Laleh Khalili examines the colonial roots of counterinsurgency practices deployed by the US after September 11, 2011 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on a broad range of primary sources produced by the US military and its officers and soldiers, she argues that the counterinsurgency practices were intended as liberal forms of warfare that through the use of law, administration, and procedure intended to facilitate the conquest and management of intransigent populations in those two countries.
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Image courtesy of interviewee