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Jack Devine builds a vivid and complex mosaic that illustrates how Russia has employed intelligence activities to undermine our democracy throughout modern history and lay the groundwork for this invasion.

Image courtesy of interviewee. February 21, 2024

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In a candid discussion about his career, the speaker reflects on his undercover work in the CIA and the gradual transition to becoming a public figure through writing books. He emphasizes the importance of human intelligence, particularly in espionage, citing that many significant historical events could have benefitted from better intelligence gathering. He highlights his personal experiences in various high-stakes situations, including operations in Chile and during the Iran-Contra affair, sharing insights into the complexities of espionage and covert actions.

The discussion also addresses current geopolitical issues, stressing the need for reliable human intelligence as a counter to modern threats, such as the conflict in Ukraine and the intelligence failures preceding the Hamas attack. The speaker critiques the over-reliance on technology in the intelligence community, advocating for a balance between human sources and technological tools.

He discusses Vladimir Putin's approach to leadership and intelligence, suggesting that he operates with a mix of spy tactics and mafia-like strategies, reinforcing the need for a nuanced understanding of contemporary threats. The speaker concludes that his books serve as a valuable resource for those seeking to grasp the intricacies of intelligence work and its implications for global security.

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I would first say that,

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for all my career I was undercover.

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Coming out and even talking,

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or even mentioning my career was quite a step.

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Writing a book that took, a number of years to get used

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to the fact that I was in the public.

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And that came about by a couple interviews in the press.

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And then I got tired of hearing people,

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provide history about events in which I

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was directly involved in.

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And I thought, I think for history's sake,

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that'd be worthwhile to put my 2 cents in.

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And that might be a bit egocentric,

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but I'm delighted that I did it.

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I also don't know school teacher.

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And, there's messages in both books that I did.

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Good Hunting and Spy Masters Prism.

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One of the key messages is how do you use the covert action,

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the action part, the James Bond part of the CIA.

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And I don't think it's well understood.

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So I have different audiences.

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The general reader, I hope, finds it interesting

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to read about spy cases and how it really works,

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but it's also meant to educate people

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that are either gonna be in policy positions

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or spy operations, espionage operations anywhere.

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And so, a friend of mine said,

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why don't, why don't you write a book?

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And he introduced me to a great publisher, Sarah Cretin.

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And next thing you know, I started writing

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and learned a lot.

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I mean, I've written thousands of cables,

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but writing a book is quite a different, a different story.

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It was easier. The second book,

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which is Spymaster Prism in the sense

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that I've been through that experience.

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But Spymasters Prism required a lot more,

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research fact finding to make sure I didn't make a mistake.

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There's two things about my career

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that I think readers would like to know.

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Um, when I joined the agency,

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I entered into the operational side.

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That's the espionage spying side.

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Now, by the way, I should tell people,

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professionals don't refer to themselves as spies,

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but if you want to communicate the outside world,

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either they're either agent, case officers or managers,

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but rarely spies.

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So I get into the operational side of it,

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and 95% of the people in the operational side,

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would prefer to do espionage.

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Uh, and that's true of my case.

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I enjoyed espionage, but I ran into also

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where the action was and whether it was in Chile when II was

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overthrown or the Iran Contra affair

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or leading the program to get drive the Russians out

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of Afghanistan, counter-narcotics, Escobar.

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Um, all of those became public events.

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So I could write about it, could talk about it.

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But having said that, you know, it, it wasn't meant

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to be sit to sit down.

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It took me a long time to do this.

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And I'd help from one of the folks in my office

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who did a great job in Victoria, who did a great job in,

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researching, research in the book.

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So I had to get my facts right,

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even though I was a participant, I actually was on the spot.

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It's interesting how your mind works

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and sometimes you think it was, you were talking

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to one person, turns out you were talking to another.

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So I had, great, great support from Victoria and,

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and getting the facts right.

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And, we interviewed a lot of people,

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which is the second part of a good book.

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Uh, first time it was 80 people.

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Second time it was probably, less

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because I was relying more on public records.

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But I hadn't talked to a lot of people to make sure

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that perceptions were right.

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I'm very comfortable with the facts.

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I mean, so this is a book that's not, it has my opinions

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for sure, more, I'd like to say my judgments,

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but it is riddled with facts.

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So fact checkers can have a field day with it,

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but I think I'm pretty comfortable

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that I've got, I've got it right.

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Let's take it in different, different pieces.

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So, I I would say, you know, the first thing,

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as I said, you know, people don't refer to 'em as spies,

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but for communications purposes, you have to use it.

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So I was what you would call a spy master.

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In other words, the spy is the person who's in the Kremlin

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or in the, Chinese, foreign ministry

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embassy of Iran.

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Those nationals who volunteer the workforce,

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they're the spies who handles 'em the spy masters.

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So that's the person that meets them in the, the middle

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of the night or, you know, clandestinely

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or with high communications.

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They're the spy, the spy masters.

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They, they, they run the cases, they make sure

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that the source is safe and and so on.

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And then through my career,

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I served in seven foreign countries, five of them.

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I was the chief. So I was the chief spy

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master in post countries.

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And fast forward to near the end of my career, I ended up,

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being in charge of all spy masters

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and s spies around the world.

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So, that's the, that's the structure of it.

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Why is it so important? I think this is a keen topic today.

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Uh, if you look at Ukraine

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or you look at, what took place,

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the tragic assault in Israel, I'm an advocate

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of human intelligence.

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That means spies.

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And what I, I wrote a couple major op-eds in the past

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year in the Wall Street Journal.

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The last one was about the intelligence failure of the US

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and the Israelis and the bottom line.

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And there's a number of points

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that we could make in a longer discussion,

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but they weren't, they didn't have enough spies.

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The old fashioned human way of, of collecting.

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And how does that show in, in the case of the Hamas attack,

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there had to be 200 people who had a good indication

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of what was coming down.

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It was too big about operation. It wasn't a simple one.

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We've all in the intelligence community around,

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in all countries around the world

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have heavily invested in technology.

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And it's a great tool, and I encourage everyone in the

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business to continue to grow that part.

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But you're not supposed to leave the human part aside.

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If we had one, one good source there,

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the Israelis might have been able to get in front of it.

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We also had the intelligence community,

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American intelligence community was asked,

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well, is Iran in it?

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Their answer was, we don't have

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enough evidence at this point.

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Well, that's saying with all your technology,

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you didn't have a human source.

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So having answers there changes history.

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But if you go back into my book, I give examples of,

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you know, you start with the missile crisis in Cuba

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where we almost went, it was probably the closest we ever

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got to a world war with the Russians.

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The way it was prevented was by satellite photography taken

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by the CIA, that the missiles were being planted in Cuba,

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and we were able to, to get in, get in front of it.

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Um, some of the key spies that I mentioned in the book,

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and you mentioned them, but Popwell, Penski, broski,

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all of these spies

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provided critical information at, at, at key key times.

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Either it was about military, programs and weaponry

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or policy decisions.

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If you look at Ukraine today, what's really interesting,

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his intelligence community did an excellent job.

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They said Putin is invading unequivocally.

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And I believe that was heavily reliant on technology.

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What, where there was a shortfall was

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how good was the Russian army.

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And I don't think we would've been better

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with more human spies

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because I think the West was anticipating the quick collapse

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of Ukraine, and that didn't happen.

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And so you can see intelligence strengths

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and intelligence weaknesses, and,

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and the intelligence community needs to continually

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calibrate and recalibrate.

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One of the things I'd mentioned about spy Mr.

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Prison, I'm very proud of it.

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If, if you go back

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and your readers go in there, you'll see

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that had I was in KF in 2018, I read a great deal

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or pointedly about the threat that Russian posed

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and that Putin was gonna make a big mistake

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if he went into, Ukraine.

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He were just gonna underestimate the pushback

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and that Keith would become the new Berlin of,

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of the new struggle with the, the newest struggle,

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with Russia.

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So, you know, intelligence is, is critically important and,

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and, and sorting and sorted these things out.

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When I talked to some of my old friends at the agency

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or in the policy world,

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they all said the same thing when I wrote the book,

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why are you writing a book about Russia?

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It's all about China.

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And the truth of the matter is never all about a country if

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you're an intelligence business.

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And what I said to 'em is, yes, we're, we're in a struggle,

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long-term struggle, for superiority,

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if you are the balance of power with China,

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but Russia's the one that's aggressive all around the world,

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They're the one we're most likely

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to end up arm in, arm against.

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So you better make sure that you've got your allocation

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of resources commensurate with that.

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And not too long

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before the war, you know, our budget had dropped from,

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on Russia from the whole entire US government budget

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as relates to intelligence dropped from 70

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to 20%, something like that.

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That was a disproportionate amount.

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So I think one of the books for people

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that wanna get a grasp over the history of Russia,

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it's relentless struggle with this, an unending,

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they have never stopped, the talking to us.

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So you mentioned, Comrad Jay, the,

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the number two person in the KG B in New York, who defected.

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And how important was that when he defected in 2004?

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He said, you know, when I, when I joined the KG B,

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the number one target was the us.

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Number two was nato, number three was China.

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Well, when I left in 2004, the number one target was the us.

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Number two was nato. And number three, China.

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Other is, it is nothing that KGB is consistent and,

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and focuses on on, they have their priorities.

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So I think a lot of Americans are quite naive

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because the communist party isn't empowered

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and all this, they don't understand really

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Putin at its core.

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And I think I tried to do that in the book,

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and you, you're probably gonna ask me about him at some

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point, but I,

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I think he represents a serious threat and an opportunity.

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The opportunity is in that he has made a big mistake

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moving into, into Ukraine.

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And I think over the long term, he will regret that

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and probably leave to his leaving office at some point.

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I am not saying in the next 56 or 500 days.

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So as I said, I think they underweighted it.

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This book was ahead of its time.

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I probably should have published it several months later

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when it started.

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But I'm happy that I was in front of the curve

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and stand by what I said in the book.

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Most people that look at Russia realize that

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probably from 1917, we were looked at as an adversary,

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but certainly in the thirties, the communists were trying

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to penetrate the United States.

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There was a lot of concern about it,

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it hit its peak in fifties.

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But I would say the Cold War was when

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the issue was really joined.

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1947, that's the year that CIA was formed.

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Uh, it had, and,

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and predecessors in the OSS, the office teaching services

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during World War ii, but that was disbanded.

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We did not have a major intelligence service.

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We had a couple small time operations,

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but we built a new intelligence business in 47.

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And that's when the, the battle started.

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And my view is, even though the Communist party fell,

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the Soviet Union fell apart.

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I happened to be, I happened to be,

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and it's quite ironic, I I happened

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to be in Moscow two months before the collapse.

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So I was there to watch it, watch it after so many years.

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I was a guest at Kremlin, which was, we could talk about

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that someday, but for the person who was in charge of

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the struggle in Afghanistan, stingers win,

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famous Charlie Wilson's war, which it wasn't Charlie's,

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but Charlie played a big part in it.

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The war, as I said, for someone like that to be invited

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to the, the KGB headquarters, it was really,

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a mind blowing experience.

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But for them, what I did was business.

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You know, they didn't, they attacked us in different places.

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And so, but it was business.

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So I think they looked at me differently

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because I went there as a representative

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of Counter Narcotics at a time when US Government wanted

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to warm up its relations

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with the intelligence community only community.

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And the only thing we could talk about was narcotics.

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So I was invited out there, so I, I watched the struggle.

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You, you talked about, the American election 2016,

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that in of itself, I go into this in book,

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it became very politicized.

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And I say we worried about collusion

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between Trump and so on.

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What the big issue, the one that still sticks of my call,

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is for many, many years, the Russians

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and, intelligence Road

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and ours had a silent agreement, if you will.

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It's called the Moscow Rules.

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That meant, we would not meddle inside their country,

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they would not meddle inside ours in the political life

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of their country that we could battle.

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We could face each other down even in armed

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conflict, but we were not gonna meddle inside.

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And that there was a couple little exceptions here in the

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States, but not to speak of, I was flabbergasted when I saw

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that the Russians actually, you know, hundreds

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and hundreds of Facebook and trolls

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and were working in our election.

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It was in a real front to the process with it,

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and I believe it continues to be a major problem.

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The whole issue of disinformation, how it's used

13:56.455 --> 13:57.795
and how it's used against it.

13:57.815 --> 13:59.835
So I went, I go into this in the book at,

13:59.935 --> 14:01.475
at, at some length.

14:01.695 --> 14:05.355
So it wasn't so much I leave politics out

14:05.355 --> 14:07.475
of just about everything I do it.

14:07.615 --> 14:08.955
The, the point

14:08.955 --> 14:11.115
that I really thought people should be focused on,

14:11.375 --> 14:12.915
the Russians changed their game plan.

14:13.385 --> 14:14.515
What are we gonna do about it?

14:14.735 --> 14:16.955
Now, they did it in every election

14:16.955 --> 14:18.235
since they're doing it in Europe.

14:18.985 --> 14:21.035
This is part of their new strategy,

14:21.045 --> 14:23.755
which I go into the book about the hybrid warfare

14:24.005 --> 14:25.955
where they use social media.

14:27.435 --> 14:30.775
And I think we should, I don't wanna babble on,

14:30.835 --> 14:33.095
but we should come back to that as a theme

14:33.095 --> 14:34.815
because there's a major difference between

14:34.875 --> 14:37.375
how Americans look at that and how Russians look at.

14:37.505 --> 14:41.645
First thing is people need to understand,

14:42.425 --> 14:45.365
the basics that in CIA you have an operational director,

14:45.425 --> 14:47.445
it has a group that collect intelligence.

14:47.625 --> 14:48.685
We go out and have spies,

14:49.345 --> 14:52.245
counterintelligence finding spies like Rick Ames

14:52.345 --> 14:56.935
and inside the CI who I knew personally and Robert Hansen

14:56.955 --> 14:58.415
and the FBI.

14:59.505 --> 15:02.005
And then it has a major portion,

15:02.265 --> 15:03.965
and this is on just the operational side.

15:03.965 --> 15:05.445
You have analysis and te science

15:05.585 --> 15:07.085
and digital intelligence stuff.

15:07.085 --> 15:09.825
But the other big part is covert action

15:10.045 --> 15:12.305
that's making things happen around the world.

15:12.305 --> 15:15.115
There's just one clause in the,

15:15.515 --> 15:17.155
national Security Act that set up the cia.

15:17.255 --> 15:20.595
It says, carry out those special activities as directed

15:20.595 --> 15:21.635
by the President of the United States.

15:22.465 --> 15:24.565
And that's the authority where the types

15:24.565 --> 15:27.685
of things you see in the movies, the,

15:28.505 --> 15:30.885
the action parts, the Jane Vaughan instead

15:30.885 --> 15:34.525
of the George Smileys, that's called covert action.

15:34.705 --> 15:39.525
And today, it's always used with it, a plausible denial.

15:39.745 --> 15:42.685
In other words, you, you have cover so that you can say

15:42.685 --> 15:43.925
to the world, I didn't do that.

15:45.075 --> 15:48.855
And more recently, Tom Snyder at Yale says, well,

15:48.855 --> 15:50.335
there's implausible denial.

15:50.355 --> 15:51.895
And that is, you deny it,

15:52.315 --> 15:54.415
but it's not, it's implausible that,

15:54.725 --> 15:56.375
that your denial is correct.

15:57.195 --> 16:01.535
So, and again, I don't, we we could do it separately,

16:01.535 --> 16:03.455
but there are rules of the game that I think need

16:03.455 --> 16:05.455
to be understood in the overt action.

16:06.235 --> 16:09.415
But going just to, to the disinformation, to your point,

16:10.155 --> 16:12.215
the Russians are using it very vigorously

16:12.235 --> 16:14.775
and trying to undermine the democracy and, and,

16:14.775 --> 16:16.015
and our allies around the world.

16:16.045 --> 16:17.175
It's not just the United States.

16:17.175 --> 16:21.905
They're stirring up, co activity in, in parts

16:21.905 --> 16:23.265
of this world and Africa

16:23.565 --> 16:27.105
and trying to, you know, describe us as colonialist

16:27.205 --> 16:28.385
and and so on.

16:28.405 --> 16:30.545
And the Ukraine is a classic example of

16:30.545 --> 16:32.225
where they go in and distort things.

16:32.325 --> 16:34.945
If you remember, the Malaysian airline was shot down,

16:35.775 --> 16:36.915
17.

16:37.505 --> 16:40.035
They came up with 10 different reasons why it was anybody

16:40.055 --> 16:43.035
but them, you know, and that's implausible.

16:43.135 --> 16:45.715
Now, it was very clearly their rocket that did it,

16:46.055 --> 16:47.075
but they had thrown out

16:47.095 --> 16:49.355
so much nonsense in the world that confused the world.

16:49.655 --> 16:52.475
Hitler on Ukraine is, we're fighting the Nazis.

16:52.475 --> 16:55.635
Well, the Nazis been gone for, you know, since 1945.

16:56.375 --> 16:59.435
So how you muddle the water. So that's it.

17:00.175 --> 17:02.075
Now, if you look at the United States,

17:02.335 --> 17:05.275
and first of all, one thing the readers need to understand,

17:05.275 --> 17:06.595
and I go into this in the book,

17:06.615 --> 17:09.795
and that is CIA doesn't do this on his own.

17:09.975 --> 17:13.115
No matter what you see in the movie, covert action has

17:13.115 --> 17:14.795
to be approved by the president of the United States

17:15.375 --> 17:17.155
and brief the Congress in 72 hours.

17:17.425 --> 17:19.435
Autocrats do not have any of those regulations.

17:19.935 --> 17:22.115
So when you see the CIAs doing something,

17:22.195 --> 17:23.955
I know no example, I was the head of the group.

17:24.195 --> 17:25.555
I looked back through years

17:25.895 --> 17:28.835
and I've watched it carefully since there is no operation,

17:28.835 --> 17:31.155
you can point to where the CIA did not

17:31.155 --> 17:32.275
have approval of the president.

17:32.495 --> 17:35.115
So that's, that's a fundamental difference.

17:35.465 --> 17:39.145
What, how are we using the social media?

17:39.405 --> 17:41.305
How are we using this information?

17:42.365 --> 17:45.465
And this is the part that I think we have to stop and pause

17:45.465 --> 17:47.185
because the Russians are pounding us

17:47.185 --> 17:48.745
around head and shoulders on this.

17:49.795 --> 17:51.055
During the Cold War,

17:51.795 --> 17:53.615
we really didn't do a lot of this information.

17:53.715 --> 17:56.295
We had a great product, America, right, America,

17:56.295 --> 17:57.815
freedom against the Communists

17:57.835 --> 17:59.735
and look at the communist model.

18:00.845 --> 18:04.225
Um, and the communists have been at disinformation since the

18:04.225 --> 18:05.825
day where the farm, it's a big part of it.

18:05.885 --> 18:07.985
If you, you know, read Animal Farm

18:08.165 --> 18:12.305
and the book by George, Orwell about how

18:12.825 --> 18:17.065
dictators talk, you, you see that, you know, it's embedded

18:17.095 --> 18:18.825
with this misinformation.

18:19.085 --> 18:21.945
But we usually did white, white propaganda,

18:21.945 --> 18:23.345
which is we're getting out the facts.

18:24.185 --> 18:27.215
I don't know if we can keep up with the social media

18:27.755 --> 18:29.295
and counter this as quickly.

18:29.475 --> 18:31.535
And I, I think this is a policy decision.

18:32.525 --> 18:36.305
And do we start meddling inside the Soviet Union,

18:36.375 --> 18:38.505
even though Putin's shown poor judgment

18:38.685 --> 18:40.345
and Chinese are doing this as well,

18:40.345 --> 18:42.945
and I, the Chinese should have a better judgment on this.

18:43.535 --> 18:44.665
They have not been involved

18:44.755 --> 18:47.465
until very recently disinformation as far

18:47.465 --> 18:48.825
as the United States is concerned.

18:49.245 --> 18:51.225
But we have a problem if these,

18:51.325 --> 18:53.825
if they're actively undermining, the Iranians are in this

18:53.845 --> 18:56.905
as well, undermining our, our country.

18:57.765 --> 18:59.105
Um, what do we do?

18:59.205 --> 19:00.825
And I think this is a policy issue

19:00.825 --> 19:04.715
and all of this, I said I, I go into detail,

19:04.855 --> 19:07.795
but I am also now addressing it in various

19:07.955 --> 19:09.515
podcasts I do, or op-eds.

19:09.695 --> 19:13.115
I'm gonna do a podcast this week on our own system about

19:13.115 --> 19:16.435
this information because I think we need more clarity

19:17.175 --> 19:18.995
and our thinking about, well, I think

19:18.995 --> 19:20.995
what he understood in other words, as opposed

19:20.995 --> 19:23.795
to he understood the power of intelligence, the power

19:23.795 --> 19:26.915
of information, that special activity capability,

19:27.095 --> 19:28.315
how you make things happen.

19:28.415 --> 19:31.615
How so? He was very quick

19:31.615 --> 19:33.615
to harness all the intelligence services

19:33.665 --> 19:34.735
after he came to power.

19:35.235 --> 19:37.975
And he was the head of not only of being a KGB officer,

19:38.075 --> 19:40.935
but he was the head of what the call the F-B-I-F-S-B

19:42.135 --> 19:44.315
and their activities are more blended than ours.

19:44.465 --> 19:46.955
There's clear demarcation between the FBI

19:46.955 --> 19:49.235
and CI, not so much in, in Russia.

19:49.495 --> 19:50.955
So he understood intelligence,

19:50.955 --> 19:53.115
he understood the collection organization of it

19:53.135 --> 19:54.235
and the strength of events.

19:55.235 --> 19:57.735
But there's another part of the intelligence world

19:57.735 --> 20:00.015
where I don't think he paid much attention to

20:00.015 --> 20:02.215
because he was coming out of the communist world.

20:02.315 --> 20:03.935
If you walk the CIA, you have them

20:04.985 --> 20:08.085
etched in the wall in marble, the quote from the Bible,

20:08.185 --> 20:10.085
you should know the truth and they'll set you free.

20:10.275 --> 20:13.005
It's a very good mantra for people of the CIA a

20:13.005 --> 20:15.525
and intelligent that is forget the bs,

20:15.835 --> 20:17.525
your job here is just get the facts.

20:18.655 --> 20:22.835
And I'm not, and look at things coldly and objectively,

20:23.015 --> 20:27.785
and I'm not sure that part of the spy master mission

20:28.525 --> 20:29.785
is as clear in its head.

20:30.635 --> 20:32.255
The other thing where I have evolved

20:32.845 --> 20:35.775
even further from the book, the, in the book I talked,

20:36.135 --> 20:39.095
I talked about the spy master president,

20:39.475 --> 20:43.095
but I would say today as I watch how he behaves,

20:43.335 --> 20:46.295
I mean name maybe Stalin with an exception,

20:46.295 --> 20:49.435
but even there it would be uni, the number of people

20:49.435 --> 20:51.675
that have been assassinated by the Russian regime

20:52.015 --> 20:55.405
and, you know, the,

20:56.605 --> 20:58.235
ProGo blown out of the sky.

20:58.635 --> 21:02.955
I mean, I think you have to look at Putin

21:03.135 --> 21:05.635
as half spy mass there, half Mafia do.

21:05.815 --> 21:09.875
And I I say that, not so much in, not in jest really.

21:10.485 --> 21:12.515
There was an article, I believe it was the New York Times,

21:13.095 --> 21:16.415
an article by a fellow who,

21:17.665 --> 21:20.285
was a linguist, and he studied Putin's speeches

21:20.385 --> 21:23.285
and he said, if you read them, it's like Don car, car.

21:23.945 --> 21:25.725
It is like, he talks like what?

21:26.425 --> 21:28.445
But I'm more concerned than he thinks like that.

21:28.505 --> 21:32.435
So when you're trying to counterpoint with him, you know,

21:32.435 --> 21:35.915
you're not sitting across from a, a great chess player.

21:36.805 --> 21:39.745
You're someone who knows how chess hook pieces move.

21:40.325 --> 21:43.065
But you're really sitting across the table from a,

21:43.575 --> 21:45.145
from a mafia, Donna.

21:45.165 --> 21:46.985
And you, you need to understand that.

21:47.205 --> 21:49.785
And, this isn't somebody you're gonna charm with.

21:49.785 --> 21:53.505
Your, your, your personality. You, you've gotta understand.

21:53.805 --> 21:55.305
And when, when things get tough,

21:56.185 --> 21:57.805
his response is to go to the mattress.

21:58.945 --> 22:01.325
Our response most often is, well,

22:01.325 --> 22:02.685
let's talk about it somewhat.

22:02.745 --> 22:05.605
So I think these are important lessons that will emerge in,

22:06.355 --> 22:10.255
in the book, and I hope the readers, find it as,

22:10.515 --> 22:11.655
worthwhile.

22:12.035 --> 22:13.775
And particularly if you're following the subject,

22:13.975 --> 22:15.655
I think it's terribly relevant today.

22:17.035 --> 22:20.295
And it may be, as my friend said, maybe it was premature,

22:20.295 --> 22:22.295
should be China, but I'm so glad I wrote it

22:22.295 --> 22:24.295
because I think we need to understand both countries.

22:24.755 --> 22:27.415
But right now we're engaged with real hand wrestling

22:27.415 --> 22:28.495
with Putin.

22:28.615 --> 22:31.155
I think, I think we need, they,

22:31.155 --> 22:34.475
people can benefit from reading or rereading my book.

22:34.475 --> 22:35.315
If I could be a little.

Reflections on a Covert Career

00:00:00 - I would first say that, for all my career I was undercover. Coming out and even talking, or even mentioning my career was quite a step. Writing a book that took, a number of years to get used to the fact that I was in the public. And that came about by a couple interviews in the press. And then I got tired of hearing people, provide history about events in which I was directly involved in. And I thought, I think for history's sake, that'd be worthwhile to put my 2 cents in. And that might be a bit egocentric,
00:00:34 - I also don't know school teacher. And, there's messages in both books that I did. Good Hunting and Spy Masters Prism. One of the key messages is how do you use the covert action, the action part, the James Bond part of the CIA. And I don't think it's well understood. So I have different audiences. The general reader, I hope, finds it interesting to read about spy cases and how it really works, but it's also meant to educate people that are either gonna be in policy positions or spy operations, espionage operations anywhere.
00:01:11 - why don't, why don't you write a book? And he introduced me to a great publisher, Sarah Cretin. And next thing you know, I started writing and learned a lot. I mean, I've written thousands of cables, but writing a book is quite a different, a different story. It was easier. The second book, which is Spymaster Prism in the sense that I've been through that experience. But Spymasters Prism required a lot more, research fact finding to make sure I didn't make a mistake.
00:01:40 - that I think readers would like to know. when I joined the agency, I entered into the operational side. That's the espionage spying side. Now, by the way, I should tell people, professionals don't refer to themselves as spies, but if you want to communicate the outside world, either they're either agent, case officers or managers, but rarely spies. So I get into the operational side of it, and 95% of the people in the operational side, would prefer to do espionage.
00:02:11 - I enjoyed espionage, but I ran into also where the action was and whether it was in Chile when II was overthrown or the Iran Contra affair or leading the program to get drive the Russians out of Afghanistan, counter-narcotics, Escobar. all of those became public events. So I could write about it, could talk about it. But having said that, you know, it, it wasn't meant to be sit to sit down. It took me a long time to do this. And I'd help from one of the folks in my office
00:02:47 - researching, research in the book. So I had to get my facts right, even though I was a participant, I actually was on the spot. It's interesting how your mind works and sometimes you think it was, you were talking to one person, turns out you were talking to another. So I had, great, great support from Victoria and, and getting the facts right. And, we interviewed a lot of people, which is the second part of a good book.

Insights on Human Intelligence and Spymasters

00:03:14 - Second time it was probably, less because I was relying more on public records. But I hadn't talked to a lot of people to make sure that perceptions were right. I'm very comfortable with the facts. I mean, so this is a book that's not, it has my opinions for sure, more, I'd like to say my judgments, but it is riddled with facts. So fact checkers can have a field day with it, but I think I'm pretty comfortable that I've got, I've got it right. Let's take it in different, different pieces.
00:03:48 - as I said, you know, people don't refer to 'em as spies, but for communications purposes, you have to use it. So I was what you would call a spy master. In other words, the spy is the person who's in the Kremlin or in the, Chinese, foreign ministry embassy of Iran. Those nationals who volunteer the workforce, they're the spies who handles 'em the spy masters.
00:04:19 - of the night or, you know, clandestinely or with high communications. They're the spy, the spy masters. They, they, they run the cases, they make sure that the source is safe and and so on. And then through my career, I served in seven foreign countries, five of them. I was the chief. So I was the chief spy master in post countries. And fast forward to near the end of my career, I ended up, being in charge of all spy masters
00:04:49 - So, that's the, that's the structure of it. Why is it so important? I think this is a keen topic today. if you look at Ukraine or you look at, what took place, the tragic assault in Israel, I'm an advocate of human intelligence. That means spies. And what I, I wrote a couple major op-eds in the past year in the Wall Street Journal. The last one was about the intelligence failure of the US
00:05:20 - And there's a number of points that we could make in a longer discussion, but they weren't, they didn't have enough spies. The old fashioned human way of, of collecting. And how does that show in, in the case of the Hamas attack, there had to be 200 people who had a good indication of what was coming down. It was too big about operation. It wasn't a simple one. We've all in the intelligence community around, in all countries around the world have heavily invested in technology.
00:05:52 - business to continue to grow that part. But you're not supposed to leave the human part aside. If we had one, one good source there, the Israelis might have been able to get in front of it. We also had the intelligence community, American intelligence community was asked, well, is Iran in it? Their answer was, we don't have enough evidence at this point. Well, that's saying with all your technology, you didn't have a human source.

Intelligence Insights: Lessons from History

00:06:23 - But if you go back into my book, I give examples of, you know, you start with the missile crisis in Cuba where we almost went, it was probably the closest we ever got to a world war with the Russians. The way it was prevented was by satellite photography taken by the CIA, that the missiles were being planted in Cuba, and we were able to, to get in, get in front of it. some of the key spies that I mentioned in the book, and you mentioned them, but Popwell, Penski, broski,
00:06:55 - provided critical information at, at, at key key times. Either it was about military, programs and weaponry or policy decisions. If you look at Ukraine today, what's really interesting, his intelligence community did an excellent job. They said Putin is invading unequivocally. And I believe that was heavily reliant on technology. What, where there was a shortfall was how good was the Russian army. And I don't think we would've been better
00:07:27 - because I think the West was anticipating the quick collapse of Ukraine, and that didn't happen. And so you can see intelligence strengths and intelligence weaknesses, and, and the intelligence community needs to continually calibrate and recalibrate. One of the things I'd mentioned about spy Mr. Prison, I'm very proud of it. If, if you go back and your readers go in there, you'll see that had I was in KF in 2018, I read a great deal or pointedly about the threat that Russian posed
00:08:02 - if he went into, Ukraine. He were just gonna underestimate the pushback and that Keith would become the new Berlin of, of the new struggle with the, the newest struggle, with Russia. So, you know, intelligence is, is critically important and, and, and sorting and sorted these things out. When I talked to some of my old friends at the agency
00:08:31 - they all said the same thing when I wrote the book, why are you writing a book about Russia? It's all about China. And the truth of the matter is never all about a country if you're an intelligence business. And what I said to 'em is, yes, we're, we're in a struggle, long-term struggle, for superiority, if you are the balance of power with China, but Russia's the one that's aggressive all around the world, They're the one we're most likely to end up arm in, arm against. So you better make sure that you've got your allocation
00:09:04 - And not too long before the war, you know, our budget had dropped from, on Russia from the whole entire US government budget as relates to intelligence dropped from 70 to 20%, something like that. That was a disproportionate amount. So I think one of the books for people that wanna get a grasp over the history of Russia, it's relentless struggle with this, an unending, they have never stopped, the talking to us. So you mentioned, Comrad Jay, the,

KGB Priorities and the Threat of Putin

00:09:37 - And how important was that when he defected in 2004? He said, you know, when I, when I joined the KG B, the number one target was the us. Number two was nato, number three was China. Well, when I left in 2004, the number one target was the us. Number two was nato. And number three, China. Other is, it is nothing that KGB is consistent and, and focuses on on, they have their priorities.
00:10:10 - because the communist party isn't empowered and all this, they don't understand really Putin at its core. And I think I tried to do that in the book, and you, you're probably gonna ask me about him at some point, but I, I think he represents a serious threat and an opportunity. The opportunity is in that he has made a big mistake moving into, into Ukraine. And I think over the long term, he will regret that
00:10:40 - I am not saying in the next 56 or 500 days. So as I said, I think they underweighted it. This book was ahead of its time. I probably should have published it several months later when it started. But I'm happy that I was in front of the curve and stand by what I said in the book. Most people that look at Russia realize that probably from 1917, we were looked at as an adversary, but certainly in the thirties, the communists were trying to penetrate the United States.
00:11:09 - it hit its peak in fifties. But I would say the Cold War was when the issue was really joined. 1947, that's the year that CIA was formed. it had, and, and predecessors in the OSS, the office teaching services during World War ii, but that was disbanded. We did not have a major intelligence service. We had a couple small time operations, but we built a new intelligence business in 47.
00:11:41 - And my view is, even though the Communist party fell, the Soviet Union fell apart. I happened to be, I happened to be, and it's quite ironic, I I happened to be in Moscow two months before the collapse. So I was there to watch it, watch it after so many years. I was a guest at Kremlin, which was, we could talk about that someday, but for the person who was in charge of the struggle in Afghanistan, stingers win, famous Charlie Wilson's war, which it wasn't Charlie's,
00:12:11 - The war, as I said, for someone like that to be invited to the, the KGB headquarters, it was really, a mind blowing experience. But for them, what I did was business. You know, they didn't, they attacked us in different places. And so, but it was business. So I think they looked at me differently because I went there as a representative of Counter Narcotics at a time when US Government wanted to warm up its relations with the intelligence community only community. And the only thing we could talk about was narcotics.

Russia's Influence in American Elections

00:12:45 - You, you talked about, the American election 2016, that in of itself, I go into this in book, it became very politicized. And I say we worried about collusion between Trump and so on. What the big issue, the one that still sticks of my call, is for many, many years, the Russians and, intelligence Road and ours had a silent agreement, if you will.
00:13:13 - That meant, we would not meddle inside their country, they would not meddle inside ours in the political life of their country that we could battle. We could face each other down even in armed conflict, but we were not gonna meddle inside. And that there was a couple little exceptions here in the States, but not to speak of, I was flabbergasted when I saw that the Russians actually, you know, hundreds and hundreds of Facebook and trolls
00:13:45 - It was in a real front to the process with it, and I believe it continues to be a major problem. The whole issue of disinformation, how it's used and how it's used against it. So I went, I go into this in the book at, at, at some length. So it wasn't so much I leave politics out of just about everything I do it. The, the point that I really thought people should be focused on, the Russians changed their game plan.
00:14:14 - Now, they did it in every election since they're doing it in Europe. This is part of their new strategy, which I go into the book about the hybrid warfare where they use social media. And I think we should, I don't wanna babble on, but we should come back to that as a theme because there's a major difference between how Americans look at that and how Russians look at. First thing is people need to understand, the basics that in CIA you have an operational director,
00:14:47 - We go out and have spies, counterintelligence finding spies like Rick Ames and inside the CI who I knew personally and Robert Hansen and the FBI. And then it has a major portion, and this is on just the operational side. You have analysis and te science and digital intelligence stuff. But the other big part is covert action that's making things happen around the world. There's just one clause in the,
00:15:17 - It says, carry out those special activities as directed by the President of the United States. And that's the authority where the types of things you see in the movies, the, the action parts, the Jane Vaughan instead of the George Smileys, that's called covert action. And today, it's always used with it, a plausible denial. In other words, you, you have cover so that you can say to the world, I didn't do that. And more recently, Tom Snyder at Yale says, well,

Disinformation Tactics and Intelligence Challenges

00:15:50 - And that is, you deny it, but it's not, it's implausible that, that your denial is correct. So, and again, I don't, we we could do it separately, but there are rules of the game that I think need to be understood in the overt action. But going just to, to the disinformation, to your point, the Russians are using it very vigorously and trying to undermine the democracy and, and, and our allies around the world. It's not just the United States. They're stirring up, co activity in, in parts
00:16:23 - and trying to, you know, describe us as colonialist and and so on. And the Ukraine is a classic example of where they go in and distort things. If you remember, the Malaysian airline was shot down, 17. They came up with 10 different reasons why it was anybody but them, you know, and that's implausible. Now, it was very clearly their rocket that did it, but they had thrown out so much nonsense in the world that confused the world. Hitler on Ukraine is, we're fighting the Nazis.
00:16:56 - So how you muddle the water. So that's it. Now, if you look at the United States, and first of all, one thing the readers need to understand, and I go into this in the book, and that is CIA doesn't do this on his own. No matter what you see in the movie, covert action has to be approved by the president of the United States and brief the Congress in 72 hours. Autocrats do not have any of those regulations. So when you see the CIAs doing something, I know no example, I was the head of the group.
00:17:25 - and I've watched it carefully since there is no operation, you can point to where the CIA did not have approval of the president. So that's, that's a fundamental difference. What, how are we using the social media? How are we using this information? And this is the part that I think we have to stop and pause because the Russians are pounding us around head and shoulders on this. During the Cold War, we really didn't do a lot of this information. We had a great product, America, right, America,
00:17:57 - and look at the communist model. and the communists have been at disinformation since the day where the farm, it's a big part of it. If you, you know, read Animal Farm and the book by George, Orwell about how dictators talk, you, you see that, you know, it's embedded with this misinformation. But we usually did white, white propaganda, which is we're getting out the facts. I don't know if we can keep up with the social media
00:18:29 - And I, I think this is a policy decision. And do we start meddling inside the Soviet Union, even though Putin's shown poor judgment and Chinese are doing this as well, and I, the Chinese should have a better judgment on this. They have not been involved until very recently disinformation as far as the United States is concerned. But we have a problem if these, if they're actively undermining, the Iranians are in this as well, undermining our, our country.

Understanding Putin: Intelligence and Strategic Missteps

00:18:59 - And I think this is a policy issue and all of this, I said I, I go into detail, but I am also now addressing it in various podcasts I do, or op-eds. I'm gonna do a podcast this week on our own system about this information because I think we need more clarity and our thinking about, well, I think what he understood in other words, as opposed to he understood the power of intelligence, the power of information, that special activity capability, how you make things happen.
00:19:31 - to harness all the intelligence services after he came to power. And he was the head of not only of being a KGB officer, but he was the head of what the call the F-B-I-F-S-B and their activities are more blended than ours. There's clear demarcation between the FBI and CI, not so much in, in Russia. So he understood intelligence, he understood the collection organization of it and the strength of events. But there's another part of the intelligence world where I don't think he paid much attention to
00:20:02 - If you walk the CIA, you have them etched in the wall in marble, the quote from the Bible, you should know the truth and they'll set you free. It's a very good mantra for people of the CIA a and intelligent that is forget the bs, your job here is just get the facts. And I'm not, and look at things coldly and objectively, and I'm not sure that part of the spy master mission is as clear in its head.
00:20:32 - even further from the book, the, in the book I talked, I talked about the spy master president, but I would say today as I watch how he behaves, I mean name maybe Stalin with an exception, but even there it would be uni, the number of people that have been assassinated by the Russian regime and, you know, the, ProGo blown out of the sky. I mean, I think you have to look at Putin
00:21:05 - And I I say that, not so much in, not in jest really. There was an article, I believe it was the New York Times, an article by a fellow who, was a linguist, and he studied Putin's speeches and he said, if you read them, it's like Don car, car. It is like, he talks like what? But I'm more concerned than he thinks like that. So when you're trying to counterpoint with him, you know, you're not sitting across from a, a great chess player.
00:21:40 - But you're really sitting across the table from a, from a mafia, Donna. And you, you need to understand that. And, this isn't somebody you're gonna charm with. Your, your, your personality. You, you've gotta understand. And when, when things get tough, his response is to go to the mattress. Our response most often is, well, let's talk about it somewhat. So I think these are important lessons that will emerge in, in the book, and I hope the readers, find it as,

Understanding Current Relations with China and Russia

00:22:34 - And particularly if you're following the subject, I think it's terribly relevant today. And it may be, as my friend said, maybe it was premature, should be China, but I'm so glad I wrote it because I think we need to understand both countries. But right now we're engaged with real hand wrestling with Putin. I think, I think we need, they, people can benefit from reading or rereading my book. If I could be a little.

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