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Kathryn Cramer Brownell discusses how cable television upended American political life in the pursuit of profits and influence

Image courtesy of interviewee. November 27, 2023

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The speaker discusses their motivation for writing a book on the evolution of media, particularly focusing on the changes in the cable television landscape from the 1960s through the 1980s. Initially intending to frame the narrative around Ronald Reagan and his deregulation policies, they uncover deeper historical roots dating back to the Nixon administration, which shaped regulatory approaches to cable. Nixon's dissatisfaction with network television bias led to efforts to develop cable as a competitive alternative, fostering a symbiotic relationship between cable operators and political figures.

The speaker highlights a significant political workshop from March 1984 where cable lobbyists promoted cable as a democratic solution to broadcasting's limitations. This video video push coincided with deregulation debates and aimed to showcase the advantages of cable's technological capabilities, which could offer more diverse programming.

They address how the emergence of channels like CSPAN and CNN transformed political communication, allowing for greater access and visibility for fringe political voices and third-party candidates, exemplified by Ross Perot's successful use of CNN in the 1992 election. The speaker notes how Bill Clinton leveraged unconventional media appearances to connect directly with voters.

The conversation shifts to the role of cable news in contemporary politics, particularly during Donald Trump's presidency, where outlets like Fox News became instrumental in shaping narratives and misinformation. The speaker emphasizes the importance of understanding the power dynamics and business strategies within the media landscape to navigate political discourse effectively.

Ultimately, they point out that while they do not have solutions to current political and media divisions, increased awareness of the interplay between media, politics, and profit can empower individuals to critically assess the information they consume.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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So I started writing this book

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because I was really interested in the changes in the media

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landscape that really become clear in the 1980s.

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I'm a historian, really interested in the intersections

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of media and politics,

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and I noticed that, you know,

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cable television comes on the scene

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and seems to explode in the 1980s,

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and historians frequently talked about it as a result

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of Ronald Reagan, the great communicator

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and his deregulatory agenda.

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And so I thought this was gonna be a book about Reagan,

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but in fact, when I started digging, I found

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that the origins of some of these political changes,

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new political attitudes about how

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to structure cable television as a business,

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were actually rooted in the 1960s

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and significantly in the Nixon administration as well.

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There are major changes in

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regulatory policy towards cable television

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that happened under Richard Nixon.

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To me, this was really interesting.

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There was always a line in the literature

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that talked about the anti-media agenda of Nixon

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as shaping cable, but that was really it.

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And, I wrote my first book about

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that ended with Richard Nixon.

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I knew his obsession with the politics of the media.

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I knew his obsession with controlling the image.

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And so I started digging into his administration

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and in particular his office of Telecommunications policy.

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And I found that, you know, these new regulatory approaches

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to cable television

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that are taken under the OTP under Nixon,

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are really connected, to his anger at the,

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the network televisions his, belief

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that the networks were biased and not to get 'em.

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And he wanted to spur cable, which had previously only

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expanded the reach of broadcast television

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by regulatory design.

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He wanted to introduce this concept of cable as a competitor

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to network television that could really kind

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of challenge the dominance

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that they had over the information people received on their

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television screens, every day.

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One of the key archives that I relied on, was the,

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the CSPAN Video Library.

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It's an incredible archive. It's free to access.

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Um, and so I strongly encourage anyone interested in media

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and politics in modern America to check it out.

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And as I was digging into this,

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I found this really fascinating, political workshop

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that was launched on March 1st, 1984.

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And in the workshop, it really encapsulated the themes.

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I saw time and time again in my research,

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that cable operators and lobbyists are coming to DC

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and they're pitching to white or White House

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and congressional staffers

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and campaign advisors,

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about why they should use cable rather than broadcasting.

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They highlighted that the problem that democracy faced was

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that broadcasting was too powerful, too exclusionary,

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because again, at this time, broadcasting only allowed,

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the three networks to really dominate

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The information that people receive cable

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because of the technological reach of cable,

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you could have more channels on the dial.

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They could, they could actually, go all night long.

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Um, cable could really exceed the boundaries,

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those limitations set by network broadcasting.

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And so operators are saying that this is the solution,

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to this, mass mediated world that's so limited

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by broadcast, and they, they highlight it

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as a democratic solution.

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But in fact, this was very much a lobbying strategy at the

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time, Congress was debating deregulatory

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legislation about cable television.

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And there's even references to this that, you know,

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we're aware that this re legislation's on the table

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and we look what we can do for you.

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Why don't you do something for us?

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And so it's this symbiotic relationship

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that Cable Operators worked really diligently to create

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with elected officials.

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Uh, that is at the core of my book.

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Um, and it, you know, this, this meeting really,

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reflected this broader political strategy by the late 1970s,

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thanks to satellite technology that allowed capable

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operators to disseminate their programming across the

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country quite cheaply, compared to having relied on,

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the wires of,

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or, microwave systems of network broadcasting.

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Um, all of a sudden there is just this explosion

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of the cable dial where, operators

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and pro are looking for different types of programs, ones

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that they can sell to, potential subscribers to say,

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you can't get this on traditional television,

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but you can if you subscribe to, to cable.

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And so HBO really is transformative,

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in offering entertainment, nonstop sports,

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or live sporting even.

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And, and movies.

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Um, ESPN comes out,

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but for the political agenda of cable operators

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and lobbyists, the two most consequential channels

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that are introduced in 1979

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and 1980 respectively are cspan, which

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provided televised, coverage of legislative proceedings,

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in the House of Representatives

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and CNN, which provides, you know,

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nonstop 24 7 news coverage.

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It's one of the things, that kind of goes to

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that broader political strategy of cable operators,

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of trying to become part of the political establishment

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because they understood that if they became part of

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that establishment, then, those people

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who benefited from exposure on cable would work

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to expand cable's reach.

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And so it's a business strategy as much

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as it's a lobbying strategy.

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And so this is part of what Cable News does.

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Um, it affords new opportunities,

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for political activists across the,

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the ideological spectrum to come in

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and share their views as punts or commentators.

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It affords opportunities for perhaps more fringe members

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of Congress,

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or third party candidates to have an opportunity

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to come on a news program because it extends 24 hours a day.

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It's not the 22 lim or,

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or maybe even an hour news broadcast of, of, of the,

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of the television networks.

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Um, and so this really, becomes a way to, and,

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and, you know, Ted Turner recognizes

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that the business potential

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of showing the political credibility

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and the political value of CNN, works

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to ingrain it in different campaigns and operations.

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And by 1992, that's exactly what happens.

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Um, and, and it's, you know, it's people

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who are normally desperate for media attention

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that are willing to gamble on a news strategy like cable.

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And that's exactly what happens in 92.

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You have someone like Ross Perot that,

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is a third party candidate, doesn't have a political party

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to back him, uses CNN to make an appeal to voters

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to write him in as a, as the third party candidates.

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And then, it's, bill Clinton, who's desperate

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for media attention in, the summer of 1992

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that will accept any media invitation that co

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that's coming his way, including something

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that's very unconventional from MTV.

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Uh, president HW Bush, said that he wouldn't go on

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what he called a teeny bopper network,

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because he thought it was undignified.

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But in fact, bill Clinton recognized

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that going on MTV would allow him to directly communicate

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to a particular demographic

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around issues that interested them.

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So younger voters,

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he talked a lot about student loan policies.

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He also controlled,

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really dominated the parameters of the conversation.

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There were no hard hitting questions. He was in control.

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He kind of shaped the, the information

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that they were getting, and he was actually able

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to use going on there

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and speaking to quote unquote, the people directly as a way

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to criticize the Washington Press Corps

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that had been hammering him about all

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of these questions of scandal.

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And so he is able to bypass the Washington Press Court

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and appeal directly to voters in a way that allowed him

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to present his message in a very unfiltered, manner.

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Cable news is as powerful

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as the political establishment really makes it.

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Um, and that's one of the one things, you know, when,

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when people like, during Donald Trump's

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campaign in 2016 during his presidency,

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he relied on Fox News.

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Uh, he relied tremendously on them

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to get his message out there to,

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to manipulate information, to advance misinformation,

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to advance conspiracy theories, about the,

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the 2020 election.

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And so, because Donald Trump elevated the role

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of Fox in his communication strategy, Fox then used

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that political prestige as a way to rake in profits.

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Um, and so political power

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and profits have gone hand in hand.

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Now, I think you see, that

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because, you know, Fox News ended up reporting the results

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of the 2020 election because of the

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Dominion lawsuit that shows they knew they were selling

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these lies, but they were scared to offend their,

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their viewers, and notably, president Trump.

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Now all of that has come out into the open

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and the relationship between Trump

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and Fox has been suffered.

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And so I think the question is, how does Fox,

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but how do any

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of the cable news channels show their relevance?

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Um, in the, the 2024 election?

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Traditionally, candidates have relied on cable news

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to get their information out there.

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They've relied on them to host debates, to host town halls,

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to, you know, to have some

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of these really important events that have been central

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to mobilizing voters.

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Um, and whether

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or not they turn to the cable news networks,

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is going to be really significant.

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And I think on the flip side,

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how cable news networks actually approach this election,

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how they, they do investigative journalism, right?

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Are are they actually trying to hold candidates accountable

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or are they allowing them to just advance some

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of this misinformation, these conspiracy theories

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that will then determine whether or not voters

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and then viewers value them enough to pay

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for the subscription fees?

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As a historian, my goal is

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to make people understand the power dynamics,

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of our media landscape.

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And, and I think that it's designed, one of, one

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of the things I chart in the book is that it is designed to

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distract and divide people because

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of the very particular regulatory course that it took,

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emphasizing market metrics rather than serving democracy.

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And I don't have the solution

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to the challenges we face in our contemporary political

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and media, divides that are very much,

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a challenge for American democracy today.

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But I do think that if people understand the power dynamics

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behind them, they understand the,

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the political calculations that are at play

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and what in how information is presented, how it's used,

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and they understand the business, dynamics

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that are there as well, that they'll better be able

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to navigate and understand

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and dissect the information that they receive,

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from their television screens.

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But also, you know, from their, their, their phones

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and their social media feeds.

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