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School Performance, Score Inflation, and Neighborhood Development

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Score inflation in English primary school exams triggered residential sorting, gentrification, and increased school competition, with lasting impacts on house prices, deprivation, and local economic activities.

Image courtesy of interviewee. October 29, 2024

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This video discusses a research study aimed at understanding how families form expectations based on inflated school scores due to a grading practice known as "border lining" in England. This video practice led to score inflation, which impacted school rankings and affected family decisions regarding school enrollment and neighborhood choices. The aim was to explore whether these expectations influenced school quality improvements and neighborhood demographics over time.

Key points include:

1. **Context of School Inflation**: The study examines score inflation that resulted from grading practices in primary schools, notably prior to the practice being abolished in 2007.

2. **Family Expectations**: The research investigates how families respond to inflated scores published in school performance tables, which can lead to changes in household locations and educational choices.

3. **Methodology**: The study utilizes a variety of data sources, including the National People Database, land registry data, and census information, to analyze the effects of score inflation on housing prices, local demographics, and school performance.

4. **Findings**:
- Neighborhoods with higher score inflation saw significant increases in house prices (by about 2% after border lining was abolished and reaching approximately 2.6% in 2019), suggesting families were willing to pay a premium to relocate near higher-scoring schools.
- Areas experiencing more score inflation noted improved demographics, including a decrease in unemployment and an increase in families with children and higher education levels.
- An increase in local businesses catering to new, incoming residents was also observed.

5. **Broader Implications**: The research highlights potential risks for low-income families, who may be priced out of neighborhoods benefiting from inflated school scores. It emphasizes the importance of continued research into the consequences of grading practices and neighborhood changes on family dynamics and local economies.

Overall, the study contributes to understanding the interplay between education, housing markets, and socioeconomic factors, indicating that while score inflation might enhance school performance, it simultaneously creates challenges for affordability and equitable access to education.

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Based on the video, here are five key points:

1. **Impact of Score Inflation on Parental Expectations**: The study investigates how families in England respond to inflated school scores caused by grading practices known as 'border lining'. These inflated scores affect parental expectations and influence their choices regarding neighborhood and school enrollment.

2. **Score Inflation and School Rankings**: Annual school performance tables published in England, which include various metrics like academic standards and school composition, are widely used by families. Score inflation can lead to changes in school rankings, prompting parents to alter their school choices based on inflated perceptions of school quality.

3. **Neighborhood Demographics and Economic Activity**: The research finds that neighborhoods with higher levels of school score inflation experience demographic improvements, such as an increase in families with higher socioeconomic status and employment levels. This demographic shift is linked to an increase in local businesses that cater to the needs of new residents.

4. **Effect on Housing Prices**: The study documents a significant increase in housing prices in neighborhoods affected by school score inflation, estimating a house premium of approximately £6,000. This increase in home values indicates that families are willing to pay more to relocate to areas with perceived better educational quality.

5. **Improvement in School Performance**: As a consequence of heightened expectations from families due to inflated scores, local schools in these neighborhoods show improvements in student performance. This reflects a positive feedback loop where score inflation not only impacts parental choices but also encourages schools to enhance their productivity and academic outcomes.

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Here are some key quotes extracted from the video:

1. **Understanding Expectations from Score Inflation**:
- "We try to understand whether families respond or form expectations from inaccurate beliefs that were generated because of score inflation in England."

2. **Convideo of Score Inflation**:
- "We asked this question in the convideo of a widespread score inflation that was generated because of a marking practice at the end of primary schools in England."

3. **Impact of Score Inflation on Family Decisions**:
- "We asked whether families formed expectations based on these inflated scores, and whether this drew them towards certain neighborhoods."

4. **Family Considerations in School Admissions**:
- "Families care about a set of school characteristics... among this set, you have, for instance, the peer composition of the school and obviously academic standards."

5. **School Performance Tables**:
- "Every year, school rankings are published... these are called school performance tables."

6. **Effects of Grading Practices**:
- "The score inflation that we look at in our paper was due to a marking practice called Border Lining."

7. **Consequences of Score Inflation**:
- "This generated jumps in the test score distribution, which inflated test scores for over a decade."

8. **Research Contributions**:
- "The main contribution of our paper is that we were the first to study what happens when you have school inflation for schools and also for neighborhoods rather than the students that were directly involved."

9. **Impact on House Prices**:
- "Neighborhoods characterized by high levels of score inflation experienced large increases in house prices over time."

10. **Economic Activity Changes**:
- "We document that neighborhoods that received more school inflation saw an increase in the number of businesses."

11. **Demographics and School Performance**:
- "Neighborhoods in the catchment areas of schools that receive higher levels of school inflation saw an increase in the number of employed and families with children."

12. **Public Housing and Gentrification**:
- "This score inflation also led to substantial increases in house prices...low-income families will be priced out of these neighborhoods."

These quotes encapsulate the primary ideas discussed, focusing on the implications of score inflation in educational systems, family responses, demographic changes, and broader economic impacts.

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We try to understand whether, families, respond,

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or form expectations from inaccurate, beliefs,

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that were, generated,

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because of score inflation, in England.

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So, in particular, so,

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so we asked this question in the context of,

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a widespread co inflation, that was generated

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because of a, of a marking practice, at the end

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of primary schools, in England.

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So this was essentially an unforeseen consequence

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of a grading scheme, which generated, co inflation.

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And for our people,

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we asked whether families formed expectations,

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based on these inflated scores,

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and whether this drew them towards certain neighborhoods,

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and ultimately whether this also caused,

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the schools themselves to improve,

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and thereby fulfilling, these quality expectations.

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We do So, in the context of England, where,

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where we have a, a market essentially

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for state fund schools,

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and what happens that admission to state fund schools,

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is essentially based on distance,

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distance from the school to the student, residents.

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And in this setting, families.

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So we know that families care, about a cer a set

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of school characteristics.

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And among this, this set, you have, for instance,

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the peer composition of the school

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and obviously academic standards.

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And this implies that families who are interested in,

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in enrolling their child in certain schools will be looking

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for high academic, standards.

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Um, in England, every year,

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school rankings are published.

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They're usually in December. So you have,

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these are called school performance tables.

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And in this group, performance tables,

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several school indicators, for instance,

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school composition, staffing information are published,

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but also this,

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but also these tables publish the share of, of students,

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within each school that, attain at certain,

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proficient proficiency cutoffs,

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families in England use,

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these performance tables widely.

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Uh, and this has been documented by,

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several papers in a context where, school inflation,

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changes, the share of children within a school

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that attains a certain proficiency, target.

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Then this may generate changes in the school rankings,

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that are, that are publishing these tables.

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And therefore this may cause parents to, to react,

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and, change, their, their decision in terms

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of the school in which they, they want

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to enroll their, their keep.

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Um, something that, something that is important to say is

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that the, the score inflation

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that we look at in our paper was due

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to a marketing practice called Border Lining, which was,

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Which has been in place until 2007.

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And this practice essentially implied that,

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in, in the standardized examinations

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that were taken at the end of primary school,

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you had certain proficiency cutoff,

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and the, the scripts of students

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that were falling within three marks from these proficiency

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cutoffs were basically regraded, by,

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by the same markers.

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Uh, and this generated, jumps, in the test score,

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distribution,

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which inflated test scores for over a decade.

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Uh, and in 2007, this practice was scraped

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because also the department for Education realized,

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that there is actually, an emerging literature,

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in economics that that studies, grading practices,

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and the potential consequences of, grade inflation,

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which cannot necessarily, does not necessarily, need

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to be manipulation.

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It can just be inflation.

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Because, for instance, of these sort of grading practices

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that have nothing to do with, purposefully manipulating,

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test scores, per perhaps the, the tools,

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the most closely related papers, are this,

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this paper on Sweden by, dominant person,

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where they document that,

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teachers in examination in Sweden essentially helped,

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students who they thought were having a bad test day,

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by inflating their, the test scores.

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And obviously this does not raise the human capital

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of students per se,

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because it's just inflating their, their, their test score,

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but it documents substantial effects on their,

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subsequent education

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and those effects on their labor market, outcomes.

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Um, there was another paper,

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for the US which is quite directly related to our paper,

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which is by the, and,

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and in quarter, it was published in 20, 19.

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Uh, and the, the document also, occurrences

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of score inflation in New York's, re's examinations,

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where they argued that scores were inflated,

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because markets has a genuine willingness

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to help, students.

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Uh, and this also had positive effect on, on, on students,

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in terms of college, in terms of, sorry,

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high school, evaluation, rates.

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Although for some students,

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there was actually a negative effect, in terms

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of getting a more, a more advanced level of education.

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So the results are a little bit ones,

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but the common, part of these two papers

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that they looked, at the, at the effect

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of task scoring inflation on students themselves.

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Uh, and, and this sense, the, the main contribution

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of our paper is that we were the first to study

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what happens when you have school inflation for schools

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and also for neighborhoods rather than the students

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that were, directly, involved.

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We also talk to the literature that studies,

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house premium, for, preschool quality.

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So there is, I won't get too much into, into the details

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because this is an extensive literature

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that has evolved over time.

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For instance, regression discontinuity has been an approach

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that has been widely used by this literature.

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And we are, essentially the first to study,

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how parents respond, to changes in school quality

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and how much parents are willing to pay,

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for differences in, in school quality that are driven

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by school inflation rather than features

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of institutional setting.

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It's quite interesting because we,

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we use different sources of data.

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Uh, we use mainly four sources of data.

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The, the, the main one is the National People Database.

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Uh, this is an administrative database that covers

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all children in state funded, schools in England.

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So we can observe, between 500

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to 600,000 students per year.

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Uh, and we observe, a certain of information about them

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so we can observe their test scores.

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Uh, in particular, they're assessed, twice,

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during their, primary school, years.

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Uh, we can also observe the characteristics,

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for instance, their ethnicity

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or the language they speak at all, as well

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as the socioeconomic status of, of their family.

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And, we also observe, their,

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residential location.

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So we can essentially pinpoint where, where they lead,

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down to the sense to, block level.

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So blocks are geographical units

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that cover approximately 800,000.

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So it's a fairly precise, measure.

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Um, the second source that we use is the land registry,

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which, includes the population of house transactions.

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Uh, in our case, we use,

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we use house transactions in England,

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and we can, we can obviously observe the price, which,

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which we use as as outcome.

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We can also observe characteristics of the house,

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so the type of house, the type of the contract,

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and the date of the sale, as well as the postcode of,

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of the house.

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Um, we also use census data from 1991, 2001

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and 2011, censuses.

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Um, and finally, the, the other data set that we use,

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which is a very interesting source that we use,

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the business structured database, which said data set

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that covers, roughly 99% of economic activity in the uk.

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And in this dataset, we can observe all businesses.

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Um, and crucially for us,

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we cannot not only observe the type of business,

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so we can distinguish, for instance, between a coffee shop

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and a grocery store,

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but importantly be, we can distinguish

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between the enterprise and the local unit.

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So meaning that if you think about Starbucks, for instance,

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we can distinguish between the Starbucks, headquarter

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and the single coffee shop.

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Uh, and so we use this data to understand

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how the local economic activity change,

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as a result of score inflation.

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What we do is that we consider these blocks,

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these residential blocks that I, that I mentioned

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before, and we consider all schools that are located

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around a block that can be reasonably accessed

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by the time he's living in, in these blocks.

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And for these schools, we essentially compute the extent

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of score inflation that these schools experience

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because of these, border lining, practice.

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And so the, the kind of idea that in mind, the intuition

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for the comparison that, that, that we make, is

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that you can imagine that you have two residential blocks,

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but the, the both schools have the same sort

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of distribution of test scores,

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but one block receive more school inflation randomly.

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So these is the kind of comparison that, we make.

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And in terms of, of, of results, of these comparison,

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we begin by documenting that the fact that this,

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school inflation is essentially as good as random

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in the sense that the markers who marked,

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these examinations that were taken in the end

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of primary schools did not know anything about the kids,

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was scripts they were marking.

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And so they did not selectively graded up,

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student sort of, sort of, well off students

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or students from a certain gender or, or ethnicity.

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Um, and secondly, we also document that this inflation was

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as good as random from the perspective of the neighborhood.

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So, the extent of score inflation does not correlate

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with house prices measured before inflation,

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before this co inflation, started.

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Uh, and it does not correlate

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with local characteristics of, of neighborhoods.

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And so once we have established that,

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so the headline finding of, of our paper, is

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that neighborhoods characterized by high levels

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of co inflation experienced,

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large increase in our prices over time.

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And in particular, we document an increase of our prices

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by roughly 2%, in 2008, so

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after border lining was abolished.

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And the, the increase in our prices grew up

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to roughly 2.6% in 2019, which is the last year of our data,

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this number may not need much.

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So to put a, to put like sort of a, a quantity behind it,

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this amounts to roughly, 6,000 pounds in terms

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of house premium, which is a substantial premium

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that families were willing to pay

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to relocate towards these neighborhoods.

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And we have also three other sets of, of, of results,

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that I can discuss very quickly.

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So the, the, the second set of results is that we document

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that, school inflation generated an improvement,

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if I can use this word, in terms of demographics

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of neighborhoods in the sense the neighborhoods in the

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catchment areas, catchment areas of schools

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that receive higher levels of school inflation,

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Inc saw an increase in the number of, employed,

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sorry, a decrease in the number of unemployed, males

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and an increase in families with children

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and an individuals with, with, high level occupations

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or high levels of education.

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And this was interestingly mirrored in the changes in

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composition of local schools, which, saw an increase in,

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in, in, in the number of viability

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Students, enrolling there.

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And this ultimately mapped in an, in an improvement, in,

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in the test course of local children,

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as well in within the school, which is why,

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what we see in the papers that ultimately,

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the expectations of these parents

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that were naturally formed were actually fulfilled

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by, by these schools.

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We actually got better,

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because of, square inflation.

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We can distinguish, between blocks that, was

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families who who reside in these blocks can access,

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more or less schools.

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So you can have residential blocks

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where families can access a certain number of schools

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and residential blocks where families can access more

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schools, meaning that they are, exposed

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to a higher school density.

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And what we observe is that the, the,

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the price effects are larger in the, in the latter blocks,

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and also the, the effects in terms of, the test was,

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results for, for the children.

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So while we cannot definitely say that the evidence that

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that, that we have suggests

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that particularly in residential blocks

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where you have access to many schools, schools started

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to compete, for the new children went

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to the neighborhood because their families decided

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to relocate there.

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Um, and on what viable can you compete if for a school

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by improving productivity

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and by improving student student achievement, which is

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what parents, cared about at the time

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that we published this paper, we could only observe,

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sense date only up to 2011.

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Uh, but, but we do see, as I also mentioned

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before, that neighbors exposed to, sorry, neighborhoods

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with schools that receive high levels of, of inflation

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also saw an, an improvement in terms of demographics.

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But the other aspect that, that,

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that we observe are changes in local economic activity.

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And so, in particular, we document that neighborhoods that

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that received more school inflation,

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saw an increase in the number of businesses.

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And interestingly, because we can distinguish the type

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of business, we can also observe that the type

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of business that we observed start essentially popping up in

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these neighborhoods are exactly the businesses that cater

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for the needs of, the incoming houses.

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So for instance, we observe an, an, an increasing number of,

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pharmacies

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and grocery stores, which are

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actually increasing over time, and then persist up to 2015,

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which is the last year in which we observed business data

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for, for this project.

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And the increase is roughly of 7%.

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So it's a sizable increase.

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Um, we also observed, an, an increase in the number

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of small shops such as, small grocery stores

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or wool stores, or small shops such

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as butchers and fish mongers.

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Um, but these changes come about more slowly.

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Um, so they start increasing a little bit right after 2008,

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and then they increase more in, in, in the long run,

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as if you had a, one way to see this is

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that you might have sort of large chains

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or, sort of traditional grocery stores

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that respond more quickly, to these,

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to the movements of houses across neighborhoods,

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whereas smaller shops, do respond but more slowly.

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So, so their changes even we can observe

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that we can still observe them today.

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Uh, but it came about more slowly.

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I am actually, so in a, in a different project,

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I look at, how public housing degenerations,

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for instance, have affected, the outcomes

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of children in local neighborhoods, which is still related

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to gentrification

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and somewhat a very much related, topic.

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Um, and I think, this is very much related to one point

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that we make in the paper, which is the fact

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that this co inflation, seemed

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to have actually benefited to some extent local children

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because the productivity of local schools was raised,

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that mute, this word, thanked,

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to, to the score inflation.

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Um, and so there, there's a very interesting literature

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developing, where I've also contributed

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with this paper on public housing, where,

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researchers are trying to understand, what are effects

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for, incumbent residents when their neighborhoods

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experiences an inflow of more aff households.

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So how do the, the outcomes of their, of local children

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who stay there, change,

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but also outcomes of, of adults, change.

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Um, so this is, this I think is a

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very interesting area for research.

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Uh, and the other interesting point that, that,

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that I believe we make, in the paper, is that

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hopefully, I, I, I managed to convey the fact

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that this co inflation also led

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to substantial increase in house prices.

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And so there is, a serious risk

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that particularly low income families,

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will be priced out of these neighborhoods.

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And so there is a large literature in economics,

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for instance, all the paper by rash, chatty and, and, and,

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and his quarters,

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that have documented the neighborhoods matter, and

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therefore, systems where you have these, these,

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boundary based admission to schools

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and that are characterized

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by score inflation might ultimately lead

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to low income families being priced

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out of good neighborhoods.

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And so understanding what happens to families

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that are potentially displaced

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because of either institutional features

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or score inflation, I believe will be super important,

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in the future.

Impact of Score Inflation on Family Expectations and School Quality in England

00:00:00 - We try to understand whether, families, respond, or form expectations from inaccurate, beliefs, that were, generated, because of score inflation, in England. So, in particular, so, so we asked this question in the context of, a widespread co inflation, that was generated because of a, of a marking practice, at the end of primary schools, in England.

00:00:33 - of a grading scheme, which generated, co inflation. And for our people, we asked whether families formed expectations, based on these inflated scores, and whether this drew them towards certain neighborhoods, and ultimately whether this also caused, the schools themselves to improve, and thereby fulfilling, these quality expectations. We do So, in the context of England, where,

00:01:05 - for state fund schools, and what happens that admission to state fund schools, is essentially based on distance, distance from the school to the student, residents. And in this setting, families. So we know that families care, about a cer a set of school characteristics. And among this, this set, you have, for instance, the peer composition of the school and obviously academic standards. And this implies that families who are interested in,

Impact of School Performance Tables on Parental Choices in England

00:01:39 - for high academic, standards. in England, every year, school rankings are published. They're usually in December. So you have, these are called school performance tables. And in this group, performance tables, several school indicators, for instance, school composition, staffing information are published, but also this, but also these tables publish the share of, of students, within each school that, attain at certain,

00:02:14 - families in England use, these performance tables widely. and this has been documented by, several papers in a context where, school inflation, changes, the share of children within a school that attains a certain proficiency, target. Then this may generate changes in the school rankings, that are, that are publishing these tables. And therefore this may cause parents to, to react,

00:02:44 - of the school in which they, they want to enroll their, their keep. something that, something that is important to say is that the, the score inflation that we look at in our paper was due to a marketing practice called Border Lining, which was, Which has been in place until 2007. And this practice essentially implied that, in, in the standardized examinations that were taken at the end of primary school,

Impact of Grading Inflation on Test Scores and Education Outcomes

00:03:14 - and the, the scripts of students that were falling within three marks from these proficiency cutoffs were basically regraded, by, by the same markers. and this generated, jumps, in the test score, distribution, which inflated test scores for over a decade. and in 2007, this practice was scraped because also the department for Education realized, that there is actually, an emerging literature, in economics that that studies, grading practices,

00:03:49 - which cannot necessarily, does not necessarily, need to be manipulation. It can just be inflation. Because, for instance, of these sort of grading practices that have nothing to do with, purposefully manipulating, test scores, per perhaps the, the tools, the most closely related papers, are this, this paper on Sweden by, dominant person, where they document that,

00:04:20 - students who they thought were having a bad test day, by inflating their, the test scores. And obviously this does not raise the human capital of students per se, because it's just inflating their, their, their test score, but it documents substantial effects on their, subsequent education and those effects on their labor market, outcomes. there was another paper, for the US which is quite directly related to our paper,

Impacts of Score Inflation on Education and Neighborhood Dynamics

00:04:47 - and in quarter, it was published in 20, 19. and the, the document also, occurrences of score inflation in New York's, re's examinations, where they argued that scores were inflated, because markets has a genuine willingness to help, students. and this also had positive effect on, on, on students, in terms of college, in terms of, sorry, high school, evaluation, rates.

00:05:17 - there was actually a negative effect, in terms of getting a more, a more advanced level of education. So the results are a little bit ones, but the common, part of these two papers that they looked, at the, at the effect of task scoring inflation on students themselves. and, and this sense, the, the main contribution of our paper is that we were the first to study what happens when you have school inflation for schools and also for neighborhoods rather than the students that were, directly, involved.

00:05:50 - house premium, for, preschool quality. So there is, I won't get too much into, into the details because this is an extensive literature that has evolved over time. For instance, regression discontinuity has been an approach that has been widely used by this literature. And we are, essentially the first to study, how parents respond, to changes in school quality and how much parents are willing to pay, for differences in, in school quality that are driven

Data Sources for Analyzing Educational and Housing Trends

00:06:23 - of institutional setting. It's quite interesting because we, we use different sources of data. we use mainly four sources of data. The, the, the main one is the National People Database. this is an administrative database that covers all children in state funded, schools in England. So we can observe, between 500 to 600,000 students per year. and we observe, a certain of information about them so we can observe their test scores.

00:06:55 - during their, primary school, years. we can also observe the characteristics, for instance, their ethnicity or the language they speak at all, as well as the socioeconomic status of, of their family. And, we also observe, their, residential location. So we can essentially pinpoint where, where they lead, down to the sense to, block level. So blocks are geographical units

00:07:24 - So it's a fairly precise, measure. the second source that we use is the land registry, which, includes the population of house transactions. in our case, we use, we use house transactions in England, and we can, we can obviously observe the price, which, which we use as as outcome. We can also observe characteristics of the house, so the type of house, the type of the contract, and the date of the sale, as well as the postcode of, of the house.

Analyzing Economic Activity and School Score Inflation

00:07:56 - and 2011, censuses. and finally, the, the other data set that we use, which is a very interesting source that we use, the business structured database, which said data set that covers, roughly 99% of economic activity in the uk. And in this dataset, we can observe all businesses. and crucially for us, we cannot not only observe the type of business, so we can distinguish, for instance, between a coffee shop and a grocery store,

00:08:25 - between the enterprise and the local unit. So meaning that if you think about Starbucks, for instance, we can distinguish between the Starbucks, headquarter and the single coffee shop. and so we use this data to understand how the local economic activity change, as a result of score inflation. What we do is that we consider these blocks, these residential blocks that I, that I mentioned before, and we consider all schools that are located around a block that can be reasonably accessed by the time he's living in, in these blocks.

00:09:00 - of score inflation that these schools experience because of these, border lining, practice. And so the, the kind of idea that in mind, the intuition for the comparison that, that, that we make, is that you can imagine that you have two residential blocks, but the, the both schools have the same sort of distribution of test scores, but one block receive more school inflation randomly. So these is the kind of comparison that, we make.

Impact of School Score Inflation on Neighborhood Property Values

00:09:30 - we begin by documenting that the fact that this, school inflation is essentially as good as random in the sense that the markers who marked, these examinations that were taken in the end of primary schools did not know anything about the kids, was scripts they were marking. And so they did not selectively graded up, student sort of, sort of, well off students or students from a certain gender or, or ethnicity.

00:10:01 - as good as random from the perspective of the neighborhood. So, the extent of score inflation does not correlate with house prices measured before inflation, before this co inflation, started. and it does not correlate with local characteristics of, of neighborhoods. And so once we have established that, so the headline finding of, of our paper, is that neighborhoods characterized by high levels of co inflation experienced, large increase in our prices over time.

00:10:32 - by roughly 2%, in 2008, so after border lining was abolished. And the, the increase in our prices grew up to roughly 2.6% in 2019, which is the last year of our data, this number may not need much. So to put a, to put like sort of a, a quantity behind it, this amounts to roughly, 6,000 pounds in terms of house premium, which is a substantial premium that families were willing to pay to relocate towards these neighborhoods.

Impact of School Inflation on Neighborhood Demographics

00:11:06 - that I can discuss very quickly. So the, the, the second set of results is that we document that, school inflation generated an improvement, if I can use this word, in terms of demographics of neighborhoods in the sense the neighborhoods in the catchment areas, catchment areas of schools that receive higher levels of school inflation, Inc saw an increase in the number of, employed,

00:11:36 - and an increase in families with children and an individuals with, with, high level occupations or high levels of education. And this was interestingly mirrored in the changes in composition of local schools, which, saw an increase in, in, in, in the number of viability Students, enrolling there. And this ultimately mapped in an, in an improvement, in, in the test course of local children, as well in within the school, which is why,

00:12:08 - the expectations of these parents that were naturally formed were actually fulfilled by, by these schools. We actually got better, because of, square inflation. We can distinguish, between blocks that, was families who who reside in these blocks can access, more or less schools. So you can have residential blocks where families can access a certain number of schools and residential blocks where families can access more schools, meaning that they are, exposed

Impact of School Inflation on Neighborhood Dynamics

00:12:39 - And what we observe is that the, the, the price effects are larger in the, in the latter blocks, and also the, the effects in terms of, the test was, results for, for the children. So while we cannot definitely say that the evidence that that, that we have suggests that particularly in residential blocks where you have access to many schools, schools started to compete, for the new children went to the neighborhood because their families decided

00:13:10 - and on what viable can you compete if for a school by improving productivity and by improving student student achievement, which is what parents, cared about at the time that we published this paper, we could only observe, sense date only up to 2011. but, but we do see, as I also mentioned before, that neighbors exposed to, sorry, neighborhoods with schools that receive high levels of, of inflation also saw an, an improvement in terms of demographics.

00:13:41 - that we observe are changes in local economic activity. And so, in particular, we document that neighborhoods that that received more school inflation, saw an increase in the number of businesses. And interestingly, because we can distinguish the type of business, we can also observe that the type of business that we observed start essentially popping up in these neighborhoods are exactly the businesses that cater for the needs of, the incoming houses. So for instance, we observe an, an, an increasing number of,

Impact of Score Inflation on Local Businesses and Schools

00:14:13 - and grocery stores, which are actually increasing over time, and then persist up to 2015, which is the last year in which we observed business data for, for this project. And the increase is roughly of 7%. So it's a sizable increase. we also observed, an, an increase in the number of small shops such as, small grocery stores or wool stores, or small shops such as butchers and fish mongers. but these changes come about more slowly.

00:14:46 - and then they increase more in, in, in the long run, as if you had a, one way to see this is that you might have sort of large chains or, sort of traditional grocery stores that respond more quickly, to these, to the movements of houses across neighborhoods, whereas smaller shops, do respond but more slowly. So, so their changes even we can observe that we can still observe them today. but it came about more slowly.

00:15:18 - I look at, how public housing degenerations, for instance, have affected, the outcomes of children in local neighborhoods, which is still related to gentrification and somewhat a very much related, topic. and I think, this is very much related to one point that we make in the paper, which is the fact that this co inflation, seemed to have actually benefited to some extent local children because the productivity of local schools was raised,

Impact of Score Inflation on Neighborhood Dynamics and Housing Affordability

00:15:51 - to, to the score inflation. and so there, there's a very interesting literature developing, where I've also contributed with this paper on public housing, where, researchers are trying to understand, what are effects for, incumbent residents when their neighborhoods experiences an inflow of more aff households. So how do the, the outcomes of their, of local children who stay there, change, but also outcomes of, of adults, change.

00:16:21 - very interesting area for research. and the other interesting point that, that, that I believe we make, in the paper, is that hopefully, I, I, I managed to convey the fact that this co inflation also led to substantial increase in house prices. And so there is, a serious risk that particularly low income families, will be priced out of these neighborhoods. And so there is a large literature in economics, for instance, all the paper by rash, chatty and, and, and,

00:17:21 - that have documented the neighborhoods matter, and therefore, systems where you have these, these, boundary based admission to schools and that are characterized by score inflation might ultimately lead to low income families being priced out of good neighborhoods. And so understanding what happens to families that are potentially displaced because of either institutional features or score inflation, I believe will be super important, in the future.

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