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The interaction between local and international power in EU police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Birte Julia Gippert explores the interaction between local and international power structures in EU peacebuilding.

Image courtesy of interviewee. May 29, 2024

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This video discusses a late spinoff article based on the author's PhD research, focusing on international peacebuilding, specifically examining interactions between local and international power dynamics in post-conflict states like Bosnia. The author highlights the challenges of peacebuilding missions initiated by international organizations, such as the UN and the EU, which aim to support war-torn countries in transitioning from conflict to peace.

The piece emphasizes the legal and sovereignty constraints that peacebuilding operations face, as they require consent from the host state. The research aims to analyze the influence of international power structures versus local actors and how their interactions affect compliance with peacebuilding efforts.

Using Bosnia as a case study, the author investigates the power dynamics between the local police and international peacekeeping forces, particularly during police restructuring processes from 2003–2008. The findings reveal a disparity in compliance between the Federation of Bosnia and the Republic of Srpska, where local police were ordered to comply in the Federation, while those in the Republic of Srpska were instructed to resist reforms.

The author discusses the significance of legitimacy in compliance decisions, noting that high perceptions of legitimacy towards the EU did not guarantee compliance if contradicted by local orders. The conclusions suggest that understanding local power dynamics is crucial for the success of international peacebuilding efforts. Even with compliance from some regions, the overall success of peace reforms can be undermined if significant parts of the local structures resist change.

Moreover, the text asserts that while peacebuilding initiatives may not always lead to the anticipated progress, they can still be effective in preventing conflict relapse. The article emphasizes the importance of examining people's perceptions at the micro-level to better understand the complexities of peacebuilding and the necessity for cooperation between local and international entities.

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So this was actually a very late spinoff from my PhD.

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Um, so I'm sure I'm not the only one who came out

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of their PhD with loads more data than would fit not only

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into the dissertation, but also into the book that came out.

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Um, so there were a few spinoff articles,

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and this was the last one.

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Um, so, so the end, so to speak, of

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that large project more broadly.

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Um, it fits into legitimacy, power

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and authority in international peace building

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or what a lot of people also call peacekeeping.

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So the, the broader idea of

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how does the international communities support countries

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that emerge out of internal conflict.

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So your, your average civil war often, whatever that means.

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Um, and international peace building operations are specific

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tools that international organizations, primarily the un

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but also regional organizations.

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So the European Union in my case,

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but also the African Union send to help war torn states

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to move from a state of war to a state of peace.

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That's the basic principle behind it.

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Um, do you want me to talk a little bit about,

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more about the context and the setting

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of peace building peace builders

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or peacekeepers move in quite a specific legal framework.

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So peace building operations are mandated

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by the UN Security Council

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and they have to be invited by the host's state.

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So both of that set a number

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of constraints to peace builders.

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They don't just come in and bully the host state into

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whatever they want, but they have

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to respect the sovereignty of the host state.

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And that means if the government says no, that's it,

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it becomes very difficult.

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And that sort of in a nutshell, web power comes in.

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So what I'm doing in this piece is trying to unre

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or trying to, to estimate how international power,

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so the peace building side of things with a big mandate

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of the UN Security Council coming into a context such

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as Bosnia, you know, a small war onn European country,

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but actually finding how powerful local actors really are.

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Um, so, and then trying to understand

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how these two sides interact with each other.

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Peace building is a cooperative process.

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The UN or the EU

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or the African Union doesn't come in saying,

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here's our reforms, we do them at all.

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There's corporation.

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Most of these reforms have

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to be implemented by local actors.

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So in my context, there was a very clear corporation

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between the civilian side of the peace building mission,

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so international police officers

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and the police officers in Bosnia.

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Um, and so that is where the idea of cooperation

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and interaction comes from.

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So peace building is generally a post-conflict

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activity state building.

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So rebuilding the institutions of the state

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to hopefully make sure they don't relapse back into conflict

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is a core element of it.

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Um, and this is sort of against the backdrop that,

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civil war torn states do not have it easy.

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So the data that we're working with shows that over 90%

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of states who emerged from civil war relapse into

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violence within five years.

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Um, that's very costly, primarily in terms of human costs,

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but of course also in terms

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of the infrastructure and everything.

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So peace building is one attempt to stop that relapse

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to stop that from happening.

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And it's the international attempt to support a country,

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but the stress is on the word support, right?

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It isn't a one-sided process

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and it's that interaction that I find interesting.

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And this comes back to something you said earlier, right?

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The element of the local. What does that mean?

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So we've seen a slightly more concerted efforts

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by academics since say, the 2000 tens,

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to look at local power, local agendas.

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And when I say local, what people tend to mean or

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or to conglomerate into that term

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is actors within the host state.

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These are very typically the political elites,

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of course those who are in government,

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but this is also the population communities within the

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population and stakeholders like civil society.

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So the idea is to analyze power, interests,

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or generally interests of those communities,

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of those groups, how do they make those interests known?

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And how does it interact with peace building efforts?

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Um, again, coming back to this idea, it's corporation.

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So that's where this article fits into sort of

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that wider literature.

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But that's quite specific field,

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as I'm sure you can imagine.

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There's a huge literature on power, not just in politics

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and international relations

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and about as many definitions as there are authors,

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but simply put direct power,

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I call it compulsory power in the article.

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Um, is one actor trying to make another actor do

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what they want, so comply with an order or stop

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or start a particular behavior.

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Um, an actor can use different mechanisms to achieve

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that level of compliance.

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So personally I differentiate between coercion,

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inducement, and compliance.

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Those are the sort of main mechanisms we tend

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to find in the literature.

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Um, at the moment. Others talk about persuasion

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and instead of legitimacy,

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but the idea is that an actor may comply with an order

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or with a demand because they're threatened.

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So I can hold a gun to you head

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and say, hand over your money, that's coercion.

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Um, I can also say, I really like your watch.

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I'll give you 50 quid for it.

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Or I'll offer you a promotion for you

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to start behaving differently

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or to comply with an order that will be inducement.

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Or I could try and convince you of the rightfulness

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of my order, right?

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I'm an expert in a field, I'm an authority.

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We have a particular relationship, so I can convince you

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of the rightfulness of my demand,

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well possibly to hand over your watch.

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Um, so that will be legitimacy.

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So in the peace building context,

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international operations have certain reforms

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that they want local actors to implement.

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So they need power to actually get that level

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of compliance they need for reforms to be implemented.

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So police restructuring, in my case, is one of them.

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In this paper, I look at a slightly unusual

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characteristic of peace

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Building operations, and that's the existence

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of parallel power structures.

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So normally in a state, laws require you

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or demand of you certain things, right?

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Stop at the right traffic light, things like that.

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Um, and as a citizen you comply with them.

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But what we actually have in terms of peace buildings,

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we suddenly have two authorities in a country,

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not just the state and its institutions,

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but also the peace building mission itself,

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which is an authority and can issue binding orders.

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So if you're now on the receiving end of this,

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and I'm looking at, local police officers,

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they receive orders both from the police mission

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and from their own local police chain of command.

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If these orders match beautiful,

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we'll probably see quite strong compliance.

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But what if they don't?

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So what do we, what actually happens in case

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of a contradictory order?

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The poor police officer has to make up their own mind,

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which one way is higher.

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And it's that, that I'm looking at.

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So this interaction of the power structures

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and what happens in terms of a clash,

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it sounds like a really technical issue,

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but actually these are decisions that have, that people have

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to make on a day-to-day basis and peace building

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and whether they opt for compliance

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or for resistance has quite a fundamental effect on whether

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peace building missions succeed or don't, both operation

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or well, both institutions have the same three

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power mechanisms, right?

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So the EU police mission

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that I'm looking at can threaten

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punishment for non-compliance.

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They actually had the power delegated power

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to dismiss local officers from their positions.

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If they didn't comply. Um, they promised rewards.

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So through, future EU accession called Bosnia Hada,

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and that's an ongoing process and huge EU funding.

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The amounts of money that were made available

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to Bosnia on the condition that they complied

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with these reforms or with a set of wider reforms were huge

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and very important to the country.

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They also appealed for perceptions of legitimacy.

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There was a lot of talk about, the attraction

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of EU norms

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and values, the ability of the police to be more effective

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to serve and protect their people more effectively.

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On the other side, of course,

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we also have the local police chain of command

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with the same mechanisms.

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So an officer has to comply

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with a lawful order from their police chain of command.

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If they don't, they face misconduct hearings

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or dismissal at the same time.

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Good service and compliance

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with the orders from your superior translate into promotion,

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higher salary recognition, you know,

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general career advancement.

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And also of course any sort of,

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especially in the public sector, any kind

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of institution also has a certain sense of dis esp, right?

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Certain mottos values that underpin the institution

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and service to the people serve

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to your own community was one

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of the ways in which the local police forces also appealed

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for their officer's legitimacy.

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So we have two sets of power structures,

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ideally ordering the same thing, great, but they may not do.

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And that's the case as I'm looking at in my specific case

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study in this case then obviously is police

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reform in Bosnia.

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So the EU police operation took over

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policing support in Bosnia from 2003.

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And the police restructuring process,

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one very specific element of the wider police reform, ran

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between 2004 and 2008.

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EUPM became much more closely associated with that project,

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with that than they actually initially thought they would.

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So the problem was that the date

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and peace agreement that ended the Bosnian war in 1995

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divided the country into two.

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So-called entities, the Federation of Bosnia had seina

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primarily inhabited by Bosniacs and Croats,

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and the Republica Subscap,

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the RRS primarily inhabited by Serbs.

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Now, of course, those divisions are nothing

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like hard and fast.

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Um, but the date

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and agreement gives each entity complete

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power over policing.

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So it means there's not one centralized police force.

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There's one centralized police force for the Republic

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of Ska based in the Ministry of Interior in Banga Luca.

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And there are 14 forces for the federation, one

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for each Canton.

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A bit like in the uk you have one force for each co

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for each county, right?

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That's a lot of police forces.

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Um, and actually from a purely effectiveness point

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of view, it didn't really work.

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It was hugely expensive to have all these police forces

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overlapping, unclear jurisdictions.

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As soon as the suspect crossed the entity line, forget it.

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There's no way you would actually get

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the cooperation you needed.

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So from a purely effective policing point

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of view, it just didn't work.

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So that's where the idea of,

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police restructuring came from.

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Um, and the scenario that was pushed very much

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by the international community was one centralized

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police force, right?

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Cheaper, easier to organize cooperation,

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guaranteed beautiful, everyone wins.

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So bx, about 50% of the population back then,

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were quite happy with that.

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They always wanted a unified state.

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They knew where they were gonna be. A majority in the

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unified Bosnia, happy days, Crow, adss

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and Serbs, not so much.

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Serbs make up about fif,

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about 30% Crow adss about 15 against the data

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from about six years ago.

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SRBs, specifically in the Republic of Soka,

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very much resisted this idea.

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They wanted policing to retain

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or they wanted to retain control over policing,

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and that meant no centralized police force whatsoever.

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So what I actually have now is two cases

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within one state, right?

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In the federation primarily Bosniacs quite a supportive

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attitude towards police centralization in the Republica.

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Not at all. No way was that going to happen.

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So that gives me quite interesting empirical, basis now

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to look at both sides of it, right?

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So how is it actually playing out?

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So what I did was, obviously first looked at a desk,

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review quite a lot of documents, from the EU themselves,

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from all sorts of academics, and think tanks.

11:58.385 --> 12:01.245
And then I went to Bosnia and spoke to the local police.

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Um, and that was very interesting, spoke

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to both police officers, middle

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and higher ranks, as well as people working into the,

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in the respective ministries of interior.

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So one in one Inya Luca,

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I asked mainly semi-structured questions.

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I always like people actually explaining things in their own

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words, particularly since at points I had

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to work through a translator.

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So it's always better if people can phrase their answers

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in the way that suits them.

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But I also use the legitimacy survey.

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Legitimacy is really slippery concept, isn't it?

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So I tried to have a survey

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to get slightly firmer comparable data about

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how legitimate local officers thought EUPM

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as an institution was

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and their police restructuring reforms in particular.

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So that empirical data was basically the

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backbone to the analysis.

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And then I used process tracing, so a step by step causal,

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analysis tool

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to see if the theoretical expectations from the power

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literature, so why people would comply,

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actually matched the data that I was finding.

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Um, so which power mechanisms were being used

13:11.045 --> 13:14.985
by the EU mission and by their local police forces and how,

13:15.005 --> 13:16.785
and whether they led to compliance.

13:17.245 --> 13:19.585
Um, in this particular police restructuring process,

13:19.965 --> 13:22.865
it was hugely different as I to be honest, expected.

13:23.245 --> 13:26.545
Um, so the ca case of the federation showed

13:26.545 --> 13:27.985
that local police officers

13:28.005 --> 13:32.105
and the ministry agreed with the restructuring process,

13:32.125 --> 13:34.465
and they simply ordered their police to comply.

13:35.475 --> 13:39.095
Um, so that ensure compliance pretty much throughout the

13:39.095 --> 13:40.495
ranks and throughout the cantons.

13:40.995 --> 13:44.375
Um, so when I asked slightly more specifically, how was eu,

13:44.555 --> 13:46.455
how was the EU mission perceived?

13:46.455 --> 13:48.735
Were they threatening? Did they offer rewards?

13:49.575 --> 13:53.135
Actually, neither of those. Um, so I spoke, in depth

13:53.155 --> 13:56.815
to people in Savo and, and, and mo.

13:56.995 --> 13:59.215
So three different cantons with different ethnic makeup.

13:59.875 --> 14:02.535
Um, and they were all saying EUPM didn't threaten,

14:02.535 --> 14:04.735
they weren't coercive, they were described as friendly,

14:04.875 --> 14:06.415
as collegial, as supportive.

14:07.195 --> 14:09.215
Um, but when I was asking for rewards,

14:09.215 --> 14:10.655
people looked at me a bit puzzled.

14:10.655 --> 14:11.695
They'd heard of, they, of course,

14:11.695 --> 14:14.615
they realized the relevance of EU accession at some point

14:14.635 --> 14:16.575
and needing to meet these EU conditions,

14:16.675 --> 14:19.535
but it didn't really matter to their day-to-day decisions.

14:19.535 --> 14:21.255
And it didn't matter to their compliance choices.

14:21.355 --> 14:22.735
It was too far removed.

14:22.885 --> 14:24.455
When I spoke about legitimacy

14:24.475 --> 14:26.695
and looked at my legitimacy survey,

14:26.705 --> 14:28.575
legitimacy attitudes were quite high,

14:28.795 --> 14:31.175
and that was predominantly because of that match, right?

14:31.335 --> 14:33.615
EUPM was working towards a unified state.

14:33.795 --> 14:35.135
That's what Bosniacs wanted.

14:35.555 --> 14:37.895
And even though crows were a lot more critical of it,

14:38.025 --> 14:41.695
there was still enough overlap generally with m's,

14:41.795 --> 14:45.415
agenda for there to be enough support so

14:45.415 --> 14:46.535
that ensure compliance.

14:46.675 --> 14:49.495
At the same time, the office were very clear saying, well,

14:49.545 --> 14:50.855
we've been ordered to comply.

14:51.185 --> 14:52.205
You do as you're told.

14:52.425 --> 14:54.685
So there was clearly a coercive element

14:54.785 --> 14:58.125
or the element of you do as you're told or else, but that

14:58.125 --> 15:00.285
or else came from the local police chain

15:00.285 --> 15:01.805
of command, not from EOPM.

15:01.865 --> 15:04.845
So the, the mixture of the legitimacy of the reforms

15:04.905 --> 15:07.685
and the coercive threat of you obey your orders

15:08.395 --> 15:10.085
work together to ensure compliance.

15:10.385 --> 15:13.525
The Republica was completely opposite.

15:13.785 --> 15:16.365
So I spoke to the Ministry of Interior and Banga Luca,

15:16.365 --> 15:19.245
and they told me very straight up,

15:19.395 --> 15:21.925
they had ordered the police to resist all reforms.

15:22.145 --> 15:24.085
So anything to do with restructuring they

15:24.085 --> 15:25.725
said is not going to happen.

15:26.665 --> 15:29.285
So their point of view was very clearly the date

15:29.285 --> 15:30.525
and peace agreement had given

15:30.885 --> 15:32.085
policing powers to the entities.

15:32.305 --> 15:33.685
So that's where it was gonna stay.

15:34.145 --> 15:38.325
An attempt to centralize the police force would require a

15:38.325 --> 15:40.565
change of the constitution, and legally

15:40.825 --> 15:41.925
and practically they're right.

15:42.065 --> 15:44.005
Um, and that was, that was the baseline of it.

15:44.005 --> 15:46.405
So police restructuring wasn't gonna go anywhere.

15:46.845 --> 15:48.885
EOPM didn't take that very well.

15:49.105 --> 15:50.285
Um, so they did threaten

15:50.425 --> 15:53.005
and they actually dismissed several higher ranking officer

15:53.265 --> 15:56.205
of the RS to try and break that resistance.

15:56.825 --> 15:58.485
Um, but they didn't get anywhere.

15:58.745 --> 16:00.405
Um, they were simply redeployed

16:00.545 --> 16:03.045
and given positioned elsewhere in the administration.

16:03.465 --> 16:05.445
So even watered down refu,

16:05.475 --> 16:07.845
watered down proposals were completely refused.

16:08.915 --> 16:12.255
So although both cases show the relevance

16:12.255 --> 16:14.655
of legitimacy perceptions, in one case,

16:14.835 --> 16:17.775
it worked towards actually supporting the proposals

16:17.795 --> 16:19.055
or towards the reform,

16:19.315 --> 16:21.535
and in the other case, it completely undercut them

16:21.765 --> 16:23.655
with regard to the actual empirical data.

16:24.195 --> 16:27.695
So specifically to this article, it shows the importance

16:27.695 --> 16:29.415
of legitimacy for compliance choices,

16:29.995 --> 16:32.575
but it shows that compliance isn't an automatic

16:33.255 --> 16:34.295
response to legitimacy.

16:34.315 --> 16:36.135
So there were a number of people who said, no,

16:36.135 --> 16:37.735
really high legitimacy perceptions think

16:37.735 --> 16:38.975
what you EUPM is doing great,

16:39.235 --> 16:40.695
are still been ordered not to comply.

16:41.875 --> 16:46.015
Um, so the power of the chain of command can cut, and,

16:46.015 --> 16:49.335
and basically trumps any kind of, any kind

16:49.335 --> 16:50.335
of international power.

16:51.235 --> 16:54.215
So this sort of went, it went against some

16:54.215 --> 16:55.775
of my expectations because there's,

16:55.775 --> 16:56.775
there's usually an expectation

16:56.775 --> 16:58.375
that international power weighs a lot,

16:58.385 --> 17:02.215
especially the EU plays a huge role in the Western Balkans

17:02.215 --> 17:03.375
and in Bosnia specifically.

17:04.035 --> 17:05.775
But actually when push came to shove,

17:05.775 --> 17:08.375
and it did in the rs local power

17:08.375 --> 17:09.615
trumped international power.

17:10.275 --> 17:12.055
So speaking to the local police officers,

17:12.055 --> 17:13.255
it actually made complete sense

17:13.255 --> 17:16.815
because any kind of threats by the local, police chain

17:16.815 --> 17:18.415
of command were much more immediate.

17:18.525 --> 17:21.135
They were relevant for, for the future, for the career

17:21.355 --> 17:24.615
of the police officer, whereas anything the EU promised was

17:24.665 --> 17:25.855
vague and far away.

17:26.235 --> 17:27.695
So it wasn't that relevant to them.

17:28.395 --> 17:30.775
So in that sense, the takeaway here then would be

17:30.775 --> 17:32.295
that policy makers really need

17:32.295 --> 17:34.375
to understand these local power dynamics.

17:34.955 --> 17:36.495
Um, and in some ways they did.

17:36.495 --> 17:39.255
There were outcry by number of experts saying,

17:39.255 --> 17:40.895
you're not going to centralize the police.

17:41.175 --> 17:42.575
A, it's unconstitutional,

17:43.075 --> 17:45.215
and B, you're not going to get away with it.

17:45.485 --> 17:47.295
Well, they thought they would and they didn't.

17:47.875 --> 17:51.085
So that that link with, with local interest

17:51.145 --> 17:54.045
and local power structures needs to be much more

17:54.565 --> 17:56.045
considered than it was in this case.

17:57.545 --> 18:00.285
Um, another rather may,

18:00.285 --> 18:02.245
maybe slightly depressing finding was that there's a comp,

18:02.245 --> 18:03.325
there's a very large difference

18:03.325 --> 18:05.245
between compliance and success.

18:06.205 --> 18:09.145
So we saw very high levels of compliance in the federation,

18:09.685 --> 18:12.425
but that meant nothing for the overall success

18:12.425 --> 18:14.305
because of the refusal of DRS.

18:14.525 --> 18:17.345
You can't have one centralized police force of one entity

18:17.345 --> 18:19.225
of the country opts out of the process.

18:20.285 --> 18:23.345
Um, so effectively what we saw that even though over half

18:23.345 --> 18:26.025
of the country complied really well, it meant nothing.

18:26.245 --> 18:29.145
The poli the reforms never actually went through,

18:29.285 --> 18:31.185
at least not to the degree that was hope for.

18:31.805 --> 18:33.385
And we can actually see that in a lot

18:33.385 --> 18:35.025
of international missions, Cambodia,

18:35.355 --> 18:37.225
Haiti being a current tragic case in point.

18:37.765 --> 18:40.785
So we need to be a lot more nuanced when we try

18:40.785 --> 18:43.625
and judge success or failure to look into

18:43.625 --> 18:44.985
where does this come from?

18:45.245 --> 18:47.305
And a lot of this is about power relations,

18:47.995 --> 18:50.305
about vested interests in power

18:50.405 --> 18:52.665
and retaining it by local elites.

18:53.795 --> 18:57.295
So when we're looking at the final bit of it,

18:57.295 --> 18:58.615
right, why does it matter?

18:59.395 --> 19:00.695
Why do we actually do this?

19:00.915 --> 19:03.575
Why do states invest a lot of money

19:03.675 --> 19:06.575
and resources into international peace building operations?

19:07.485 --> 19:10.815
Then we, they want to see some form of progress right?

19:10.845 --> 19:12.015
Towards the reforms

19:12.015 --> 19:15.415
that these states think will achieve lasting peace.

19:16.215 --> 19:17.675
Now, there's of course good reason to be

19:18.715 --> 19:20.835
critical about why the reforms meant

19:20.835 --> 19:21.995
to achieve peace are written

19:22.095 --> 19:24.075
by internationals rather than by locals.

19:24.615 --> 19:27.355
Um, and also how representative the elites

19:27.355 --> 19:29.715
that peacebuilders often work with really are

19:29.815 --> 19:31.155
of the wider population.

19:32.015 --> 19:33.475
But actually data does show us

19:33.475 --> 19:36.635
that peace building overall is successful at reducing the

19:36.635 --> 19:38.675
chance of a conflict reigniting.

19:39.495 --> 19:41.635
And what we see in Bosnia, as well

19:41.635 --> 19:43.195
as in many other states is that

19:43.475 --> 19:46.925
although the country hasn't progressed, I'm going

19:46.925 --> 19:50.285
to use my lovely air quotes here in, in the way foreseen

19:50.665 --> 19:52.765
by the original EU proposals,

19:53.065 --> 19:55.005
we also haven't seen a relapse into violence.

19:55.695 --> 19:58.165
We've seen some demonstrations, we've seen them problems.

19:58.415 --> 20:00.285
We've seen effectively a, a set

20:00.285 --> 20:01.685
of problems that have been frozen.

20:02.515 --> 20:05.205
Many of these coming back to the stipulations of the date

20:05.205 --> 20:08.485
and peace accord, but we haven't seen a relapse into

20:08.765 --> 20:11.975
violence, whether that's enough of a basis

20:11.995 --> 20:13.415
of success, we'll see.

20:13.755 --> 20:15.695
But what this paper does is it actually shows

20:15.695 --> 20:17.455
that when you go down into the micro level

20:17.795 --> 20:19.855
and you look at people's perceptions

20:19.875 --> 20:21.895
and people's reasons for, for choices

20:21.995 --> 20:25.255
and decision making, that really helps us better understand

20:25.435 --> 20:27.895
why and how, how our works,

20:28.595 --> 20:31.935
and also the significance of the level of cooperation

20:31.995 --> 20:36.135
or the lack of cooperation, that we see as a basis

20:36.135 --> 20:36.855
of peace building.

"Exploring Local Dynamics in International Peacebuilding: Insights from Post-Conflict Bosnia"

00:00:00 - So this was actually a very late spinoff from my PhD. so I'm sure I'm not the only one who came out of their PhD with loads more data than would fit not only into the dissertation, but also into the book that came out. so there were a few spinoff articles, and this was the last one. so, so the end, so to speak, of that large project more broadly. it fits into legitimacy, power and authority in international peace building or what a lot of people also call peacekeeping. So the, the broader idea of how does the international communities support countries that emerge out of internal conflict. So your, your average civil war often, whatever that means.
00:00:44 - tools that international organizations, primarily the un but also regional organizations. So the European Union in my case, but also the African Union send to help war torn states to move from a state of war to a state of peace. That's the basic principle behind it. do you want me to talk a little bit about, more about the context and the setting of peace building peace builders or peacekeepers move in quite a specific legal framework. So peace building operations are mandated by the UN Security Council and they have to be invited by the host's state. So both of that set a number of constraints to peace builders. They don't just come in and bully the host state into
00:01:25 - to respect the sovereignty of the host state. And that means if the government says no, that's it, it becomes very difficult. And that sort of in a nutshell, web power comes in. So what I'm doing in this piece is trying to unre or trying to, to estimate how international power, so the peace building side of things with a big mandate of the UN Security Council coming into a context such as Bosnia, you know, a small war onn European country, but actually finding how powerful local actors really are. so, and then trying to understand how these two sides interact with each other. Peace building is a cooperative process.
00:02:06 - or the African Union doesn't come in saying, here's our reforms, we do them at all. There's corporation. Most of these reforms have to be implemented by local actors. So in my context, there was a very clear corporation between the civilian side of the peace building mission, so international police officers and the police officers in Bosnia. and so that is where the idea of cooperation and interaction comes from. So peace building is generally a post-conflict activity state building. So rebuilding the institutions of the state to hopefully make sure they don't relapse back into conflict is a core element of it.
00:02:47 - civil war torn states do not have it easy. So the data that we're working with shows that over 90% of states who emerged from civil war relapse into violence within five years. that's very costly, primarily in terms of human costs, but of course also in terms of the infrastructure and everything. So peace building is one attempt to stop that relapse to stop that from happening. And it's the international attempt to support a country, but the stress is on the word support, right? It isn't a one-sided process and it's that interaction that I find interesting. And this comes back to something you said earlier, right? The element of the local. What does that mean?
00:03:29 - by academics since say, the 2000 tens, to look at local power, local agendas. And when I say local, what people tend to mean or or to conglomerate into that term is actors within the host state. These are very typically the political elites, of course those who are in government, but this is also the population communities within the population and stakeholders like civil society. So the idea is to analyze power, interests, or generally interests of those communities, of those groups, how do they make those interests known? And how does it interact with peace building efforts?

"Exploring Mechanisms of Compliance in International Peacebuilding Operations"

00:04:13 - So that's where this article fits into sort of that wider literature. But that's quite specific field, as I'm sure you can imagine. There's a huge literature on power, not just in politics and international relations and about as many definitions as there are authors, but simply put direct power, I call it compulsory power in the article. is one actor trying to make another actor do what they want, so comply with an order or stop or start a particular behavior. an actor can use different mechanisms to achieve that level of compliance. So personally I differentiate between coercion,
00:04:51 - Those are the sort of main mechanisms we tend to find in the literature. at the moment. Others talk about persuasion and instead of legitimacy, but the idea is that an actor may comply with an order or with a demand because they're threatened. So I can hold a gun to you head and say, hand over your money, that's coercion. I can also say, I really like your watch. I'll give you 50 quid for it. Or I'll offer you a promotion for you to start behaving differently or to comply with an order that will be inducement. Or I could try and convince you of the rightfulness of my order, right? I'm an expert in a field, I'm an authority. We have a particular relationship, so I can convince you of the rightfulness of my demand,
00:05:34 - so that will be legitimacy. So in the peace building context, international operations have certain reforms that they want local actors to implement. So they need power to actually get that level of compliance they need for reforms to be implemented. So police restructuring, in my case, is one of them. In this paper, I look at a slightly unusual characteristic of peace Building operations, and that's the existence of parallel power structures. So normally in a state, laws require you or demand of you certain things, right? Stop at the right traffic light, things like that. and as a citizen you comply with them.
00:06:15 - we suddenly have two authorities in a country, not just the state and its institutions, but also the peace building mission itself, which is an authority and can issue binding orders. So if you're now on the receiving end of this, and I'm looking at, local police officers, they receive orders both from the police mission and from their own local police chain of command. If these orders match beautiful, we'll probably see quite strong compliance. But what if they don't? So what do we, what actually happens in case of a contradictory order? The poor police officer has to make up their own mind, which one way is higher. And it's that, that I'm looking at.
00:06:55 - and what happens in terms of a clash, it sounds like a really technical issue, but actually these are decisions that have, that people have to make on a day-to-day basis and peace building and whether they opt for compliance or for resistance has quite a fundamental effect on whether peace building missions succeed or don't, both operation or well, both institutions have the same three power mechanisms, right? So the EU police mission that I'm looking at can threaten punishment for non-compliance. They actually had the power delegated power to dismiss local officers from their positions. If they didn't comply. they promised rewards. So through, future EU accession called Bosnia Hada,
00:07:39 - The amounts of money that were made available to Bosnia on the condition that they complied with these reforms or with a set of wider reforms were huge and very important to the country. They also appealed for perceptions of legitimacy. There was a lot of talk about, the attraction of EU norms and values, the ability of the police to be more effective to serve and protect their people more effectively. On the other side, of course, we also have the local police chain of command with the same mechanisms. So an officer has to comply with a lawful order from their police chain of command. If they don't, they face misconduct hearings or dismissal at the same time.

"Complex Power Dynamics in Bosnia's Police Reform"

00:08:18 - with the orders from your superior translate into promotion, higher salary recognition, you know, general career advancement. And also of course any sort of, especially in the public sector, any kind of institution also has a certain sense of dis esp, right? Certain mottos values that underpin the institution and service to the people serve to your own community was one of the ways in which the local police forces also appealed for their officer's legitimacy. So we have two sets of power structures, ideally ordering the same thing, great, but they may not do.
00:08:59 - study in this case then obviously is police reform in Bosnia. So the EU police operation took over policing support in Bosnia from 2003. And the police restructuring process, one very specific element of the wider police reform, ran between 2004 and 2008. EUPM became much more closely associated with that project, with that than they actually initially thought they would. So the problem was that the date and peace agreement that ended the Bosnian war in 1995 divided the country into two. So-called entities, the Federation of Bosnia had seina primarily inhabited by Bosniacs and Croats,
00:09:42 - the RRS primarily inhabited by Serbs. Now, of course, those divisions are nothing like hard and fast. but the date and agreement gives each entity complete power over policing. So it means there's not one centralized police force. There's one centralized police force for the Republic of Ska based in the Ministry of Interior in Banga Luca. And there are 14 forces for the federation, one for each Canton. A bit like in the uk you have one force for each co for each county, right? That's a lot of police forces. and actually from a purely effectiveness point of view, it didn't really work.
00:10:25 - overlapping, unclear jurisdictions. As soon as the suspect crossed the entity line, forget it. There's no way you would actually get the cooperation you needed. So from a purely effective policing point of view, it just didn't work. So that's where the idea of, police restructuring came from. and the scenario that was pushed very much by the international community was one centralized police force, right? Cheaper, easier to organize cooperation, guaranteed beautiful, everyone wins. So bx, about 50% of the population back then, were quite happy with that. They always wanted a unified state. They knew where they were gonna be. A majority in the
00:11:07 - and Serbs, not so much. Serbs make up about fif, about 30% Crow adss about 15 against the data from about six years ago. SRBs, specifically in the Republic of Soka, very much resisted this idea. They wanted policing to retain or they wanted to retain control over policing, and that meant no centralized police force whatsoever. So what I actually have now is two cases within one state, right? In the federation primarily Bosniacs quite a supportive attitude towards police centralization in the Republica. Not at all. No way was that going to happen. So that gives me quite interesting empirical, basis now
00:11:47 - So how is it actually playing out? So what I did was, obviously first looked at a desk, review quite a lot of documents, from the EU themselves, from all sorts of academics, and think tanks. And then I went to Bosnia and spoke to the local police. and that was very interesting, spoke to both police officers, middle and higher ranks, as well as people working into the, in the respective ministries of interior. So one in one Inya Luca, I asked mainly semi-structured questions. I always like people actually explaining things in their own words, particularly since at points I had to work through a translator. So it's always better if people can phrase their answers in the way that suits them.

"Analyzing Legitimacy and Compliance in Police Reform: A Comparative Study of Local Perceptions and Power Dynamics"

00:12:29 - Legitimacy is really slippery concept, isn't it? So I tried to have a survey to get slightly firmer comparable data about how legitimate local officers thought EUPM as an institution was and their police restructuring reforms in particular. So that empirical data was basically the backbone to the analysis. And then I used process tracing, so a step by step causal, analysis tool to see if the theoretical expectations from the power literature, so why people would comply, actually matched the data that I was finding.
00:13:11 - by the EU mission and by their local police forces and how, and whether they led to compliance. in this particular police restructuring process, it was hugely different as I to be honest, expected. so the ca case of the federation showed that local police officers and the ministry agreed with the restructuring process, and they simply ordered their police to comply. so that ensure compliance pretty much throughout the ranks and throughout the cantons. so when I asked slightly more specifically, how was eu, how was the EU mission perceived? Were they threatening? Did they offer rewards?
00:13:53 - to people in Savo and, and, and mo. So three different cantons with different ethnic makeup. and they were all saying EUPM didn't threaten, they weren't coercive, they were described as friendly, as collegial, as supportive. but when I was asking for rewards, people looked at me a bit puzzled. They'd heard of, they, of course, they realized the relevance of EU accession at some point and needing to meet these EU conditions, but it didn't really matter to their day-to-day decisions. And it didn't matter to their compliance choices. It was too far removed. When I spoke about legitimacy and looked at my legitimacy survey, legitimacy attitudes were quite high, and that was predominantly because of that match, right?
00:14:33 - That's what Bosniacs wanted. And even though crows were a lot more critical of it, there was still enough overlap generally with m's, agenda for there to be enough support so that ensure compliance. At the same time, the office were very clear saying, well, we've been ordered to comply. You do as you're told. So there was clearly a coercive element or the element of you do as you're told or else, but that or else came from the local police chain of command, not from EOPM. So the, the mixture of the legitimacy of the reforms and the coercive threat of you obey your orders work together to ensure compliance. The Republica was completely opposite.
00:15:16 - and they told me very straight up, they had ordered the police to resist all reforms. So anything to do with restructuring they said is not going to happen. So their point of view was very clearly the date and peace agreement had given policing powers to the entities. So that's where it was gonna stay. An attempt to centralize the police force would require a change of the constitution, and legally and practically they're right. and that was, that was the baseline of it. So police restructuring wasn't gonna go anywhere. EOPM didn't take that very well. so they did threaten and they actually dismissed several higher ranking officer of the RS to try and break that resistance.
00:15:58 - they were simply redeployed and given positioned elsewhere in the administration. So even watered down refu, watered down proposals were completely refused. So although both cases show the relevance of legitimacy perceptions, in one case, it worked towards actually supporting the proposals or towards the reform, and in the other case, it completely undercut them with regard to the actual empirical data. So specifically to this article, it shows the importance of legitimacy for compliance choices, but it shows that compliance isn't an automatic response to legitimacy. So there were a number of people who said, no, really high legitimacy perceptions think

"Local Power Dynamics and Compliance in Peacebuilding Efforts: A Critical Analysis"

00:16:39 - are still been ordered not to comply. so the power of the chain of command can cut, and, and basically trumps any kind of, any kind of international power. So this sort of went, it went against some of my expectations because there's, there's usually an expectation that international power weighs a lot, especially the EU plays a huge role in the Western Balkans and in Bosnia specifically. But actually when push came to shove, and it did in the rs local power trumped international power. So speaking to the local police officers, it actually made complete sense because any kind of threats by the local, police chain of command were much more immediate.
00:17:21 - of the police officer, whereas anything the EU promised was vague and far away. So it wasn't that relevant to them. So in that sense, the takeaway here then would be that policy makers really need to understand these local power dynamics. and in some ways they did. There were outcry by number of experts saying, you're not going to centralize the police. A, it's unconstitutional, and B, you're not going to get away with it. Well, they thought they would and they didn't. So that that link with, with local interest and local power structures needs to be much more considered than it was in this case. another rather may,
00:18:02 - there's a very large difference between compliance and success. So we saw very high levels of compliance in the federation, but that meant nothing for the overall success because of the refusal of DRS. You can't have one centralized police force of one entity of the country opts out of the process. so effectively what we saw that even though over half of the country complied really well, it meant nothing. The poli the reforms never actually went through, at least not to the degree that was hope for. And we can actually see that in a lot of international missions, Cambodia, Haiti being a current tragic case in point. So we need to be a lot more nuanced when we try
00:18:43 - where does this come from? And a lot of this is about power relations, about vested interests in power and retaining it by local elites. So when we're looking at the final bit of it, right, why does it matter? Why do we actually do this? Why do states invest a lot of money and resources into international peace building operations? Then we, they want to see some form of progress right? Towards the reforms that these states think will achieve lasting peace. Now, there's of course good reason to be critical about why the reforms meant
00:19:22 - by internationals rather than by locals. and also how representative the elites that peacebuilders often work with really are of the wider population. But actually data does show us that peace building overall is successful at reducing the chance of a conflict reigniting. And what we see in Bosnia, as well as in many other states is that although the country hasn't progressed, I'm going to use my lovely air quotes here in, in the way foreseen by the original EU proposals, we also haven't seen a relapse into violence. We've seen some demonstrations, we've seen them problems. We've seen effectively a, a set of problems that have been frozen.
00:20:36 - and peace accord, but we haven't seen a relapse into violence, whether that's enough of a basis of success, we'll see. But what this paper does is it actually shows that when you go down into the micro level and you look at people's perceptions and people's reasons for, for choices and decision making, that really helps us better understand why and how, how our works, and also the significance of the level of cooperation or the lack of cooperation, that we see as a basis of peace building.

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