Popular in History

Arts and Humanities

Freedom’s Dominion

Vanderbilt University Jefferson Cowie

Arts and Humanities

Titus Quinctius Flamininus’ “Italian triumph”

McGill University Michael Fronda

Arts and Humanities

Lincoln and the Jews

Brandeis University Jonathan Sarna

Arts and Humanities

Early Modern Natural Law Theories

University of Copenhagen Knud Haakonssen

Arts and Humanities

Phoenicians Among Others: Why Migrants Mattered in the Ancient Mediterranean

University of California San Diego Denise Demetriou

Arts and Humanities

The loneliness of leadership

University of Liverpool Elaine Chalus

Arts and Humanities

Press Management and U.S. Support for France in Indochina, 1950–1954

View more insights in Arts and Humanities - History - Asian History

View more figures from University of Sheffield

View the page of Alex Ferguson

Read the Study

Next in Arts and Humanities

Does the United States Need a Climate Refugee Policy?

Maria Cristina Garcia | Cornell University

The European Reformation

Euan Cameron | Columbia University

Alex Ferguson examines the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vietnam’s management of the American press during the later stages of the Franco-Viet Minh War.

Image courtesy of interviewee. May 29, 2024

Log-in or Sign-up to Faculti
Currently viewing this subject insight as a guest. You have insight(s) remaining for this month. Login to view 8000+ figures on the platform.

Generating Workspace...

Export as PDF

This video discusses the early involvement of the United States in the Vietnam conflict during the 1950s, particularly the context of US support for French colonial efforts against the Viet Minh, a nationalist coalition seeking independence for Vietnam. The US viewed the situation through a Cold War lens, fearing the spread of communism, but initially hesitated to openly back France due to discomfort with colonialism. France sought to rebrand the conflict as a civil war intertwined with the Cold War to gain US support.

American military and economic assistance began in 1950, largely driven by aims to combat perceived Soviet influence and prevent a communist takeover. Despite this, French officials were wary of American journalists, whom they believed could undermine their efforts. The US government saw the press as a crucial component of public perception regarding the war and actively worked to manage journalists’ reports to maintain a favorable diplomatic image for French efforts.

US officials were particularly concerned that negative press could lead to diminished French morale, increased tensions between the US and France, and potential reductions in support from Congress. As journalists often relied on official sources for information, US diplomats engaged in various strategies, including informal relationships and direct interventions with media outlets, to influence the reporting landscape.

The article also highlights the impact of journalists and non-state actors in shaping the Cold War narrative, showing that despite the US's military power, its influence was limited and depended on cooperation, particularly from France. Ultimately, the US efforts to manage press coverage reflected a nuanced understanding of how public perception could affect geopolitical outcomes in the Battle for Vietnam during a tumultuous period marked by ideological conflicts.

Language:

Export as PDF

Export as PDF
It seems you haven't a specific video to analyze. Please share the video you would like me to extract key points from, and I'll be happy to help!

Export as PDF
Could you please provide the video or a specific passage you're referring to? That way, I can help you identify key quotes from it.

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.000 --> 00:02.685
So the article is, focuses on the beginning

00:02.825 --> 00:07.325
of major US involvement in Vietnam during the early 1950s.

00:08.065 --> 00:09.765
Uh, this is when the United States sort

00:09.765 --> 00:13.245
of first becomes an active participant in the struggle

00:13.385 --> 00:14.645
for, for Vietnam.

00:14.645 --> 00:18.525
It makes a very fateful decision in 1950 to provide

00:19.045 --> 00:21.525
military, and economic support to the,

00:21.525 --> 00:24.385
to French imperial forces that are at

00:24.385 --> 00:27.225
that point engaged in a war to salvage.

00:28.005 --> 00:30.785
Um, what has sort of become the, the jewel in the crown

00:30.785 --> 00:34.265
of France, Asian empires, that's, Vietnam,

00:34.285 --> 00:37.145
and, other states in, in French, Indo China,

00:37.165 --> 00:40.025
as we often refer to, say, Laos and, and Cambodia.

00:41.005 --> 00:43.705
Um, so French, French forces become engaged in the war there

00:43.705 --> 00:45.185
following Wari.

00:45.495 --> 00:48.705
It's, they're, fighting,

00:48.725 --> 00:51.945
an organization called the Viet Min, which is,

00:52.065 --> 00:55.905
a nationalist coalition, that is led

00:56.205 --> 00:57.225
by communists.

00:57.605 --> 01:00.705
Uh, the most famous name,

01:00.705 --> 01:03.465
amongst those leadership figures is Ho Chi Minh.

01:04.085 --> 01:06.105
Uh, and that organization aims

01:06.365 --> 01:09.625
to win Vietnam's independence from French colonial rule

01:09.645 --> 01:13.865
and establish a, a communist, state in that corner of,

01:13.925 --> 01:15.025
of Southeast Asia.

01:16.295 --> 01:20.615
Um, so France, France is primarily interested in kind of

01:21.435 --> 01:23.335
in sort of retaking control

01:23.335 --> 01:25.375
of its former colonial possession for the United States.

01:25.375 --> 01:28.455
They're viewing developments in Vietnam in the late 1940s

01:28.455 --> 01:30.375
through a Cold War lens.

01:30.515 --> 01:33.255
So, because this Vietnamese organization has communist

01:33.255 --> 01:36.415
leadership, they're seeing it, as the sort

01:36.415 --> 01:40.535
of latest attempt by Moscow, by the Soviet Union to,

01:40.535 --> 01:42.535
establish additional communist territories

01:42.535 --> 01:46.615
around the world in this global struggle for the fate of,

01:46.635 --> 01:47.735
of, of mankind.

01:48.555 --> 01:50.895
Um, US officials, despite that, are pretty

01:51.415 --> 01:54.015
reluctant initially to support France's war.

01:54.015 --> 01:57.455
They're pretty uncomfortable with the idea

01:57.455 --> 02:00.735
of helping a colonial power, reestablish its,

02:00.795 --> 02:02.055
its imperial control

02:02.155 --> 02:03.255
and preventing,

02:03.585 --> 02:06.215
indigenous people from establishing an independent state.

02:07.065 --> 02:09.725
But France is pretty savvy over the, over the late 1940s,

02:09.865 --> 02:13.925
and its 1950 in rebranding what was

02:13.925 --> 02:16.085
to them at least a colonial war as something

02:16.085 --> 02:18.485
that was more than that, as something that was,

02:18.565 --> 02:20.565
a Vietnamese civil war,

02:20.585 --> 02:23.205
and something that was also an episode in the, the Cold War.

02:23.345 --> 02:26.805
So they, they do that by branding Ho Chi Minh as a sort

02:26.805 --> 02:29.725
of servant of the Soviet Union as a servant of Moscow.

02:30.225 --> 02:33.005
Uh, and they also give, a degree of independence

02:33.005 --> 02:36.165
to an anti-communist Vietnamese state that was led by the,

02:36.165 --> 02:39.085
the former emperor of Vietnam Bao die.

02:39.585 --> 02:41.965
Uh, and those are the sort of major decisions

02:41.965 --> 02:43.965
that eventually lead the United States to agree to,

02:44.105 --> 02:47.485
to sponsor support France War in,

02:47.665 --> 02:50.685
in Vietnam from the beginning.

02:50.685 --> 02:52.845
That's a pretty tense diplomatic relationship,

02:52.915 --> 02:54.325
despite the fact that the United States

02:54.325 --> 02:56.605
and France have a shared goal preventing this,

02:56.605 --> 02:58.085
this communist takeover of this.

02:59.685 --> 03:02.825
Um, French officials are happy to take American money

03:03.165 --> 03:05.545
and American arms,

03:06.085 --> 03:09.345
but they're much less keen on those Americans

03:09.345 --> 03:12.145
who arrive in Vietnam to staff,

03:12.145 --> 03:13.625
and expanding diplomatic mission.

03:14.485 --> 03:16.825
Uh, and those other Americans that are drawn to,

03:17.005 --> 03:19.025
to the Southeast Asian colony for other reasons.

03:19.195 --> 03:21.825
Among those, which is, pertinent for,

03:21.825 --> 03:24.025
for this discussion are journalists.

03:24.025 --> 03:26.465
So we see a number of American journalists begin

03:26.465 --> 03:29.865
to stop in Vietnam to report, on this list,

03:30.195 --> 03:33.145
flashpoint in the, the Cold War, struggle.

03:34.405 --> 03:37.945
Um, so French officials accused these Americans of seeking

03:37.965 --> 03:40.985
to sort of undermine their control, and perhaps even to try

03:40.985 --> 03:43.905
and usurp France in, in Vietnam.

03:44.645 --> 03:47.225
Um, and these officials, these French officials,

03:47.745 --> 03:51.025
frequently threaten to abandon Vietnam to the Communists.

03:51.025 --> 03:55.065
So they threaten to withdraw their troops from Vietnam,

03:55.125 --> 03:58.345
and leave the Communist to, to conquer that country.

03:59.485 --> 04:02.465
Um, that threat is taken pretty seriously

04:02.485 --> 04:03.705
in the United States.

04:03.705 --> 04:06.345
There's growing opposition to the war in France.

04:06.565 --> 04:09.065
By the time we get to the 1950s, it's been given the,

04:09.065 --> 04:11.345
the name Lasal Ge the Dirty War.

04:12.325 --> 04:13.745
Um, and there's a lot of fatigue.

04:13.885 --> 04:15.825
So France is spending a lot of money on this war.

04:15.825 --> 04:16.945
It's losing a lot of men

04:17.005 --> 04:18.905
and in particular military officers.

04:19.365 --> 04:20.865
And so there is an increasing appetite

04:20.865 --> 04:22.145
for France to get out.

04:22.165 --> 04:24.305
So the Americans become increasingly concerned

04:24.305 --> 04:27.105
that they antagonize the French too much,

04:27.575 --> 04:28.905
that France might actually follow

04:28.905 --> 04:32.185
through on these repeated threats to, to withdraw.

04:32.565 --> 04:34.465
Um, and that would leave the United States in a very

04:34.785 --> 04:35.985
dangerous position.

04:36.645 --> 04:38.505
Uh, it would either mean that they would have to

04:39.365 --> 04:41.345
commit ground troops of their own

04:42.285 --> 04:44.185
to continue fighting this war against communism.

04:44.185 --> 04:46.465
And they're pretty reluctant to, to do so, not least

04:46.465 --> 04:48.705
because they've been fighting a war,

04:49.005 --> 04:51.105
or concurrently they're fighting a war in Korea.

04:52.005 --> 04:54.225
Um, so another Asian land war that will,

04:54.255 --> 04:55.745
that will be pretty damaging.

04:56.405 --> 04:58.385
Um, so the choices between that

04:58.485 --> 05:02.585
or just simply allowing the country to slip into communism,

05:02.645 --> 05:04.985
and that's at this point in the early 1950s, something

05:04.985 --> 05:08.065
that the United States is just not prepared to do, to give

05:08.605 --> 05:10.745
the communists and the Soviet Union in particular,

05:10.765 --> 05:14.225
in particular, another win in this ideological struggle.

05:14.765 --> 05:17.585
As you might expect, the vast majority

05:17.685 --> 05:21.665
of what's been written about American press coverage,

05:21.765 --> 05:23.785
of the, of the struggle for Vietnam was focused on the,

05:23.805 --> 05:28.545
the later American war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

05:28.545 --> 05:30.745
What we, as historians sometimes refer to

05:30.745 --> 05:33.665
as the second though, China War was obviously the war

05:33.665 --> 05:35.545
where American troops are doing a lot of the fighting

05:35.885 --> 05:37.585
and dying,

05:37.645 --> 05:41.545
and where there are various accusations made,

05:41.575 --> 05:45.825
that the media are sabotaging the US war effort

05:45.905 --> 05:50.025
by writing too critically, too pessimistically, about

05:50.025 --> 05:52.305
what the United States is, is, is doing there.

05:52.365 --> 05:53.505
So quite naturally, a lot

05:53.505 --> 05:55.025
of the attention from historians are sort

05:55.025 --> 05:56.145
of gravitated to that later,

05:56.725 --> 05:58.125
Uh, American war, particularly

05:58.125 --> 06:00.285
because of a lot of the, the scholars writing on the subject

06:00.315 --> 06:02.005
tend to be from the, from the United States.

06:03.155 --> 06:06.125
There's been much less written on this earlier,

06:06.465 --> 06:08.325
war in Vietnam to the first Indo China War,

06:08.325 --> 06:10.965
the Franco Viet Men War that I'm focusing on.

06:11.705 --> 06:15.485
Um, and what has been written tends to describe

06:16.015 --> 06:18.445
press coverage as a bit of a non-event, as a bit

06:18.445 --> 06:19.565
of a, a non-story.

06:20.465 --> 06:23.285
Um, and, and what those historians are really pointing to

06:23.285 --> 06:27.525
that suggested that essentially that journalists tended

06:27.525 --> 06:30.765
to align themselves quite closely with the position

06:30.765 --> 06:33.165
of the US government that they're reporting

06:34.285 --> 06:36.125
actually worked in various ways to sort

06:36.125 --> 06:39.045
of support us diplomacy in Vietnam.

06:39.065 --> 06:40.405
And that therefore, there's just not really

06:40.445 --> 06:41.525
a lot to, to talk about.

06:42.395 --> 06:44.015
Um,

06:44.235 --> 06:47.055
and they feel that there's historians that have that kind

06:47.055 --> 06:49.455
of come before me and written on this topic have, have come

06:49.455 --> 06:53.975
to that conclusion largely because, of notions of a kind

06:53.975 --> 06:56.255
of anti-communist consensus in the United States,

06:56.285 --> 06:57.815
that journalists tended to view

06:58.475 --> 07:01.375
global developments in the same Cold War lens

07:01.375 --> 07:04.635
as US policy makers, and

07:04.635 --> 07:06.675
therefore tended to be quite supportive of US efforts

07:06.735 --> 07:09.715
to contain communist expansion wherever it might arise.

07:10.655 --> 07:12.035
Um, and that actually in their reports,

07:12.035 --> 07:13.315
they've been pretty optimistic

07:13.735 --> 07:16.795
and, critical in the way that they reported on French

07:17.385 --> 07:18.955
efforts there, that they were happy

07:19.135 --> 07:21.595
to simply take French policymakers

07:21.595 --> 07:23.435
and American policymakers word for it.

07:24.225 --> 07:26.885
Um, and also that they, they kinda lacked,

07:26.885 --> 07:28.605
because this was a part

07:28.605 --> 07:30.685
of the world in which the United States had very little

07:30.755 --> 07:32.605
involvement prior to 1950.

07:33.625 --> 07:37.885
Um, journalistic organizations didn't have a huge amount

07:37.885 --> 07:41.805
of resources to dedicate to this story, particularly given

07:41.805 --> 07:44.005
that whilst the United States was becoming more involved,

07:44.005 --> 07:45.365
it wasn't yet at the, at the stage

07:45.365 --> 07:47.645
that would be in the sixties and seventies with American

07:48.425 --> 07:51.085
ground troops, doing the, doing the fighting.

07:51.265 --> 07:55.285
So it often meant that, the journalists sort of stopping

07:55.385 --> 07:57.645
by for a day or two here or there, and

07:57.645 --> 08:00.525
therefore that they weren't able to develop the contacts

08:00.825 --> 08:02.445
and insights that would allow them

08:02.445 --> 08:04.565
to more consistently challenge the sort

08:04.565 --> 08:07.685
of established narrative about, about the French War.

08:08.975 --> 08:13.415
Um, so in, in short, I guess their,

08:13.415 --> 08:15.855
their conclusion has been that news reporting was an issue

08:15.855 --> 08:18.455
that the US government gave little real thought about,

08:18.455 --> 08:20.375
because journalists were sort of onside

08:20.515 --> 08:24.095
and cooperating, with the US government in a, in a way

08:24.095 --> 08:27.015
that Washington felt was beneficial for its diplomatic,

08:27.195 --> 08:28.215
objectives.

08:29.205 --> 08:30.905
Um, so that's kind of existing position.

08:30.905 --> 08:34.065
The, the article also kind of taps into just,

08:34.095 --> 08:36.705
just in its focus on, on, on journalism, a sort

08:36.705 --> 08:37.745
of shift over the last 20

08:37.845 --> 08:41.705
or 30 years away from simply understanding the Cold War in

08:42.105 --> 08:43.745
military terms as this sort of nuclear

08:43.745 --> 08:47.065
or military standoff between the United States

08:47.085 --> 08:49.785
and the Soviet Union that sort of conjures images of,

08:49.785 --> 08:51.025
you know, missile crisis

08:51.445 --> 08:54.905
or, the Berlin Wall checkpoint, Charlie, all these kind

08:54.905 --> 08:57.645
of, of iconic images that we have, the, the Cold War very

08:58.375 --> 09:00.085
gravitated around this notion of a,

09:00.285 --> 09:01.365
a military confrontation.

09:01.365 --> 09:02.925
And actually historians over the last 20

09:02.925 --> 09:05.925
or 30 years have started to consider in, in,

09:05.945 --> 09:10.205
in more depth the Cold War as a battle of ideas,

09:10.305 --> 09:14.005
and as a struggle in which non-state actors, so actors

09:14.145 --> 09:17.585
who are not official government representatives,

09:18.335 --> 09:20.305
also played a, a critical role.

09:20.805 --> 09:23.545
Uh, and so one of the places that historians have been doing

09:23.545 --> 09:26.305
that is, is, is in focusing on journalists

09:26.525 --> 09:30.665
and media as part of this, this wider cohort struggle,

09:31.625 --> 09:33.345
contrary to what had been written before.

09:33.565 --> 09:36.225
The article reveals that US officials

09:36.765 --> 09:39.545
did care about American media reporting from Vietnam,

09:39.545 --> 09:42.225
but actually they treated it very, very seriously

09:43.055 --> 09:45.305
dedicated lots of time,

09:45.325 --> 09:49.345
and energy into trying into trying to ensure that

09:49.345 --> 09:51.985
what American journalists, reported

09:52.635 --> 09:55.745
would help us diplomatic objectives in Vietnam.

09:55.745 --> 09:59.145
That it would largely present as all rosy positive,

09:59.315 --> 10:02.705
optimistic impression of what the French were well to.

10:03.005 --> 10:06.585
And that that in doing so, would give France fewer options

10:06.685 --> 10:09.265
to say, well, with enough with this war,

10:09.325 --> 10:10.505
you've annoyed us too much.

10:11.125 --> 10:12.625
We are gonna leave and, and let you deal

10:12.625 --> 10:13.745
with the, the consequences.

10:14.805 --> 10:16.345
So that's the sort of central thrust

10:16.365 --> 10:19.105
of the article really is to, is to, is to showcase that it,

10:19.165 --> 10:23.385
it did matter, and it mattered a number of ways.

10:23.385 --> 10:25.665
They, American officials really concerned

10:26.255 --> 10:27.865
that it could do three things.

10:28.025 --> 10:29.825
A critical and pessimistic journalistic

10:29.825 --> 10:31.065
reporting of the war could do three things.

10:31.095 --> 10:34.745
Firstly, is that it could undermine French military morale

10:35.525 --> 10:37.025
if a, if representatives

10:37.025 --> 10:39.705
of a so-called ally were criticizing

10:39.705 --> 10:42.505
or were pessimistic about French chances of success there.

10:43.345 --> 10:45.585
Secondly, that it could simply antagonize the,

10:45.725 --> 10:48.665
the French create fissures,

10:48.665 --> 10:51.305
additional tensions in the Franco American relationship

10:51.305 --> 10:53.345
that would make France more likely

10:53.685 --> 10:55.625
to consider an exit from Vietnam.

10:56.635 --> 10:59.335
Um, and finally that it would have sort

10:59.335 --> 11:01.615
of domestic implications in the United States that it might

11:02.165 --> 11:05.775
push Congress who are funding

11:06.235 --> 11:10.375
and arming the French War effort to reconsider the aid

11:10.375 --> 11:11.695
that they were apportioning to,

11:11.875 --> 11:13.975
to the French in, in Vietnam.

11:14.075 --> 11:18.485
So they were concerned that that in those ways, that the war

11:19.065 --> 11:21.805
for Vietnam could be lost in the, in the pages

11:21.805 --> 11:25.165
of American newspapers and magazines.

11:25.225 --> 11:27.645
And it mattered what was printed there almost as much

11:27.645 --> 11:30.085
as it mattered what was happening in the, in the fighting

11:30.315 --> 11:33.205
between the, the French and the Vietnamese, communists.

11:34.705 --> 11:36.885
Um, they thought like that for a number of reasons.

11:37.075 --> 11:38.965
They took press press coverage

11:38.995 --> 11:40.245
seriously for a number of reasons.

11:41.185 --> 11:45.085
One of those is the red scare, the second red scare.

11:45.265 --> 11:49.965
So sort of increasing concerns about communist subversion in

11:49.965 --> 11:53.005
the United States, and in particular, whether

11:53.045 --> 11:56.405
or not, news companies, magazines,

11:56.405 --> 12:00.245
newspapers had been infiltrated by communist agents.

12:01.035 --> 12:03.205
They were aware of the press's influence

12:03.225 --> 12:05.325
and power to shape public opinion.

12:05.385 --> 12:10.165
So they, they saw that as a particular, weak spa

12:10.315 --> 12:13.245
that might be exploited by communist agents.

12:14.025 --> 12:16.125
Um, so they're fearful that, that, that

12:16.125 --> 12:17.725
that might be the case here.

12:18.465 --> 12:20.325
Um, and the other major event that that sort

12:20.325 --> 12:22.405
of factored into their consideration was the, the,

12:22.405 --> 12:25.645
so-called Fall of China, which was the victory of

12:26.155 --> 12:29.565
Macon's communist forces in the Chinese Civil War in,

12:29.585 --> 12:31.045
in 1949.

12:31.865 --> 12:35.005
Um, and there were concerns even by the early 1950s

12:35.075 --> 12:37.595
that actually Mao's victory

12:37.935 --> 12:41.155
and the defeat of the anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek,

12:41.175 --> 12:43.755
who was, United States' major ally in China,

12:44.095 --> 12:46.715
had been brought about in part by critical

12:47.295 --> 12:50.155
and pessimistic American press reporting that they'd sort

12:50.155 --> 12:51.875
of undermined him and helped

12:51.875 --> 12:53.555
to facilitate a communist victory.

12:53.615 --> 12:54.915
And the Americans were concerned

12:54.915 --> 12:57.675
that the same thing might repeat itself in the latest

12:58.265 --> 13:01.075
Cold War, battleground in in Indo China.

13:02.215 --> 13:04.195
Um, so these were the two kind of major events.

13:04.195 --> 13:06.155
And the, the other thing that, that, that mattered

13:06.155 --> 13:08.395
and why they took it so seriously was it just the French

13:08.625 --> 13:09.795
kept complaining about it.

13:09.905 --> 13:13.515
They frequently called in to the offices

13:13.615 --> 13:17.435
of the US diplomatic mission, to, to complain about,

13:17.855 --> 13:19.435
you know, so-called inflammatory

13:19.455 --> 13:21.435
or critical press reporting.

13:21.455 --> 13:24.195
So because the French were constantly reminding these

13:24.635 --> 13:26.755
American officials that it was irritating them

13:26.815 --> 13:29.835
and that it might have consequences on French morale,

13:29.895 --> 13:31.675
on French political opinion back home,

13:32.415 --> 13:34.755
the Americans were sort of corralled into thinking that,

13:34.945 --> 13:37.395
okay, we need to take press reporting seriously

13:37.395 --> 13:39.915
because this is something that can, that can have a, a,

13:39.915 --> 13:42.915
a tangible, impact on the, the outcome in Vietnam.

13:43.535 --> 13:45.715
Uh, whether or not this, this, this Southeast Asian,

13:45.715 --> 13:47.955
former Southeast Asian colony could be salvaged from,

13:48.025 --> 13:49.035
from, from communism.

13:50.335 --> 13:52.235
Uh, and so the article sort of sketches out

13:53.665 --> 13:56.065
American reporting, from Vietnam

13:56.125 --> 13:59.625
and looks at the various ways that us diplomats sort

13:59.625 --> 14:02.705
to manage, American reporting.

14:02.885 --> 14:06.585
So talks about things like briefing staff,

14:06.585 --> 14:09.105
and journalists about us diplomatic priorities,

14:09.765 --> 14:13.305
and forcing them to think about whether what you say or do

14:13.405 --> 14:17.585
or write is gonna have any harmful effects on us diplomatic

14:17.585 --> 14:19.705
objectives, whether it's gonna undermine them in any way.

14:20.605 --> 14:22.785
Um, they also move to, to woo

14:22.805 --> 14:25.305
or to butter up, journalists.

14:25.565 --> 14:28.225
So, entertaining them at their home, taking 'em out

14:28.225 --> 14:31.825
for dinner, doing them various favors of sorts as a way

14:31.825 --> 14:33.505
to encourage them to, to write in ways

14:33.505 --> 14:34.865
that would be beneficial to us.

14:35.045 --> 14:38.665
Um, objectives. Um, we also sort see more kind

14:38.665 --> 14:42.745
of coercive activities where they intervene with editors

14:42.765 --> 14:45.465
so they're aware that a piece is, has been written

14:45.645 --> 14:47.025
and that it might be published,

14:47.025 --> 14:49.665
and that it's likely to have harmful repercussions.

14:50.325 --> 14:52.525
Uh, and so they intervened attempt to intervene

14:52.525 --> 14:54.125
with various editors to kill the story

14:54.185 --> 14:57.205
before it makes its way into the, into the public realm.

14:58.225 --> 15:00.445
Um, and the other thing they do is that they,

15:00.515 --> 15:03.725
they don't see journalists as solely responsible

15:04.505 --> 15:06.565
for writing critical or pessimistic pieces.

15:06.565 --> 15:09.605
They actually feel that some of the time, at least,

15:09.605 --> 15:13.085
that actually the French are, are at fault for any, any

15:13.645 --> 15:15.445
damaging journalism that's produced.

15:15.465 --> 15:17.205
And that's because they feel the French is,

15:17.705 --> 15:20.525
as the French are placed, too restrictive,

15:20.585 --> 15:23.325
or too oppressive restrictions on press reporting.

15:23.385 --> 15:26.565
So reducing the places that journalists could travel to,

15:26.865 --> 15:30.645
the people that they could talk to, intervening

15:30.645 --> 15:31.805
to tell them what they could

15:31.805 --> 15:34.885
and couldn't published, not not allowing things to pass

15:34.885 --> 15:37.005
through sensors that back in the

15:37.005 --> 15:38.085
United States would be fine.

15:38.105 --> 15:40.365
And there was an attempt there by,

15:40.425 --> 15:42.845
US government officials to push fronts than liberalize

15:43.545 --> 15:45.765
its attitude to, to managing the press.

15:45.785 --> 15:48.805
And their hope was that a more liberal French press policy

15:49.255 --> 15:52.085
would make these journalists more open to, more receptive

15:52.085 --> 15:55.125
to French, the French position on the war, and

15:55.125 --> 15:57.005
therefore more likely to publish pieces that will,

15:57.035 --> 15:59.365
that will help you as diplomatic objectives rather than,

15:59.465 --> 16:00.565
rather than damage them.

16:01.145 --> 16:03.495
So I think there are a number of things

16:03.495 --> 16:06.295
that we can draw from this, this sort of episode.

16:07.815 --> 16:10.675
One is the limits to us

16:11.245 --> 16:13.075
power in the, the Cold War.

16:13.335 --> 16:16.905
Um, I mentioned just, just a minute ago, US hopes

16:16.905 --> 16:19.785
of pushing France to liberalize its press policy in Vietnam

16:19.785 --> 16:22.345
in ways that would be beneficial to us objectives.

16:22.345 --> 16:24.105
Those, those efforts largely fail.

16:24.725 --> 16:28.025
The French are pretty resistant to us efforts to, to,

16:28.045 --> 16:29.985
to move in that, that region.

16:30.325 --> 16:31.785
Um, and that's, and that's largely

16:31.785 --> 16:35.105
because Paris is aware that the Americans need them.

16:35.535 --> 16:37.545
They know that they know

16:37.545 --> 16:39.585
that the United States want French forces

16:39.605 --> 16:41.825
to do the fighting in dying in Vietnam, and

16:41.825 --> 16:44.225
therefore they know that they can get away with ignoring

16:44.965 --> 16:47.985
us suggestions without any real consequences.

16:48.685 --> 16:50.945
Um, America, the Americans both need France

16:50.945 --> 16:53.505
to fight in Vietnam, but they also need,

16:53.505 --> 16:55.865
French support in Western Europe,

16:56.315 --> 17:00.025
where they're concerned about Soviet expansion,

17:00.025 --> 17:01.945
from Eastern Europe into, into Western Europe.

17:02.165 --> 17:03.905
And there's a large

17:04.485 --> 17:06.905
and quite powerful communist party in France itself.

17:06.925 --> 17:08.105
So they're sort of concerned

17:08.615 --> 17:11.385
that France itself might become a communist state.

17:11.405 --> 17:13.065
So they feel like there, there's a need there

17:13.065 --> 17:14.305
to keep France happy,

17:14.965 --> 17:17.985
and that allows them to resist us pressure

17:17.985 --> 17:19.465
to liberalize their press policy.

17:19.725 --> 17:22.145
So in some ways, the article speaks to the limits,

17:22.205 --> 17:23.785
to us power in the Early Cold War

17:23.785 --> 17:26.225
and the agency that is enjoyed

17:26.245 --> 17:29.185
by junior actors in the Cold War, you know, nation states

17:29.185 --> 17:30.465
that don't often receive a lot

17:30.465 --> 17:33.985
of attention when we think about the, the kind of dynamics

17:33.985 --> 17:35.105
of the, the Cold War.

17:36.485 --> 17:38.505
Um, I think one of the other things that's important is

17:38.505 --> 17:40.945
that we see here the importance

17:41.735 --> 17:44.905
that US officials imbued in the actions

17:44.965 --> 17:48.825
and behaviors of a quite diverse cast of characters,

17:48.935 --> 17:52.045
often figures that weren't officially employed

17:52.105 --> 17:54.245
by the US government,

17:54.955 --> 17:58.205
that was seemingly insignificant maybe to US diplomacy,

17:58.205 --> 18:01.425
but actually US officials treated these figures,

18:01.495 --> 18:02.585
with great, great care

18:02.605 --> 18:06.625
and felt that they, they held the potential to,

18:07.245 --> 18:09.545
to assist the United States in either winning

18:09.645 --> 18:13.865
or losing this Cold War struggle in, in, in Southeast Asia.

18:14.525 --> 18:16.865
Um, so we get a bit of a sense there of the importance

18:16.865 --> 18:21.045
of non-state actors about how individuals seemingly

18:21.605 --> 18:23.605
unimportant could be seen as ambassadors

18:23.605 --> 18:24.685
of the United States,

18:24.715 --> 18:26.765
even if they weren't officially employed by,

18:26.945 --> 18:28.245
by the US government.

18:30.065 --> 18:33.775
Um, I guess the other, the other thing that may,

18:33.805 --> 18:38.165
that comes out of the piece is that one

18:38.165 --> 18:41.005
of the reasons why the United States invested so much time

18:41.025 --> 18:42.645
and effort in managing the press is

18:42.645 --> 18:44.605
because it was one of the few places

18:44.655 --> 18:47.445
where they felt they could have a, a tangible impact

18:48.105 --> 18:49.925
on developments in, in Vietnam.

18:50.665 --> 18:53.965
Um, the aid and, and, and money that they

18:54.165 --> 18:57.665
provided to the French seemingly, was, was not enough

18:57.665 --> 18:59.585
to tip the sort of balance of the military struggle.

18:59.845 --> 19:03.185
Um, the war was, was largely a stalemate.

19:03.685 --> 19:05.865
Uh, and in 1954, France suffers a,

19:05.905 --> 19:09.385
a humiliating defeat in northwest Vietnam at a place called

19:09.725 --> 19:11.305
Dmb fu,

19:11.305 --> 19:14.385
which eventually facilitates a French withdrawal from the,

19:14.385 --> 19:17.265
from the country and a, a new beginning, a new, a new stage

19:17.265 --> 19:20.265
of the, the struggle for Vietnam that didn't involve,

19:20.445 --> 19:22.185
the French Empire.

19:23.085 --> 19:24.955
Um, and

19:24.955 --> 19:27.475
because, so US military aid doesn't really have

19:27.475 --> 19:28.555
an effect on the war that much.

19:28.555 --> 19:29.675
It helps France keep going,

19:29.695 --> 19:32.515
but it ultimately doesn't enable them to be successful.

19:33.215 --> 19:35.275
And as, as I've mentioned earlier, France is also

19:35.855 --> 19:37.315
not particularly receptive

19:37.695 --> 19:39.755
to American intrusion in other aspects

19:39.775 --> 19:41.235
of the situation of Vietnam.

19:41.235 --> 19:42.675
So they're not willing to listen

19:42.835 --> 19:44.675
to American ideas about military strategy

19:45.535 --> 19:48.035
or providing additional independence

19:48.035 --> 19:49.755
to this anti-communist Vietnamese government.

19:50.455 --> 19:51.755
Um, and so in the end,

19:51.775 --> 19:53.595
things like press management become important

19:53.835 --> 19:54.835
'cause it is one of the few places

19:54.835 --> 19:57.755
where they feel like they can actually have an impact on the

19:58.115 --> 19:59.795
situation in, in Vietnam.

20:00.615 --> 20:02.835
Um, so it's, I think this story is important

20:02.835 --> 20:04.035
for, for that reason as well.

20:04.035 --> 20:08.115
It gives us a sense of what American officials believed

20:08.335 --> 20:12.145
to be possible in, in Vietnam and some of the limits,

20:12.205 --> 20:14.425
and again, restrictions of what they felt they were able

20:14.425 --> 20:17.905
to achieve at a moment in time in which they are the

20:17.905 --> 20:19.225
world's sole regiment.

20:19.225 --> 20:22.025
You know, they're an enormously powerful military

20:22.025 --> 20:23.945
and economic power by the time we get into the mid

20:24.625 --> 20:27.465
20th century, but there are still things that they're unable

20:27.485 --> 20:31.185
to do, and it seems like US officials recognized that.

20:32.555 --> 20:34.495
Um, and then the final thing I would say in terms of sort

20:34.495 --> 20:37.675
of implications and wider findings is

20:37.675 --> 20:40.115
that US officials did enjoy some success in

20:40.395 --> 20:41.795
managing, managing the press.

20:42.815 --> 20:47.095
Um, journalists were often quite receptive to US government,

20:47.345 --> 20:49.565
efforts to, to get 'em right about, to get 'em

20:49.565 --> 20:51.325
to write about the war in a particular way.

20:52.215 --> 20:55.955
Um, but there were moments where these systems,

20:56.205 --> 20:58.515
these interventions failed and were critical

20:58.515 --> 21:02.395
and pessimistic stories, slipped by,

21:02.415 --> 21:05.475
and did inflict damage on the Franco America relationship

21:05.815 --> 21:09.675
and cause genuine concern about the future of us,

21:09.725 --> 21:11.875
objectives in, in Vietnam and whether

21:11.875 --> 21:14.235
or not Vietnam would fall to, to communism.

21:14.235 --> 21:17.355
And, and the reason for that is largely relates

21:17.375 --> 21:18.555
to journalistic culture

21:18.895 --> 21:21.595
and this notion of objective journalism that is,

21:21.595 --> 21:24.155
that journalists would rely primarily

21:24.495 --> 21:27.155
for their information on official government sources.

21:28.015 --> 21:29.275
And so it meant for the large part

21:29.275 --> 21:31.835
that actually if government figures were largely positive,

21:32.455 --> 21:34.555
and uncritical in their reading of the French, that

21:34.555 --> 21:36.275
that could, that could help the United States

21:36.275 --> 21:37.555
government in its management of the press.

21:38.255 --> 21:40.515
But the problem was that the war wasn't going particularly

21:40.515 --> 21:43.275
well, as I said, it entered a, a stalemate.

21:43.655 --> 21:46.315
And so there were, if journalists looked hard enough,

21:46.625 --> 21:48.715
officials who were willing to go on the record

21:49.295 --> 21:51.995
and speak of the war in a more critical and pessimistic way

21:51.995 --> 21:53.075
and ways, and that

21:53.075 --> 21:55.275
therefore meant that when they published stories

21:55.305 --> 21:57.435
with these sources, they were able to better resist

21:57.975 --> 22:00.555
the efforts of the US government to, to get 'em

22:00.555 --> 22:03.915
to kill a story which might be damaging to us,

22:04.085 --> 22:05.515
diplomatic objectives.

22:07.045 --> 22:09.825
In terms of future research, there are a, a few things

22:09.825 --> 22:12.185
that I'm looking at developing further from this piece.

22:12.245 --> 22:15.705
One, one of these is the kind

22:15.705 --> 22:18.185
of cultural environment in which journalists

22:18.185 --> 22:20.225
and government officials were brought up.

22:21.155 --> 22:24.375
Um, I think there's a growing sense in the literature

22:24.445 --> 22:25.935
that they shared.

22:26.095 --> 22:30.655
A lot of spaces were part of many of the same networks,

22:30.655 --> 22:31.895
you know, brought up in the same schools,

22:31.995 --> 22:34.535
the same universities, often drawn from the same class.

22:35.475 --> 22:39.295
You have instances in Vietnam where influential columnists,

22:39.515 --> 22:42.295
so people like Joseph Op, are related

22:42.595 --> 22:44.295
to figures in the US mission.

22:44.315 --> 22:47.455
So there's some, family connections there at work.

22:47.555 --> 22:51.255
So I'd be interested in, in sort of probing the degree

22:51.275 --> 22:55.415
to which those networks, those cultures shaped us efforts

22:55.415 --> 22:56.935
to try and manage the press and in,

22:56.955 --> 23:00.375
and in, in large part, encouraged American journalists

23:00.395 --> 23:04.575
to align themselves with US diplomatic, objectives

23:04.575 --> 23:07.015
because they were often talking from the same position

23:07.015 --> 23:08.695
and from the same places as many

23:08.695 --> 23:11.655
of their counterparts within the, within the US government.

"Initial American Involvement in Vietnam: Context and Consequences in the Early 1950s"

00:00:00 - So the article is, focuses on the beginning of major US involvement in Vietnam during the early 1950s. this is when the United States sort of first becomes an active participant in the struggle for, for Vietnam. It makes a very fateful decision in 1950 to provide military, and economic support to the, to French imperial forces that are at that point engaged in a war to salvage. what has sort of become the, the jewel in the crown of France, Asian empires, that's, Vietnam, and, other states in, in French, Indo China, as we often refer to, say, Laos and, and Cambodia. so French, French forces become engaged in the war there
00:00:45 - It's, they're, fighting, an organization called the Viet Min, which is, a nationalist coalition, that is led by communists. the most famous name, amongst those leadership figures is Ho Chi Minh. and that organization aims to win Vietnam's independence from French colonial rule and establish a, a communist, state in that corner of, of Southeast Asia. so France, France is primarily interested in kind of in sort of retaking control of its former colonial possession for the United States.
00:01:28 - through a Cold War lens. So, because this Vietnamese organization has communist leadership, they're seeing it, as the sort of latest attempt by Moscow, by the Soviet Union to, establish additional communist territories around the world in this global struggle for the fate of, of, of mankind. US officials, despite that, are pretty reluctant initially to support France's war. They're pretty uncomfortable with the idea of helping a colonial power, reestablish its, its imperial control and preventing, indigenous people from establishing an independent state.
00:02:09 - and its 1950 in rebranding what was to them at least a colonial war as something that was more than that, as something that was, a Vietnamese civil war, and something that was also an episode in the, the Cold War. So they, they do that by branding Ho Chi Minh as a sort of servant of the Soviet Union as a servant of Moscow. and they also give, a degree of independence to an anti-communist Vietnamese state that was led by the, the former emperor of Vietnam Bao die. and those are the sort of major decisions that eventually lead the United States to agree to, to sponsor support France War in,
00:02:50 - That's a pretty tense diplomatic relationship, despite the fact that the United States and France have a shared goal preventing this, this communist takeover of this. French officials are happy to take American money and American arms, but they're much less keen on those Americans who arrive in Vietnam to staff, and expanding diplomatic mission. and those other Americans that are drawn to, to the Southeast Asian colony for other reasons. Among those, which is, pertinent for, for this discussion are journalists. So we see a number of American journalists begin to stop in Vietnam to report, on this list,
00:03:34 - so French officials accused these Americans of seeking to sort of undermine their control, and perhaps even to try and usurp France in, in Vietnam. and these officials, these French officials, frequently threaten to abandon Vietnam to the Communists. So they threaten to withdraw their troops from Vietnam, and leave the Communist to, to conquer that country. that threat is taken pretty seriously in the United States. There's growing opposition to the war in France. By the time we get to the 1950s, it's been given the, the name Lasal Ge the Dirty War.

"French Withdrawal Threats and U.S. Concerns in the Early Vietnam Conflict"

00:04:13 - So France is spending a lot of money on this war. It's losing a lot of men and in particular military officers. And so there is an increasing appetite for France to get out. So the Americans become increasingly concerned that they antagonize the French too much, that France might actually follow through on these repeated threats to, to withdraw. and that would leave the United States in a very dangerous position. it would either mean that they would have to commit ground troops of their own to continue fighting this war against communism. And they're pretty reluctant to, to do so, not least because they've been fighting a war, or concurrently they're fighting a war in Korea. so another Asian land war that will,
00:04:56 - so the choices between that or just simply allowing the country to slip into communism, and that's at this point in the early 1950s, something that the United States is just not prepared to do, to give the communists and the Soviet Union in particular, in particular, another win in this ideological struggle. As you might expect, the vast majority of what's been written about American press coverage, of the, of the struggle for Vietnam was focused on the, the later American war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. What we, as historians sometimes refer to as the second though, China War was obviously the war where American troops are doing a lot of the fighting
00:05:37 - and where there are various accusations made, that the media are sabotaging the US war effort by writing too critically, too pessimistically, about what the United States is, is, is doing there. So quite naturally, a lot of the attention from historians are sort of gravitated to that later, American war, particularly because of a lot of the, the scholars writing on the subject tend to be from the, from the United States. There's been much less written on this earlier, war in Vietnam to the first Indo China War, the Franco Viet Men War that I'm focusing on. and what has been written tends to describe
00:06:18 - of a, a non-story. and, and what those historians are really pointing to that suggested that essentially that journalists tended to align themselves quite closely with the position of the US government that they're reporting actually worked in various ways to sort of support us diplomacy in Vietnam. And that therefore, there's just not really a lot to, to talk about. and they feel that there's historians that have that kind of come before me and written on this topic have, have come to that conclusion largely because, of notions of a kind of anti-communist consensus in the United States,
00:06:58 - global developments in the same Cold War lens as US policy makers, and therefore tended to be quite supportive of US efforts to contain communist expansion wherever it might arise. and that actually in their reports, they've been pretty optimistic and, critical in the way that they reported on French efforts there, that they were happy to simply take French policymakers and American policymakers word for it. and also that they, they kinda lacked, because this was a part of the world in which the United States had very little involvement prior to 1950. journalistic organizations didn't have a huge amount
00:07:41 - that whilst the United States was becoming more involved, it wasn't yet at the, at the stage that would be in the sixties and seventies with American ground troops, doing the, doing the fighting. So it often meant that, the journalists sort of stopping by for a day or two here or there, and therefore that they weren't able to develop the contacts and insights that would allow them to more consistently challenge the sort of established narrative about, about the French War. so in, in short, I guess their, their conclusion has been that news reporting was an issue that the US government gave little real thought about,

"Journalism and Diplomacy: The Role of Media in Cold War Strategies"

00:08:20 - and cooperating, with the US government in a, in a way that Washington felt was beneficial for its diplomatic, objectives. so that's kind of existing position. The, the article also kind of taps into just, just in its focus on, on, on journalism, a sort of shift over the last 20 or 30 years away from simply understanding the Cold War in military terms as this sort of nuclear or military standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union that sort of conjures images of, you know, missile crisis or, the Berlin Wall checkpoint, Charlie, all these kind of, of iconic images that we have, the, the Cold War very gravitated around this notion of a,
00:09:01 - And actually historians over the last 20 or 30 years have started to consider in, in, in more depth the Cold War as a battle of ideas, and as a struggle in which non-state actors, so actors who are not official government representatives, also played a, a critical role. and so one of the places that historians have been doing that is, is, is in focusing on journalists and media as part of this, this wider cohort struggle, contrary to what had been written before. The article reveals that US officials did care about American media reporting from Vietnam, but actually they treated it very, very seriously
00:09:45 - and energy into trying into trying to ensure that what American journalists, reported would help us diplomatic objectives in Vietnam. That it would largely present as all rosy positive, optimistic impression of what the French were well to. And that that in doing so, would give France fewer options to say, well, with enough with this war, you've annoyed us too much. We are gonna leave and, and let you deal with the, the consequences. So that's the sort of central thrust of the article really is to, is to, is to showcase that it, it did matter, and it mattered a number of ways.
00:10:26 - that it could do three things. A critical and pessimistic journalistic reporting of the war could do three things. Firstly, is that it could undermine French military morale if a, if representatives of a so-called ally were criticizing or were pessimistic about French chances of success there. Secondly, that it could simply antagonize the, the French create fissures, additional tensions in the Franco American relationship that would make France more likely to consider an exit from Vietnam. and finally that it would have sort of domestic implications in the United States that it might push Congress who are funding
00:11:10 - that they were apportioning to, to the French in, in Vietnam. So they were concerned that that in those ways, that the war for Vietnam could be lost in the, in the pages of American newspapers and magazines. And it mattered what was printed there almost as much as it mattered what was happening in the, in the fighting between the, the French and the Vietnamese, communists. they thought like that for a number of reasons. They took press press coverage seriously for a number of reasons. One of those is the red scare, the second red scare. So sort of increasing concerns about communist subversion in
00:11:53 - or not, news companies, magazines, newspapers had been infiltrated by communist agents. They were aware of the press's influence and power to shape public opinion. So they, they saw that as a particular, weak spa that might be exploited by communist agents. so they're fearful that, that, that that might be the case here. and the other major event that that sort of factored into their consideration was the, the, so-called Fall of China, which was the victory of Macon's communist forces in the Chinese Civil War in, in 1949.

"Press Influence and Diplomatic Challenges: The U.S. Response to Reporting on the Vietnam Conflict"

00:12:35 - that actually Mao's victory and the defeat of the anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek, who was, United States' major ally in China, had been brought about in part by critical and pessimistic American press reporting that they'd sort of undermined him and helped to facilitate a communist victory. And the Americans were concerned that the same thing might repeat itself in the latest Cold War, battleground in in Indo China. so these were the two kind of major events. And the, the other thing that, that, that mattered and why they took it so seriously was it just the French kept complaining about it. They frequently called in to the offices
00:13:17 - you know, so-called inflammatory or critical press reporting. So because the French were constantly reminding these American officials that it was irritating them and that it might have consequences on French morale, on French political opinion back home, the Americans were sort of corralled into thinking that, okay, we need to take press reporting seriously because this is something that can, that can have a, a, a tangible, impact on the, the outcome in Vietnam. whether or not this, this, this Southeast Asian, former Southeast Asian colony could be salvaged from, from, from communism. and so the article sort of sketches out
00:13:56 - and looks at the various ways that us diplomats sort to manage, American reporting. So talks about things like briefing staff, and journalists about us diplomatic priorities, and forcing them to think about whether what you say or do or write is gonna have any harmful effects on us diplomatic objectives, whether it's gonna undermine them in any way. they also move to, to woo or to butter up, journalists. So, entertaining them at their home, taking 'em out for dinner, doing them various favors of sorts as a way to encourage them to, to write in ways that would be beneficial to us.
00:14:38 - of coercive activities where they intervene with editors so they're aware that a piece is, has been written and that it might be published, and that it's likely to have harmful repercussions. and so they intervened attempt to intervene with various editors to kill the story before it makes its way into the, into the public realm. and the other thing they do is that they, they don't see journalists as solely responsible for writing critical or pessimistic pieces. They actually feel that some of the time, at least, that actually the French are, are at fault for any, any damaging journalism that's produced.
00:15:17 - as the French are placed, too restrictive, or too oppressive restrictions on press reporting. So reducing the places that journalists could travel to, the people that they could talk to, intervening to tell them what they could and couldn't published, not not allowing things to pass through sensors that back in the United States would be fine. And there was an attempt there by, US government officials to push fronts than liberalize its attitude to, to managing the press. And their hope was that a more liberal French press policy would make these journalists more open to, more receptive to French, the French position on the war, and therefore more likely to publish pieces that will,
00:15:59 - rather than damage them. So I think there are a number of things that we can draw from this, this sort of episode. One is the limits to us power in the, the Cold War. I mentioned just, just a minute ago, US hopes of pushing France to liberalize its press policy in Vietnam in ways that would be beneficial to us objectives. Those, those efforts largely fail. The French are pretty resistant to us efforts to, to, to move in that, that region. and that's, and that's largely because Paris is aware that the Americans need them. They know that they know

"Limits of U.S. Power and the Role of Non-State Actors in Early Cold War Vietnam"

00:16:39 - to do the fighting in dying in Vietnam, and therefore they know that they can get away with ignoring us suggestions without any real consequences. America, the Americans both need France to fight in Vietnam, but they also need, French support in Western Europe, where they're concerned about Soviet expansion, from Eastern Europe into, into Western Europe. And there's a large and quite powerful communist party in France itself. So they're sort of concerned that France itself might become a communist state. So they feel like there, there's a need there to keep France happy, and that allows them to resist us pressure
00:17:19 - So in some ways, the article speaks to the limits, to us power in the Early Cold War and the agency that is enjoyed by junior actors in the Cold War, you know, nation states that don't often receive a lot of attention when we think about the, the kind of dynamics of the, the Cold War. I think one of the other things that's important is that we see here the importance that US officials imbued in the actions and behaviors of a quite diverse cast of characters, often figures that weren't officially employed by the US government, that was seemingly insignificant maybe to US diplomacy,
00:18:01 - with great, great care and felt that they, they held the potential to, to assist the United States in either winning or losing this Cold War struggle in, in, in Southeast Asia. so we get a bit of a sense there of the importance of non-state actors about how individuals seemingly unimportant could be seen as ambassadors of the United States, even if they weren't officially employed by, by the US government. I guess the other, the other thing that may, that comes out of the piece is that one of the reasons why the United States invested so much time
00:18:42 - because it was one of the few places where they felt they could have a, a tangible impact on developments in, in Vietnam. the aid and, and, and money that they provided to the French seemingly, was, was not enough to tip the sort of balance of the military struggle. the war was, was largely a stalemate. and in 1954, France suffers a, a humiliating defeat in northwest Vietnam at a place called Dmb fu, which eventually facilitates a French withdrawal from the, from the country and a, a new beginning, a new, a new stage of the, the struggle for Vietnam that didn't involve, the French Empire.
00:19:24 - because, so US military aid doesn't really have an effect on the war that much. It helps France keep going, but it ultimately doesn't enable them to be successful. And as, as I've mentioned earlier, France is also not particularly receptive to American intrusion in other aspects of the situation of Vietnam. So they're not willing to listen to American ideas about military strategy or providing additional independence to this anti-communist Vietnamese government. and so in the end, things like press management become important 'cause it is one of the few places where they feel like they can actually have an impact on the situation in, in Vietnam. so it's, I think this story is important for, for that reason as well.
00:20:08 - to be possible in, in Vietnam and some of the limits, and again, restrictions of what they felt they were able to achieve at a moment in time in which they are the world's sole regiment. You know, they're an enormously powerful military and economic power by the time we get into the mid 20th century, but there are still things that they're unable to do, and it seems like US officials recognized that. and then the final thing I would say in terms of sort of implications and wider findings is that US officials did enjoy some success in managing, managing the press. journalists were often quite receptive to US government,

"Challenges of Maintaining Positive Press Coverage During the Vietnam Conflict"

00:20:49 - to write about the war in a particular way. but there were moments where these systems, these interventions failed and were critical and pessimistic stories, slipped by, and did inflict damage on the Franco America relationship and cause genuine concern about the future of us, objectives in, in Vietnam and whether or not Vietnam would fall to, to communism. And, and the reason for that is largely relates to journalistic culture and this notion of objective journalism that is, that journalists would rely primarily for their information on official government sources.
00:21:29 - that actually if government figures were largely positive, and uncritical in their reading of the French, that that could, that could help the United States government in its management of the press. But the problem was that the war wasn't going particularly well, as I said, it entered a, a stalemate. And so there were, if journalists looked hard enough, officials who were willing to go on the record and speak of the war in a more critical and pessimistic way and ways, and that therefore meant that when they published stories with these sources, they were able to better resist the efforts of the US government to, to get 'em to kill a story which might be damaging to us, diplomatic objectives. In terms of future research, there are a, a few things
00:22:12 - One, one of these is the kind of cultural environment in which journalists and government officials were brought up. I think there's a growing sense in the literature that they shared. A lot of spaces were part of many of the same networks, you know, brought up in the same schools, the same universities, often drawn from the same class. You have instances in Vietnam where influential columnists, so people like Joseph Op, are related to figures in the US mission. So there's some, family connections there at work. So I'd be interested in, in sort of probing the degree
00:23:08 - to try and manage the press and in, and in, in large part, encouraged American journalists to align themselves with US diplomatic, objectives because they were often talking from the same position and from the same places as many of their counterparts within the, within the US government.

Faculti AI can make mistakes

Research

Policy

Analysis