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Destined to Brexit?

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Wolfram Kaiser explores whether and how the United Kingdom was destined to Brexit before it even joined the European Communities in 1973.

Image courtesy of interviewee. February 1, 2024

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This video video presents a detailed analysis of the historical context surrounding Brexit, particularly reflecting on the UK's relationship with European integration since its accession to the European communities in 1973. The speaker, a historian, discusses whether Brexit was an inevitable outcome of the UK's membership in the EU or if it could have been avoided given various historical trajectories.

Key points from the discussion include:

1. **Nature of Brexit**: The speaker describes Brexit as an "uncivil divorce" where both the UK and the EU likely face losses, although the UK may be affected more significantly.

2. **Pathways vs. Path Dependency**: The concept of "pathways" is introduced to analyze the historical processes leading to Brexit, contrasting it with "path dependency," which is more deterministic. The speaker argues that although there were strong historical influences that facilitated Brexit, it was not an inevitable conclusion.

3. **Historical Context**: The UK's approach to Europe was always secondary to its relationships with the Commonwealth and the United States, which shaped foreign policy and domestic perceptions. Economic challenges and shifting priorities narrowed policy options regarding European integration.

4. **Expectations of Membership**: There were overblown expectations about the economic benefits of joining the EU, with many believing it would automatically revitalize British industry without recognizing the need for internal reform.

5. **Political Dynamics**: The historical adversarial political system in the UK has hindered the development of a strong, cross-party consensus on European issues, leading to divisions in both the Conservative and Labour parties.

6. **Narrative Construction**: The failure of the pro-EU campaign during the Brexit referendum is attributed to a lack of a compelling, emotionally engaging narrative advocating for EU membership, contrasting with the more effective messaging of the Leave campaign.

7. **Lessons for the Future**: The speaker emphasizes the importance of political elites reflecting on historical narratives and constructing cohesive narratives around policy issues, as these can significantly influence public perception and political outcomes.

Overall, the analysis asserts that Brexit was shaped by historical factors and political choices, suggesting that while certain pathways made Brexit easier, it was not an unavoidable outcome of the UK's EU membership.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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With the experience of, Brexit 2016, the referendum,

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and then 2019, the actual Brexit

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and the negotiations leading up to Brexit.

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Uh, the question is, of course, for historians like me, is,

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well, was it always likely

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or maybe even certain that with the UK joining in 1973,

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that this would eventually lead

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to the UK also leaving the European Union again?

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So in that sense, was Brexit the death foretold?

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Um, certainly I think we collectively,

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both in the United Kingdom

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and in continental Europe, have experienced Brexit as a kind

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of uncivil divorce

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with both sides probably losing out from my perspective,

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the UK more than the European Union.

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Um, and this is where this question comes in,

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would it have been possible in some way

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or another to avoid this kind of outcome?

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Uh, or was there very strong trajectory ever since the UK

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joined in 1973 that made it, at least easy,

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maybe even certain, for the UK

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to leave eventually at least?

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Um, alternatively, were there factors

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that facilitated Brexit,

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but could Brexit nevertheless have been avoided?

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And the argument, in my research,

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I think the key argument is essentially

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that there were strong pathways, what we call pathways

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that have facilitated Brexit,

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but that Brexit nevertheless was not the inevitable outcome.

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And this would be a very deterministic view of Britain

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and Europe in the postwar period, which would, in my view,

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alleviate the British politically leads from the burden

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of their own failure to create a strong pro-European

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narrative and to achieve a stronger cross-party consensus,

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which would've been necessary to make sure that the UK

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and the British people would've felt more at ease.

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And, at home, if you like, inside of

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what is now the European Union,

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we've developed this in a bigger project together with,

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other social scientists

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who also share a strong interest in the pa pa past and,

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and using the past for,

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or looking into the past for explaining the present day

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politics and policymaking in this case of Britain

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and European integration.

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And the concept of pathways is intended to,

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allow a delineation from the long existing concept

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of historical path dependency.

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This is something that historical,

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so-called historical institutionalists have come up with

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to explain how history matters.

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But the problem with the concept of,

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the historical path dependency is that it tends

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to be quite deterministic.

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Paul s mainly on formal institutions on treaties, laws,

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rulemaking and so on,

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and what kind of long-term impact they have in terms

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of narrowing the options of political decision makers

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and institutions in terms of their current

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and future politics and policymaking.

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So what the term pathways allows me

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and allows us to do is

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to also look at other more informal aspects of politics

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and policymaking in historical, perspective,

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particularly historical experience generally conceived of

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as including perceptions and narratives of the past

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and how they matter for contemporary politics

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and policymaking, or ways of constructing, in this case,

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national identity and how that has mattered for Britain

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and European integration notions,

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or for example, national, in this case,

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national traditions or for example,

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parliamentary sovereignty

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and how they've been employed to relate to a process

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of the process of European integration, the politics

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of the European Union, and also practices

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that arguably develop over a long time periods,

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for example, a foreign policy that has been shaped very much

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by, the British experience of colonial rule.

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So pathways allow for historical contingency,

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but they also make it, allow for the possibility

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that decision makers can shape the historical evolution

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and also create new pathways.

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So it's much less deterministic

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as a concept compared to path dependency.

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And I think that's what its main usefulness is.

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Essentially, I think I'm trying to make,

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four interrelated arguments.

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The first one is indeed about the question of

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narrowing policy options in advance

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of the actual British accession to the European communities

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as they were then caught in 1973,

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I think when the UK came out

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of the Second World War victorious, of course.

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And this very much shaped the perception not just

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of decision makers, but also the British public.

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This, idea of having won

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and having fought single handedly for a certain period

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of time in the beginning of the second World War against the

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Nazi German regime.

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Uh, coming out of the Second World War,

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British thinking about Britain's place in the world was very

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much shaped by what Churchill termed the three

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circuits concepts.

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So the UK in this perspective was at the heart

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of three different types of relationships with Europe, also

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with the Commonwealth, and of course

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with the United States of America.

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And what I think is very important to keep in mind is

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that from the beginning, Europe came third in terms

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of the priority list for the vast majority, vast majority,

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with the very few individual exceptions

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of the British political elites

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and decision makers, both in the Conservative party

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and in the Labor Party as well.

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But importantly, these three circles in terms

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of their nature and their importance for the UK

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changed very much in the following 20 years or so.

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And this led to this narrowing

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of policy options on European integration.

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Now, first of all, on Europe, for Britain, the initial setup

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of the organization for European economic, cooperation,

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which is now the OECD, seemed to be the ideal

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economic framework for European trade

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because it allowed the United Kingdom to continue

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with its own national foreign trade policy.

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It did not involve the creation of a customs union

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with a common external tariff,

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and it was also intergovernmental entirely.

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So every country had a, had a veto.

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So in terms of both the economic interests of the UK

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and its institutional preferences, it completely fitted

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with the UK's ideas and preferences.

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Problem was, of course, that it didn't fit

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with the institutional

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and economic preferences of France particularly

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and other continental European countries,

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which essentially led them to create the European corn

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and steel community in 19 51, 52,

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and the European economic community in 19 57, 58,

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which was a customs union, a horizontal customs union for,

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all industrial sectors.

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And what is really important to see is that immediately

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with the creation of the ec,

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it was widely perceived in continental Europe

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and also in the UK as a great economic

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and political success.

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And you have in the late 1950s, early 1960s,

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huge trade growth and economic growth far

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outpacing the United Kingdom.

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And this made a huge impact on the debate in the UK about

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Britain and European integration.

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And then of course, you have the

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decline of the Commonwealth.

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The Commonwealth initially

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after 1945 still took 50% of British exports,

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but this decline to 25% in the early 1960s.

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And more importantly politically,

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the commonwealth became more

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and more problematic for the uk.

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Countries like Australia wanted to reorient their trade

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and were more interested in creating new links

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with the EEC once it was set up.

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And of course, there was the conflict over,

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the apartheid regime in South Africa

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and the early 1960s as well.

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And then lastly, the special relationship as Churchill.

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A coined also changed the nature

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from Britain playing a very, important role of course

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as the United States, first partner in Europe

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to a situation in the early 1960s where the newly elected,

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president Kennedy demanded in no unclear terms from the

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McMillian government, but that Britain must join the EEC

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and prevent it from becoming less, allied

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with the United States and oriented towards the US

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and NATO under the potential political leadership

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of the French president at the time, child de Gore.

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This is the second very important, point in terms

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of Britain's relationship with Europe

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and European integration.

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Um, and the second strong element of the pathway of Britain

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and European integration

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that the expectations once Britain applied for membership

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of the EECO was later the ECO, the European communities,

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the expectations of the membership dividends were overblown.

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And this is true for the applications

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of 1961 under the conservative McMillion government,

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but also for the Wilson government, labor government

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of 1967.

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So in the early 1960s, the UK expected

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mainly that exposure to this new common market

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and the customs union, once Britain had joined,

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would automatically lead to rejuvenation of British industry

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and make it more competitive in global markets.

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And this was clearly misplaced

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because the domestic problems, economic problems

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of the UK were domestic

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and had to be addressed also through

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internal reforms within the United Kingdom,

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which eventually came

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after Thatcher came to power in 1979. And

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Secondly, the expectation was that,

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going into the EEC would save the special relationship

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with the United States.

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Now, even though the United Kingdom could not join the EEC

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19 61, 63,

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because the world vetoed British membership in 1963,

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this actually did happen

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because the United Kingdom was able to

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secure the Pershing deal for, nuclear,

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missiles from the United States in 1962.

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And this was connected to its preparedness

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to actually declare that it was prepared

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to join the ec even though it didn't actually happen in 1967

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for the Wilson government.

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The idea of an automatic economic cure

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for Britain's problems was even more important.

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And this kind of conditional application

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for membership was also seen by Harold Wilson,

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who didn't personally have any particularly strong views on

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the matter as the only way

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of keeping the Labor Party together,

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which was internally very split between those in favor

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of joining the ec.

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And those categorically opposed to that,

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when eventually in 1973 Britain joined.

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Of course, the problem was it joined exactly at the time

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of the first oil crisis

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and of major economic problems everywhere in Western Europe.

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And so the time

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of joining was also not exactly prop propitious for,

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Britain overcoming its own domestic economic problems

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or finding a new role in terms of international relations.

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When you look at European Union member states

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and comparative perspective that, those member states

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where there is a strong cross party consensus,

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have done much better in terms

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of projecting their own interest in the European Union,

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also making sure that there's sufficient domestic popular

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support for membership and also for further integration.

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And this has not been the case in the uk.

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The UK is perhaps not the only case

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where this has been problematic,

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but is is the most obvious one.

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And it's to some extent, of course, connected

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to the adversarial political system

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where you have strong confrontation, within parliament

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between the government and the opposition.

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You do not have a tradition of coalition politics,

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which requires cross party consensus,

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despite the few exceptions

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that we've seen in the post war history.

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Um, now, however,

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aside from the structural institutional issue,

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British political elites have also made no effort

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to construct such a cross party consensus,

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because of course, it's possible despite

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of these structural limitations,

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because there is a very strong consensus in the UK

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and has always been on the desirability of close relations

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with the United States and also with nato,

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but not on the question of Europe.

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And I think this goes back

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to the early post-war period when Churchill already used the

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European issue in the second of the 1940s

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to discredit the Labor government,

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without actually claiming

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that he would do anything differently.

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In terms of actually joining these organizations, the ECSC

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and the EC in the 1950s, he claimed

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that the British Labor Party

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and government were not able to lead Europe

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as he would have been able to do in his view.

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Then when he actually came back to Power 1951,

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nothing changed in terms of government policy,

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but he had tried

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to discredit the Labor Party foreign policy record

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by attacking it continuously for not,

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allegedly not being pro-European enough.

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And then in 1961, the British McMillan,

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the Conservative McMillan government,

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also used the EEC application to split the Labor Party more

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because it was clear to McMillan that,

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while there was some opposition from the Empire Wing within

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the Conservative Party at the time,

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his own party would follow him into the application

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for membership of the EEC and going into the eec.

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Whereas Gates Skills Labor Party was far more split

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internally and was getting into terrible trouble,

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internally as a result

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of the British application for membership.

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And of course, eventually in the second half the 1960s

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and the 1970s,

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the Labor Party became ever more internally split over the

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issue until after 1979.

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It actually advocated for a number

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of years leaving the European communities

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as they were at the time altogether.

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But of course, this, situation in terms

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of party competition,

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competition became inverse in the 1990s.

13:11.665 --> 13:14.605
And Tony Blair as Labor Party Prime Minister, used

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European Union political issues

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to discredit the Conservative party

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and aggravate its split internally over the question

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initially of attitudes to European integration.

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Eventually the question of Brexit, of course,

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until the Brexit referendum of 2016

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and the situation where the conservative party was very,

13:34.435 --> 13:37.125
very deeply split and much more than the Labor Party.

13:37.585 --> 13:40.605
And so, strategically I think political leaders have

13:40.605 --> 13:43.605
used the European issue to split,

13:43.915 --> 13:46.205
competing political parties internally

13:46.585 --> 13:48.685
and to, use the European issue

13:48.705 --> 13:50.085
for their own party advantage.

13:50.505 --> 13:53.605
And this has been a major issue in terms of Britain

13:53.625 --> 13:54.885
and European integration.

13:55.645 --> 13:58.685
I would like to refer to Fenton O'Toole, an Irish author

13:58.745 --> 14:01.685
who published a book in 2018 about, Brexit

14:02.465 --> 14:06.325
and from his own perspective, interesting perspective of,

14:06.505 --> 14:09.725
an Irishman, who of course had experience

14:09.745 --> 14:11.405
of the Irish collectively

14:11.745 --> 14:14.685
of being a colonized people colonized by the English.

14:15.105 --> 14:17.525
Um, he made the argument that the English,

14:17.525 --> 14:20.325
generally speaking and English politic political leaders,

14:20.345 --> 14:22.685
and he does make this distinction between the English

14:22.685 --> 14:25.325
and the British, see the world in black

14:25.325 --> 14:28.165
and white as a result of their colonial experience.

14:28.225 --> 14:32.125
So in this world of black and white, either you rule

14:32.345 --> 14:33.645
or you are ruled.

14:34.385 --> 14:37.045
And his argument is, which I think is very interesting, is

14:37.045 --> 14:40.725
that the British have been used to ruling, of course,

14:40.725 --> 14:41.925
their colonial empire.

14:42.625 --> 14:45.685
And in the context of the European Union, a narrative,

14:45.705 --> 14:49.045
the Farish narrative caught on easily

14:49.275 --> 14:51.845
that now they were in the position of being ruled

14:51.865 --> 14:54.365
by Brussels, by, by these institutions

14:54.365 --> 14:55.645
that no one can understand,

14:56.025 --> 14:59.605
and by people from other countries without any significant

14:59.605 --> 15:02.805
British influence on European integration and EU politics.

15:02.985 --> 15:05.165
Now, aside from the fact that the UK as one

15:05.165 --> 15:07.525
of the big member states in the European Union has always

15:07.525 --> 15:10.605
had significant impact on European union politics,

15:10.605 --> 15:13.525
and it's possible to show this in on trade, on international

15:13.525 --> 15:14.805
and defense policy issues,

15:14.825 --> 15:18.645
but also many other areas, of course, this perspective

15:18.825 --> 15:22.725
of being ruled by foreigners was something that was utilized

15:22.785 --> 15:25.285
by the Brexiters in the referendum campaign and,

15:25.385 --> 15:28.445
and was quite used quite successfully politically.

15:28.945 --> 15:32.125
Now, where does do these expectations

15:32.175 --> 15:33.445
among the political elite

15:33.445 --> 15:37.285
and the public come from of being able to rule, if you like,

15:37.465 --> 15:40.445
or at least to participate in ruling now?

15:40.445 --> 15:42.045
First of all, the colonial experience,

15:42.045 --> 15:44.085
which I've already mentioned, but secondly,

15:44.085 --> 15:47.205
after the second World War, also the special relationship.

15:47.545 --> 15:48.765
So here, the idea was

15:48.765 --> 15:51.445
that Britain had a share in ruling the West in, in,

15:51.985 --> 15:56.205
if you like, this is reflected in the British labor foreign

15:56.565 --> 15:59.605
Minister Bevins, saying in 1948

15:59.605 --> 16:02.845
that the UK was not just another European country

16:03.185 --> 16:04.965
and expected the United States

16:05.145 --> 16:07.045
to treat it separately and differently.

16:08.025 --> 16:11.645
And this idea of ruling is also then reflected in,

16:11.715 --> 16:14.845
many interesting quotes that you can find, not just the one

16:14.845 --> 16:17.485
or two that I will give you from British politicians.

16:17.485 --> 16:20.525
In the period of joining the European community

16:20.525 --> 16:22.685
and being a member state, for example,

16:22.745 --> 16:25.685
the labor foreign minister Stewart in 1967 said

16:25.685 --> 16:28.525
to the German foreign minister, Billy Brandt,

16:28.525 --> 16:31.205
really let us in so that we can take the lead.

16:31.585 --> 16:34.405
No one was expecting the UK to take the lead,

16:34.425 --> 16:36.445
but it was nevertheless taken for granted

16:36.515 --> 16:39.845
that the UK would lead the European communities alone, more

16:39.845 --> 16:41.565
or less once it had joined.

16:42.425 --> 16:44.445
Um, and similarly, in the 1970s

16:44.445 --> 16:46.285
and eighties, British politicians,

16:46.365 --> 16:48.085
continuously made references

16:48.185 --> 16:50.725
to the big three countries in the European community.

16:50.745 --> 16:53.925
So they were referring to the uk to the Federal Republic

16:53.945 --> 16:55.085
of Germany and to France.

16:55.465 --> 16:56.525
But regularly

16:56.585 --> 16:59.805
and repeatedly despite warnings, always forgot

16:59.865 --> 17:02.805
to mention Italy because they didn't take Italy

17:02.875 --> 17:04.205
seriously as a partner.

17:04.665 --> 17:05.845
But of course, this kind

17:05.845 --> 17:08.845
of public discourse didn't go down very well in Italy

17:08.945 --> 17:10.965
or in smaller states that also thought

17:10.965 --> 17:12.045
that they could play a role

17:12.145 --> 17:13.765
and should play a role in the European,

17:13.765 --> 17:14.925
what is now the European Union.

17:15.465 --> 17:18.685
So I think this attitude to ruling,

17:18.825 --> 17:21.965
was also based on an, a complete misunderstanding

17:21.985 --> 17:24.085
of the actual governing practices in

17:24.085 --> 17:25.485
what is now the European Union.

17:25.665 --> 17:29.085
In the European Union focus is on cooperation,

17:29.185 --> 17:30.525
not ruling over others.

17:31.025 --> 17:33.085
The focus is on shared sovereignty,

17:33.105 --> 17:34.725
not on absolute sovereignty

17:34.725 --> 17:36.925
that you can exercise in relation to others.

17:38.235 --> 17:40.645
It's also very important to consider the role

17:40.645 --> 17:41.805
of smaller states,

17:42.025 --> 17:44.445
not just the large states in the European Union.

17:45.065 --> 17:48.285
And generally speaking, a majority voting is seen

17:48.285 --> 17:51.165
as something that is legitimate and something that the UK

17:51.185 --> 17:53.325
and British governments often have problems with.

17:53.985 --> 17:56.845
And then there's also a need for any state, small

17:56.905 --> 18:00.405
or large, to actually develop a high continuity in its own

18:00.405 --> 18:03.805
preferences and strong reliability in its own policy making.

18:03.985 --> 18:06.445
And because of the alternation of British governments

18:06.505 --> 18:09.565
and the, majority voting system,

18:09.955 --> 18:12.165
this has never been the case in the case of the uk.

18:12.165 --> 18:13.165
And lastly, also,

18:13.165 --> 18:16.085
even if you just look at the intergovernmental dimension,

18:16.085 --> 18:18.205
when Britain joined, there was already a strongly

18:18.205 --> 18:20.445
established Franco-German relationship, which

18:20.465 --> 18:21.685
for historical economic

18:21.825 --> 18:23.965
and political reasons was far more important

18:24.535 --> 18:25.725
throughout the history

18:25.765 --> 18:28.165
of the European Union than the relationship of the UK

18:28.165 --> 18:30.845
with either, the French or the Germans.

18:31.385 --> 18:34.245
So I think it's also this attitude to ruling

18:34.345 --> 18:37.885
or being ruled is also reflected incidentally in current

18:38.275 --> 18:40.925
debates about rejoining the European Union.

18:41.305 --> 18:44.285
So when you follow these debates in the uk, which exist

18:44.305 --> 18:46.085
of course to a very limited extent,

18:46.145 --> 18:50.605
but in any case, they always refer to what under

18:50.635 --> 18:53.885
what conditions the United Kingdom would want to rejoin,

18:54.035 --> 18:56.725
they completely ignore the simple fact

18:56.915 --> 19:00.325
that no one in the European Union now is keen on the

19:00.325 --> 19:02.005
United Kingdom to rejoin.

19:02.185 --> 19:03.885
And they were certainly not prepared

19:03.885 --> 19:07.085
to grant the same very generous conditions of membership

19:07.085 --> 19:11.125
that Britain had enjoyed until 19, 2019,

19:11.705 --> 19:13.605
for example, the big budget rebate.

19:13.785 --> 19:16.125
So I think even in this discussion now

19:16.125 --> 19:17.805
after the experience of Brexit,

19:18.065 --> 19:22.805
you still see the continued impact of this idea of,

19:22.805 --> 19:24.845
either ruling or being ruled,

19:25.175 --> 19:28.765
think perhaps three major conclusions which are relevant

19:28.765 --> 19:29.965
for the present day as well.

19:30.055 --> 19:34.685
First important thing is the, the strong need for high level

19:34.705 --> 19:38.005
of self rexi reflexivity of political elites.

19:38.275 --> 19:40.845
This, of course, doesn't just apply to the United Kingdom

19:40.985 --> 19:43.325
or the particular issue of European integration,

19:43.645 --> 19:44.765
European union politics.

19:45.185 --> 19:47.885
Um, but I think in the uk in relation to the question

19:47.945 --> 19:50.125
of Britain and Europe,

19:50.915 --> 19:53.765
many historically influenced assumptions, for example,

19:53.765 --> 19:57.765
about leading Europe, were never matched by the economic

19:57.825 --> 19:59.205
and political realities.

19:59.285 --> 20:01.405
They led to unrealistic expectations

20:01.465 --> 20:05.725
and promises to the population as well, of the benefits

20:05.725 --> 20:08.485
or concerning the benefits of European Union membership.

20:09.025 --> 20:12.445
Um, and I think not just on this question,

20:12.445 --> 20:15.405
but also on other questions, this higher level of self

20:16.405 --> 20:18.925
reflexivity is something that is really important

20:19.065 --> 20:21.045
for a more rational form of politics

20:21.045 --> 20:23.725
and policy making, which I think, everyone is looking

20:23.785 --> 20:25.485
for and needs these days.

20:26.185 --> 20:29.045
And the second point would be that role

20:29.235 --> 20:32.325
that elites can play a crucial role in strategically shaping

20:32.605 --> 20:34.525
perspectives on a policy issue

20:34.665 --> 20:38.525
and also constructing narratives in the long run

20:39.265 --> 20:40.885
and how important it is for them

20:40.905 --> 20:44.805
to communicate their policies consistently across time.

20:45.585 --> 20:49.605
And, so you see in 2016, when you look in retrospect,

20:49.605 --> 20:52.365
when you look at the referendum campaign, the pro,

20:52.685 --> 20:55.045
EU referendum campaign,

20:55.225 --> 20:58.005
did not really have an emotionally engaging

20:58.085 --> 20:59.365
pro-European narrative.

20:59.425 --> 21:04.005
It was simply based on warning against the negative

21:04.645 --> 21:06.445
economic impact of leaving.

21:06.875 --> 21:09.165
This is not something that can get people excited,

21:09.265 --> 21:13.045
but the important thing here is that this 2016 failure,

21:13.265 --> 21:17.005
as I would put it, of course, was the outcome

21:17.145 --> 21:19.765
of this long period of membership.

21:19.785 --> 21:24.125
And even before membership in 1973 of British Elite,

21:24.175 --> 21:26.405
never actually finding a rationale

21:26.405 --> 21:29.285
or defining an a rationale for membership

21:29.625 --> 21:31.925
and developing such a consistent narrative

21:31.925 --> 21:33.925
that would convince British, the British people

21:33.945 --> 21:37.045
and make them feel at ease or at home in the European Union.

21:37.745 --> 21:41.085
And the last point is, in the more academic sense is

21:41.085 --> 21:43.205
that these historical pathways

21:43.205 --> 21:45.165
that we've discussed are hugely important

21:45.665 --> 21:47.245
for shaping trajectories.

21:47.745 --> 21:51.005
Uh, here the focus was on Britain European integration.

21:51.195 --> 21:53.325
It's also true for other policy challenges,

21:53.825 --> 21:57.125
but there's always scope for changing pathways.

21:57.265 --> 22:00.565
So Brexit was never the inevitable outcome following

22:00.635 --> 22:03.845
Britain's accession to the European communities in 1973.

Determinism and Pathways in Brexit Analysis

00:00:00 - With the experience of, Brexit 2016, the referendum, and then 2019, the actual Brexit and the negotiations leading up to Brexit. the question is, of course, for historians like me, is, well, was it always likely or maybe even certain that with the UK joining in 1973, that this would eventually lead to the UK also leaving the European Union again? So in that sense, was Brexit the death foretold? certainly I think we collectively, both in the United Kingdom and in continental Europe, have experienced Brexit as a kind
00:00:33 - with both sides probably losing out from my perspective, the UK more than the European Union. and this is where this question comes in, would it have been possible in some way or another to avoid this kind of outcome? or was there very strong trajectory ever since the UK joined in 1973 that made it, at least easy, maybe even certain, for the UK to leave eventually at least? alternatively, were there factors that facilitated Brexit,
00:01:06 - And the argument, in my research, I think the key argument is essentially that there were strong pathways, what we call pathways that have facilitated Brexit, but that Brexit nevertheless was not the inevitable outcome. And this would be a very deterministic view of Britain and Europe in the postwar period, which would, in my view, alleviate the British politically leads from the burden of their own failure to create a strong pro-European narrative and to achieve a stronger cross-party consensus,
00:01:37 - and the British people would've felt more at ease. And, at home, if you like, inside of what is now the European Union, we've developed this in a bigger project together with, other social scientists who also share a strong interest in the pa pa past and, and using the past for, or looking into the past for explaining the present day politics and policymaking in this case of Britain and European integration. And the concept of pathways is intended to,
00:02:09 - of historical path dependency. This is something that historical, so-called historical institutionalists have come up with to explain how history matters. But the problem with the concept of, the historical path dependency is that it tends to be quite deterministic. Paul s mainly on formal institutions on treaties, laws, rulemaking and so on, and what kind of long-term impact they have in terms of narrowing the options of political decision makers
00:02:39 - and future politics and policymaking. So what the term pathways allows me and allows us to do is to also look at other more informal aspects of politics and policymaking in historical, perspective, particularly historical experience generally conceived of as including perceptions and narratives of the past and how they matter for contemporary politics and policymaking, or ways of constructing, in this case,

Historical Pathways and British-European Relations

00:03:10 - and European integration notions, or for example, national, in this case, national traditions or for example, parliamentary sovereignty and how they've been employed to relate to a process of the process of European integration, the politics of the European Union, and also practices that arguably develop over a long time periods, for example, a foreign policy that has been shaped very much by, the British experience of colonial rule. So pathways allow for historical contingency,
00:03:44 - that decision makers can shape the historical evolution and also create new pathways. So it's much less deterministic as a concept compared to path dependency. And I think that's what its main usefulness is. Essentially, I think I'm trying to make, four interrelated arguments. The first one is indeed about the question of narrowing policy options in advance of the actual British accession to the European communities as they were then caught in 1973,
00:04:14 - of the Second World War victorious, of course. And this very much shaped the perception not just of decision makers, but also the British public. This, idea of having won and having fought single handedly for a certain period of time in the beginning of the second World War against the Nazi German regime. coming out of the Second World War, British thinking about Britain's place in the world was very much shaped by what Churchill termed the three circuits concepts. So the UK in this perspective was at the heart of three different types of relationships with Europe, also
00:04:46 - with the United States of America. And what I think is very important to keep in mind is that from the beginning, Europe came third in terms of the priority list for the vast majority, vast majority, with the very few individual exceptions of the British political elites and decision makers, both in the Conservative party and in the Labor Party as well. But importantly, these three circles in terms of their nature and their importance for the UK changed very much in the following 20 years or so.
00:05:17 - of policy options on European integration. Now, first of all, on Europe, for Britain, the initial setup of the organization for European economic, cooperation, which is now the OECD, seemed to be the ideal economic framework for European trade because it allowed the United Kingdom to continue with its own national foreign trade policy. It did not involve the creation of a customs union with a common external tariff, and it was also intergovernmental entirely.
00:05:48 - So in terms of both the economic interests of the UK and its institutional preferences, it completely fitted with the UK's ideas and preferences. Problem was, of course, that it didn't fit with the institutional and economic preferences of France particularly and other continental European countries, which essentially led them to create the European corn and steel community in 19 51, 52, and the European economic community in 19 57, 58, which was a customs union, a horizontal customs union for,

UK-EU Relations: Economic Growth and Challenges

00:06:20 - And what is really important to see is that immediately with the creation of the ec, it was widely perceived in continental Europe and also in the UK as a great economic and political success. And you have in the late 1950s, early 1960s, huge trade growth and economic growth far outpacing the United Kingdom. And this made a huge impact on the debate in the UK about Britain and European integration. And then of course, you have the decline of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth initially after 1945 still took 50% of British exports,
00:06:54 - And more importantly politically, the commonwealth became more and more problematic for the uk. Countries like Australia wanted to reorient their trade and were more interested in creating new links with the EEC once it was set up. And of course, there was the conflict over, the apartheid regime in South Africa and the early 1960s as well. And then lastly, the special relationship as Churchill. A coined also changed the nature from Britain playing a very, important role of course
00:07:25 - to a situation in the early 1960s where the newly elected, president Kennedy demanded in no unclear terms from the McMillian government, but that Britain must join the EEC and prevent it from becoming less, allied with the United States and oriented towards the US and NATO under the potential political leadership of the French president at the time, child de Gore. This is the second very important, point in terms
00:07:54 - and European integration. and the second strong element of the pathway of Britain and European integration that the expectations once Britain applied for membership of the EECO was later the ECO, the European communities, the expectations of the membership dividends were overblown. And this is true for the applications of 1961 under the conservative McMillion government, but also for the Wilson government, labor government of 1967.
00:08:27 - mainly that exposure to this new common market and the customs union, once Britain had joined, would automatically lead to rejuvenation of British industry and make it more competitive in global markets. And this was clearly misplaced because the domestic problems, economic problems of the UK were domestic and had to be addressed also through internal reforms within the United Kingdom, which eventually came after Thatcher came to power in 1979. And
00:08:56 - going into the EEC would save the special relationship with the United States. Now, even though the United Kingdom could not join the EEC 19 61, 63, because the world vetoed British membership in 1963, this actually did happen because the United Kingdom was able to secure the Pershing deal for, nuclear, missiles from the United States in 1962. And this was connected to its preparedness to actually declare that it was prepared

Britain's Political Split Over European Integration

00:09:30 - for the Wilson government. The idea of an automatic economic cure for Britain's problems was even more important. And this kind of conditional application for membership was also seen by Harold Wilson, who didn't personally have any particularly strong views on the matter as the only way of keeping the Labor Party together, which was internally very split between those in favor of joining the ec. And those categorically opposed to that, when eventually in 1973 Britain joined.
00:10:02 - of the first oil crisis and of major economic problems everywhere in Western Europe. And so the time of joining was also not exactly prop propitious for, Britain overcoming its own domestic economic problems or finding a new role in terms of international relations. When you look at European Union member states and comparative perspective that, those member states where there is a strong cross party consensus,
00:10:31 - of projecting their own interest in the European Union, also making sure that there's sufficient domestic popular support for membership and also for further integration. And this has not been the case in the uk. The UK is perhaps not the only case where this has been problematic, but is is the most obvious one. And it's to some extent, of course, connected to the adversarial political system where you have strong confrontation, within parliament between the government and the opposition. You do not have a tradition of coalition politics,
00:11:03 - despite the few exceptions that we've seen in the post war history. now, however, aside from the structural institutional issue, British political elites have also made no effort to construct such a cross party consensus, because of course, it's possible despite of these structural limitations, because there is a very strong consensus in the UK and has always been on the desirability of close relations with the United States and also with nato,
00:11:34 - And I think this goes back to the early post-war period when Churchill already used the European issue in the second of the 1940s to discredit the Labor government, without actually claiming that he would do anything differently. In terms of actually joining these organizations, the ECSC and the EC in the 1950s, he claimed that the British Labor Party and government were not able to lead Europe as he would have been able to do in his view. Then when he actually came back to Power 1951,
00:12:06 - but he had tried to discredit the Labor Party foreign policy record by attacking it continuously for not, allegedly not being pro-European enough. And then in 1961, the British McMillan, the Conservative McMillan government, also used the EEC application to split the Labor Party more because it was clear to McMillan that, while there was some opposition from the Empire Wing within the Conservative Party at the time, his own party would follow him into the application

Political Splits and Perceptions of Power

00:12:39 - Whereas Gates Skills Labor Party was far more split internally and was getting into terrible trouble, internally as a result of the British application for membership. And of course, eventually in the second half the 1960s and the 1970s, the Labor Party became ever more internally split over the issue until after 1979. It actually advocated for a number of years leaving the European communities as they were at the time altogether. But of course, this, situation in terms
00:13:08 - competition became inverse in the 1990s. And Tony Blair as Labor Party Prime Minister, used European Union political issues to discredit the Conservative party and aggravate its split internally over the question initially of attitudes to European integration. Eventually the question of Brexit, of course, until the Brexit referendum of 2016 and the situation where the conservative party was very, very deeply split and much more than the Labor Party. And so, strategically I think political leaders have
00:13:43 - competing political parties internally and to, use the European issue for their own party advantage. And this has been a major issue in terms of Britain and European integration. I would like to refer to Fenton O'Toole, an Irish author who published a book in 2018 about, Brexit and from his own perspective, interesting perspective of, an Irishman, who of course had experience of the Irish collectively
00:14:15 - he made the argument that the English, generally speaking and English politic political leaders, and he does make this distinction between the English and the British, see the world in black and white as a result of their colonial experience. So in this world of black and white, either you rule or you are ruled. And his argument is, which I think is very interesting, is that the British have been used to ruling, of course, their colonial empire.
00:14:45 - the Farish narrative caught on easily that now they were in the position of being ruled by Brussels, by, by these institutions that no one can understand, and by people from other countries without any significant British influence on European integration and EU politics. Now, aside from the fact that the UK as one of the big member states in the European Union has always had significant impact on European union politics, and it's possible to show this in on trade, on international
00:15:14 - but also many other areas, of course, this perspective of being ruled by foreigners was something that was utilized by the Brexiters in the referendum campaign and, and was quite used quite successfully politically. Now, where does do these expectations among the political elite and the public come from of being able to rule, if you like, or at least to participate in ruling now? First of all, the colonial experience, which I've already mentioned, but secondly,

Britain's Role and Perception in Europe

00:15:47 - So here, the idea was that Britain had a share in ruling the West in, in, if you like, this is reflected in the British labor foreign Minister Bevins, saying in 1948 that the UK was not just another European country and expected the United States to treat it separately and differently. And this idea of ruling is also then reflected in, many interesting quotes that you can find, not just the one
00:16:17 - In the period of joining the European community and being a member state, for example, the labor foreign minister Stewart in 1967 said to the German foreign minister, Billy Brandt, really let us in so that we can take the lead. No one was expecting the UK to take the lead, but it was nevertheless taken for granted that the UK would lead the European communities alone, more or less once it had joined. and similarly, in the 1970s and eighties, British politicians,
00:16:48 - to the big three countries in the European community. So they were referring to the uk to the Federal Republic of Germany and to France. But regularly and repeatedly despite warnings, always forgot to mention Italy because they didn't take Italy seriously as a partner. But of course, this kind of public discourse didn't go down very well in Italy or in smaller states that also thought that they could play a role and should play a role in the European, what is now the European Union. So I think this attitude to ruling,
00:17:21 - of the actual governing practices in what is now the European Union. In the European Union focus is on cooperation, not ruling over others. The focus is on shared sovereignty, not on absolute sovereignty that you can exercise in relation to others. It's also very important to consider the role of smaller states, not just the large states in the European Union. And generally speaking, a majority voting is seen as something that is legitimate and something that the UK
00:17:53 - And then there's also a need for any state, small or large, to actually develop a high continuity in its own preferences and strong reliability in its own policy making. And because of the alternation of British governments and the, majority voting system, this has never been the case in the case of the uk. And lastly, also, even if you just look at the intergovernmental dimension, when Britain joined, there was already a strongly established Franco-German relationship, which for historical economic
00:18:24 - throughout the history of the European Union than the relationship of the UK with either, the French or the Germans. So I think it's also this attitude to ruling or being ruled is also reflected incidentally in current debates about rejoining the European Union. So when you follow these debates in the uk, which exist of course to a very limited extent, but in any case, they always refer to what under what conditions the United Kingdom would want to rejoin,

Brexit's Legacy: Ruling or Being Ruled?

00:18:56 - that no one in the European Union now is keen on the United Kingdom to rejoin. And they were certainly not prepared to grant the same very generous conditions of membership that Britain had enjoyed until 19, 2019, for example, the big budget rebate. So I think even in this discussion now after the experience of Brexit, you still see the continued impact of this idea of, either ruling or being ruled,
00:19:28 - for the present day as well. First important thing is the, the strong need for high level of self rexi reflexivity of political elites. This, of course, doesn't just apply to the United Kingdom or the particular issue of European integration, European union politics. but I think in the uk in relation to the question of Britain and Europe, many historically influenced assumptions, for example, about leading Europe, were never matched by the economic
00:19:59 - They led to unrealistic expectations and promises to the population as well, of the benefits or concerning the benefits of European Union membership. and I think not just on this question, but also on other questions, this higher level of self reflexivity is something that is really important for a more rational form of politics and policy making, which I think, everyone is looking for and needs these days. And the second point would be that role
00:20:32 - perspectives on a policy issue and also constructing narratives in the long run and how important it is for them to communicate their policies consistently across time. And, so you see in 2016, when you look in retrospect, when you look at the referendum campaign, the pro, EU referendum campaign, did not really have an emotionally engaging pro-European narrative.
00:21:04 - economic impact of leaving. This is not something that can get people excited, but the important thing here is that this 2016 failure, as I would put it, of course, was the outcome of this long period of membership. And even before membership in 1973 of British Elite, never actually finding a rationale or defining an a rationale for membership
00:21:31 - that would convince British, the British people and make them feel at ease or at home in the European Union. And the last point is, in the more academic sense is that these historical pathways that we've discussed are hugely important for shaping trajectories. here the focus was on Britain European integration. It's also true for other policy challenges, but there's always scope for changing pathways. So Brexit was never the inevitable outcome following