Popular in Law

Human Rights Law

Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and Potential of Individualising a Systemic Problem

Max Planck Institute Anne Peters

Law

A statistical approach to law school citation rankings

University of Virginia Joshua Fischman

Constitutional Law

What is constitutional ideology?

University of Oxford Nick Barber

Civil Procedure Law

Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

University of Pennsylvania Sean Farhang

Law

Diversity and Social Mobility in the UK legal profession

Law Society I. Stephanie Boyce

Internet Law

The Law of AI for Good

University of San Diego Orly Lobel

Human Rights Law

Transforming Restorative Justice for Transitional Settings

University of Nottingham Kerry Clamp

Tyranny of the One

View more insights in Professional - Law - Constitutional Law

View more figures from University of San Diego

View the page of Laurence Claus

Read the Study

Next in Constitutional Law

Court-Packing in Context

Barry Cushman | University of Notre Dame

Taking Stock of Indigenous-State Treaty-Making in Australia: Opportunities and Challenges

Harry Hobbs | UNSW Sydney

Laurence Claus discusses the resilience of Swiss democracy’s plural executive and executive power sharing.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 22, 2024

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

This video video presents a compelling argument against the concentration of power in a single chief executive, using Switzerland's multi-person leadership model as a prime example. It discusses how having one leader can lead to tyranny by providing a path for charismatic individuals to amass loyal followings and wield significant control. The author identifies several dangers of a singular executive position, such as fostering an environment conducive to dictatorship, prioritizing personal ambition over collective governance, and creating gridlock while presenting tyranny as a possible solution.

In contrast, the Swiss model, which features a seven-member Federal Council, promotes shared power, inclusivity, and accountability. Decisions are made collectively, reducing the risk of personalism and enhancing stability within the democracy. The discussion touches upon the historical context of executive power debates in the United States and underscores the importance of diversity and representation within governance structures. This video video argues that decentralized leadership systems mitigate the risks associated with individual power consolidation, ultimately demonstrating that such models can effectively safeguard democratic processes.

Language:

Export as PDF

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.000 --> 00:04.485
The tyranny of the one returns our minds to an idea

00:04.745 --> 00:09.005
for protecting democracy that we have not much talked about

00:09.185 --> 00:12.055
for, over 200 years.

00:12.755 --> 00:16.935
And for almost all of that 200 years, one Nation Switzerland

00:17.595 --> 00:21.775
has, been governing itself according to that idea

00:22.435 --> 00:23.815
and has proven that it works,

00:23.815 --> 00:25.495
that it keeps democracy strong.

00:26.435 --> 00:30.485
And the idea is this don't have one person at the top,

00:31.415 --> 00:33.355
don't have one Chief executive.

00:33.935 --> 00:36.475
Our contemporary, contemporary literature on protecting

00:36.475 --> 00:40.875
democracy has grappled with most everything except

00:41.575 --> 00:45.115
the job that would be tyrants actually want.

00:46.185 --> 00:50.325
And we have so often seen that a tyrant can grow up

00:50.745 --> 00:53.565
and rise, rise to power inside a democracy

00:53.915 --> 00:57.845
through their ability to attract a mass following.

00:58.635 --> 01:01.725
Many people can become enthralled to a person.

01:02.865 --> 01:05.005
No one has ever been enthralled to a committee.

01:06.015 --> 01:08.155
So if we don't want one person at the top for life,

01:09.075 --> 01:12.215
how about just not having one person at the top at all?

01:13.375 --> 01:16.185
Here in the United States, we have not really

01:17.285 --> 01:20.225
con considered debated the question of how,

01:20.285 --> 01:21.345
how the executive ought

01:21.345 --> 01:25.425
to be structured since 1787 when we did have a real debate

01:25.425 --> 01:26.425
with Benjamin Franklin

01:27.125 --> 01:29.745
and many other leading founders arguing strongly

01:30.485 --> 01:32.665
for sharing the executive power,

01:33.205 --> 01:35.065
but only Switzerland really did it.

01:35.445 --> 01:39.985
And of the one explains why it's time for the rest of us

01:40.125 --> 01:43.185
to reconsider our one true leader models.

01:44.115 --> 01:46.105
Let's notice five ways

01:46.975 --> 01:50.545
that having one chief executive endangers democracy.

01:51.405 --> 01:54.305
Uh, first of all, contests to be the president

01:54.765 --> 01:57.625
or the Prime Minister, provide a platform

01:57.725 --> 02:01.345
for a charismatic person to build a devoted following

02:01.605 --> 02:05.385
and turn that following into a mighty force that can capture

02:05.905 --> 02:07.625
temporary control of government

02:07.625 --> 02:09.505
through democratic processes.

02:10.365 --> 02:13.785
And then second, the office of chief executive hands,

02:13.855 --> 02:18.625
that one person just what they need to make temporary power

02:19.145 --> 02:22.665
permanent through the powers to hire and fire

02:23.165 --> 02:25.265
and spend and command.

02:25.765 --> 02:29.905
The one true leader can grow a shadow system using favors

02:29.905 --> 02:33.345
and fear to create this power pyramid

02:33.495 --> 02:34.745
with one person at the top

02:35.445 --> 02:38.865
and everyone else personally loyal to that one person.

02:39.565 --> 02:41.425
And through the workings of the shadow system,

02:41.925 --> 02:43.785
the one true leader can hollow out

02:44.125 --> 02:47.025
and occupy the institutions of government

02:47.025 --> 02:48.385
that is supposed to check and balance.

02:49.125 --> 02:51.345
The chief executive government ceases

02:51.345 --> 02:54.305
to be about the common good, the public interest,

02:54.365 --> 02:56.465
and becomes all about the narrow

02:56.735 --> 02:58.545
self-interest of the leader.

02:59.545 --> 03:00.845
Now, over the two centuries

03:00.845 --> 03:04.565
that American style presidential models of government

03:04.865 --> 03:07.645
and British style prime ministerial models

03:07.705 --> 03:09.685
of government have been widely copied,

03:10.305 --> 03:13.205
we have seen them fail repeatedly in just this way.

03:14.725 --> 03:16.195
Third in many times

03:16.335 --> 03:17.835
and places contests

03:17.835 --> 03:21.315
to be the one chief executive have led people to expect

03:21.345 --> 03:23.475
that democracy won't go on forever

03:23.705 --> 03:27.315
because people can see how often in the past these sorts

03:27.315 --> 03:29.315
of contests have ushered in dictators

03:29.735 --> 03:31.915
and they can see the kinds of competitors

03:32.465 --> 03:34.195
that these contests attract.

03:34.475 --> 03:36.995
Expectations that whoever wins will likely

03:37.425 --> 03:39.275
stay, are heightened anywhere.

03:39.295 --> 03:41.475
Of course, that that has happened before.

03:43.135 --> 03:46.995
Fourth, having one chief executive can change the main

03:47.015 --> 03:51.395
reason for political parties to exist and to stay united.

03:51.945 --> 03:55.715
Instead of being all about promoting policies

03:55.715 --> 03:57.755
that they believe are in the public interest,

03:58.185 --> 04:01.955
parties can become mainly about capturing the executive

04:02.535 --> 04:06.115
and with it the rewards of executive incumbency,

04:06.115 --> 04:09.235
including plum jobs and government contracts

04:09.375 --> 04:11.515
and regulatory accommodations for allies.

04:12.465 --> 04:15.965
So the one true leader model gives party members reasons

04:16.105 --> 04:18.685
to stay together just so they can dominate.

04:18.795 --> 04:21.165
They don't really even need to share deep beliefs.

04:21.935 --> 04:23.715
The one true leader model allows a party

04:23.775 --> 04:26.435
to dominate without overwhelming popular support

04:26.465 --> 04:28.795
because someone has to be chief executive

04:29.135 --> 04:32.435
and a charismatic leader can get them over the line to claim

04:32.435 --> 04:34.715
that prize at a particular moment in time.

04:36.155 --> 04:39.825
Fifth, having one chief executive nurtures gridlock

04:40.715 --> 04:43.335
and then it dangles tyranny as the solution

04:43.475 --> 04:45.855
to gridlock right when cont contest

04:45.915 --> 04:49.415
to be the one true leader fixate our politics on capturing

04:49.415 --> 04:52.105
that office rather than on

04:52.105 --> 04:53.745
what should actually be done by government.

04:54.335 --> 04:56.625
Many players in the political system get reasons

04:56.845 --> 05:00.705
to want the government to fail at being a good government so

05:00.705 --> 05:03.625
that their team can more easily replace it.

05:04.405 --> 05:05.425
So deadlocks

05:05.425 --> 05:07.145
and stal mates that are really created

05:07.165 --> 05:11.185
by the one true leader model itself become FOD

05:11.185 --> 05:14.145
for candidates to, for chief executive to claim

05:14.415 --> 05:17.305
that the system is broken and that they alone can fix it.

05:17.855 --> 05:21.025
When Switzerland became a nation, they insisted

05:21.655 --> 05:25.265
that seven people share in leading the government,

05:25.725 --> 05:27.865
and they did this in response to their ethnic

05:27.925 --> 05:29.585
and religious diversity.

05:30.605 --> 05:33.705
Having seven leaders now of course, promotes democracy

05:34.365 --> 05:36.265
and diversity in other ways too.

05:36.725 --> 05:39.505
It is now, for example, expected that at least three

05:39.885 --> 05:41.425
of the seven will be women.

05:42.655 --> 05:44.635
The seven members of Switzerland's Federal Council

05:45.285 --> 05:46.915
administer the nation together.

05:47.945 --> 05:49.755
Each of them heads a department of the government.

05:49.755 --> 05:51.075
But all of the big decisions

05:51.075 --> 05:53.355
of government are made by the seven of them.

05:54.015 --> 05:56.715
The Constitution requires them to act as a collegial body.

05:57.275 --> 05:58.925
Council members are expected

05:59.465 --> 06:01.285
to support the council's decisions,

06:01.555 --> 06:03.685
even when those decisions are not exactly

06:03.835 --> 06:05.565
what they would individually have wanted.

06:06.575 --> 06:08.755
And the seven members of Switzerland's Federal

06:08.755 --> 06:09.955
Council are equals.

06:10.855 --> 06:13.465
Each year the Federal Assembly elects one council member

06:13.485 --> 06:14.505
to chair meetings.

06:15.285 --> 06:16.345
And for that one year,

06:16.345 --> 06:19.785
the chosen person represents the nation In formal settings

06:19.785 --> 06:23.585
where one person needs to do that, they cannot be reelected

06:23.585 --> 06:24.945
to that role The following year,

06:25.985 --> 06:27.165
the Swiss electoral system

06:27.165 --> 06:28.725
achieves proportional representation.

06:28.875 --> 06:30.925
Political parties win seats in proportion

06:30.925 --> 06:31.965
to their share of the vote.

06:32.225 --> 06:36.045
And this means that many political parties have seats in the

06:36.045 --> 06:38.965
Swiss Federal Assembly and that none has a majority

06:39.065 --> 06:41.405
of the seats, therefore, choosing members

06:41.425 --> 06:42.525
of the Federal Council.

06:43.265 --> 06:45.405
The national executive requires

06:45.405 --> 06:47.205
that political parties work together.

06:47.825 --> 06:49.645
If each party just voted for its own,

06:50.425 --> 06:51.445
no one would be elected.

06:52.645 --> 06:55.145
So this is led the parties in the legislature

06:55.145 --> 06:58.385
to agree on a formula by which the major parties are all

06:58.785 --> 07:01.025
represented in the national executive

07:02.015 --> 07:03.345
parties in the legislature are

07:03.345 --> 07:04.425
therefore not preoccupied

07:04.425 --> 07:06.425
with capturing the executive from one another.

07:07.145 --> 07:09.775
Their successes parties does not depend on being dominant,

07:10.245 --> 07:12.255
that because they don't need to cobble together enough

07:12.255 --> 07:13.495
support to win the executive.

07:13.525 --> 07:17.695
Instead, their successes parties comes from having better

07:17.865 --> 07:21.895
ideas, better policy, proposals, and parliament.

07:21.895 --> 07:24.855
The legislature remains actively about the struggle,

07:24.915 --> 07:27.575
the debate, the battle for ideas about

07:28.255 --> 07:29.735
policies, not personalities.

07:30.675 --> 07:33.735
The Swiss system does not give anyone reasons

07:34.275 --> 07:36.215
to want Swiss government to fail.

07:37.165 --> 07:40.655
When we remove the glittering prize of executive incumbency

07:41.195 --> 07:44.295
having one chief executive, our opposition to proposal

07:44.855 --> 07:47.575
proposals of the government are really about

07:47.935 --> 07:49.215
disagreement over ideas.

07:49.335 --> 07:52.375
They're not about opposing in the hopes of replacing.

07:53.115 --> 07:56.415
So democracy is made much more stable, much more secure

07:56.605 --> 07:59.335
because the system does not give anyone an

07:59.515 --> 08:01.295
inside track to endangering.

08:01.795 --> 08:04.095
The article cites empirical evidence that

08:04.695 --> 08:07.895
personalizing dictatorship makes it much more durable

08:08.275 --> 08:11.355
and damaging without one true leader.

08:11.535 --> 08:14.595
It turns out it's actually really hard to derail a democracy

08:15.725 --> 08:16.895
without one true leader.

08:17.365 --> 08:18.975
It's also hard to stay a tyranny.

08:19.565 --> 08:21.215
Democracies with one true leader

08:21.795 --> 08:23.655
are playing on tyranny turf.

08:24.005 --> 08:25.975
They can be undermined from the inside.

08:27.135 --> 08:29.185
Tyrannies that share ultimate power

08:29.965 --> 08:32.065
are really playing on democracy's turf.

08:32.575 --> 08:33.985
They mostly come about when

08:34.505 --> 08:36.905
a military overthrows a civilian government

08:36.905 --> 08:38.225
and then doesn't know what to do next.

08:39.275 --> 08:41.375
The tyranny by committee tends to be transitional.

08:41.805 --> 08:45.615
It's a bridge either to democracy or to one true tyrant.

08:45.995 --> 08:49.135
And we can make sense of this when we see tyranny

08:49.135 --> 08:50.375
by committee through the eyes

08:50.435 --> 08:52.295
of the individual committee members.

08:52.925 --> 08:54.135
It's not actually fun

08:55.025 --> 08:57.325
To share in power if you've got a constantly

08:57.325 --> 08:58.525
fear and knife in the back.

08:59.365 --> 09:02.395
China, for example, seemed to be on a path toward democracy

09:03.175 --> 09:06.155
during the years that its government began to share power

09:06.205 --> 09:07.275
among many minds.

09:07.895 --> 09:10.715
But as Xi Jinping has consolidated the reigns

09:10.715 --> 09:15.035
of power again in one pair of hands, we've watched hopes

09:15.335 --> 09:17.115
for accountability to the Chinese people.

09:17.135 --> 09:19.635
And a real rule of law fade away.

09:20.175 --> 09:24.235
The gatherings that draft new constitutions, in times

09:24.375 --> 09:27.395
of national transition tend to be dominated

09:27.975 --> 09:31.395
by the most likely leaders of the systems

09:31.425 --> 09:32.915
that they are devising.

09:33.615 --> 09:35.915
So a predictable obstacle to power sharing

09:36.535 --> 09:37.955
is the personal ambition

09:38.215 --> 09:42.555
or expectation of the reformers truly shared governance

09:42.945 --> 09:45.275
that keeps individuals out of the spotlight.

09:45.825 --> 09:48.435
There's just not so appealing to many likely leaders.

09:48.775 --> 09:52.835
The article cites evidence that Careerism explains a lot

09:53.445 --> 09:57.155
about how we came to have the constitutions that we do.

09:58.325 --> 10:00.505
But of course, no one ever gives that reason. Right.

10:00.565 --> 10:02.265
The reasons that are most often given

10:03.005 --> 10:06.185
for having one chief executive are that the government

10:06.185 --> 10:08.225
with one chief executive will have more energy

10:08.365 --> 10:10.145
and speed and accountability.

10:11.405 --> 10:13.425
And the article shows why these reasons are weak.

10:14.225 --> 10:17.535
Swift experience proves that a shared executive can be

10:17.535 --> 10:20.695
as efficient and as accountable as one person

10:20.835 --> 10:21.895
and more reliably.

10:21.995 --> 10:24.515
So our sense that the executive part

10:24.515 --> 10:26.675
of government has an a special need

10:26.695 --> 10:30.555
for speed has its roots in our historic experience

10:30.575 --> 10:31.835
of the Warrior King.

10:32.265 --> 10:33.955
Because leading in battle, of course,

10:34.065 --> 10:35.875
does require snap decision making.

10:37.055 --> 10:40.275
But when battlefield conditions require singular leadership,

10:40.345 --> 10:42.795
that leadership is needed from a commander in the field,

10:43.495 --> 10:45.675
not from some distant national executive.

10:45.975 --> 10:49.715
Too often our thinking about this has been one in which the

10:49.715 --> 10:52.795
battlefield tail has wagged the governance dog.

10:53.815 --> 10:56.675
The only time a national executive may need to decide

10:56.705 --> 11:00.155
with battle speed is a nuclear confrontation.

11:00.535 --> 11:01.595
And for obvious reasons,

11:01.595 --> 11:05.955
nuclear powers have elaborate procedures for deciding when

11:06.035 --> 11:07.275
to push the nuclear button.

11:07.525 --> 11:11.075
Those elaborate procedures could involve more than one

11:11.075 --> 11:14.635
person in the ultimate decision to fire a nuclear weapon.

11:14.935 --> 11:16.915
And there are strong reasons not

11:16.915 --> 11:20.075
to let one person's whims decide whether the world

11:20.275 --> 11:21.395
plunges into nuclear war.

11:22.425 --> 11:23.645
Or just a few years ago,

11:24.305 --> 11:28.425
the Swiss model underwent a stress test calling

11:28.425 --> 11:30.145
for Switzerland to cut back on immigration

11:30.605 --> 11:31.865
and keep its distance.

11:31.965 --> 11:33.545
In international relations,

11:34.225 --> 11:37.705
a billionaire businessman called Christophe Blocker turned a

11:37.725 --> 11:40.505
sleepy rural party into an electoral powerhouse

11:40.935 --> 11:43.665
that won more votes than any other party

11:44.285 --> 11:46.345
in Swiss national elections.

11:46.915 --> 11:50.625
Swiss democracy translated Christophe blocker's electoral

11:50.625 --> 11:52.905
success into seats in

11:53.245 --> 11:54.565
National and regional assemblies.

11:55.435 --> 11:58.615
But Swiss democracy never gave Christophe blocker a

11:58.615 --> 11:59.815
chance to become Chief.

11:59.965 --> 12:02.455
Executive Blocker could gather popular support

12:02.475 --> 12:04.175
to change government policies,

12:04.635 --> 12:08.415
but Blocker could not ride that passing popular support

12:08.415 --> 12:11.775
to capture the government and remake it in his image.

12:13.105 --> 12:15.965
The Swiss Federal Assembly elected Christophe blocker

12:16.145 --> 12:18.845
to a four year term on the federal council.

12:19.555 --> 12:21.245
Stories of simmering tensions

12:21.265 --> 12:24.125
of collegiality in jeopardy soon began to appear.

12:24.905 --> 12:26.445
And after an awkward four years,

12:27.265 --> 12:29.245
the Federal Assembly did not reelect him.

12:30.015 --> 12:31.835
It was the only time in over a century

12:32.665 --> 12:35.195
that a federal counselor had run for reelection

12:35.195 --> 12:38.955
and been denied because the job is just a bad fit

12:39.415 --> 12:40.795
for a charismatic leader.

12:41.095 --> 12:42.635
It does not give them a platform

12:42.775 --> 12:44.635
to stand out within the group.

12:45.185 --> 12:47.075
They don't get to make decisions on their own.

12:47.825 --> 12:49.395
They don't get to advertise their

12:49.635 --> 12:51.075
superiority really in any way.

12:52.555 --> 12:56.215
The Swiss Federal Council is a showboats nightmare, right?

12:56.475 --> 12:58.655
And on learning that he wasn't gonna be reelected blocker

12:58.855 --> 13:01.655
declared quote that he was torn between relief,

13:01.655 --> 13:03.335
disappointment, and outrage.

13:04.045 --> 13:05.825
If the assembly wasn't gonna keep him in the council,

13:06.455 --> 13:09.745
then he would withdraw his party from the government,

13:09.745 --> 13:11.625
he said, and become an opposition.

13:12.575 --> 13:14.035
But that didn't get the party anywhere

13:14.185 --> 13:17.075
because the plural executive model helps steer people away

13:17.075 --> 13:18.355
from cults of personality.

13:18.455 --> 13:21.755
It just offers no avenue to Messianic ambition.

13:22.495 --> 13:25.235
So Blocker's party ultimately agreed to nominate two people

13:25.935 --> 13:28.555
to fill a later vacancy on the Federal Council.

13:29.415 --> 13:30.915
One of them was Christophe blocker.

13:31.295 --> 13:33.355
The Federal Assembly chose the other person.

13:34.705 --> 13:36.905
Blockers party slunk back into

13:36.905 --> 13:38.425
power back into the government.

13:39.555 --> 13:43.145
But the system had seen him off without any major trauma

13:44.095 --> 13:47.925
worth, without any real risk to democracy itself.

13:48.695 --> 13:52.845
Swiss democracy reliably deflects attempts to undermine it

13:53.145 --> 13:54.965
by giving the players in the democracy.

13:55.265 --> 13:58.445
Gam gain ample space to promote policies,

13:58.585 --> 14:01.125
but very little space to promote themselves.

14:01.675 --> 14:03.805
There's no big brother's face filling new

14:03.805 --> 14:04.885
screens in Switzerland.

14:05.865 --> 14:08.445
For almost two centuries, the Swiss have in a sense,

14:09.075 --> 14:10.605
performed a clinical trial

14:10.985 --> 14:12.885
for government without one true leader.

14:13.465 --> 14:14.885
And they've proven that it works.

Switzerland's Model: A Solution to Tyranny

00:00:00 - The tyranny of the one returns our minds to an idea for protecting democracy that we have not much talked about for, over 200 years. And for almost all of that 200 years, one Nation Switzerland has, been governing itself according to that idea and has proven that it works, that it keeps democracy strong. And the idea is this don't have one person at the top, don't have one Chief executive. Our contemporary, contemporary literature on protecting
00:00:41 - the job that would be tyrants actually want. And we have so often seen that a tyrant can grow up and rise, rise to power inside a democracy through their ability to attract a mass following. Many people can become enthralled to a person. No one has ever been enthralled to a committee. So if we don't want one person at the top for life,
00:01:13 - Here in the United States, we have not really con considered debated the question of how, how the executive ought to be structured since 1787 when we did have a real debate with Benjamin Franklin and many other leading founders arguing strongly for sharing the executive power, but only Switzerland really did it. And of the one explains why it's time for the rest of us
00:01:44 - Let's notice five ways that having one chief executive endangers democracy. first of all, contests to be the president or the Prime Minister, provide a platform for a charismatic person to build a devoted following and turn that following into a mighty force that can capture temporary control of government through democratic processes.
00:02:13 - that one person just what they need to make temporary power permanent through the powers to hire and fire and spend and command. The one true leader can grow a shadow system using favors and fear to create this power pyramid with one person at the top and everyone else personally loyal to that one person. And through the workings of the shadow system,
00:02:44 - and occupy the institutions of government that is supposed to check and balance. The chief executive government ceases to be about the common good, the public interest, and becomes all about the narrow self-interest of the leader. Now, over the two centuries that American style presidential models of government and British style prime ministerial models of government have been widely copied, we have seen them fail repeatedly in just this way.

The Risks of a Single Executive

00:03:16 - and places contests to be the one chief executive have led people to expect that democracy won't go on forever because people can see how often in the past these sorts of contests have ushered in dictators and they can see the kinds of competitors that these contests attract. Expectations that whoever wins will likely stay, are heightened anywhere. Of course, that that has happened before. Fourth, having one chief executive can change the main
00:03:51 - Instead of being all about promoting policies that they believe are in the public interest, parties can become mainly about capturing the executive and with it the rewards of executive incumbency, including plum jobs and government contracts and regulatory accommodations for allies. So the one true leader model gives party members reasons to stay together just so they can dominate.
00:04:21 - The one true leader model allows a party to dominate without overwhelming popular support because someone has to be chief executive and a charismatic leader can get them over the line to claim that prize at a particular moment in time. Fifth, having one chief executive nurtures gridlock and then it dangles tyranny as the solution to gridlock right when cont contest to be the one true leader fixate our politics on capturing
00:04:52 - what should actually be done by government. Many players in the political system get reasons to want the government to fail at being a good government so that their team can more easily replace it. So deadlocks and stal mates that are really created by the one true leader model itself become FOD for candidates to, for chief executive to claim that the system is broken and that they alone can fix it. When Switzerland became a nation, they insisted
00:05:25 - and they did this in response to their ethnic and religious diversity. Having seven leaders now of course, promotes democracy and diversity in other ways too. It is now, for example, expected that at least three of the seven will be women. The seven members of Switzerland's Federal Council administer the nation together. Each of them heads a department of the government. But all of the big decisions of government are made by the seven of them.
00:05:57 - Council members are expected to support the council's decisions, even when those decisions are not exactly what they would individually have wanted. And the seven members of Switzerland's Federal Council are equals. Each year the Federal Assembly elects one council member to chair meetings. And for that one year, the chosen person represents the nation In formal settings where one person needs to do that, they cannot be reelected to that role The following year,

Proportional Representation and Political Collaboration

00:06:27 - achieves proportional representation. Political parties win seats in proportion to their share of the vote. And this means that many political parties have seats in the Swiss Federal Assembly and that none has a majority of the seats, therefore, choosing members of the Federal Council. The national executive requires that political parties work together. If each party just voted for its own, no one would be elected. So this is led the parties in the legislature to agree on a formula by which the major parties are all
00:07:02 - parties in the legislature are therefore not preoccupied with capturing the executive from one another. Their successes parties does not depend on being dominant, that because they don't need to cobble together enough support to win the executive. Instead, their successes parties comes from having better ideas, better policy, proposals, and parliament. The legislature remains actively about the struggle, the debate, the battle for ideas about policies, not personalities.
00:07:34 - to want Swiss government to fail. When we remove the glittering prize of executive incumbency having one chief executive, our opposition to proposal proposals of the government are really about disagreement over ideas. They're not about opposing in the hopes of replacing. So democracy is made much more stable, much more secure because the system does not give anyone an inside track to endangering.
00:08:04 - personalizing dictatorship makes it much more durable and damaging without one true leader. It turns out it's actually really hard to derail a democracy without one true leader. It's also hard to stay a tyranny. Democracies with one true leader are playing on tyranny turf. They can be undermined from the inside. Tyrannies that share ultimate power are really playing on democracy's turf.
00:08:34 - a military overthrows a civilian government and then doesn't know what to do next. The tyranny by committee tends to be transitional. It's a bridge either to democracy or to one true tyrant. And we can make sense of this when we see tyranny by committee through the eyes of the individual committee members. It's not actually fun To share in power if you've got a constantly fear and knife in the back. China, for example, seemed to be on a path toward democracy
00:09:06 - among many minds. But as Xi Jinping has consolidated the reigns of power again in one pair of hands, we've watched hopes for accountability to the Chinese people. And a real rule of law fade away. The gatherings that draft new constitutions, in times of national transition tend to be dominated by the most likely leaders of the systems that they are devising.

Challenges of Centralized Executive Power

00:09:36 - is the personal ambition or expectation of the reformers truly shared governance that keeps individuals out of the spotlight. There's just not so appealing to many likely leaders. The article cites evidence that Careerism explains a lot about how we came to have the constitutions that we do. But of course, no one ever gives that reason. Right. The reasons that are most often given for having one chief executive are that the government
00:10:08 - and speed and accountability. And the article shows why these reasons are weak. Swift experience proves that a shared executive can be as efficient and as accountable as one person and more reliably. So our sense that the executive part of government has an a special need for speed has its roots in our historic experience of the Warrior King. Because leading in battle, of course, does require snap decision making.
00:10:40 - that leadership is needed from a commander in the field, not from some distant national executive. Too often our thinking about this has been one in which the battlefield tail has wagged the governance dog. The only time a national executive may need to decide with battle speed is a nuclear confrontation. And for obvious reasons, nuclear powers have elaborate procedures for deciding when to push the nuclear button.
00:11:11 - person in the ultimate decision to fire a nuclear weapon. And there are strong reasons not to let one person's whims decide whether the world plunges into nuclear war. Or just a few years ago, the Swiss model underwent a stress test calling for Switzerland to cut back on immigration and keep its distance. In international relations, a billionaire businessman called Christophe Blocker turned a
00:11:40 - that won more votes than any other party in Swiss national elections. Swiss democracy translated Christophe blocker's electoral success into seats in National and regional assemblies. But Swiss democracy never gave Christophe blocker a chance to become Chief. Executive Blocker could gather popular support to change government policies, but Blocker could not ride that passing popular support
00:12:13 - The Swiss Federal Assembly elected Christophe blocker to a four year term on the federal council. Stories of simmering tensions of collegiality in jeopardy soon began to appear. And after an awkward four years, the Federal Assembly did not reelect him. It was the only time in over a century that a federal counselor had run for reelection and been denied because the job is just a bad fit

Swiss Democracy: Power Without a Leader

00:12:41 - It does not give them a platform to stand out within the group. They don't get to make decisions on their own. They don't get to advertise their superiority really in any way. The Swiss Federal Council is a showboats nightmare, right? And on learning that he wasn't gonna be reelected blocker declared quote that he was torn between relief, disappointment, and outrage. If the assembly wasn't gonna keep him in the council, then he would withdraw his party from the government,
00:13:12 - But that didn't get the party anywhere because the plural executive model helps steer people away from cults of personality. It just offers no avenue to Messianic ambition. So Blocker's party ultimately agreed to nominate two people to fill a later vacancy on the Federal Council. One of them was Christophe blocker. The Federal Assembly chose the other person. Blockers party slunk back into power back into the government. But the system had seen him off without any major trauma
00:14:13 - Swiss democracy reliably deflects attempts to undermine it by giving the players in the democracy. Gam gain ample space to promote policies, but very little space to promote themselves. There's no big brother's face filling new screens in Switzerland. For almost two centuries, the Swiss have in a sense, performed a clinical trial for government without one true leader. And they've proven that it works.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Faculti

Popular in Law

Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and Potential of Individualising a Systemic Problem

A statistical approach to law school citation rankings

What is constitutional ideology?

Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

The Law of AI for Good

Transforming Restorative Justice for Transitional Settings

Tyranny of the One

Next in Constitutional Law

Guide

Platform and Category Pages

Contact Us

FAQs

What is Faculti?

How do you select interviews?

Interview Process

Page Structure

Popular in Law

Guide

Platform and Category Pages

Contact Us

FAQs

What is Faculti?

How do you select interviews?

Interview Process

Accessibility Options

Contrast Adjustment

Text Size Adjustment

Text Spacing Adjustment

Line Height Adjustment

Cursor Size Adjustment

Page Structure Options

Page Structure