Popular in Social Sciences

Political Science

V-Dem’s Conceptions of Democracy and Their Consequences

University of Notre Dame Michael Coppedge

Central Monetary Authorities

Macroeconomic modelling of CBDC: a critical review

European Central Bank Ulrich Bindseil

Social Identities and Divisions

A new explanation of antisemitism: Jew hatred as a civilisational phenomenon

Boston University Liah Greenfeld

Central Monetary Authorities

Financing Private Credit

Federal Reserve Bank of New York Nina Boyarchenko

Economics

Failing Banks

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Emil Verner

Culture and Society

The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place

New York University Harvey Moltoch

American Politics

Labour Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance

View more insights in Social Sciences - Economics - Labor Economics

View more figures from University of Wisconsin Madison

View the page of Naoki Aizawa

Read the Study

Next in Economics

Measurement and Theory of Core Inflation

Argia Sbordone | Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Do renewable energy investments create local jobs?

Natalia Fabra | University Carlos III Madrid

How do firms’ screening incentives impact the design of social insurance programs, and could an optimal combination of disability insurance and firm subsidies reduce labor market distortions while increasing welfare?

Image courtesy of interviewee. October 31, 2024

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

This video summarizes a study evaluating social insurance programs, particularly focusing on how they impact employers in the labor market and the incentives for hiring individuals affected by negative labor market shocks, such as disabilities. The research highlights that while social insurance programs like disability and employment insurance aim to protect workers, concerns exist that they may distort work incentives for individuals and affect employers' hiring decisions.

The study emphasizes the importance of addressing employer-side incentives, such as the tendency for firms to screen out individuals with disabilities due to perceived risks. By doing so, the paper argues that this can exacerbate labor market risks faced by these workers, reducing their employment opportunities and worsening outcomes.

The authors propose that integrating employer-side policies, such as subsidies for hiring people with disabilities, can mitigate the negative effects of these screening practices. They argue that a combination of more generous disability insurance and employer subsidies would improve labor market performance and enhance social welfare. Traditional designs of disability insurance typically focus on worker incentives, but this study urges that a focus on employer behavior is equally crucial.

Additionally, the paper suggests that similar challenges exist for other marginalized groups in the labor market, such as single parents, where targeted subsidies could promote better employment outcomes and overall inclusivity. The conclusions call for more quantitative analysis to better understand the dynamics between workers and employers, aiming to inform more comprehensive and effective social insurance policies.

Language:

Export as PDF

Export as PDF
1. **Evaluation of Social Insurance Programs**: The study focuses on the performance and design of social insurance programs, particularly examining how they influence employer behavior in the labor market and affect workers facing negative shocks, such as disabilities.

2. **Employer Screening Incentives**: The paper discusses how employers may avoid hiring individuals with disabilities due to perceived risks, exacerbating the labor market challenges these individuals face. This behavior is linked to the employers' goals of maximizing profits and their methods of designing employment contracts.

3. **Integration of Employer-Side Policies**: The research argues for the necessity of addressing employer-side factors, such as providing subsidies to encourage the hiring and retention of disabled workers, rather than solely focusing on worker-side adjustments to social insurance programs.

4. **Dual Approach for Better Outcomes**: It emphasizes the need for a combined approach that includes more generous disability insurance alongside subsiding employers to hire individuals with disabilities, thus reducing the incentive for employers to screen out these workers and improving labor market dynamics.

5. **Quantitative Analysis for Policy Improvement**: Through quantitative modeling and analysis, the study concludes that reforming U.S. disability policies to include more employer-side interventions could enhance labor market efficiency and improve overall social welfare, suggesting the potential applicability of these findings to other social insurance scenarios.

Export as PDF
Certainly! Here are some key quotes and ideas extracted from the video, which discuss the evaluation of social insurance programs and their impact on the labor market:

1. **Purpose of Social Insurance Programs**:
- "Social insurance programs like disability insurance, employment insurance, or health insurance, are designed to protect the workers who are hit, who are affected by some labor, negative labor market shocks."

2. **Concerns Over Work Incentives**:
- "There are concerns that this type of social insurance programs may distort the work incentive or the incentive to participate in the labor market."

3. **Role of Employers**:
- "It is equally important to think about how firms respond to people who are affected by these shocks, including their incentive to hire and retain these workers."
- "We focus on the role of the employers, screening activities or screening incentives."

4. **Screening and Hiring Bias**:
- "Employers may have an incentive to screen out, or avoid hiring, people who are experiencing certain shocks like disability shocks."

5. **Labor Market Risks**:
- "Such screening activities could harm the labor market for disabled workers or even for moderate disabled workers."

6. **Integration of Employer and Worker Incentives**:
- "Addressing these firm-side incentives is essential to more efficient social insurance programs, less than just addressing worker-side forces."

7. **Benefits of Subsidizing Employers**:
- "Subsidizing firms to hire those with disabilities can reduce the firm's incentive to screen out these workers, leading to better outcomes in the labor market."

8. **Disability Insurance and Labor Market Dynamics**:
- "More generous disability insurance could potentially lower people’s incentive to work or return to work, reducing labor force participation among those workers."

9. **Contribution of Employer-Side Policies**:
- "US disability policies can be significantly improved by expanding the use of employer-side policies, particularly subsidizing firms to hire people with disabilities."

10. **Optimal Design of Disability Programs**:
- "The optimal structure consists of more generous firm-side policies, more generous disability insurance, and more use of firm-side subsidies."

11. **Potential for Broader Applications**:
- "Our findings highlight the potential of these approaches in other convideos like social insurance programs or social welfare programs."

These quotes encapsulate the main themes and arguments of the video, touching upon the complexities of social insurance, the role of employers in the labor market, and the interplay of incentives for both workers and employers.

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:90000

1
00:00:00.025 --> 00:00:03.845
In our study, we evaluate the performance

2
00:00:04.225 --> 00:00:07.525
and the design of the social insurance programs

3
00:00:08.065 --> 00:00:12.365
by focusing on the load of employers in the labor market.

4
00:00:13.485 --> 00:00:16.625
So social insurance programs like disability insurance,

5
00:00:17.115 --> 00:00:18.185
employment insurance,

6
00:00:18.325 --> 00:00:22.945
or health insurance, are designed to protect the workers

7
00:00:23.485 --> 00:00:26.265
who are hit, who are affected by some labor,

8
00:00:26.705 --> 00:00:29.345
negative labor market shocks, like disability shock

9
00:00:29.345 --> 00:00:31.825
and so on in the economics.

10
00:00:32.045 --> 00:00:34.985
Um, there has been a lot of research understand, trying

11
00:00:34.985 --> 00:00:38.505
to understand, the effect of social insurance

12
00:00:38.505 --> 00:00:41.945
or labor market to particularly the people are concerned

13
00:00:41.945 --> 00:00:45.105
that this type of social insurance programs may,

14
00:00:45.175 --> 00:00:49.145
distort, the, the people's, work incentive

15
00:00:49.365 --> 00:00:51.505
or the incentive to participate in labor market.

16
00:00:52.745 --> 00:00:56.565
But it is also equally, important to think about

17
00:00:57.105 --> 00:01:01.405
how firms were employer in the labor market, left

18
00:01:01.465 --> 00:01:05.845
or respond to other people who are affected by these shocks.

19
00:01:05.985 --> 00:01:08.485
So, particularly whether the question is whether they have

20
00:01:08.485 --> 00:01:12.165
incentive to hire and retain, these workers.

21
00:01:13.685 --> 00:01:17.875
And in our paper, we focus on the,

22
00:01:18.545 --> 00:01:21.515
role of the employers, screening activities

23
00:01:21.535 --> 00:01:24.235
or screening incentives specifically.

24
00:01:24.375 --> 00:01:27.675
Uh, we consider that pharma may have incentive

25
00:01:27.815 --> 00:01:29.555
to screen out,

26
00:01:29.655 --> 00:01:33.395
or avoid hiring, the, the people who are experiencing,

27
00:01:34.055 --> 00:01:38.885
certain shocks like disability shocks, if indeed,

28
00:01:38.885 --> 00:01:41.925
the firm engaging this type of the screening activities.

29
00:01:42.895 --> 00:01:47.035
And it can potentially exaggerate a labor market risk

30
00:01:47.345 --> 00:01:48.595
that actual worker face

31
00:01:48.785 --> 00:01:50.435
because maybe the people

32
00:01:50.455 --> 00:01:53.675
who are experiencing the disabilities have a more,

33
00:01:53.755 --> 00:01:57.395
more difficulties in return to work and job quickies,

34
00:01:57.775 --> 00:01:59.915
or they may have more difficulty in finding

35
00:01:59.915 --> 00:02:00.955
the more appropriate jobs.

36
00:02:01.135 --> 00:02:03.795
In the context of a us, disability policies,

37
00:02:04.975 --> 00:02:06.715
we argue both theoretically

38
00:02:06.715 --> 00:02:11.315
and empiric, that addressing these farm side incentive,

39
00:02:11.335 --> 00:02:14.995
is crucial in designing the more effective

40
00:02:14.995 --> 00:02:17.475
or more efficient social insurance programs.

41
00:02:19.205 --> 00:02:22.175
Less than just addressing, worker side forces.

42
00:02:23.555 --> 00:02:25.255
Uh, it's essential to integrate

43
00:02:25.325 --> 00:02:29.215
with an employer side forces such as subsiding farm

44
00:02:29.395 --> 00:02:30.575
to hire those people

45
00:02:31.835 --> 00:02:35.655
or retain these people like with disability, for example.

46
00:02:36.555 --> 00:02:39.495
And then this intervention can reduce the firm's incentive

47
00:02:39.675 --> 00:02:42.855
to, like screening, screening out these workers

48
00:02:43.675 --> 00:02:45.735
and also potentially contribute to the,

49
00:02:45.735 --> 00:02:47.335
the better in outcome in the labor market.

50
00:02:49.195 --> 00:02:52.475
Moreover, facilitating the access

51
00:02:52.935 --> 00:02:55.915
to the good employment opportunities,

52
00:02:56.775 --> 00:02:58.395
can also,

53
00:02:58.705 --> 00:03:00.125
Like, address,

54
00:03:00.125 --> 00:03:04.565
the issues arising from the work disincentive effect of,

55
00:03:04.665 --> 00:03:09.475
the, this so worker side social insurance programs and

56
00:03:09.475 --> 00:03:12.875
consequently that it can potentially provide,

57
00:03:12.975 --> 00:03:15.675
better like overall social insurance systems

58
00:03:16.055 --> 00:03:18.035
and also the, contribute

59
00:03:18.195 --> 00:03:19.675
to the better design labor market.

60
00:03:20.865 --> 00:03:22.165
And particularly in the context

61
00:03:22.345 --> 00:03:23.685
of the use disability process.

62
00:03:24.265 --> 00:03:28.805
We find that more, genius disability insurance, coupled

63
00:03:28.835 --> 00:03:32.245
with more use of, the,

64
00:03:33.405 --> 00:03:35.845
subsidizing firm to hire the people

65
00:03:35.845 --> 00:03:37.525
with disability can generate

66
00:03:38.225 --> 00:03:40.245
the better labor market, performance.

67
00:03:40.245 --> 00:03:42.565
And at the same time, it achieve the better social

68
00:03:42.565 --> 00:03:44.045
welfare in our paper.

69
00:03:44.665 --> 00:03:48.725
Um, we focus on the possibilities that,

70
00:03:49.275 --> 00:03:53.525
farm may design, the employment contract,

71
00:03:53.665 --> 00:03:58.245
to avoid, a attracting the people with disabilities

72
00:03:59.255 --> 00:04:00.315
so that we are, you know,

73
00:04:00.315 --> 00:04:03.035
thinking about the one possible way that,

74
00:04:03.305 --> 00:04:06.155
from actually engaging in the, labor market screenings.

75
00:04:07.195 --> 00:04:09.455
So we are thinking that like employment contract usually

76
00:04:09.455 --> 00:04:12.415
consists of the wage, wage and knowledge benefit.

77
00:04:13.275 --> 00:04:16.855
And we think that like, employer can potentially design,

78
00:04:16.965 --> 00:04:20.095
like, for example, like a non wage benefit risk appealing

79
00:04:20.095 --> 00:04:22.455
to the people with disability, for example,

80
00:04:22.765 --> 00:04:25.735
providing less flexibilities in their job or,

81
00:04:26.235 --> 00:04:28.775
or less accommodating this type of workers.

82
00:04:30.365 --> 00:04:34.145
And then this behavior will be potentially, like a

83
00:04:34.145 --> 00:04:37.145
concerning because it can potentially exaggerate

84
00:04:37.725 --> 00:04:40.345
the labor market risk or, that worker

85
00:04:40.685 --> 00:04:44.025
and face, coming from this disability shocks.

86
00:04:44.445 --> 00:04:47.065
And also, would be a fundamental problem

87
00:04:47.325 --> 00:04:49.465
for designing social insurance programs.

88
00:04:51.335 --> 00:04:54.035
And to explore the impact of this type

89
00:04:54.035 --> 00:04:56.955
of screening contract, we develop,

90
00:04:56.965 --> 00:05:01.315
equivalent labor search models that integrate the firm's,

91
00:05:01.315 --> 00:05:02.595
screening contract.

92
00:05:03.135 --> 00:05:05.035
The workers, disability shocks

93
00:05:05.415 --> 00:05:08.715
and also, ledge benefit are a tool for the screenings,

94
00:05:10.775 --> 00:05:13.955
equip labor search models, often also known

95
00:05:13.955 --> 00:05:16.115
as the such matching model of the labor market.

96
00:05:16.625 --> 00:05:19.195
It's now considered as a workforce,

97
00:05:19.195 --> 00:05:20.435
the model of the labor market.

98
00:05:21.175 --> 00:05:25.075
And one of its strengths is that, its ability for us

99
00:05:25.075 --> 00:05:28.555
to study employers to behaviors in the labor market.

100
00:05:30.495 --> 00:05:32.875
And the two study, the issue related

101
00:05:33.015 --> 00:05:34.275
to the disabilities.

102
00:05:34.815 --> 00:05:37.355
We consider that the workers may be subject

103
00:05:37.415 --> 00:05:38.915
to the disability shocks,

104
00:05:39.285 --> 00:05:42.115
which can negatively impact their labor productivity,

105
00:05:42.775 --> 00:05:45.755
and also it may change the preference on the type

106
00:05:45.755 --> 00:05:46.795
of job they want to work.

107
00:05:48.255 --> 00:05:51.585
Workers are applying the job, which may consist

108
00:05:51.585 --> 00:05:53.465
of like a wage and know wage benefit.

109
00:05:54.365 --> 00:05:57.525
We particularly think that people with disability prefer

110
00:05:57.525 --> 00:06:01.645
to work a job which provide, more flexibility, such as,

111
00:06:01.705 --> 00:06:04.165
you know, the providing the option to these work hours,

112
00:06:04.745 --> 00:06:07.445
partly because maybe these workers need to stay at home

113
00:06:07.825 --> 00:06:10.085
or they may need to go to hospital more often.

114
00:06:12.295 --> 00:06:15.115
And on the labor demand side, we consider

115
00:06:15.115 --> 00:06:17.755
that farms design the, wage and,

116
00:06:17.755 --> 00:06:20.195
and knowledge benefit to adopt workers.

117
00:06:21.295 --> 00:06:24.515
And then they do so by maximizing, maximizing their profit.

118
00:06:26.375 --> 00:06:30.875
We consider that, well, we assume that,

119
00:06:30.985 --> 00:06:35.555
farm cannot like discriminate explicitly based on the,

120
00:06:35.655 --> 00:06:37.475
the workers, you know, disability status.

121
00:06:39.235 --> 00:06:43.655
And then this is based on, this is based on the fact

122
00:06:43.725 --> 00:06:46.175
that in the country, like in many countries,

123
00:06:46.425 --> 00:06:48.935
there are anti-discrimination like regulation

124
00:06:49.005 --> 00:06:50.455
regarding the disabilities.

125
00:06:50.715 --> 00:06:52.935
In the case of the us this is called American

126
00:06:52.935 --> 00:06:54.175
with Disability Act.

127
00:06:54.755 --> 00:06:58.375
So the farm cannot expressly discriminate based on like a

128
00:06:58.375 --> 00:07:01.815
disability status regarding the hiring or firing

129
00:07:01.815 --> 00:07:03.655
or choice design of the compensations.

130
00:07:05.285 --> 00:07:06.585
In such an environment,

131
00:07:06.975 --> 00:07:10.625
what farm can potentially do is design their employment

132
00:07:10.945 --> 00:07:14.185
contract is appealing to attract the worker

133
00:07:14.415 --> 00:07:17.025
with disabilities, particularly if they don't want

134
00:07:17.025 --> 00:07:18.425
to hire, these workers.

135
00:07:19.455 --> 00:07:23.115
And this may happen through the, the, the, you know,

136
00:07:23.345 --> 00:07:26.835
less, you know, at other less problems of job.

137
00:07:27.465 --> 00:07:29.595
They may make the job less flexible

138
00:07:30.135 --> 00:07:32.395
or they may less likely to accommodate.

139
00:07:33.975 --> 00:07:37.115
And then the issue is that, like this type of,

140
00:07:37.255 --> 00:07:40.595
the behavior could potentially distort labor market outcome

141
00:07:40.905 --> 00:07:44.115
because eventually in the economy, four, it may generate

142
00:07:45.135 --> 00:07:48.115
in problems of some important gene flexibilities,

143
00:07:48.615 --> 00:07:52.235
or it could generate some over concentrations of,

144
00:07:52.415 --> 00:07:54.795
of the less, disabled workers in the labor forces.

145
00:07:56.795 --> 00:08:00.815
The key insight, from our model is that such,

146
00:08:01.005 --> 00:08:05.175
from screening activities could harm the labor market

147
00:08:06.305 --> 00:08:09.325
by, you know, negatively impacting even for less,

148
00:08:09.845 --> 00:08:12.765
disabled workers or even for moderate disabled workers.

149
00:08:14.575 --> 00:08:17.435
And this has an important implication for the labor market.

150
00:08:17.615 --> 00:08:19.875
Uh, so sorry, the, this has an important implication

151
00:08:19.875 --> 00:08:21.675
for the social insurance program designs.

152
00:08:23.195 --> 00:08:25.495
And by understanding these distortions,

153
00:08:25.925 --> 00:08:30.575
policymaker can design the better targeted employer side,

154
00:08:30.595 --> 00:08:33.375
you know, policy, policies like a subsidies

155
00:08:33.595 --> 00:08:36.695
or they can potentially incentivize farm to pro,

156
00:08:36.695 --> 00:08:40.295
provide those non wage benefit, non wage benefit more,

157
00:08:41.115 --> 00:08:43.975
and that can potentially mitigate, this efficiency

158
00:08:44.275 --> 00:08:46.575
and ultimately improving labor market performance.

159
00:08:46.855 --> 00:08:49.535
I think traditionally that, you know, literature

160
00:08:49.675 --> 00:08:53.055
of the public finance thinks that optimal design

161
00:08:53.055 --> 00:08:54.935
of the disability insurance programs

162
00:08:55.345 --> 00:08:56.765
Is determined by two factors.

163
00:08:57.975 --> 00:09:01.965
First factor is its insurance benefit, which is mainly

164
00:09:01.965 --> 00:09:04.845
through the provision of the adequate income support

165
00:09:05.425 --> 00:09:06.965
for the people with disabilities.

166
00:09:08.315 --> 00:09:11.175
The second channel is it's work incentive effect.

167
00:09:11.875 --> 00:09:15.575
The particularly, we concerned, we are concerned

168
00:09:15.605 --> 00:09:19.735
that more generous disability insurance could,

169
00:09:19.745 --> 00:09:21.975
lower the people's incentive to work

170
00:09:22.075 --> 00:09:26.175
or return to work, which lower the labor force participation

171
00:09:26.175 --> 00:09:27.655
of the those workers and,

172
00:09:27.655 --> 00:09:30.495
and also causing some excessive government expenditures.

173
00:09:31.915 --> 00:09:34.135
In this paper, we've argued

174
00:09:34.135 --> 00:09:36.495
that they're one additional factor we need

175
00:09:36.495 --> 00:09:39.415
to think about in designing these programs, which is,

176
00:09:39.635 --> 00:09:42.815
its its effect on the farm screening incentives.

177
00:09:44.415 --> 00:09:46.275
So that the point is that,

178
00:09:46.345 --> 00:09:49.795
more genius disabled insurance programs could potentially,

179
00:09:50.215 --> 00:09:51.755
make, the people

180
00:09:51.755 --> 00:09:55.875
with very severely disabled workers, are more likely

181
00:09:55.895 --> 00:09:59.275
to take up those, disability interest benefit, and

182
00:09:59.275 --> 00:10:01.915
therefore they're more likely not apply for a job

183
00:10:03.105 --> 00:10:04.755
from the perspective of the firm.

184
00:10:05.815 --> 00:10:08.385
Then they actually, they, they don't really need

185
00:10:08.385 --> 00:10:10.945
to engage in like a screening activities.

186
00:10:12.495 --> 00:10:15.235
The cons, this can potentially improve the employment

187
00:10:15.555 --> 00:10:18.195
contract or even for the moderate disabled workers

188
00:10:18.615 --> 00:10:20.275
or even for less disabled workers.

189
00:10:20.895 --> 00:10:22.755
Now, ultimately the potentially, you know,

190
00:10:22.755 --> 00:10:24.275
improving labor market allocations.

191
00:10:26.205 --> 00:10:27.705
So this kind of suggests

192
00:10:27.705 --> 00:10:29.545
that there are some potential benefit

193
00:10:29.685 --> 00:10:34.345
of expanding the ations, programs in, in thinking about,

194
00:10:34.365 --> 00:10:35.745
you know, labor market impact.

195
00:10:36.565 --> 00:10:38.825
Now that we need to think, how about, you know,

196
00:10:38.845 --> 00:10:43.355
the key trade off, as I said, like, one, like the,

197
00:10:43.635 --> 00:10:46.555
possible caveat of expanding the DIS programs is

198
00:10:46.585 --> 00:10:48.675
that it can work, this incentive effect

199
00:10:49.455 --> 00:10:53.075
and such a work is, is work is incentive effect.

200
00:10:53.205 --> 00:10:55.315
It'll be a more severe,

201
00:10:55.535 --> 00:10:57.435
it is more challenging for government.

202
00:10:57.655 --> 00:11:01.035
So particularly if government cannot like really observe

203
00:11:01.375 --> 00:11:03.235
who is like a more severely disabled

204
00:11:03.335 --> 00:11:05.795
or who is a moderately disabled or who can actually work.

205
00:11:08.015 --> 00:11:12.075
So, so based on that, we can actually cons,

206
00:11:12.255 --> 00:11:15.355
we can actually conclude our framework that the,

207
00:11:15.355 --> 00:11:18.835
using the disability insurance program alone is unlikely

208
00:11:18.895 --> 00:11:22.595
to be, you know, satisfactory in addressing these two

209
00:11:22.595 --> 00:11:23.915
type of the infancy

210
00:11:23.975 --> 00:11:26.395
or problems, which is the pharmac screenings problem

211
00:11:26.815 --> 00:11:28.795
and also the work disincentive effect.

212
00:11:30.045 --> 00:11:32.535
Instead, the, our framework suggests data,

213
00:11:32.755 --> 00:11:36.535
one additional complementary policies, which is a subsidy

214
00:11:37.075 --> 00:11:39.255
for farm to hire these workers.

215
00:11:40.485 --> 00:11:42.895
This type of the, the policy can work as just a,

216
00:11:42.895 --> 00:11:47.695
just typical hiring subsidy, which can act as, subsidy

217
00:11:47.695 --> 00:11:49.895
for farm to provide more known wage benefit.

218
00:11:51.295 --> 00:11:52.675
And that kind of push can

219
00:11:53.125 --> 00:11:56.945
Mitigate, that this work disincentive effect as well

220
00:11:56.945 --> 00:11:58.825
because job can be more attractive.

221
00:11:59.825 --> 00:12:02.885
And at the same time, this can also, you know,

222
00:12:02.885 --> 00:12:05.205
address the concerns about like a pharmac

223
00:12:05.205 --> 00:12:06.925
screening activity as well.

224
00:12:08.305 --> 00:12:11.325
So we think that the combina possible combination

225
00:12:11.325 --> 00:12:13.445
of this type of approach could lead to the, you know,

226
00:12:13.445 --> 00:12:15.445
more efficient labor market, you know,

227
00:12:15.845 --> 00:12:17.645
allocation while providing the possibly better

228
00:12:17.645 --> 00:12:18.725
insurance scheme.

229
00:12:20.205 --> 00:12:23.665
And one important lesson we run from our exercise is that

230
00:12:24.515 --> 00:12:27.105
given this kind of trade off, I I mentioned

231
00:12:28.585 --> 00:12:29.905
optimal like design

232
00:12:30.045 --> 00:12:34.425
or more efficient, the design of the disability process

233
00:12:35.095 --> 00:12:37.985
require more quantitative analysis,

234
00:12:39.925 --> 00:12:43.385
and particularly we need to know about how worker respond,

235
00:12:43.525 --> 00:12:46.225
and also we need to know about how employer respond.

236
00:12:47.145 --> 00:12:50.285
So we need some kind of like a more, quantitative,

237
00:12:50.345 --> 00:12:53.485
you know, approach to actually discipline about,

238
00:12:53.595 --> 00:12:55.005
both side of their response

239
00:12:55.005 --> 00:12:56.725
or their interaction in the labor market,

240
00:12:57.095 --> 00:13:00.245
which is more challenging than the typical like,

241
00:13:00.315 --> 00:13:02.365
like, analysis in this context

242
00:13:02.375 --> 00:13:04.285
where there are people are mainly focusing on

243
00:13:04.285 --> 00:13:05.605
labor surprise side response.

244
00:13:05.635 --> 00:13:06.845
Some of the key risks

245
00:13:07.065 --> 00:13:10.405
or key finding from our exercise is that

246
00:13:10.985 --> 00:13:15.045
US disability policies can be significantly improved

247
00:13:16.065 --> 00:13:20.045
by expanding the use of, employer side policies.

248
00:13:20.265 --> 00:13:22.845
So particularly subsidizing farm to hire people

249
00:13:22.845 --> 00:13:25.565
with disability or subsidizing farm

250
00:13:25.585 --> 00:13:28.045
to provide knowledge benefit like the

251
00:13:28.045 --> 00:13:29.285
option to reduce work hours.

252
00:13:31.805 --> 00:13:34.465
And this type of approach is currently very limited in the

253
00:13:34.485 --> 00:13:35.785
US compared

254
00:13:35.785 --> 00:13:39.025
with severe European countries which have more robust

255
00:13:39.085 --> 00:13:41.105
or large scale like farm side programs.

256
00:13:43.265 --> 00:13:46.285
We opt this conclusion, by,

257
00:13:46.695 --> 00:13:50.285
using the quantitative version of our Caribbean model

258
00:13:50.285 --> 00:13:52.925
that I explained, and,

259
00:13:52.985 --> 00:13:55.765
and importantly that, we make actually a number

260
00:13:55.765 --> 00:13:58.445
of the efforts to make that our quantitative analysis,

261
00:13:58.465 --> 00:14:00.005
you know, convincing and incredible.

262
00:14:01.545 --> 00:14:05.045
For example, we expressly incorporate a realistic feature

263
00:14:05.265 --> 00:14:09.965
of the US D forces like America with Disability Act

264
00:14:10.425 --> 00:14:12.325
or, disability insurance programs,

265
00:14:12.985 --> 00:14:14.285
or several kind form

266
00:14:14.385 --> 00:14:17.005
of the employer side subsidies into our

267
00:14:17.005 --> 00:14:18.085
equivalent framework.

268
00:14:19.525 --> 00:14:23.105
And also, we show some descriptive evidence that,

269
00:14:23.605 --> 00:14:26.865
the, the model seem to, explain well about number

270
00:14:27.065 --> 00:14:28.105
of the data patterns.

271
00:14:28.685 --> 00:14:31.225
For example, we find that people,

272
00:14:31.255 --> 00:14:33.945
with disabilities are more likely to so into job,

273
00:14:34.155 --> 00:14:37.025
which provide, more option to release work hours.

274
00:14:37.765 --> 00:14:41.865
And we also find some evidence that farm may use this,

275
00:14:41.865 --> 00:14:44.545
knowledge benefit, like a option to release work hour

276
00:14:44.925 --> 00:14:48.945
as a possible tool to screen other people with disabilities.

277
00:14:50.445 --> 00:14:54.055
And then we kind of estimate our model to account for a lot

278
00:14:54.055 --> 00:14:57.975
of the, standard fact regarding the relationship

279
00:14:57.975 --> 00:14:59.775
between the workers' disability status

280
00:15:00.235 --> 00:15:03.135
and labor market outcomes, including the employment

281
00:15:03.155 --> 00:15:05.375
and know wage benefit and wage and so on.

282
00:15:06.885 --> 00:15:10.525
Moreover, to improve the credibility, we even,

283
00:15:11.235 --> 00:15:13.725
conduct some, model variation showing

284
00:15:13.755 --> 00:15:17.085
that the model is able to generate reasonable,

285
00:15:17.185 --> 00:15:20.045
or realistic, response of,

286
00:15:20.235 --> 00:15:22.445
realistic labor surprise response,

287
00:15:22.505 --> 00:15:23.885
of the disability insurance.

288
00:15:25.675 --> 00:15:28.615
And after we are confident about, you know, models ability

289
00:15:28.675 --> 00:15:32.935
to make some quantitative conclusions, we stimulate,

290
00:15:33.155 --> 00:15:37.335
the different configuration of the policies, to search

291
00:15:37.395 --> 00:15:39.935
for the what would be the best mix of the policies.

292
00:15:41.785 --> 00:15:46.005
And according to our analysis, the optimal structure,

293
00:15:46.475 --> 00:15:50.965
consist of more generous, farm side,

294
00:15:50.965 --> 00:15:52.845
more genius, disability insurance.

295
00:15:53.465 --> 00:15:57.525
And together with more use of the farm side subsidies

296
00:15:58.455 --> 00:16:01.635
and such approach, lead to significant welfare gain,

297
00:16:02.085 --> 00:16:05.995
which is about 2% of the worker, you know, consumption.

298
00:16:06.055 --> 00:16:09.515
So that means the workers' consumption can include increase

299
00:16:09.575 --> 00:16:12.795
by the 2%, the major other kind of Wayfair, you know,

300
00:16:12.795 --> 00:16:14.195
benefit of this type of approaches.

301
00:16:14.885 --> 00:16:17.585
And moreover, it improve the labor market allocation.

302
00:16:19.375 --> 00:16:21.875
And the key mechanism behind this result is

303
00:16:21.875 --> 00:16:25.675
that the farm services reduce the incentive of the farm

304
00:16:26.015 --> 00:16:28.635
to screen the, the, workers,

305
00:16:29.535 --> 00:16:30.875
and at the same time,

306
00:16:31.295 --> 00:16:34.955
it address the work disincentive effect arising from the

307
00:16:34.955 --> 00:16:37.475
more genius, disability insurance programs.

308
00:16:38.395 --> 00:16:41.935
So consequently, the government can further expand,

309
00:16:41.935 --> 00:16:44.795
disability insurance programs, and,

310
00:16:44.795 --> 00:16:48.355
and as a result, the society can provide a better insurance

311
00:16:48.355 --> 00:16:49.675
against the disabilities,

312
00:16:50.015 --> 00:16:52.315
and at the same time it can achieve the,

313
00:16:52.315 --> 00:16:54.995
the better labor market, you know, efficiency.

314
00:16:55.135 --> 00:16:59.275
So we think that our finding have a on the welfare benefit

315
00:16:59.695 --> 00:17:04.195
of integrations of the farm side policies, with,

316
00:17:04.465 --> 00:17:07.035
more disability insurance, programs.

317
00:17:07.225 --> 00:17:11.635
Yeah, yeah. Um, highlight the potential of this type

318
00:17:11.635 --> 00:17:14.355
of approaches in other context like social,

319
00:17:14.575 --> 00:17:16.275
in other social insurance programs

320
00:17:16.295 --> 00:17:20.165
or social welfare programs, for example,

321
00:17:20.745 --> 00:17:24.725
we consider that people with some, caring

322
00:17:25.525 --> 00:17:27.805
responsibilities such as a single parent

323
00:17:28.545 --> 00:17:32.325
may face similar labor market challenge in the sense that

324
00:17:33.035 --> 00:17:36.925
they need to work a job which provide more flexibilities.

325
00:17:38.585 --> 00:17:42.685
And also we consider that farm often passive, that this type

326
00:17:42.685 --> 00:17:46.245
of worker is less profitable in the sense

327
00:17:46.275 --> 00:17:48.485
that maybe this type of workers are more likely

328
00:17:48.545 --> 00:17:49.685
to quit the job soon.

329
00:17:50.105 --> 00:17:52.085
So they may more likely to, you know,

330
00:17:52.095 --> 00:17:54.245
avoid hiring these type of workers.

331
00:17:56.065 --> 00:17:59.085
If this type of the screening incentive is actually indeed

332
00:17:59.445 --> 00:18:03.285
relevant mm-Hmm, then we consider that, subsidizing farm

333
00:18:03.825 --> 00:18:07.245
to hire and retain these type of the workers maybe

334
00:18:07.245 --> 00:18:10.005
through the subsidizing the parental key.

335
00:18:10.165 --> 00:18:14.125
Parental, for example, would, be,

336
00:18:14.125 --> 00:18:15.205
welfare enhancing

337
00:18:15.665 --> 00:18:18.725
and also it can potentially improve the effectiveness

338
00:18:18.785 --> 00:18:21.245
of the welfare programs which often target

339
00:18:21.385 --> 00:18:22.885
and support these type of the peoples.

340
00:18:23.585 --> 00:18:27.805
Indeed, we are known that many of these programs are strike

341
00:18:28.105 --> 00:18:31.645
to the, achieve the right balance of providing,

342
00:18:31.675 --> 00:18:35.405
appropriate support, for those, people.

343
00:18:35.705 --> 00:18:37.925
Uh, and also providing a good work incentive

344
00:18:40.055 --> 00:18:42.275
by offering the, targeted firm subsidies.

345
00:18:42.775 --> 00:18:45.475
We can create more inclusive labor market

346
00:18:46.415 --> 00:18:47.955
and also achieve the,

347
00:18:48.215 --> 00:18:50.355
or, the better, you know, design

348
00:18:50.355 --> 00:18:51.635
of the welfare programs.

349
00:18:51.895 --> 00:18:52.995
We hope that,

350
00:18:53.335 --> 00:18:58.155
our paper can potentially stimulate further interest on,

351
00:18:58.475 --> 00:19:00.075
discovering the lower employers

352
00:19:00.775 --> 00:19:02.675
or interaction between the work

353
00:19:02.695 --> 00:19:05.705
and farm as a crucial factor.

Evaluating Social Insurance and Employer Dynamics

00:00:00 - In our study, we evaluate the performance and the design of the social insurance programs by focusing on the load of employers in the labor market. So social insurance programs like disability insurance, employment insurance, or health insurance, are designed to protect the workers who are hit, who are affected by some labor, negative labor market shocks, like disability shock and so on in the economics.

00:00:34 - to understand, the effect of social insurance or labor market to particularly the people are concerned that this type of social insurance programs may, distort, the, the people's, work incentive or the incentive to participate in labor market. But it is also equally, important to think about how firms were employer in the labor market, left or respond to other people who are affected by these shocks.

00:01:08 - incentive to hire and retain, these workers. And in our paper, we focus on the, role of the employers, screening activities or screening incentives specifically. we consider that pharma may have incentive to screen out, or avoid hiring, the, the people who are experiencing, certain shocks like disability shocks, if indeed,

Enhancing Labor Market Outcomes for Disabled Workers

00:01:42 - And it can potentially exaggerate a labor market risk that actual worker face because maybe the people who are experiencing the disabilities have a more, more difficulties in return to work and job quickies, or they may have more difficulty in finding the more appropriate jobs. In the context of a us, disability policies, we argue both theoretically and empiric, that addressing these farm side incentive,

00:02:14 - or more efficient social insurance programs. Less than just addressing, worker side forces. it's essential to integrate with an employer side forces such as subsiding farm to hire those people or retain these people like with disability, for example. And then this intervention can reduce the firm's incentive to, like screening, screening out these workers

00:02:45 - the better in outcome in the labor market. Moreover, facilitating the access to the good employment opportunities, can also, Like, address, the issues arising from the work disincentive effect of, the, this so worker side social insurance programs and consequently that it can potentially provide, better like overall social insurance systems

Enhancing Labor Market Performance through Disability Insurance

00:03:18 - to the better design labor market. And particularly in the context of the use disability process. We find that more, genius disability insurance, coupled with more use of, the, subsidizing firm to hire the people with disability can generate the better labor market, performance. And at the same time, it achieve the better social welfare in our paper. we focus on the possibilities that,

00:03:53 - to avoid, a attracting the people with disabilities so that we are, you know, thinking about the one possible way that, from actually engaging in the, labor market screenings. So we are thinking that like employment contract usually consists of the wage, wage and knowledge benefit. And we think that like, employer can potentially design, like, for example, like a non wage benefit risk appealing

00:04:22 - providing less flexibilities in their job or, or less accommodating this type of workers. And then this behavior will be potentially, like a concerning because it can potentially exaggerate the labor market risk or, that worker and face, coming from this disability shocks. And also, would be a fundamental problem for designing social insurance programs.

Disability Shocks and Labor Market Dynamics

00:04:54 - of screening contract, we develop, equivalent labor search models that integrate the firm's, screening contract. The workers, disability shocks and also, ledge benefit are a tool for the screenings, equip labor search models, often also known as the such matching model of the labor market. It's now considered as a workforce, the model of the labor market. And one of its strengths is that, its ability for us

00:05:30 - And the two study, the issue related to the disabilities. We consider that the workers may be subject to the disability shocks, which can negatively impact their labor productivity, and also it may change the preference on the type of job they want to work. Workers are applying the job, which may consist of like a wage and know wage benefit. We particularly think that people with disability prefer

00:06:01 - you know, the providing the option to these work hours, partly because maybe these workers need to stay at home or they may need to go to hospital more often. And on the labor demand side, we consider that farms design the, wage and, and knowledge benefit to adopt workers. And then they do so by maximizing, maximizing their profit. We consider that, well, we assume that,

Disability Regulations and Labor Market Dynamics

00:06:35 - the workers, you know, disability status. And then this is based on, this is based on the fact that in the country, like in many countries, there are anti-discrimination like regulation regarding the disabilities. In the case of the us this is called American with Disability Act. So the farm cannot expressly discriminate based on like a disability status regarding the hiring or firing

00:07:05 - In such an environment, what farm can potentially do is design their employment contract is appealing to attract the worker with disabilities, particularly if they don't want to hire, these workers. And this may happen through the, the, the, you know, less, you know, at other less problems of job. They may make the job less flexible or they may less likely to accommodate.

00:07:37 - the behavior could potentially distort labor market outcome because eventually in the economy, four, it may generate in problems of some important gene flexibilities, or it could generate some over concentrations of, of the less, disabled workers in the labor forces. The key insight, from our model is that such, from screening activities could harm the labor market

Enhancing Labor Market Outcomes for Disabled Workers

00:08:09 - disabled workers or even for moderate disabled workers. And this has an important implication for the labor market. so sorry, the, this has an important implication for the social insurance program designs. And by understanding these distortions, policymaker can design the better targeted employer side, you know, policy, policies like a subsidies or they can potentially incentivize farm to pro,

00:08:41 - and that can potentially mitigate, this efficiency and ultimately improving labor market performance. I think traditionally that, you know, literature of the public finance thinks that optimal design of the disability insurance programs Is determined by two factors. First factor is its insurance benefit, which is mainly through the provision of the adequate income support for the people with disabilities.

00:09:11 - The particularly, we concerned, we are concerned that more generous disability insurance could, lower the people's incentive to work or return to work, which lower the labor force participation of the those workers and, and also causing some excessive government expenditures. In this paper, we've argued that they're one additional factor we need to think about in designing these programs, which is,

Impact of Generous Disability Insurance on Employment Incentives

00:09:44 - So that the point is that, more genius disabled insurance programs could potentially, make, the people with very severely disabled workers, are more likely to take up those, disability interest benefit, and therefore they're more likely not apply for a job from the perspective of the firm. Then they actually, they, they don't really need to engage in like a screening activities.

00:10:15 - contract or even for the moderate disabled workers or even for less disabled workers. Now, ultimately the potentially, you know, improving labor market allocations. So this kind of suggests that there are some potential benefit of expanding the ations, programs in, in thinking about, you know, labor market impact. Now that we need to think, how about, you know, the key trade off, as I said, like, one, like the,

00:10:46 - that it can work, this incentive effect and such a work is, is work is incentive effect. It'll be a more severe, it is more challenging for government. So particularly if government cannot like really observe who is like a more severely disabled or who is a moderately disabled or who can actually work. So, so based on that, we can actually cons, we can actually conclude our framework that the,

Addressing Labor Market Challenges: Subsidies and Screening in Disability Insurance

00:11:18 - to be, you know, satisfactory in addressing these two type of the infancy or problems, which is the pharmac screenings problem and also the work disincentive effect. Instead, the, our framework suggests data, one additional complementary policies, which is a subsidy for farm to hire these workers. This type of the, the policy can work as just a, just typical hiring subsidy, which can act as, subsidy

00:11:51 - And that kind of push can Mitigate, that this work disincentive effect as well because job can be more attractive. And at the same time, this can also, you know, address the concerns about like a pharmac screening activity as well. So we think that the combina possible combination of this type of approach could lead to the, you know, more efficient labor market, you know, allocation while providing the possibly better insurance scheme.

00:12:24 - given this kind of trade off, I I mentioned optimal like design or more efficient, the design of the disability process require more quantitative analysis, and particularly we need to know about how worker respond, and also we need to know about how employer respond. So we need some kind of like a more, quantitative,

Enhancing US Disability Policies through Employer Incentives

00:12:53 - both side of their response or their interaction in the labor market, which is more challenging than the typical like, like, analysis in this context where there are people are mainly focusing on labor surprise side response. Some of the key risks or key finding from our exercise is that US disability policies can be significantly improved by expanding the use of, employer side policies. So particularly subsidizing farm to hire people

00:13:25 - to provide knowledge benefit like the option to reduce work hours. And this type of approach is currently very limited in the US compared with severe European countries which have more robust or large scale like farm side programs. We opt this conclusion, by, using the quantitative version of our Caribbean model that I explained, and,

00:13:55 - of the efforts to make that our quantitative analysis, you know, convincing and incredible. For example, we expressly incorporate a realistic feature of the US D forces like America with Disability Act or, disability insurance programs, or several kind form of the employer side subsidies into our equivalent framework. And also, we show some descriptive evidence that,

Enhancing Disability Employment Through Policy Optimization

00:14:27 - of the data patterns. For example, we find that people, with disabilities are more likely to so into job, which provide, more option to release work hours. And we also find some evidence that farm may use this, knowledge benefit, like a option to release work hour as a possible tool to screen other people with disabilities. And then we kind of estimate our model to account for a lot

00:14:57 - between the workers' disability status and labor market outcomes, including the employment and know wage benefit and wage and so on. Moreover, to improve the credibility, we even, conduct some, model variation showing that the model is able to generate reasonable, or realistic, response of, realistic labor surprise response, of the disability insurance.

00:15:28 - to make some quantitative conclusions, we stimulate, the different configuration of the policies, to search for the what would be the best mix of the policies. And according to our analysis, the optimal structure, consist of more generous, farm side, more genius, disability insurance. And together with more use of the farm side subsidies

Enhancing Labor Market Efficiency through Disability Insurance Reforms

00:16:02 - which is about 2% of the worker, you know, consumption. So that means the workers' consumption can include increase by the 2%, the major other kind of Wayfair, you know, benefit of this type of approaches. And moreover, it improve the labor market allocation. And the key mechanism behind this result is that the farm services reduce the incentive of the farm to screen the, the, workers,

00:16:31 - it address the work disincentive effect arising from the more genius, disability insurance programs. So consequently, the government can further expand, disability insurance programs, and, and as a result, the society can provide a better insurance against the disabilities, and at the same time it can achieve the, the better labor market, you know, efficiency. So we think that our finding have a on the welfare benefit

00:17:04 - more disability insurance, programs. Yeah, yeah. highlight the potential of this type of approaches in other context like social, in other social insurance programs or social welfare programs, for example, we consider that people with some, caring responsibilities such as a single parent may face similar labor market challenge in the sense that

Enhancing Labor Market Inclusivity through Targeted Subsidies

00:17:38 - And also we consider that farm often passive, that this type of worker is less profitable in the sense that maybe this type of workers are more likely to quit the job soon. So they may more likely to, you know, avoid hiring these type of workers. If this type of the screening incentive is actually indeed relevant mm-Hmm, then we consider that, subsidizing farm

00:18:07 - through the subsidizing the parental key. Parental, for example, would, be, welfare enhancing and also it can potentially improve the effectiveness of the welfare programs which often target and support these type of the peoples. Indeed, we are known that many of these programs are strike to the, achieve the right balance of providing, appropriate support, for those, people.

00:19:02 - by offering the, targeted firm subsidies. We can create more inclusive labor market and also achieve the, or, the better, you know, design of the welfare programs. We hope that, our paper can potentially stimulate further interest on, discovering the lower employers or interaction between the work and farm as a crucial factor.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Research

Policy

Analysis