of the public.

Overall, the text asserts the importance of examining the goals, institutions, and methods of governance within various authoritarian regimes to understand their approaches to repression better. The author aims to provide a framework for analyzing these complexities and explains that seemingly irrational actions by these regimes often have underlying motivations that require explanation.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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Context for the study is

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that there's a large literature of state repression.

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Um, we know a lot about the causes

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and dynamics of state repression,

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but I think that the literature is focused too much on

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explaining why dictatorships are more

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repressive than democracies.

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Uh, that that really is a main gist of the literature.

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Um, and not as much, on explaining

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why authoritarian regimes differ

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amongst themselves in the ways in which

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they go about repression, right?

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So we see that dictatorships use

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different tactics of repression.

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Uh, it's not just, you know, the levels that are different,

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but it's also the tactics that are used, right?

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And so I, I, I think we have, we have a little bit less,

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in terms of explaining differences among

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dictatorships than we have in terms

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of explaining differences

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between democracies and dictatorships.

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The other thing also, that, I found myself

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thinking about is that there's, a recurrent,

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theme in the literature that governments will

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respond to dissent that is over, that is violent, right?

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That challenges, their authority, so that,

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that's, that's established, right?

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Um, but lately we've also realized

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that there isn't a one-to-one equivalence

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between the level of dissent.

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Uh, you see, in a society

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and the way in which a government will respond.

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Sometimes it will meet, you know, that, dissent

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with the same, the same amount of repression, sometimes not.

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So I think that cries off for an explanation as well.

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There's some literature on differences, among

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dictatorships in the types of repression that they use

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and the tactics that they use.

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Um, and so you would see in the literature, typically,

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that scholars distinguish,

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among mainly three different kinds of dictatorships,

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what they call single party dictatorships, then military

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dictatorships and, and then personalistic dictatorships.

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Um, but the, the problem,

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as I see it here, is that even within the category

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of single party dictatorships, there are different kinds

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of single party dictatorships that differ, in,

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you know, how they go about repression, right?

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So, like, for me, for example, right?

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Like, I make a difference between, I distinguish

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between communist, dictatorships

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and non-communist single party dictatorships.

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Again, you know, they're all,

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they all fall within the umbrella

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of single party dictatorships.

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But, I see the, the

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Communist ones as being a little bit different in the way

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that they approach, repression.

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Um, also, I think that,

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within the literature you see a lot of emphasis on how

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institutions predispose, you know, certain governments

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to do certain kinds of things.

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And that, very much goes with the emphasis,

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in the literature on repression, sort of being a rational

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response to, you know, as what, what, what leaders,

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perceive as, as, as, as threats, right?

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But I think that what sometimes,

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is not spoken about enough is that in addition to

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differences in institutions

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and policies, there are also differences in goals, right?

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Uh, among regimes.

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And then those goals sometimes affect

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the, the kinds of things that, governments do,

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because they, they, they affect the way they go about

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governance, and hence, they have effects on

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policies like, you know, repression.

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So I think that, you know, we need

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to maybe emphasize goals a little more, not just,

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you know, institutions.

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There are various data sets,

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and various indicators the scholars have used over the

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years, to study state repression.

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So the one that I use,

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is a relatively recent dataset,

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of political attributes.

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It is called the varieties of demo, the Varieties

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of Democracy, dataset.

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Um, and, what I quite like about it is that it is one

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of only two datasets that disaggregates,

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quite nicely among different types of, repression.

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Because sometimes, you know, you see scholars

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that use one composite indicator, of repression.

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Um, and, sometimes, you know, they use, for example,

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indicators, for example, of,

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what they call empowerment rights, which are, you know,

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basically civil and political rights,

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or the lack thereof in, in countries.

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And then, there are, datasets, also used,

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to study what is,

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what is called physical integrity rights, which are,

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you know, rights that individuals have to their own dignity

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as human beings, right?

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Um, so like the right not to be,

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killed extra judicially, tortured, disappeared, you know,

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those kinds of things.

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But, in, in, in my study,

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I'm able to take advantage of, like I said, one,

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of the projects that

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Uses the ED indicators,

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but also that covers a wide range of years

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as opposed to the other one.

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Um, and also what I think is different is that,

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when people talk about physical integrity rights,

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I think that they're lumping together two things

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that are a little bit different, right?

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So they're lumping together, repression, which is,

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you know, extra legal

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or extra judicial, the things that are, that are done,

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without due process, like, torturing, you know,

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individuals or, you know, disappearing them

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or, assassinating them with something which is,

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called a political imprisonment, which is not necessarily,

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you know, extralegal extra judicial,

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and, also is not, sometimes used

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with the same function, is not really employed

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to intimidate, a larger number

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of people other than the victim, right?

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So, political imprisonment sometimes is, just used

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to punish, you know, the individual

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or individuals that engaged in a certain behavior.

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Whereas, you know, state terrorism, which is

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the, the label that I use for, disappearance,

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political assassinations

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and torture, is really a type of repression that is

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off the books, if you will, right?

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So it's, it's sort of a, it's sort of extra legal,

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extra constitutional.

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Um, then there's a type of oppression that is,

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a little bit more preventive.

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So it's really more about heading off, you know,

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things before they happen.

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So, that I call, oppression,

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which is really, really consists of,

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of taking away the rights to free speech

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and the free press.

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Um, and then, you know, what I, what I call

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by, by the way, this is not, something that I,

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originated.

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I mean, this is something that, you know, can be

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supported in the literature,

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but, lately scholars have not used this,

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categorization as much.

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So I do want to give credit what credit is due.

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But, but the third category would be,

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would be repression, which is different from,

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you know, state repression.

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State repression is, you know, the whole menu of tactics.

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And then repression is basically just, you know,

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the things that a lot of people associate with repression.

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So when the government, you know, detains,

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political opponents or beats them up,

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or, you know, imprison, imprisons them,

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Or, you know, breaks up rallies

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and demonstrations and things like that.

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So it's basically the attempt to restrict, the rights

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or the freedoms of association and assembly.

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So what I found clearly in the data, and this is

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after sort of, controlling for,

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or adjusting for some problems,

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as scholars sometimes run into, for example,

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what we call indigeneity, which is, the phenomenon where

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you can have not only consolidate in the direction that you,

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you anticipate, but also in, in the other direction.

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So, so when we adjust for,

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or control for endogeneity diffusion, of

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repression, and other, other phenomena like,

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for example, the fact

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that it may take more than one per period of time,

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more than one year for,

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you know, for descent of effect affect repression.

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And the other way around, what I found was that,

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we have a very clear difference between the way

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that communist, regimes go about repression

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and the way that military dictatorships go about repression

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compared to other authoritarian regimes.

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So I found that communist dictatorships,

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engage more in oppression.

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Uh, so, you know,

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their repression is a little bit more preventive, than,

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reactive.

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Uh, whereas military regimes engage

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or use more state terrorism than, communist regimes

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and other, types of dictatorships, they both use,

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repression,

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although communist regimes en engage in a little bit more

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repression than military regimes.

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And the reason for that, the way that I like to explain it,

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is that, military regimes

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and communist regimes come to power in very different ways.

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They have very different goals,

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therefore, the ways in which they relate

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to their societies is very different.

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So, many communist regimes come to power as a result

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of a revolutionary process that already sort of

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engages and evolves the populace in the, in the process,

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when they come to power, they create,

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a political party, right?

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And this political party reaches deep into society.

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Uh, so it is able to, mobilize, you know,

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different social sectors, is able to groom insiders

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within the political regime is also,

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it also makes it possible for these kinds

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of political systems to gather intelligence and information.

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Um,

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And, and then given that their goal is

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to transform society, I think

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that many communist regimes are interested

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in heading off descent before it even happens.

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So they, they tend

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to be a little bit more oppressive, if you will.

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Uh, military regimes on the other hand,

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they start out very differently.

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They start out already,

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being very illegitimate in the hands of

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many in the population

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because many, you know,

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many citizens say, well, wait a minute, the role

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of the armed forces is not to be in power.

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The role of the armed forces is

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to protect the country against an external threat.

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So already, when they come to power,

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sometimes military regimes face a significant degree

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of mobilization from within society, right?

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And they're seen as illegitimate.

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Um, they don't have the kinds of ties,

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with social actors that communist regimes have.

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Uh, usually, they don't have the same goals.

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You know, their goals are, are not as

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revolutionary, if you will.

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You know, they sometimes they wanna return the situation to,

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or the status quo to a previous time,

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but it, they don't to, to sort of completely change society,

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the economy, a lot of times initially, especially,

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they don't even have political

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parties through which they govern.

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So military regimes have a lot of difficulty, right?

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Gathering intelligence, in collaborating with,

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civil society actors.

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And, and, and hence, they, they tend

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to engage in the type of repression that,

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I call state terrorism, which is, you know,

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more blunt if you will.

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It's, it's a little bit more clumsy, more, you know,

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more blunt, compared to, you know, for example,

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communist regimes, which are, more monolithic, right?

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Sometimes military dictators don't even control the

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judiciary, so they can't even trust

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that the judiciary is going to treat, a oppositionist,

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in the way that they expect that they want.

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So they sometimes resort to these other tactics, for,

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you know, the reasons that I laid out, right?

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The conclusions are,

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and the implications really are to us, right?

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The things that,

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certain regimes do may seem a little bit irrational,

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or they may seem like overkill, quote unquote, right?

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Like, if we sort of look around the world at the experiences

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of some political systems, you know,

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we may wonder why did they do it like that?

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Like how come

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They, I mean, if they could have, for example,

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if they could have taken their dissidence to court,

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even if it was a kangaroo court, some kind of sham trial,

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and get them, you know, sentenced to death,

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why didn't they do that as opposed to, you know,

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the way they did it, which was very clumsy, you know,

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very blunt.

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Um, but that's exactly why I wrote the articles,

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because when we face a situation like that,

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we can't just say, well, you know,

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what happened was irrational.

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No, it has to be explained, right?

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And, when I say that it has to be explained,

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what I'm saying is that there has to be a reason why certain

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governments are doing certain things, which we consider,

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you know, irrational

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or which from our point of view, go too far, right?

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And that's what I try to do in the article.

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I try to say that, look, I mean, there's a reason why

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military regimes, right, do the things they do.

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Um, you know, it's not a good reason,

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or, you know, it's not something to approve of or to excuse.

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It's just, it's just something

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that needs an explanation.

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And as I said, right, the explanation lies in,

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the goals, you know, that different autocracies have,

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the ways in which they come to power, and yeah.

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Uh, you know, the institutions that they set up

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and how they're able to govern through those institutions,

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sometimes that's a little bit easier to do,

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sometimes is a little bit more difficult, right?

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But, all of that in, in a sense, sort of begs

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and cries for, for, for, for an explanation.

Examining Variations in Authoritarian Repression

00:00:00 - Context for the study is that there's a large literature of state repression. we know a lot about the causes and dynamics of state repression, but I think that the literature is focused too much on explaining why dictatorships are more repressive than democracies. that that really is a main gist of the literature. and not as much, on explaining why authoritarian regimes differ amongst themselves in the ways in which
00:00:32 - So we see that dictatorships use different tactics of repression. it's not just, you know, the levels that are different, but it's also the tactics that are used, right? And so I, I, I think we have, we have a little bit less, in terms of explaining differences among dictatorships than we have in terms of explaining differences between democracies and dictatorships. The other thing also, that, I found myself
00:01:06 - theme in the literature that governments will respond to dissent that is over, that is violent, right? That challenges, their authority, so that, that's, that's established, right? but lately we've also realized that there isn't a one-to-one equivalence between the level of dissent. you see, in a society
00:01:36 - Sometimes it will meet, you know, that, dissent with the same, the same amount of repression, sometimes not. So I think that cries off for an explanation as well. There's some literature on differences, among dictatorships in the types of repression that they use and the tactics that they use. and so you would see in the literature, typically,
00:02:06 - among mainly three different kinds of dictatorships, what they call single party dictatorships, then military dictatorships and, and then personalistic dictatorships. but the, the problem, as I see it here, is that even within the category of single party dictatorships, there are different kinds of single party dictatorships that differ, in,
00:02:37 - So, like, for me, for example, right? Like, I make a difference between, I distinguish between communist, dictatorships and non-communist single party dictatorships. Again, you know, they're all, they all fall within the umbrella of single party dictatorships. But, I see the, the Communist ones as being a little bit different in the way that they approach, repression. also, I think that,

Exploring Goals and Institutions in State Repression

00:03:12 - institutions predispose, you know, certain governments to do certain kinds of things. And that, very much goes with the emphasis, in the literature on repression, sort of being a rational response to, you know, as what, what, what leaders, perceive as, as, as, as threats, right?
00:03:41 - is not spoken about enough is that in addition to differences in institutions and policies, there are also differences in goals, right? among regimes. And then those goals sometimes affect the, the kinds of things that, governments do, because they, they, they affect the way they go about governance, and hence, they have effects on
00:04:13 - So I think that, you know, we need to maybe emphasize goals a little more, not just, you know, institutions. There are various data sets, and various indicators the scholars have used over the years, to study state repression. So the one that I use, is a relatively recent dataset, of political attributes. It is called the varieties of demo, the Varieties of Democracy, dataset.
00:04:47 - of only two datasets that disaggregates, quite nicely among different types of, repression. Because sometimes, you know, you see scholars that use one composite indicator, of repression. and, sometimes, you know, they use, for example, indicators, for example, of, what they call empowerment rights, which are, you know,
00:05:19 - or the lack thereof in, in countries. And then, there are, datasets, also used, to study what is, what is called physical integrity rights, which are, you know, rights that individuals have to their own dignity as human beings, right? so like the right not to be, killed extra judicially, tortured, disappeared, you know, those kinds of things.
00:05:51 - I'm able to take advantage of, like I said, one, of the projects that Uses the ED indicators, but also that covers a wide range of years as opposed to the other one. and also what I think is different is that, when people talk about physical integrity rights, I think that they're lumping together two things that are a little bit different, right?

Categories of State Repression and Control

00:06:22 - you know, extra legal or extra judicial, the things that are, that are done, without due process, like, torturing, you know, individuals or, you know, disappearing them or, assassinating them with something which is, called a political imprisonment, which is not necessarily, you know, extralegal extra judicial, and, also is not, sometimes used
00:06:56 - to intimidate, a larger number of people other than the victim, right? So, political imprisonment sometimes is, just used to punish, you know, the individual or individuals that engaged in a certain behavior. Whereas, you know, state terrorism, which is the, the label that I use for, disappearance, political assassinations
00:07:27 - off the books, if you will, right? So it's, it's sort of a, it's sort of extra legal, extra constitutional. then there's a type of oppression that is, a little bit more preventive. So it's really more about heading off, you know, things before they happen. So, that I call, oppression, which is really, really consists of,
00:07:59 - and the free press. and then, you know, what I, what I call by, by the way, this is not, something that I, originated. I mean, this is something that, you know, can be supported in the literature, but, lately scholars have not used this, categorization as much.
00:08:27 - But, but the third category would be, would be repression, which is different from, you know, state repression. State repression is, you know, the whole menu of tactics. And then repression is basically just, you know, the things that a lot of people associate with repression. So when the government, you know, detains, political opponents or beats them up, or, you know, imprison, imprisons them, Or, you know, breaks up rallies
00:08:59 - So it's basically the attempt to restrict, the rights or the freedoms of association and assembly. So what I found clearly in the data, and this is after sort of, controlling for, or adjusting for some problems, as scholars sometimes run into, for example, what we call indigeneity, which is, the phenomenon where you can have not only consolidate in the direction that you,

Comparing Repression in Communist and Military Regimes

00:09:31 - So, so when we adjust for, or control for endogeneity diffusion, of repression, and other, other phenomena like, for example, the fact that it may take more than one per period of time, more than one year for, you know, for descent of effect affect repression. And the other way around, what I found was that,
00:10:04 - that communist, regimes go about repression and the way that military dictatorships go about repression compared to other authoritarian regimes. So I found that communist dictatorships, engage more in oppression. so, you know, their repression is a little bit more preventive, than, reactive. whereas military regimes engage
00:10:38 - and other, types of dictatorships, they both use, repression, although communist regimes en engage in a little bit more repression than military regimes. And the reason for that, the way that I like to explain it, is that, military regimes and communist regimes come to power in very different ways.
00:11:05 - therefore, the ways in which they relate to their societies is very different. So, many communist regimes come to power as a result of a revolutionary process that already sort of engages and evolves the populace in the, in the process, when they come to power, they create, a political party, right? And this political party reaches deep into society.
00:11:39 - different social sectors, is able to groom insiders within the political regime is also, it also makes it possible for these kinds of political systems to gather intelligence and information. And, and then given that their goal is to transform society, I think that many communist regimes are interested in heading off descent before it even happens.
00:12:09 - to be a little bit more oppressive, if you will. military regimes on the other hand, they start out very differently. They start out already, being very illegitimate in the hands of many in the population because many, you know, many citizens say, well, wait a minute, the role of the armed forces is not to be in power. The role of the armed forces is

Military Regimes: Legitimacy and Repression Challenges

00:12:39 - So already, when they come to power, sometimes military regimes face a significant degree of mobilization from within society, right? And they're seen as illegitimate. they don't have the kinds of ties, with social actors that communist regimes have. usually, they don't have the same goals. You know, their goals are, are not as
00:13:08 - You know, they sometimes they wanna return the situation to, or the status quo to a previous time, but it, they don't to, to sort of completely change society, the economy, a lot of times initially, especially, they don't even have political parties through which they govern. So military regimes have a lot of difficulty, right? Gathering intelligence, in collaborating with,
00:13:40 - And, and, and hence, they, they tend to engage in the type of repression that, I call state terrorism, which is, you know, more blunt if you will. It's, it's a little bit more clumsy, more, you know, more blunt, compared to, you know, for example, communist regimes, which are, more monolithic, right? Sometimes military dictators don't even control the judiciary, so they can't even trust
00:14:14 - in the way that they expect that they want. So they sometimes resort to these other tactics, for, you know, the reasons that I laid out, right? The conclusions are, and the implications really are to us, right? The things that, certain regimes do may seem a little bit irrational, or they may seem like overkill, quote unquote, right?
00:14:44 - of some political systems, you know, we may wonder why did they do it like that? Like how come They, I mean, if they could have, for example, if they could have taken their dissidence to court, even if it was a kangaroo court, some kind of sham trial, and get them, you know, sentenced to death, why didn't they do that as opposed to, you know, the way they did it, which was very clumsy, you know, very blunt.
00:15:15 - because when we face a situation like that, we can't just say, well, you know, what happened was irrational. No, it has to be explained, right? And, when I say that it has to be explained, what I'm saying is that there has to be a reason why certain governments are doing certain things, which we consider, you know, irrational or which from our point of view, go too far, right? And that's what I try to do in the article.

Understanding Military Regimes' Repressive Actions

00:15:47 - military regimes, right, do the things they do. you know, it's not a good reason, or, you know, it's not something to approve of or to excuse. It's just, it's just something that needs an explanation. And as I said, right, the explanation lies in, the goals, you know, that different autocracies have, the ways in which they come to power, and yeah.
00:16:29 - and how they're able to govern through those institutions, sometimes that's a little bit easier to do, sometimes is a little bit more difficult, right? But, all of that in, in a sense, sort of begs and cries for, for, for, for an explanation.

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