The Mediterranean and North Africa, 1940–1944

Simon Ball explores the components of French strategic analysis and decision-making down to the defeat of June 1940. He proposes that the leaders of France had no choice from the mid-1920s onward but to adopt the grand strategy, though not all the operational campaign plans, that they utilized in 1939-40.

Image courtesy of interviewee

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