Popular in Social Sciences

Banks and Policy Organisations

Macroeconomic modelling of CBDC: a critical review

European Central Bank Ulrich Bindseil

Social Identities and Divisions

A new explanation of antisemitism: Jew hatred as a civilisational phenomenon

Boston University Liah Greenfeld

Banks and Policy Organisations

Financing Private Credit

Federal Reserve Bank of New York Nina Boyarchenko

Economics

Failing Banks

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Emil Verner

Culture and Society

The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place

New York University Harvey Moltoch

American Politics

Keeping the Republic

Boston College Marc Landy

British Politics

Entrepreneurial thinking: the politics and practice of policy impact

University of Sheffield Matthew Flinders

Mobility Interrupted

View more insights in Social Sciences - Political Science

View more figures from New Paltz State University of New York

View the page of Benjamin Junge

Read the Study

Next in Political Science

Is There Really a Dictator’s Dilemma? Information and Repression in Autocracy

Scott Gehlbach | University of Chicago

Pollster choices vs voters’ decisions

Joshua Clinton | Vanderbilt University

How do sequences of upward and downward socioeconomic mobility influence political views among those who have “risen” or “fallen” during periods of leftist governance? Benjamin Junge discusses the relationship between retrospective assessments of prior socioeconomic mobility and anti-PT sentiment.

Image courtesy of interviewee. December 20, 2023

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

This video video discusses research on the relationship between socioeconomic mobility and political sentiment in Brazil, focusing on the anti-Workers' Party (PT) sentiment that emerged following the economic and political crisis beginning around 2013. The study, conducted between 2016 and 2018 by researchers from Portland State University and Rutgers University, involved anthropological methods, including surveys of 1,200 households across Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Recife.

The research aimed to understand how socioeconomic mobility impacts political attitudes, especially anti-leftist sentiment. It found that individuals who experienced "stalled mobility," meaning they had previously improved their economic status but then faced economic decline, were significantly more likely to express anti-PT sentiment. This video video sentiment was less pronounced among those whose circumstances either continuously improved or got worse.

The concept termed the "dashed hopes hypothesis" suggests that individuals who were encouraged to dream of a better life through policies of the PT, and then faced setbacks, developed resentment towards the party. This video video phenomenon contributed to the election of right-wing politician Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, highlighting a polarizing political landscape in Brazil.

The findings reflect broader conditions and historical contexts in Brazil, addressing how political views have been shaped by past experiences with socioeconomic changes, and suggesting that similar dynamics may exist in other Latin American countries. The study emphasizes the lasting impact of perceived mobility on political attitudes, revealing the complexities behind nostalgia for past political regimes, including authoritarian periods.

Language:

Export as PDF

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.075 --> 00:03.925
Anti Chimo, is a reference to, the PT

00:03.985 --> 00:08.045
or the Workers' Party, in Portuguese, this is par.

00:09.505 --> 00:13.245
So pt, and this is the party that controlled,

00:13.265 --> 00:15.085
the Brazilian federal government,

00:15.085 --> 00:17.085
during the first decade of the 21st century,

00:17.385 --> 00:19.645
and a couple of years into the second decade,

00:20.625 --> 00:24.925
but was subsequently blamed by many Brazilians for,

00:25.465 --> 00:26.965
the crisis, the economic

00:27.225 --> 00:31.165
and political crisis that ensued beginning in around 2013.

00:31.625 --> 00:35.045
So we use this concept of anti patal

00:35.305 --> 00:40.285
or anti-left sentiment as one, optics one,

00:40.425 --> 00:45.325
one factor for explaining, the tumultuous outcome

00:45.385 --> 00:47.405
of the 2018 presidential election.

00:47.625 --> 00:50.805
The objectives of our research, were

00:50.805 --> 00:54.085
to understand the effects of socioec,

00:54.115 --> 00:58.605
socioeconomic mobility on, political sentiment,

00:58.625 --> 01:03.565
and particularly on anti-left or anti PT sentiment.

01:04.185 --> 01:09.125
Um, now, this was in the context of 2016,

01:09.125 --> 01:12.325
which was a moment of deep economic political crisis

01:12.955 --> 01:16.485
precarity, for Brazilians following a decade

01:16.585 --> 01:18.445
of economic growth and optimism.

01:18.905 --> 01:21.925
So in part, we're trying to understand what, what,

01:21.995 --> 01:25.965
what are the effects of economic precarity on political

01:26.245 --> 01:27.685
attitudes and political views

01:27.755 --> 01:30.925
that later on could have influenced the 2018

01:30.965 --> 01:32.405
presidential elections.

01:32.715 --> 01:35.845
From 2016 to 2018,

01:36.505 --> 01:40.485
we conducted a three year anthropological investigation.

01:40.635 --> 01:43.005
When I say we, I'm speaking of my colleagues,

01:43.005 --> 01:45.525
Charles Klein at Portland State University

01:46.025 --> 01:48.125
and Sean Mitchell at Rutgers University.

01:48.125 --> 01:51.045
And the three of us, conducted a three year

01:51.565 --> 01:55.165
investigation of the political views of a group,

01:55.305 --> 01:58.845
we refer to as Brazil's once rising poor.

01:59.225 --> 02:00.245
So these are poor

02:00.345 --> 02:03.805
and working class Brazilian people, families, communities

02:04.105 --> 02:06.565
who experienced some degree of upward mobility

02:06.565 --> 02:09.285
during the first decade of the 21st century.

02:09.825 --> 02:12.885
But by the time we did our study had many

02:12.885 --> 02:14.325
of these groups had,

02:14.325 --> 02:17.045
these families had fallen into economic precarity.

02:17.385 --> 02:20.805
So we were interested in what does precarity,

02:20.805 --> 02:23.925
what are its effects on political views and attitudes.

02:24.145 --> 02:27.645
So as part of this study, in each of these,

02:27.665 --> 02:31.245
in three cities, Rio de Janero, Sao Paulo,

02:31.385 --> 02:34.285
and the Northeastern city of Recife,

02:34.385 --> 02:37.005
we conducted a range of anthropological,

02:37.245 --> 02:39.605
research techniques, interviews, observations,

02:40.305 --> 02:41.565
and surveys.

02:42.025 --> 02:45.605
And for this study that I'm reporting on here, on

02:46.125 --> 02:49.725
mobility and anti anti smo, we conducted a survey

02:50.515 --> 02:54.325
with 1200 households split between the three cities,

02:54.465 --> 02:58.685
so about 400 in each city, in 2016.

02:59.265 --> 03:01.205
And we asked them a range of questions.

03:01.545 --> 03:03.645
Uh, these are, poor

03:03.645 --> 03:06.085
and working class households in each of the three cities.

03:06.505 --> 03:10.445
We asked a range of questions, including questions about

03:10.745 --> 03:12.925
how well had their family done in

03:12.925 --> 03:14.525
during the first decade of the century.

03:14.525 --> 03:16.925
And the second had things gotten better,

03:17.105 --> 03:18.645
gotten worse, stayed the same.

03:19.345 --> 03:21.685
And we also asked questions, of

03:21.685 --> 03:24.085
what do they think about the PT and the workers' party?

03:24.265 --> 03:27.045
We asked a range of questions that allowed us

03:27.105 --> 03:31.485
to construct an index of anti PT sentiment.

03:32.065 --> 03:34.605
So essentially our anti PT index.

03:34.825 --> 03:38.405
Our anti index, was the,

03:38.515 --> 03:42.165
constructed based on, responses to,

03:42.235 --> 03:43.445
nine or 10 questions.

03:43.835 --> 03:47.525
Each one of them asked opinions, you know, usually with

03:47.525 --> 03:49.725
what we refer to as a Likert scale question.

03:49.825 --> 03:51.445
So it's, it gives 'em a statement,

03:51.445 --> 03:52.605
the respondent a statement,

03:52.605 --> 03:54.365
and we say, how strongly do you agree

03:54.565 --> 03:56.165
with this statement or disagree with it?

03:56.665 --> 04:00.765
Um, and so these were statements, about, how much,

04:01.345 --> 04:04.965
how at fault was the PT for the,

04:05.265 --> 04:06.725
the economic precarity

04:06.725 --> 04:08.565
and the economic crisis,

04:08.675 --> 04:11.085
that our respondents were, were living through.

04:11.745 --> 04:13.085
Um,

04:14.305 --> 04:18.765
and questions about the PTs signature poverty reduction,

04:18.835 --> 04:21.485
initiatives, in the earlier decade that many

04:21.485 --> 04:24.005
of our respondents had benefited from directly.

04:24.305 --> 04:26.205
And we wanted to ask them, what did you think of these?

04:26.345 --> 04:28.245
Did you agree with 'em? Did you support with 'em?

04:28.545 --> 04:30.365
Uh, did you support them? Uh,

04:30.365 --> 04:33.125
we also asked our respondents about,

04:33.155 --> 04:35.645
some anti PT social movements

04:35.645 --> 04:37.485
and if they were involved with those,

04:37.505 --> 04:38.685
and if they supported those.

04:39.145 --> 04:41.725
And, then at the end of the day, we added all

04:41.725 --> 04:46.285
of their responses, and created a nine point, index.

04:46.345 --> 04:50.885
So if, if the higher the index, the more anti PT sentiment,

04:51.105 --> 04:54.485
and the less, the lower the value of the index,

04:54.545 --> 04:56.805
the lower, anti PT sentiment.

04:57.465 --> 05:01.645
So the key finding of our research, is that people who

05:02.445 --> 05:05.245
remembered their economic condition as having gotten better,

05:05.545 --> 05:07.605
having improved during the first decade

05:07.625 --> 05:12.525
of the 2020 first century, and then getting worse

05:12.825 --> 05:16.725
or no change during the subsequent decade, this is the,

05:16.865 --> 05:19.845
the sequence we referred to as stalled mobility.

05:20.365 --> 05:24.485
A stalled mobility sequence were on average significantly

05:24.875 --> 05:27.775
more inclined to anti leftist or anti-left

05:27.775 --> 05:31.165
or anti PT sentiment compared to respondents

05:31.165 --> 05:32.805
with other mobility patterns.

05:33.185 --> 05:35.045
In fact, families

05:35.045 --> 05:37.645
and households whose, whose lives had,

05:37.645 --> 05:41.245
experienced any other, mobility pattern, for example,

05:41.825 --> 05:43.765
continuing to get better

05:43.985 --> 05:48.125
or always getting worse, they were not associated

05:48.155 --> 05:49.645
with anti-left sentiment.

05:49.645 --> 05:53.165
It was only the stalled mobility pat pattern that,

05:53.225 --> 05:57.085
was consistently associated with anti-left, sentiment.

05:57.355 --> 06:00.965
I've already described the immediate backdrop,

06:01.105 --> 06:02.845
to our, our survey.

06:03.225 --> 06:05.485
Uh, how do poor and EEC

06:05.485 --> 06:08.045
and working class people respond to economic crisis

06:08.545 --> 06:10.645
and how does it influence their political views?

06:11.065 --> 06:14.805
But the broader context was the 2018 elections,

06:15.165 --> 06:16.485
presidential elections

06:16.835 --> 06:19.165
that saw really the extraordinary rise

06:19.345 --> 06:23.445
and eventual triumph of, of hard right,

06:23.455 --> 06:26.245
politician Jair Bolsonaro 2018,

06:26.385 --> 06:28.845
he was the president from 2018,

06:29.385 --> 06:30.765
for the next four years.

06:31.345 --> 06:34.725
Now, scholars of Brazilian political views,

06:34.725 --> 06:36.125
social movements,

06:36.185 --> 06:39.645
and attitudes like myself, we're still trying

06:39.665 --> 06:42.805
to explain the conditions of the 2018 election.

06:43.065 --> 06:46.405
Uh, what were the conditions, factors that mattered?

06:46.825 --> 06:49.645
Uh, did it have to do with the, the rise

06:49.645 --> 06:51.365
of the e evangelical church?

06:51.545 --> 06:53.245
Did it have to do with social media?

06:53.945 --> 06:56.525
Did it have to do with some vi ways

06:56.585 --> 06:59.445
of remembering Brazil's dictatorship from the

06:59.445 --> 07:00.805
sixties, seventies, and eighties?

07:01.185 --> 07:03.565
And these debates will continue for some time,

07:04.025 --> 07:07.765
but one factor we all agree was significant.

07:08.265 --> 07:11.925
Um, was anti t sentiment,

07:12.515 --> 07:14.045
anti-left sentiment.

07:14.425 --> 07:18.325
So simply to, to identify empirically

07:18.545 --> 07:21.605
and very consistently a correlation,

07:21.675 --> 07:23.565
between anti-left sentiment

07:23.785 --> 07:27.125
and mobility pattern, is a very novel,

07:27.485 --> 07:29.045
a novel insight of our study

07:29.065 --> 07:32.325
and to, to our knowledge, no one else has ever demonstrated,

07:32.465 --> 07:33.685
that association.

07:34.145 --> 07:37.845
Now, what is driving anti PT sentiment?

07:38.465 --> 07:41.845
Um, what is it driving this,

07:41.915 --> 07:43.605
this particular kind of sentiment?

07:44.165 --> 07:46.765
I think it's that, in, in the,

07:47.105 --> 07:49.165
in pre-existing studies in Brazil

07:49.165 --> 07:53.525
and in Latin America, we have tended to,

07:53.985 --> 07:58.205
to rely on income, employment status, these kind

07:58.205 --> 08:01.525
of classic, socioeconomic variables

08:01.545 --> 08:03.285
to explain political attitudes.

08:03.505 --> 08:04.765
And they tell us something,

08:04.905 --> 08:07.485
but they don't reflect change over time.

08:08.105 --> 08:13.045
Uh, and they don't, they don't, reflect,

08:13.505 --> 08:17.205
how when your hopes are, awakened.

08:17.385 --> 08:20.605
And the pt, the workers' party during the first decade

08:20.625 --> 08:23.525
of the 20, 21st century dared poor

08:23.525 --> 08:25.965
and working class Brazilians to dream,

08:26.425 --> 08:27.885
and to some extent, they

08:28.205 --> 08:30.485
provided the means through government initiatives

08:30.825 --> 08:33.845
for these dreams to begin to be realized through

08:33.875 --> 08:36.005
what we would call social welfare programs.

08:36.545 --> 08:39.925
Um, but then with the subsequent crisis, the,

08:40.265 --> 08:43.085
the rug was pulled out from underneath all of this.

08:43.865 --> 08:47.445
And I think what we're, uncovering in our research is

08:47.445 --> 08:49.205
that when you've been dared to dream,

08:49.585 --> 08:52.805
and then those dreams, become precarious,

08:53.265 --> 08:54.845
you have a particular kind

08:54.845 --> 08:57.405
Of, of let's say resentment or frustration,

08:57.905 --> 09:01.605
or some have even called it hate against the incumbent,

09:01.985 --> 09:04.525
in this case, leftist party that dared you

09:04.525 --> 09:05.965
to dream in the, in the first place.

09:06.415 --> 09:09.525
We've sometimes referred to our hypothesis

09:09.625 --> 09:12.845
as the dashed hopes hypothesis that

09:13.505 --> 09:16.125
dashed hopes when your life, your live,

09:16.155 --> 09:17.765
your status has gotten better

09:17.905 --> 09:21.645
and then gets worse, has its own particular kind

09:21.745 --> 09:25.605
of force in shaping, anti-democratic,

09:25.675 --> 09:26.885
political views.

09:27.755 --> 09:30.965
What are the long-term effects potentially

09:31.025 --> 09:34.845
beyond the 2018 elections of these,

09:34.995 --> 09:39.405
stalled mobility sequences, these stalled mobility patterns

09:39.665 --> 09:43.245
and their impact, their possible impact on political views?

09:44.235 --> 09:45.325
Well, I would say

09:45.475 --> 09:49.925
that in 2018 when Shaya Bolsonaro was elected, Brazil was

09:50.845 --> 09:53.925
becoming increasingly divided in terms of political views.

09:54.665 --> 09:57.685
Um, but it was a much,

09:58.035 --> 10:01.845
messier more complicated, scenario

10:01.995 --> 10:04.285
that ultimately led to Bolsonaro election.

10:04.585 --> 10:08.125
But if we fast forward, to 2020,

10:08.265 --> 10:10.765
the 2021 elections,

10:10.815 --> 10:13.285
where Bolsonaro very narrowly lost,

10:13.425 --> 10:15.485
and Luis Ignacio, Lula da Silva,

10:15.505 --> 10:19.005
or Lula, the PT candidate who had run the government

10:19.005 --> 10:22.685
during the first decade of, the 21st century, won

10:22.685 --> 10:23.765
and is the current president.

10:24.225 --> 10:26.805
Um, if we advance to that, then we see

10:27.465 --> 10:31.445
Brazil is fully polarized, very polarized,

10:31.515 --> 10:34.285
much more than it had been at the level of families

10:34.285 --> 10:37.485
and ordinary people, than it had been in 2018.

10:38.145 --> 10:39.885
And I think that,

10:40.315 --> 10:43.805
this stalled mobility from the earlier period is still

10:43.805 --> 10:48.045
shaping people's political attitudes, especially since

10:48.625 --> 10:52.605
the, the fellow who is the president now is the fellow

10:52.785 --> 10:54.725
who was the president 20 years ago,

10:54.875 --> 10:58.445
when anyone who's at least 20 or 25 years old

10:58.945 --> 11:01.325
and has living memory of how things got better

11:01.505 --> 11:05.645
and then got worse, in their own family situation.

11:06.025 --> 11:07.085
So it's complicated,

11:07.185 --> 11:09.285
but I think the influence of mobility,

11:10.005 --> 11:13.405
recollected remembered mobility patterns is still shaping

11:13.725 --> 11:15.325
people's political attitudes.

11:15.325 --> 11:18.045
Though the political world has, has changed

11:18.105 --> 11:21.845
and transformed a fair amount since 2018, to our knowledge,

11:21.915 --> 11:24.645
this is the first study that is,

11:24.775 --> 11:26.845
using empirical survey data

11:26.875 --> 11:30.565
with a large sample in multiple Brazilian cities,

11:31.685 --> 11:34.885
demonstrated, the impact of,

11:35.485 --> 11:39.045
recollected socioeconomic mobility patterns on political

11:39.565 --> 11:40.605
attitudes and views.

11:41.305 --> 11:46.085
Um, so it's an important study, that can be,

11:46.225 --> 11:48.965
the, the results of which can be used in other Latin

11:49.325 --> 11:50.325
American set settings

11:50.575 --> 11:53.685
where similar political processes have taken place.

11:54.185 --> 11:57.245
Brazil is not the only, the only,

11:57.245 --> 11:58.965
Latin American country,

11:58.965 --> 12:03.205
that experienced a leftist regime in the early 21st century.

12:03.425 --> 12:07.085
The so-called Pink Tide, it was called back in the day,

12:07.595 --> 12:11.285
only to be followed by a resurgence of,

12:11.365 --> 12:12.645
conservative politics.

12:12.705 --> 12:17.205
So trying, trying to explain how ordinary people made sense

12:17.305 --> 12:19.645
of those shifts and possibly supported them,

12:19.715 --> 12:22.965
even though their lives had gotten better under a leftist,

12:23.145 --> 12:25.605
government, is interesting

12:25.665 --> 12:28.605
and important work to be done across, the region.

12:29.205 --> 12:32.925
I would also say, you know, we're, we're really struggling,

12:33.065 --> 12:34.645
on a particular question

12:34.645 --> 12:36.725
that concerns historical memory.

12:37.465 --> 12:40.965
Brazil, shares a dictatorial past

12:41.075 --> 12:43.845
with many other Latin American countries,

12:44.425 --> 12:45.485
and, it,

12:45.545 --> 12:47.965
it had a dictatorship in the sixties, seventies and eighties.

12:48.185 --> 12:51.085
And it is peculiar, it's challenging for many of us

12:51.145 --> 12:55.205
who study Brazil to make sense of people who seem to be

12:55.745 --> 12:59.365
waxing nostalgic for the, the good old days of, when,

12:59.555 --> 13:03.045
when, when there was more order in society,

13:03.185 --> 13:04.645
and less crime on the streets.

13:05.145 --> 13:08.525
And yet ordinary citizens didn't have civil rights,

13:08.545 --> 13:10.205
didn't have freedom of ex the right

13:10.205 --> 13:12.005
to expression, the right to assembly.

13:12.545 --> 13:17.005
Um, so part of, part of understanding,

13:17.235 --> 13:20.205
this particular variety of nostalgia that's, that seems

13:20.205 --> 13:24.085
to be coming back across Latin America,

13:24.365 --> 13:27.765
I think our study, helps provide insight into it

13:27.765 --> 13:31.405
because, and it reminds us that when you've,

13:31.515 --> 13:33.405
when your hopes have been awakened

13:33.905 --> 13:36.645
and you start to really change your life

13:36.865 --> 13:40.325
and see some results with support from the government,

13:40.475 --> 13:41.485
it's very powerful

13:41.585 --> 13:43.285
and it's just as powerful

13:43.915 --> 13:47.925
when subsequently your hopes are extinguished,

13:47.925 --> 13:49.565
because of economic precarity.

13:49.585 --> 13:53.405
And it might, incline you, to,

13:53.715 --> 13:56.365
have a positive nostalgia towards an earlier

13:56.985 --> 13:58.485
anti-democratic period.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Faculti

Popular in Social Sciences

Macroeconomic modelling of CBDC: a critical review

Financing Private Credit

Failing Banks

The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place

Keeping the Republic

Entrepreneurial thinking: the politics and practice of policy impact

Mobility Interrupted

Next in Political Science

Guide

Platform and Category Pages

Contact Us

FAQs

Guide

Interview Process

For in-depth insights:

For news and opinion commentaries:

Page Structure

Popular in Social Sciences

Guide

Platform and Category Pages

Contact Us

FAQs

Guide

Interview Process

For in-depth insights:

For news and opinion commentaries:

Accessibility Options

Contrast Adjustment

Text Size Adjustment

Text Spacing Adjustment

Line Height Adjustment

Cursor Size Adjustment

Page Structure Options

Page Structure