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How does women’s power in peace negotiations impact gender provisions in agreements?

Image courtesy of interviewee. December 4, 2024

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This video presents a study on the relationship between women's participation in peace negotiations and the inclusion of provisions for women in peace agreements. It highlights that while there is a positive correlation between women's involvement and the likelihood of those agreements containing such provisions, it is crucial for women to hold positions of power, particularly signatory roles, to effectively influence the outcomes.

The study categorizes the roles in negotiations into a hierarchy:
1. **Signatories** who have the power to request amendments.
2. **Negotiators** who can advocate for women's issues.
3. **Mediators** whose goal is reaching agreements generally, making it harder to push a women's agenda.
4. **Observers** who have minimal influence in the process.

The researcher emphasizes the necessity for women to be not just present, but empowered in negotiations to secure favorable terms. The study developed a original dataset (Peace Agreement Delegate dataset, PAD) analyzing 116 comprehensive peace agreements from 1990 to 2021 to capture the percentage of women involved. It also discusses existing assumptions about women's involvement leading to better outcomes, showing that mere presence does not guarantee advocacy for women's provisions.

The findings suggest that women's substantive representation and the ability to affect agreement outcomes are critical in ensuring that provisions for women are included. The study calls for a reevaluation of policies that assume women's presence alone suffices for better outcomes and suggests the need for more research on this topic, particularly examining the complexities beyond just the number of female delegates.

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Here are five key points from the video:

1. **Women's Participation and Power Dynamics**: The study investigates the link between women's involvement in peace negotiations and the inclusion of provisions for women in peace agreements. It emphasizes that merely having women present is insufficient; they must hold significant positions of power, such as being signatories, to effectively influence outcomes.

2. **Hierarchy of Roles in Negotiations**: There is a clear hierarchy in formal peace negotiations ('track one'), where signatories have the most influence over the terms of the agreement. In contrast, mediators have limited power to advocate for specific issues like women's rights, as their primary goal is to facilitate a general agreement.

3. **Development of the Peace Agreement Delegate Dataset (PAD)**: To analyze the relationship between women's roles and provisions for women in agreements, the researcher created the PAD dataset, which includes data on 2,299 delegates from 116 comprehensive peace agreements between 1990 and 2021. Gender identification was carried out using gender API software alongside manual coding for accuracy.

4. **Impact of Women’s Representation**: While there is a positive correlation between the presence of women in negotiations and the presence of provisions for women, the findings indicate that the effectiveness of women's advocacy is contingent on holding powerful roles. Women's involvement alone is not a guarantee of better outcomes for women's rights in peace agreements.

5. **Limitations of Current Approaches**: The analysis highlights a limitation of the binary approach in coding provisions for women in agreements, as it sacrifices specificity. The study also notes that not all beneficial provisions explicitly mentioning women may be recognized as such, and some provisions may inadvertently reinforce the status quo that disadvantages women. The findings suggest a need for a more nuanced understanding and methodology when assessing the impacts of women's participation in peace negotiations.

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Here are some key quotes from the video you :

1. **Purpose of the Study**: "This study explores the relationship between women's involvement in peace negotiations and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions for women, but it also accounts for power."

2. **Significance of Position**: "I ask if the position held by women delegates in peace negotiation matters, or if women simply need to be in the room."

3. **Correlation Found**: "While there is a positive correlation between women's involvement in comprehensive peace negotiations and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions for women, women do need... positions of power to alter outcomes."

4. **Hierarchy in Negotiations**: "There's a very fairly clear hierarchy in track one peace negotiations... the position with the most power are signatories."

5. **Role of Negotiators vs. Mediators**: "Negotiators who still have a fair bit of agency over the agreement outcome... this really contrasts mediators, whose primary goal is to come to an agreement in general."

6. **Statistical Significance**: "Women are... provisions for women are only statistically significant when women are in signatory positions."

7. **Dataset Development**: "We developed the Peace Agreement Delegate dataset... to measure the percentage of women delegates."

8. **Assumptions of Policy**: "Current policy assumes that increasing women's involvement will inherently result in better outcomes... while women's involvement does drive better outcomes for women in some negotiations... provisions for women aren't guaranteed."

9. **Numbers vs. Power**: "Increasing the percentage of women delegates does increase the likelihood that an agreement will contain provisions for women, but numbers alone aren't sufficient."

10. **Implications for Policy**: "This argument really does propose a shift in quota-based policies more generally, so it's necessary given these structural dynamics."

11. **Research Methodology Reflection**: "I prioritize breadth over depth... exploring the depth of provisions for women is something that I kind of hope to do in future research."

12. **Concern About Provisions**: "Agreements may mention women or girls, but they actually can hinder women's rights or reaffirm the current status quo that disadvantages women."

These quotes encapsulate the main themes and findings of the study, focusing on the importance of women's presence and positions in peace negotiations, the development of a dataset for analysis, and the implications for policy on women's rights and representation.

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This study explores, the relationship

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between women's involvement in peace negotiations

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and the likelihood that agreements contain

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provisions for women.

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Uh, but it also accounts for power.

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So I ask if the position held

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by women delegates in peace negotiation matters,

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or if women simply need to be in the room.

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Um, and I find that while there is a positive correlation

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between women's involvement in comprehensive peace

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negotiations and the likelihood

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that agreements contain provisions for women, women do need

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to be in positions of power.

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There's a very fairly clear hierarchy in track one,

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peace negotiations.

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Uh, and track one just means formal high level,

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deliberations, but the position

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with the most power are signatories.

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Um, and this is because they have the capacity to kind

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of ask for amendments, prior to signing an agreement.

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Now, this isn't to say that women in signatory positions

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have complete control over the agreement outcome,

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or that they don't face pressure by other delegates,

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but they do have the most relative power compared

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to women in other positions.

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Next, we have negotiators who still have a fair bit

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of agency over the agreement outcome.

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So if women's issues are important to negotiators,

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they have the ability to include

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that on the negotiation agenda.

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Um, but this really contrasts mediators whose primary goal

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is to come to an agreement in general.

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Um, so even if a mediator really cares about advocating

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for women, it's difficult to push for that agenda,

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especially if that contrasts what negotiators are after.

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And then lastly, we have observers, who are important

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for increasing the legitimacy of an agreement

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or local buy-in,

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but they have very little control over the

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actual agreement outcome.

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So often they're referred to as silent observers.

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Um, and so using this kind of hierarchy, in terms of

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positions, I find that women are for, I find that provisions

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for women are only statistically significant

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when women are in signatory positions.

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So I leverage Barnett

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and AL'S definition of power to, argue that, you know,

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women need to have the capacity to alter outcomes,

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to secure provisions for women.

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So the takeaway is that it's not enough for women

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to simply be in the room,

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but rather women do need these positions of power

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to, to alter outcomes.

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We developed the peace agreement delegate data set.

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Um, so in order to determine the relationship

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between women's involvement in peace negotiations

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and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions

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for women, I needed to capture the percentage

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of women in track one negotiations.

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So no preexisting data captured this kind of individual

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delegate data in any sort of systemic way.

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Um, and there's amazing qualitative work

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that explores women's involvement in specific cases,

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but there's nothing that could be leveraged

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for a transnational study.

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Um, and so this led me to develop the original dataset,

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that I'm calling the Peace Agreement Delegate dataset

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or PAD for short.

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Um, so to measure the percentage of women delegates,

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I began by extracting all 116 comprehensive peace agreements

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finalized between 1990 and 2021 from the pacs

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or PAX dataset by Bell Etal,

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developed at the University of Edinborough.

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So I used comprehensive peace agreements

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because they're considered

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to be the final agreement in a peace process.

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Um, and they generally encompass kind

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of all previous partial agreements, within an annex,

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an annex or the agreement itself.

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So to create pad, I read all

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of these 116 agreements,

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and I identified any name

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that was referenced within the agreement.

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The names can be embedded within the text, often within kind

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of introductory remarks,

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but most agreements have a specific designated page,

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that includes all of the names of delegates

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and their respective position.

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So, after reading all 116 agreements,

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I find 2,299 delegates across,

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these comprehensive agreements.

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I then, determine the gender

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of these 2,300 delegates using gender API software.

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Um, and I use this software

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because it identifies the gender

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of a name based on the country of origin,

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and offers a confidence score.

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So, for example, the name Ali in the US as coded as male,

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but with a confidence score of 61%, given

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that unisex application of the name versus the name Ali

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and Jordan is coded as male,

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but with a 98% confidence score.

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Um, so I then manually coded all missing

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and inconclusive data, as well as any delegate that had a,

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confidence score below 75%.

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Um, so a Google search Wikipedia data was really effective

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for well-known individuals.

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I can trace, you know, the exact name

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to the exact individual,

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but for lesser known individuals, I turned to kind

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of social media profiles, LinkedIn profiles,

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and matched to the general profile, up to,

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to the name that was in the agreement.

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Final output, again, was this original data set

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that captures all documented track one delegates

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to comprehensive peace negotiations

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or peace agreements, finalized between 1990 and in 2021.

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We know that peace agreements are windows of opportunity

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for marginalized groups.

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So this uses Miriam Anderson's terminology.

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Um, and this is because conflict can act

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as a critical juncture

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where groups can capitalize on these altered power

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structures or institutions

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or power vacuums, kind of that come about post-conflict.

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And so peace negotiations offer a chance for groups

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to formalize those economic political social rights,

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in the case of women.

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Uh, so Lindsay Re's work, for example, finds

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that provisions for women in peace negotiations

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increases women's rights, post-conflict.

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Um, and similarly, Anderson

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and Balde find that provisions for women, lead

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to an increase in women's political,

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participation post-conflict as well.

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So, for example, through peace negotiations,

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women can secure property rights

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or, you know, access to healthcare.

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They can hold political office

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that they were previously barred through.

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They can really make these political social economic gains.

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But current policy assumes

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that increasing women's involvement will inherently result

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in better outcomes because there's this assumption that,

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well, if these provisions benefit women,

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obviously women are gonna advocate for them.

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Um, and so while women's involvement does drive better

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outcomes for women in some negotiations,

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so Columbia's 2016 comprehensive peace agreement is an often

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used example for this, right?

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The agreement had over a hundred provisions

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for women really accredited to women's involvement,

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but provisions for women aren't guaranteed.

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So we have cases like peace processes finalized in Gavan,

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Ghana, Molly Somalia, amongst other places

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where women were included,

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but the final agreement didn't contain any

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provisions for women.

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And so this suggests

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that women's involvement isn't a silver bullet

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for securing provisions for women, despite women peace

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and security sector policy, assuming that it is.

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So while I do find that numbers matter, right?

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Increasing the percentage

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of women delegates does increase the likelihood

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that an agreement will contain provisions for women,

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numbers alone aren't sufficient.

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So rather I find that women's substantive representation

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necessitates women's ability to alter agreement outcomes.

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So women need to be in positions of power.

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Um, and this argument really does propose a shift in

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how we're thinking about women peace and security

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and quota based policies more generally.

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Um, so it's, this is necessary given these kind

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of like structural dynamics that are designed

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to limit women's, advocacy for women,

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measure the relationship between women's involvement

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and, peace negotiations,

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and the likelihood that agreements

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contain provisions for women.

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Um, I begin by conceptualizing provisions for women

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or women's kind of substantive representation.

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Um, and to you do, so, I use the PACS dataset

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by Christine Bell Etal, which uses a Texas data binary

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approach, to measure provisions for women.

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So if an agreement mentions girls widows,

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mothers sexual violence, gender-based violence, UNSC 1325,

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which is kind of the, the hallmark resolution

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for women peace and security,

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or CDA, which is the convention

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to end discrimination against women.

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If an agreement mentions any of these things, it's coded

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as containing provisions for women

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and it's coded as a one versus if all of these, you know,

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words are absent from the agreement, it's coded

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as not containing provisions

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for women, it's coded as a zero.

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The cost of this binary approach is

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that it sacrifices specificity, an agreement

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that mentions women once is coded the exact same

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as an agreement that has over a hundred provisions

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for women like Columbia's 2016, agreement.

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Um, but I prioritize breadth over depth in this particular

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study because the intention was

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to understand the relationship between women's involvement

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and provisions for women across kind of time and space.

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So geographical cases, over 30 years.

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Um, but I think exploring the depth of provisions

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for women is something that I kind of hope

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to do in future research.

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And I'll note that, Jackie True has done really

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excellent, work in this particular vein.

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Um, but the second cost of a Texas data binary approach is

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that it omits provisions

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that would disproportionately benefit women,

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but don't explicitly reference women.

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So things like a provision saying all children have the

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right to education is going

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to inherently benefit girls if prior to this agreement,

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you know, girls were,

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disadvantaged in accessing education, right?

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So that has a disproportionate benefit

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for girls despite not mentioning girls in the provision.

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And so a Texas data approach isn't necessarily gonna pick up

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that that's a provision for for women.

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Um, and so this is a legitimate kind of concern,

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and is something that I address

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through various robustness checks,

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exploring the relationship between women's involvement,

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and issue specific provisions like education,

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property rights, justice sector reform.

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Um, and I find that due to the variation across cases,

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this issue specific approach doesn't necessarily pick up,

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you know, common trends, indicating that, you know,

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across time and space, women are advocating

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for very different things,

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and that the issues of most salience, you know, d are,

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are different based on localized context.

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Um, the last concern is that agreements may mention women

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or girls, but they actually can hinder, women's rights

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or reaffirm, you know, a current status quo

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that disadvantages women.

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So it mentions women, but it doesn't do so in kind

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of a positive or advantageous way.

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Um, so to ensure provisions

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for women actually advance gender equality,

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I read all agreements containing provisions for women,

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and I found a singular case, that in Ethiopia

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where women didn't stand to benefit from the provision.

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And so I just excluded that agreement from,

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from analysis,

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and ran kind of the, the,

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regression based analysis without it before analyzing,

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Uh, the relationship between, women's descriptive

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and substantive representation.

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I controlled for the following kind

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of confounding variables.

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So Thomas finds that conflicts with high rates

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of women combatants, like in Columbia, are more likely

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to include provisions for women in final agreements.

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Um, and so I control

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for this using the Women in Armed Rebellion dataset

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or Ward dataset by Wood and Thomas, Brandon,

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and best find that conflicts with high, documented rates

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of wartime sexual violence are more likely

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to include provisions for women.

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Uh, and so I control four conflict related sexual violence

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using the sexual violence in armed conflict

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or SAC dataset by Cohen at all.

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Uh, and then Bell and O'Rourke find

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that when the UN is a signatory to an agreement,

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it increases the likelihood

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that the agreement contains provisions for women.

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Um, so I control for kind

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of third party involvement using the PACS dataset

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by bell at all.

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Um, but my biggest concern was gender equality.

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Um, you know, is it women's involvement

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that's driving provisions for women,

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or is it the fact that a more gender equitable society is

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inherently more likely to include women

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and include provisions for women?

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Um, so to address this,

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I use various gender indices like the gender inequality

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index, the gender development index, as well

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as independent measures like girls access to education,

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and teen pregnancy.

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Um, so by controlling for these variables, I kind of aim

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to account for these broader sociopolitical factors.

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Um, however, the influence of alternative factors seems

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to really show up, in this negative

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or this, insignificant statistical relationship

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between women and negotiator positions

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and agreements containing provisions for women.

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And this is because, again,

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negotiators have a fair bit of power, right?

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So the insignificant statistical relationship indicates

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that potentially power isn't telling the

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complete story here.

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Um, so it's feasible that party loyalties like who,

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you know, the negotiators are actually representing may,

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sway negotiator's ability to advocate for women.

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Um, so for example, Paff holds said all in the 2016 article,

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find that, party loyalties often trumped, you know,

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women shared interest.

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Um, but it alternatively, women negotiators may be pressured

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to adapt to peace processes, gendered hierarchies.

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Um, and

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so while these broader socioeconomic trends may be present,

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it's also feasible that the small number

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of women negotiators really explains this insignificant

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relationship, given

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that the smaller number may be more susceptible

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to individual variation.

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Um, and so future,

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I think case-based research is probably the best way

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to go about this, to, you know, better understand,

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more fully understand this relationship between negotiators

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and broader sociopolitical factors,

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that may influence their capacity

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or willingness to advocate for women.

Women's Roles and Power in Peace Negotiations

00:00:00 - This study explores, the relationship between women's involvement in peace negotiations and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions for women. but it also accounts for power. So I ask if the position held by women delegates in peace negotiation matters, or if women simply need to be in the room. and I find that while there is a positive correlation between women's involvement in comprehensive peace negotiations and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions for women, women do need

00:00:33 - There's a very fairly clear hierarchy in track one, peace negotiations. and track one just means formal high level, deliberations, but the position with the most power are signatories. and this is because they have the capacity to kind of ask for amendments, prior to signing an agreement. Now, this isn't to say that women in signatory positions have complete control over the agreement outcome, or that they don't face pressure by other delegates,

00:01:04 - to women in other positions. Next, we have negotiators who still have a fair bit of agency over the agreement outcome. So if women's issues are important to negotiators, they have the ability to include that on the negotiation agenda. but this really contrasts mediators whose primary goal is to come to an agreement in general. so even if a mediator really cares about advocating for women, it's difficult to push for that agenda, especially if that contrasts what negotiators are after.

Empowering Women in Peace Negotiations: The Role of Position and Power

00:01:39 - for increasing the legitimacy of an agreement or local buy-in, but they have very little control over the actual agreement outcome. So often they're referred to as silent observers. and so using this kind of hierarchy, in terms of positions, I find that women are for, I find that provisions for women are only statistically significant when women are in signatory positions. So I leverage Barnett and AL'S definition of power to, argue that, you know,

00:02:12 - to secure provisions for women. So the takeaway is that it's not enough for women to simply be in the room, but rather women do need these positions of power to, to alter outcomes. We developed the peace agreement delegate data set. so in order to determine the relationship between women's involvement in peace negotiations and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions for women, I needed to capture the percentage of women in track one negotiations.

00:02:46 - delegate data in any sort of systemic way. and there's amazing qualitative work that explores women's involvement in specific cases, but there's nothing that could be leveraged for a transnational study. and so this led me to develop the original dataset, that I'm calling the Peace Agreement Delegate dataset or PAD for short. so to measure the percentage of women delegates, I began by extracting all 116 comprehensive peace agreements

Analyzing Gender Representation in Peace Agreements

00:03:18 - or PAX dataset by Bell Etal, developed at the University of Edinborough. So I used comprehensive peace agreements because they're considered to be the final agreement in a peace process. and they generally encompass kind of all previous partial agreements, within an annex, an annex or the agreement itself. So to create pad, I read all of these 116 agreements,

00:03:46 - that was referenced within the agreement. The names can be embedded within the text, often within kind of introductory remarks, but most agreements have a specific designated page, that includes all of the names of delegates and their respective position. So, after reading all 116 agreements, I find 2,299 delegates across, these comprehensive agreements. I then, determine the gender of these 2,300 delegates using gender API software.

00:04:20 - because it identifies the gender of a name based on the country of origin, and offers a confidence score. So, for example, the name Ali in the US as coded as male, but with a confidence score of 61%, given that unisex application of the name versus the name Ali and Jordan is coded as male, but with a 98% confidence score. so I then manually coded all missing and inconclusive data, as well as any delegate that had a,

Building a Dataset for Women's Representation in Peace Agreements

00:04:54 - so a Google search Wikipedia data was really effective for well-known individuals. I can trace, you know, the exact name to the exact individual, but for lesser known individuals, I turned to kind of social media profiles, LinkedIn profiles, and matched to the general profile, up to, to the name that was in the agreement. Final output, again, was this original data set that captures all documented track one delegates

00:05:22 - or peace agreements, finalized between 1990 and in 2021. We know that peace agreements are windows of opportunity for marginalized groups. So this uses Miriam Anderson's terminology. and this is because conflict can act as a critical juncture where groups can capitalize on these altered power structures or institutions or power vacuums, kind of that come about post-conflict. And so peace negotiations offer a chance for groups

00:05:55 - in the case of women. so Lindsay Re's work, for example, finds that provisions for women in peace negotiations increases women's rights, post-conflict. and similarly, Anderson and Balde find that provisions for women, lead to an increase in women's political, participation post-conflict as well. So, for example, through peace negotiations, women can secure property rights or, you know, access to healthcare.

Women's Empowerment in Peace Agreements: Beyond Presence to Power

00:06:24 - that they were previously barred through. They can really make these political social economic gains. But current policy assumes that increasing women's involvement will inherently result in better outcomes because there's this assumption that, well, if these provisions benefit women, obviously women are gonna advocate for them. and so while women's involvement does drive better outcomes for women in some negotiations, so Columbia's 2016 comprehensive peace agreement is an often

00:06:55 - The agreement had over a hundred provisions for women really accredited to women's involvement, but provisions for women aren't guaranteed. So we have cases like peace processes finalized in Gavan, Ghana, Molly Somalia, amongst other places where women were included, but the final agreement didn't contain any provisions for women. And so this suggests that women's involvement isn't a silver bullet for securing provisions for women, despite women peace

00:07:28 - So while I do find that numbers matter, right? Increasing the percentage of women delegates does increase the likelihood that an agreement will contain provisions for women, numbers alone aren't sufficient. So rather I find that women's substantive representation necessitates women's ability to alter agreement outcomes. So women need to be in positions of power. and this argument really does propose a shift in

Assessing Women's Representation in Peace Agreements

00:07:57 - and quota based policies more generally. so it's, this is necessary given these kind of like structural dynamics that are designed to limit women's, advocacy for women, measure the relationship between women's involvement and, peace negotiations, and the likelihood that agreements contain provisions for women. I begin by conceptualizing provisions for women or women's kind of substantive representation.

00:08:29 - by Christine Bell Etal, which uses a Texas data binary approach, to measure provisions for women. So if an agreement mentions girls widows, mothers sexual violence, gender-based violence, UNSC 1325, which is kind of the, the hallmark resolution for women peace and security, or CDA, which is the convention to end discrimination against women. If an agreement mentions any of these things, it's coded

00:08:59 - and it's coded as a one versus if all of these, you know, words are absent from the agreement, it's coded as not containing provisions for women, it's coded as a zero. The cost of this binary approach is that it sacrifices specificity, an agreement that mentions women once is coded the exact same as an agreement that has over a hundred provisions for women like Columbia's 2016, agreement. but I prioritize breadth over depth in this particular

Analyzing Women's Provisions in Peace Agreements

00:09:30 - to understand the relationship between women's involvement and provisions for women across kind of time and space. So geographical cases, over 30 years. but I think exploring the depth of provisions for women is something that I kind of hope to do in future research. And I'll note that, Jackie True has done really excellent, work in this particular vein. but the second cost of a Texas data binary approach is that it omits provisions

00:10:01 - but don't explicitly reference women. So things like a provision saying all children have the right to education is going to inherently benefit girls if prior to this agreement, you know, girls were, disadvantaged in accessing education, right? So that has a disproportionate benefit for girls despite not mentioning girls in the provision. And so a Texas data approach isn't necessarily gonna pick up that that's a provision for for women.

00:10:34 - and is something that I address through various robustness checks, exploring the relationship between women's involvement, and issue specific provisions like education, property rights, justice sector reform. and I find that due to the variation across cases, this issue specific approach doesn't necessarily pick up, you know, common trends, indicating that, you know, across time and space, women are advocating

Contextual Challenges in Gender Equality Provisions

00:11:03 - and that the issues of most salience, you know, d are, are different based on localized context. the last concern is that agreements may mention women or girls, but they actually can hinder, women's rights or reaffirm, you know, a current status quo that disadvantages women. So it mentions women, but it doesn't do so in kind of a positive or advantageous way. so to ensure provisions for women actually advance gender equality,

00:11:35 - and I found a singular case, that in Ethiopia where women didn't stand to benefit from the provision. And so I just excluded that agreement from, from analysis, and ran kind of the, the, regression based analysis without it before analyzing, the relationship between, women's descriptive and substantive representation. I controlled for the following kind of confounding variables.

00:12:05 - of women combatants, like in Columbia, are more likely to include provisions for women in final agreements. and so I control for this using the Women in Armed Rebellion dataset or Ward dataset by Wood and Thomas, Brandon, and best find that conflicts with high, documented rates of wartime sexual violence are more likely to include provisions for women. and so I control four conflict related sexual violence using the sexual violence in armed conflict

Examining Gender Equality in Peace Agreements

00:12:35 - and then Bell and O'Rourke find that when the UN is a signatory to an agreement, it increases the likelihood that the agreement contains provisions for women. so I control for kind of third party involvement using the PACS dataset by bell at all. but my biggest concern was gender equality. you know, is it women's involvement that's driving provisions for women, or is it the fact that a more gender equitable society is inherently more likely to include women and include provisions for women?

00:13:06 - I use various gender indices like the gender inequality index, the gender development index, as well as independent measures like girls access to education, and teen pregnancy. so by controlling for these variables, I kind of aim to account for these broader sociopolitical factors. however, the influence of alternative factors seems to really show up, in this negative or this, insignificant statistical relationship

00:13:40 - and agreements containing provisions for women. And this is because, again, negotiators have a fair bit of power, right? So the insignificant statistical relationship indicates that potentially power isn't telling the complete story here. so it's feasible that party loyalties like who, you know, the negotiators are actually representing may, sway negotiator's ability to advocate for women. so for example, Paff holds said all in the 2016 article,

Gender Dynamics in Peace Negotiations

00:14:14 - women shared interest. but it alternatively, women negotiators may be pressured to adapt to peace processes, gendered hierarchies. and so while these broader socioeconomic trends may be present, it's also feasible that the small number of women negotiators really explains this insignificant relationship, given that the smaller number may be more susceptible to individual variation.

00:14:55 - I think case-based research is probably the best way to go about this, to, you know, better understand, more fully understand this relationship between negotiators and broader sociopolitical factors, that may influence their capacity or willingness to advocate for women.

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