Popular in Political Science

Political Science

V-Dem’s Conceptions of Democracy and Their Consequences

University of Notre Dame Michael Coppedge

American Politics

Keeping the Republic

Boston College Marc Landy

British Politics

Entrepreneurial thinking: the politics and practice of policy impact

University of Sheffield Matthew Flinders

Canadian Politics

Parties and Elections: An End to Canadian Exceptionalism?

St. Francis Xavier University James Bickerton

Asian Politics

The Politics of Knowledge in Development

University of Delhi Madhulika Banerjee

American Politics

Fifty years of declining confidence and increasing polarization in trust

University of California Berkeley Henry Brady

Political Economy

Wait and See?

University of Liverpool Mariaelisa Epifanio

The Opening Dilemma

View more insights in Social Sciences - Political Science - American Politics

View more figures from Cornell University

View the page of Richard Bensel

Read the Study

Next in American Politics

Stronger Issues, Weaker Predispositions

Paul Goren | University of Minnesota

Pollster choices vs voters’ decisions

Joshua Clinton | Vanderbilt University

Richard Bensel suggests why the opening dilemma might become a serious threat toAmerican democracy if the nation were to attempt to convene a new constitutional convention.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 6, 2024

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

The speaker discusses their long-standing interest in parliamentary rules and the democratic process, highlighting a fundamental conundrum in establishing democratic legislatures or constitutional assemblies. They argue that three essential elements—parliamentary leadership, certified representatives, and parliamentary rules—must coexist for a legislature to function, yet each is dependent on the others for its creation. This video video interdependence presents a significant challenge, as a democracy cannot self-establish the institutions necessary to express the will of the people, which is a critical requirement for any constitutional entity.

The speaker explores the disconnect between democratic theory and rational choice theory, noting that while democratic theory focuses on how people come to recognize a collective will, it often does not address how institutions that express this will are actually formed. Conversely, rational choice theorists analyze how preferences are processed within established institutions but struggle to explain the emergence of those institutions.

Drawing on examples from United States constitutional conventions, particularly the challenging Illinois Convention of 1869, the speaker illustrates how closely divided political parties can lead to institutional gridlock, reflecting the opening dilemma of creating a legitimate assembly. They suggest that, like the Illinois case, a hypothetical future constitutional convention in the U.S. could encounter similar challenges, leading to a crisis in recognizing a collective will.

The speaker concludes by emphasizing that modern foundings—both democratic and non-democratic—tend to rely on a mythological conception of the will of the people and grapple with the same opening dilemma regarding identity and purpose. Through examining historical examples, the work reveals universal patterns in how societies navigate the establishment of political legitimacy and institutional structures.

Language:

Export as PDF

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.155 --> 00:01.965
I've been interested in parliamentary rules

00:03.225 --> 00:04.325
for over 50 years,

00:04.505 --> 00:07.005
and I wrote my doctoral dissertation on it.

00:07.665 --> 00:11.015
And for, for many decades, I've been pre,

00:11.285 --> 00:13.895
I've been persuaded that formal rules,

00:14.545 --> 00:18.815
processing preferences in legislatures could implement,

00:19.555 --> 00:23.495
the democratic will, the will of the people.

00:24.115 --> 00:25.455
Uh, and it was a matter

00:25.555 --> 00:28.375
of processing these preferences into outcomes,

00:28.635 --> 00:31.095
and that was a mathematical and a logical problem.

00:31.875 --> 00:34.935
Um, but then, about 20 years ago,

00:35.735 --> 00:40.455
I became persuaded that while rational choice rules

00:40.675 --> 00:45.215
and frameworks of interpretation could explain a lot of what

00:46.065 --> 00:47.755
went on in legislatures

00:47.855 --> 00:50.995
and constitutional assemblies, they could not explain

00:51.615 --> 00:54.595
how those constitutional assemblies in legislatures

00:55.165 --> 00:56.595
would be created.

00:57.745 --> 01:02.685
And in fact, there's a very important,

01:02.835 --> 01:06.085
conundrum at the founding of legislatures

01:06.225 --> 01:08.005
and constitutional assemblies,

01:08.625 --> 01:11.605
and that is that you need to begin with,

01:11.865 --> 01:16.045
you need three elements in order to create a legislature

01:16.105 --> 01:17.645
or a constitutional assembly.

01:18.555 --> 01:21.615
You need a parliamentary leader to recognize motions.

01:22.155 --> 01:24.215
You need members who are certified

01:24.435 --> 01:27.415
and legitimated as representatives

01:27.555 --> 01:29.375
of their their constituencies.

01:29.675 --> 01:31.295
And you need parliamentary rules.

01:31.835 --> 01:33.415
You need those three things.

01:34.155 --> 01:37.535
The problem comes is that,

01:38.435 --> 01:41.295
you cannot create any of these things

01:42.005 --> 01:43.455
without the other two.

01:44.505 --> 01:49.285
And that as a result, a democracy cannot found itself

01:50.615 --> 01:55.265
because it cannot create the institutional forms

01:55.655 --> 01:58.945
through which the will of the people could be

01:59.515 --> 02:02.865
translated into a constitution, into a state

02:02.935 --> 02:04.265
with formal powers.

02:04.805 --> 02:09.615
Um, and that conundrum then, is

02:10.135 --> 02:12.575
a, well, a fundamental fact.

02:12.885 --> 02:16.615
It's a logical, fundamental fact of, of,

02:17.105 --> 02:18.135
democratic life.

02:18.315 --> 02:21.015
My work is, is primarily,

02:21.735 --> 02:24.575
engaging two different li literatures.

02:25.275 --> 02:30.255
On the one hand, there is a very vibrant, active literature,

02:30.795 --> 02:34.695
and democratic theory about how peoples come

02:34.755 --> 02:36.175
to recognize themselves

02:36.595 --> 02:39.015
and come to constitute a collective will.

02:39.555 --> 02:41.335
Um, and in democratic theory,

02:41.485 --> 02:44.855
that is a really fundamental, problem.

02:45.555 --> 02:48.735
Um, the way that political, the political theorists have

02:49.375 --> 02:52.775
recognized that the people must constitute themselves.

02:53.555 --> 02:56.975
The problem for political theorists is

02:56.975 --> 02:58.695
that there is no way for a people

02:58.835 --> 03:01.645
To constitute themselves except through imagination.

03:02.225 --> 03:06.285
And so they try to solve this problem, by assuming,

03:06.555 --> 03:10.725
usually by assuming a primordial essentialist identity

03:10.945 --> 03:15.325
for a people that predates their, their consciousness.

03:16.585 --> 03:19.745
On the other hand, political theorists aren't,

03:19.935 --> 03:21.185
primarily concerned

03:21.185 --> 03:25.065
or even often concerned in the institutional ways.

03:25.575 --> 03:30.025
This people then create a state so that for

03:30.025 --> 03:33.985
that reason, the conundrum isn't solved and democratic,

03:34.125 --> 03:37.745
and, and political, theory, theories of democracy.

03:38.525 --> 03:41.225
On the other hand, this is a fundamental problem

03:41.645 --> 03:44.615
for rational choice theorists who do

03:45.215 --> 03:47.775
concentrate on formal institution making

03:47.955 --> 03:51.695
and processing, preferences into a, into a popular will.

03:52.275 --> 03:55.095
Um, but they have no way of explaining

03:55.235 --> 03:59.015
or accounting for the way in which those institutions

03:59.405 --> 04:01.615
that are processing these preferences are

04:01.615 --> 04:02.935
created or emerged.

04:03.315 --> 04:05.735
So this brings together the rational choice

04:05.795 --> 04:09.055
and democratic theory, components of the problem.

04:09.595 --> 04:12.015
Um, and I address both of them in the paper.

04:12.635 --> 04:14.015
Oh, I don't resolve it.

04:14.255 --> 04:16.495
I, I, I think

04:16.495 --> 04:20.735
that dilemma sits right in the heart of problematic,

04:21.355 --> 04:23.375
for democracy.

04:24.035 --> 04:26.055
Um, democratic theory can do a lot

04:26.055 --> 04:29.135
of things once the institutions are, are up and running,

04:29.435 --> 04:30.815
but they cannot explain,

04:31.195 --> 04:33.455
or they cannot account for,

04:33.715 --> 04:35.295
how they're created in the beginning.

04:35.995 --> 04:38.095
Um, now the,

04:38.515 --> 04:42.535
but your question is, has another element to it,

04:42.545 --> 04:45.495
which is, we know this problem is resolved

04:46.095 --> 04:48.655
'cause we don't, democracies are everywhere.

04:48.915 --> 04:52.095
And so how did they resolve this opening dilemma?

04:52.875 --> 04:54.775
Um, and in the United States,

04:55.025 --> 04:58.655
which has probably had more constitutional conventions than

04:58.715 --> 05:01.055
any other, country in the world,

05:01.245 --> 05:06.175
because the states have done this, they routinely,

05:06.315 --> 05:08.775
fairly routinely, the political,

05:08.885 --> 05:11.335
when a state holds a constitutional convention,

05:11.845 --> 05:14.095
political parties arrive at the site

05:14.475 --> 05:17.495
and they decide that who their, their leaders are.

05:17.955 --> 05:20.815
And usually one of the parties has a majority

05:21.155 --> 05:23.335
of the ostensibly elected delegates.

05:23.875 --> 05:27.775
And that leader then becomes the leader of the convention.

05:28.475 --> 05:32.575
And then that leader recognizing the members of

05:32.575 --> 05:35.855
that majority party institutes rules and so forth

05:35.875 --> 05:39.095
and so on, all of these things are customary.

05:39.685 --> 05:43.055
They are, done through tradition and habits.

05:43.795 --> 05:47.975
Um, and as long as all both parties,

05:48.125 --> 05:51.695
including the minority party, recognize those traditions

05:51.715 --> 05:54.655
and customary practices, then the,

05:54.685 --> 05:56.895
opening dilemma is in

05:56.895 --> 06:00.205
A sense, you know, put, shoved under the rug.

06:00.465 --> 06:01.805
You don't, you don't see it.

06:02.345 --> 06:04.885
Uh, and for that reason, they've been, they've been

06:04.985 --> 06:09.445
so common, that the opening dilemma has usually

06:10.265 --> 06:12.645
not appeared in public view.

06:13.025 --> 06:14.805
In American political history.

06:15.525 --> 06:19.525
I have this library, of political documents

06:19.585 --> 06:23.365
and old books and references, 20,000 books.

06:23.665 --> 06:27.365
And one of the book, and something like, like 50

06:27.385 --> 06:30.445
of them are constitutional conventions, journals,

06:30.445 --> 06:31.485
and, and records.

06:32.145 --> 06:37.125
So when I imagined discovered there was this conundrum,

06:37.645 --> 06:39.285
I went to those, those records,

06:39.865 --> 06:41.325
and I started going through them.

06:41.945 --> 06:44.125
And most, and most of them are journals.

06:44.125 --> 06:46.765
And it was very hard because it was abstracted to see

06:46.765 --> 06:49.085
where the, how the opening dilemma was, was,

06:49.465 --> 06:51.925
you know, resolved.

06:52.745 --> 06:55.365
But on the other hand, the Illinois Convention

06:55.465 --> 07:00.165
and 1869 had two very thick volumes,

07:00.845 --> 07:05.085
a thousand pages a piece, that was a verbatim record.

07:05.905 --> 07:08.485
And what, what I found there, was

07:08.485 --> 07:10.285
that they had incredible problems

07:10.885 --> 07:13.285
establishing the institutional forms

07:13.465 --> 07:15.085
for their constitutional convention.

07:15.425 --> 07:19.285
And the reason for that was that the two parties were very,

07:19.435 --> 07:21.285
very close in numbers.

07:21.865 --> 07:24.045
And in fact, there were five members

07:24.145 --> 07:26.325
or so who were ostensibly Republicans,

07:26.665 --> 07:30.365
but who didn't like their, their party members very much.

07:30.425 --> 07:31.765
And so they, they're swing votes.

07:32.265 --> 07:35.845
So they couldn't, they didn't have a majority,

07:35.995 --> 07:38.405
neither part political party had a majority.

07:38.665 --> 07:41.245
So neither political party, though, they elected leaders,

07:41.855 --> 07:44.405
could impose their leader,

07:44.405 --> 07:46.885
through customary practices on the convention.

07:47.425 --> 07:51.325
So what they had to do is that, first of all, is they, they,

07:51.355 --> 07:52.925
they, they bounced around this.

07:53.035 --> 07:55.245
They couldn't elect a, a presiding officer.

07:55.425 --> 07:59.045
So they said, well, if we can't elect a presiding officer,

07:59.455 --> 08:01.605
maybe we can determine who the members are.

08:01.835 --> 08:03.165
Well, they rapidly found out

08:03.515 --> 08:07.925
that they had no procedural rules for, for, so,

08:08.995 --> 08:11.015
certifying the membership.

08:11.475 --> 08:14.375
So then they, then they said, well,

08:14.375 --> 08:15.935
maybe we could create some rules

08:16.275 --> 08:18.415
and the rules for customary rules.

08:18.875 --> 08:22.015
But they rapidly found out that some members who wanted to,

08:22.315 --> 08:25.295
to delay the proceedings could talk forever,

08:25.645 --> 08:27.015
because there were no rules

08:27.125 --> 08:28.935
that prevented that from happening.

08:29.355 --> 08:32.895
So the problem was they couldn't figure out any way

08:32.895 --> 08:35.895
of solving this problem, for a while.

08:36.075 --> 08:38.815
In fact, they had two temporary leaders,

08:39.035 --> 08:41.295
one from each party, and they would,

08:41.685 --> 08:45.815
they would decide on common, common decisions,

08:46.235 --> 08:51.095
but they couldn't decide the, the most important questions.

08:51.635 --> 08:54.935
So what happened in the Illinois Convention in 1869

08:55.505 --> 08:58.445
Is that the members ca came face to face

08:59.275 --> 09:00.525
with the opening dilemma.

09:01.365 --> 09:05.535
They confronted it in a way that both surprised them

09:05.925 --> 09:07.535
because they'd never seen it before,

09:08.785 --> 09:10.725
and also frustrated them.

09:11.545 --> 09:15.685
Um, and so they began to talk in very flowery, very grand

09:16.595 --> 09:18.005
notions of will to the people

09:18.585 --> 09:20.285
and who they were, were representing,

09:20.285 --> 09:21.445
and so forth and so on.

09:21.785 --> 09:25.325
Um, it was really, really, wonderful stuff.

09:25.665 --> 09:26.685
It was very common.

09:26.685 --> 09:28.405
People, because constitutional conventions

09:28.405 --> 09:29.485
have very common people.

09:29.555 --> 09:33.325
They're, they're, they're not, they're, they're not,

09:33.595 --> 09:35.285
established leaders in most cases.

09:35.945 --> 09:40.565
Uh, just common, common folk, confronting

09:41.285 --> 09:43.405
a conundrum that they didn't understand.

09:44.235 --> 09:48.565
Imagine that the United States in say, 2025,

09:49.875 --> 09:52.385
wants to hold a constitutional convention.

09:52.525 --> 09:54.905
And there are reasons why a constitutional,

09:55.105 --> 10:00.025
a new constitutional convention, would res would

10:01.185 --> 10:03.675
what change some of the practices, some

10:03.675 --> 10:05.595
of the institutional forms,

10:06.415 --> 10:07.675
and make them more democratic.

10:07.775 --> 10:09.435
For the United example,

10:09.575 --> 10:12.635
the United States Senate might become a proportional rather

10:12.635 --> 10:13.955
than two states and so forth.

10:13.965 --> 10:15.675
There are things out there that might,

10:15.675 --> 10:16.915
that, that might be done.

10:17.255 --> 10:19.715
So imagine that the United States attempts

10:19.715 --> 10:22.635
to hold the Constitutional Convention in 2025,

10:23.175 --> 10:24.555
and they elect the delegates

10:24.815 --> 10:28.195
and the, the, the, the egs that say they,

10:28.555 --> 10:29.795
they arrive in Washington

10:30.295 --> 10:33.955
and the two parties are very closely matched.

10:35.405 --> 10:37.465
They'd run into the same thing

10:38.055 --> 10:41.265
that the Illinois Convention did in 1869.

10:41.935 --> 10:44.185
They would be unable to certify themselves

10:44.285 --> 10:47.305
as legitimate representatives that'd be unable to

10:47.825 --> 10:49.625
elect a parliamentary leader,

10:50.005 --> 10:52.545
and they'd be unable to elect to,

10:53.125 --> 10:55.145
to ratify rules of procedure.

10:55.735 --> 10:59.785
Then what would happen is they would, you would have the,

11:00.245 --> 11:03.825
the entire political system come face to face with the fact

11:03.825 --> 11:07.425
that there is no will of the people, the will of the people,

11:07.885 --> 11:12.505
and in fact, is a methodological, imagined thing.

11:13.135 --> 11:17.185
It's very useful in democracies when it's,

11:17.215 --> 11:19.745
when it's clothed in institutional forms.

11:20.405 --> 11:23.465
But as an abstract methodological belief

11:23.645 --> 11:27.345
or idea, it really needs consensus.

11:27.765 --> 11:30.065
The United States doesn't have that consensus.

11:30.705 --> 11:33.865
I think holding a constitutional convention,

11:34.195 --> 11:37.705
right now would be an incredibly dangerous thing

11:37.765 --> 11:39.065
for the United States to do.

11:39.495 --> 11:41.545
When I wrote this paper,

11:41.845 --> 11:46.625
and published it, I was in the process of doing that.

11:47.005 --> 11:49.265
Um, I also started on a book,

11:49.365 --> 11:51.385
and the book is the founding of Modern States.

11:52.005 --> 11:56.245
And in that book, I undertook to un to analyze

11:56.945 --> 11:59.485
six different modern foundings,

11:59.745 --> 12:02.565
and how they resolved the opening dilemma.

12:02.905 --> 12:05.085
You know, how they had an answer for it.

12:05.505 --> 12:08.565
Um, three of them were non-democratic states.

12:08.745 --> 12:11.925
The Russian revolution in which the dictatorship

12:12.025 --> 12:15.565
of the proletariat, resolved the answer

12:15.565 --> 12:17.045
through the Communist Party.

12:17.545 --> 12:21.045
Uh, the second, was the,

12:21.355 --> 12:25.685
Nazi regime brought to power in 1933 in Germany, that

12:25.715 --> 12:28.885
that became the enabler of the historical destiny

12:29.025 --> 12:30.045
of the German people.

12:30.785 --> 12:34.405
And the third was the creation of the Islamic theocracy,

12:34.905 --> 12:35.965
in Iran.

12:36.465 --> 12:39.685
And in those three cases, the resolution

12:39.745 --> 12:43.445
of the opening dilemma, is that

12:44.085 --> 12:47.525
a revolutionary party declares itself

12:48.335 --> 12:49.955
to be the will of the people

12:50.815 --> 12:54.055
and declares itself to be the will of the people

12:54.285 --> 12:56.535
because it embodies

12:56.795 --> 12:59.375
and, is the vehicle

12:59.715 --> 13:02.175
for the historical destiny of that people.

13:02.755 --> 13:05.895
So when non-democratic foundings, the will

13:05.895 --> 13:08.975
of the people is still fundamentally important,

13:09.435 --> 13:13.215
but it is not a democratic notion in the sense that we,

13:13.555 --> 13:16.375
we in the west usually imagine it to be.

13:16.795 --> 13:21.055
Um, I also, looked at three democratic

13:21.155 --> 13:24.855
or traditional democracies, the unwritten English

13:25.535 --> 13:29.495
constitution, which embodied the rights of Englishmen,

13:29.955 --> 13:33.895
the American Revolution, which w was created

13:34.065 --> 13:36.375
after those rights of Englishmen were denied

13:36.395 --> 13:38.695
to the colonists and the French Revolution,

13:38.985 --> 13:41.855
which asserted the rights of man as a justification

13:41.875 --> 13:46.095
for the demolition, of the, of the remains

13:46.095 --> 13:47.335
of, of feudalism.

13:47.955 --> 13:49.135
Now, when I look at those

13:49.315 --> 13:53.375
and I, I compare them, there two things happen.

13:54.535 --> 13:58.405
First of all, all modern foundings have been committed

13:58.405 --> 14:01.245
to the existence of a mythological conception of the will

14:01.245 --> 14:04.845
of the people, including a belief that that will,

14:04.905 --> 14:08.645
can only be revealed through a properly conceived and pro

14:08.865 --> 14:11.005
and performed political practice.

14:11.555 --> 14:14.285
That there are differences between non-democratic

14:14.285 --> 14:17.685
and democratic foundings, but they're not distinct

14:17.865 --> 14:20.045
or significant differences.

14:20.435 --> 14:22.325
They both do the same thing.

14:22.945 --> 14:26.285
The second is that all modern foundings have been grounded

14:26.905 --> 14:31.485
in a priority normative decisions concerning the identity

14:31.545 --> 14:35.045
of the people, the transcendent social purpose associated

14:35.045 --> 14:36.205
with their historical destiny

14:36.705 --> 14:40.445
and the practice through which the popular will, is

14:40.625 --> 14:42.245
and should be manifested.

14:42.705 --> 14:46.525
So for example, in the Soviet, for the Soviet state,

14:46.945 --> 14:50.845
the Bolshevik revolutionary elite identified the proletariat

14:51.385 --> 14:56.245
as the people declared the global communist revolution

14:56.305 --> 14:59.405
to be their destiny, and asserted that the,

14:59.405 --> 15:02.965
that their party was the vehicle through the, which the will

15:02.965 --> 15:06.005
of the prolo proletariat would be manifested.

15:06.545 --> 15:10.405
So these things are their universal,

15:10.825 --> 15:14.525
as I see it, and that that opening dilemma,

15:14.735 --> 15:17.925
which we see at the founding that always occurs,

15:18.185 --> 15:21.965
always present at the founding of a constitutional assembly,

15:22.625 --> 15:26.685
in fact, has a much broader relevance and application

15:26.875 --> 15:30.765
because it has to do with how we imagine people's

15:31.145 --> 15:32.205
and political purpose

15:32.905 --> 15:36.325
and the, the way in which the institutional forms meaning

15:36.345 --> 15:38.885
the state that we erect in order

15:38.985 --> 15:40.965
to combine these two things, I.

Democracy's Foundational Elements and Challenges

00:00:00 - I've been interested in parliamentary rules for over 50 years, and I wrote my doctoral dissertation on it. And for, for many decades, I've been pre, I've been persuaded that formal rules, processing preferences in legislatures could implement, the democratic will, the will of the people. and it was a matter of processing these preferences into outcomes, and that was a mathematical and a logical problem.
00:00:35 - I became persuaded that while rational choice rules and frameworks of interpretation could explain a lot of what went on in legislatures and constitutional assemblies, they could not explain how those constitutional assemblies in legislatures would be created. And in fact, there's a very important,
00:01:06 - and constitutional assemblies, and that is that you need to begin with, you need three elements in order to create a legislature or a constitutional assembly. You need a parliamentary leader to recognize motions. You need members who are certified and legitimated as representatives of their their constituencies. And you need parliamentary rules. You need those three things.
00:01:38 - you cannot create any of these things without the other two. And that as a result, a democracy cannot found itself because it cannot create the institutional forms through which the will of the people could be translated into a constitution, into a state with formal powers.
00:02:10 - a, well, a fundamental fact. It's a logical, fundamental fact of, of, democratic life. My work is, is primarily, engaging two different li literatures. On the one hand, there is a very vibrant, active literature, and democratic theory about how peoples come to recognize themselves
00:02:39 - and in democratic theory, that is a really fundamental, problem. the way that political, the political theorists have recognized that the people must constitute themselves. The problem for political theorists is that there is no way for a people To constitute themselves except through imagination. And so they try to solve this problem, by assuming, usually by assuming a primordial essentialist identity

Democratic Theory and Institutional Creation Dilemma

00:03:16 - On the other hand, political theorists aren't, primarily concerned or even often concerned in the institutional ways. This people then create a state so that for that reason, the conundrum isn't solved and democratic, and, and political, theory, theories of democracy. On the other hand, this is a fundamental problem
00:03:45 - concentrate on formal institution making and processing, preferences into a, into a popular will. but they have no way of explaining or accounting for the way in which those institutions that are processing these preferences are created or emerged. So this brings together the rational choice and democratic theory, components of the problem. and I address both of them in the paper.
00:04:14 - I, I, I think that dilemma sits right in the heart of problematic, for democracy. democratic theory can do a lot of things once the institutions are, are up and running, but they cannot explain, or they cannot account for, how they're created in the beginning. now the, but your question is, has another element to it, which is, we know this problem is resolved
00:04:48 - And so how did they resolve this opening dilemma? and in the United States, which has probably had more constitutional conventions than any other, country in the world, because the states have done this, they routinely, fairly routinely, the political, when a state holds a constitutional convention, political parties arrive at the site and they decide that who their, their leaders are.
00:05:21 - of the ostensibly elected delegates. And that leader then becomes the leader of the convention. And then that leader recognizing the members of that majority party institutes rules and so forth and so on, all of these things are customary. They are, done through tradition and habits. and as long as all both parties,
00:05:51 - and customary practices, then the, opening dilemma is in A sense, you know, put, shoved under the rug. You don't, you don't see it. and for that reason, they've been, they've been so common, that the opening dilemma has usually not appeared in public view. In American political history. I have this library, of political documents

Challenges of 1869 Constitutional Conventions

00:06:23 - And one of the book, and something like, like 50 of them are constitutional conventions, journals, and, and records. So when I imagined discovered there was this conundrum, I went to those, those records, and I started going through them. And most, and most of them are journals. And it was very hard because it was abstracted to see where the, how the opening dilemma was, was, you know, resolved.
00:06:55 - and 1869 had two very thick volumes, a thousand pages a piece, that was a verbatim record. And what, what I found there, was that they had incredible problems establishing the institutional forms for their constitutional convention. And the reason for that was that the two parties were very, very close in numbers. And in fact, there were five members
00:07:26 - but who didn't like their, their party members very much. And so they, they're swing votes. So they couldn't, they didn't have a majority, neither part political party had a majority. So neither political party, though, they elected leaders, could impose their leader, through customary practices on the convention. So what they had to do is that, first of all, is they, they, they, they bounced around this. They couldn't elect a, a presiding officer.
00:07:59 - maybe we can determine who the members are. Well, they rapidly found out that they had no procedural rules for, for, so, certifying the membership. So then they, then they said, well, maybe we could create some rules and the rules for customary rules. But they rapidly found out that some members who wanted to, to delay the proceedings could talk forever,
00:08:27 - that prevented that from happening. So the problem was they couldn't figure out any way of solving this problem, for a while. In fact, they had two temporary leaders, one from each party, and they would, they would decide on common, common decisions, but they couldn't decide the, the most important questions. So what happened in the Illinois Convention in 1869 Is that the members ca came face to face
00:09:01 - They confronted it in a way that both surprised them because they'd never seen it before, and also frustrated them. and so they began to talk in very flowery, very grand notions of will to the people and who they were, were representing, and so forth and so on. it was really, really, wonderful stuff. It was very common. People, because constitutional conventions have very common people.

Challenges of a 2025 Constitutional Convention

00:09:33 - established leaders in most cases. just common, common folk, confronting a conundrum that they didn't understand. Imagine that the United States in say, 2025, wants to hold a constitutional convention. And there are reasons why a constitutional, a new constitutional convention, would res would
00:10:03 - of the institutional forms, and make them more democratic. For the United example, the United States Senate might become a proportional rather than two states and so forth. There are things out there that might, that, that might be done. So imagine that the United States attempts to hold the Constitutional Convention in 2025, and they elect the delegates and the, the, the, the egs that say they, they arrive in Washington and the two parties are very closely matched.
00:10:38 - that the Illinois Convention did in 1869. They would be unable to certify themselves as legitimate representatives that'd be unable to elect a parliamentary leader, and they'd be unable to elect to, to ratify rules of procedure. Then what would happen is they would, you would have the, the entire political system come face to face with the fact that there is no will of the people, the will of the people,
00:11:13 - It's very useful in democracies when it's, when it's clothed in institutional forms. But as an abstract methodological belief or idea, it really needs consensus. The United States doesn't have that consensus. I think holding a constitutional convention, right now would be an incredibly dangerous thing for the United States to do.
00:11:41 - and published it, I was in the process of doing that. I also started on a book, and the book is the founding of Modern States. And in that book, I undertook to un to analyze six different modern foundings, and how they resolved the opening dilemma. You know, how they had an answer for it. three of them were non-democratic states. The Russian revolution in which the dictatorship
00:12:15 - through the Communist Party. the second, was the, Nazi regime brought to power in 1933 in Germany, that that became the enabler of the historical destiny of the German people. And the third was the creation of the Islamic theocracy, in Iran. And in those three cases, the resolution of the opening dilemma, is that

Understanding People's Will in Governance

00:12:48 - to be the will of the people and declares itself to be the will of the people because it embodies and, is the vehicle for the historical destiny of that people. So when non-democratic foundings, the will of the people is still fundamentally important, but it is not a democratic notion in the sense that we, we in the west usually imagine it to be.
00:13:21 - or traditional democracies, the unwritten English constitution, which embodied the rights of Englishmen, the American Revolution, which w was created after those rights of Englishmen were denied to the colonists and the French Revolution, which asserted the rights of man as a justification for the demolition, of the, of the remains of, of feudalism.
00:13:49 - and I, I compare them, there two things happen. First of all, all modern foundings have been committed to the existence of a mythological conception of the will of the people, including a belief that that will, can only be revealed through a properly conceived and pro and performed political practice. That there are differences between non-democratic and democratic foundings, but they're not distinct or significant differences.
00:14:22 - The second is that all modern foundings have been grounded in a priority normative decisions concerning the identity of the people, the transcendent social purpose associated with their historical destiny and the practice through which the popular will, is and should be manifested. So for example, in the Soviet, for the Soviet state, the Bolshevik revolutionary elite identified the proletariat
00:14:56 - to be their destiny, and asserted that the, that their party was the vehicle through the, which the will of the prolo proletariat would be manifested. So these things are their universal, as I see it, and that that opening dilemma, which we see at the founding that always occurs, always present at the founding of a constitutional assembly,
00:15:38 - because it has to do with how we imagine people's and political purpose and the, the way in which the institutional forms meaning the state that we erect in order to combine these two things, I.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Research

Policy

Analysis