The Personal and Operational Consequences of Global Forward Basing and Officer Rotation in the Interwar Royal Navy

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Matthew Heaslip highlights how maintaining the British Empire and carrying out its foreign policy were greatly aided by the appointment of Royal Navy captains to command warships across the globe.

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Institution: University of Portsmouth

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Matthew Heaslip highlights how maintaining the British Empire and carrying out its foreign policy were greatly aided by the appointment of Royal Navy captains to command warships across the globe.

Image courtesy of interviewee. January 18, 2024

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This video video discusses a study focused on the junior to mid-ranking officers of the Royal Navy during the interwar period, emphasizing the lack of literature on their experiences compared to the abundant studies on warships and senior officers. The research aims to enhance understanding of how these officers executed foreign policy on the ground and managed operations around the world, particularly in a time of significant historical transition.

The study analyzed personnel files of 504 officers, exploring their postings, experiences, and the impacts of their assignments, specifically excluding home waters and Mediterranean operations for a clearer context of localized control. It highlighted the importance of command of operations while noting the personal and professional challenges faced by these officers, including mental health issues and the toll of long postings away from family.

Key findings include the correlation between ship type and career progression, with officers from larger, prestigious ships more likely to attain higher ranks. There was, however, an unpredictability about success tied to specific ships, and some officers faced difficulties due to the lack of structured transfer processes when arriving at new postings. Additionally, the study revealed a culture of networking and patronage that influenced promotions more than individual performance.

The research pointed out significant gaps in mental health support for officers, particularly in remote locations such as the China station, where excessive drinking often exacerbated vulnerabilities. Moreover, the challenges faced by submariners and gunboat crews were highlighted, indicating higher mortality rates due to service-related incidents.

Overall, the study underscores the complexity of managing personnel in a historical military context, revealing that effective networking, the right assignments, and luck played crucial roles in the success and wellbeing of Royal Navy officers. The implications of these historical insights inform contemporary military practices and highlight the importance of robust mental health support systems in high-stress environments.

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We have a considerable amount

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of literature looking at the, the warships, the equipment

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that was used during the interwar period,

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we have far less looking at the people who actually employed

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that equipment, those warships in practice

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and delivered foreign policy around the world.

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So while we've had a number of studies

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that have now more recently looked at senior offices,

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so they're training their selection as well

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as the autobiographies

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and biographies of particularly successful

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offices in this period.

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Um, and we've also got a small

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but growing selection of accounts, looking at, semen,

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particularly in the context of the incor mutiny of 1931.

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We have very, very little looking at the junior

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to mid ranking officers

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who are the ones on the scenes making key decisions

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and actually translating top level foreign policy

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into practice on the ground.

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And this stands in contrast with both histories

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of the British Army

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and the Royal Air Force

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that are a little better in looking at these groups

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and how foreign policy was actually delivered in practice,

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but also in comparison with other militaries

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and NAS around the world.

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It also stands in stark contrast

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with a much better understanding we have of, the lives

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and experiences of civilian officials, who were the eyes

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and ears of the British Empire, who delivered the mechanics

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of actually operating the peace time, British Empire.

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So therefore, this is a key group that we need to study

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to better understand how the system worked.

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In practice. The data, included, all

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of the commanding officers of warships posted to squadrons

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outside of home waters or the Mediterranean.

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So we excluded, home waters

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because they were under direct control of the admiralty.

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And we also, I also excluded, the Mediterranean

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because a lot of Mediterranean operations

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and the way they operated was, strongly associated,

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associated with great power deterrence.

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And so it came under much stronger centralized control.

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So we're looking at all of the ships posted around the,

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the world, that had a greater degree of,

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self-control, or at least localized,

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control in their operations.

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So globe Global Ford basing.

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Now of the 504 offices,

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not all of them had complete files.

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Um, so only, about 98.7%

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of them could be included in the study,

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which is still a very, a very good number in total.

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Um, but within that 98.7%, some had, much,

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less complete personnel files,

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or where, the amount

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of detail was quite, quite limited.

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Um, so in addition to the, the purely statistical,

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elements, the quantitative work,

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looking at the personnel files, I also drew in,

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letters, diaries, biographies,

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photograph albums as well to try

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and get more of a qualitative edge to adds

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to the core quantitative findings.

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Now, of those 504 offices are roughly two thirds,

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had at least one posting on the China station.

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So there is quite heavy skewing towards, that fleet,

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which is not surprising

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because the China station was the Royal Navy's third largest

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fleet in this period.

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But there were sufficient officers

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who had not spent any time on China station

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for meaningful comparison with the other,

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little squadrons around the world.

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Amongst, those offices,

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there was also quite a nice spread.

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So, they served aboard 167 different, warships.

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Um, but that included a range of cruisers

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and destroyers, right down to gunboats

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and submarines as well.

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So really quite a range.

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And that also meant then that the study had quite a good mix

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of officer ranks, so particularly lefthand commanders,

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commanders and captains,

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but also a few left tenants as well.

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So, this enabled a comparison

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and a contrast in terms of, the experience of offices

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of different ages and different levels of seniority

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and experience to see what impact that had on,

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their experiences during this period.

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So we're looking at the, the topic of, managing,

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command of, operations around the world,

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both in the period that, this study was looking at,

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but in general, throughout history, there's,

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a difficult balance that had to be maintained between,

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two key opposing elements.

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So, the, the first priority was the need

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to maintain a coherent strategy, led by commanders

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who fully understood what they were meant to be achieving

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and which tactics, to use, in delivering,

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those priorities.

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And as a result, they needed

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to also fully appreciate the local circumstances,

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and the, the people that they were dealing

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with on a day-to-day basis.

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So that's all favored then them spending longer

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on the posting around the world.

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But on the other side, you then have risks associated

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with a longer posting.

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So there are numerous personal ones that,

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it has quite a toll on those officers personal lives

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that generally their wives and families were back in Britain

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or wherever in the world that they came from.

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And so therefore, spending two

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or three years away from them could,

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put quite a strain on those relationships.

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But also then you have issues of acculturation, so

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where they perhaps, become susceptible to local

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potential adversaries in undermining their effectiveness.

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Um, there's also the risk of complacency

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that they get rather set in their ways.

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They don't look at new ways

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to do things more efficiently or more effectively.

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And also underlying health risks, both physical

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and mental, which were key areas of what this,

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study, revealed.

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So in terms of what in practice, I found

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through this study, some

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of the findings were really to be expected.

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So if we take, the offices of the,

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cruisers in particular looking around the world,

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as we would expect the offices of the larger heavy cruisers,

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particularly the modern heavy cruisers posted

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to the China stations, the most prestigious

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of these forward based fleets, they were far more likely

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to reach flag rank, which is,

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broadly speaking, admiral and above.

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Um, they were much more reach, likely to reach

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that level, than their contemporaries

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who were serving a board

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or rather commanding the lighter cruises in less

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prestigious locations.

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So that one was entirely logical and very much expected.

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However, a really key finding from the study was

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that there were specific ships

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or commands that did not really fit with

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what might be expected.

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So, particularly among these smaller warships led

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by junior officers, we found that, they could lead

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to a disproportionate number of senior offices compared

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to other ships of their size.

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Uh, later on. Now, in one case, I found that,

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HMS Hollyhock a sloop

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that's largely served on the China station.

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Uh, it just appears to be a lucky ship.

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I I couldn't find any reason why the officers were

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so successful, but in other cases, it was clear

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that the ship was intended to have junior officers

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who were set aside for higher things later in their careers.

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Um, so, HMS tarantula, for example,

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on the West River out of Hong Kong,

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was clearly set aside for officers due for higher ranks,

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and almost all of them did reach higher ranks,

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excluding one or two who dealt with, personal

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or health issues in their careers.

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Now, the implications of which precise ship

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and officer was posted to command appears

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to also have been understood at the time.

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So it was really interesting that I found that commanders,

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of Sloops

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and some of the older destroyers, for example,

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the pretty much the minute they finished commanding

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that ship, returned to Britain, many

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of them would actually, retire straight away.

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So roughly half of them retired four years

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before they were meant to

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because they appeared

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to have realized they've reached the apex

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of their naval careers

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and they were not going to go on to higher things.

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The the choice of ship was one that they knew it wasn't a,

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a prestigious location.

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So that was a really fascinating, demonstration

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of the appreciation at the time that they actually,

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everyone knew what was going on with this system.

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So when we're looking at

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how operationally effective the system was,

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it was broadly functional at a corporate

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and individual, level, particularly in balancing,

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many of the key priorities,

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but it had some significant weaknesses.

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So on the plus side, the two year rotational model

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that was broadly adopted and,

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and followed, helped officers get an understanding

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of their locations of the job that they were meant to do

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and to, deliver on those goals.

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What we also find is that for the most part,

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there were officers of sufficient experience

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and ability for them

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to manage crisis points in these locations.

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And so most scenarios were handled fairly well.

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However, there was clearly a poor appreciation of the link

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between problems at an individual level

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and its implications for the Navy on an institutional level.

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So, for example,

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one really clear weak link was in the briefing

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of officers when they arrived to a new posting.

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Uh, quite often there was no,

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what we've nowadays call a handover process to make sure

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that the new officer understood what they were meant to do,

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who they should be speaking to,

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and the best way of handling their job.

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And this meant that, in many cases, it took months

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for them to get up to speed on their job.

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And this resulted a number of, flashpoints

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where officers

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with greater experience would most likely have been able

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to avoid some of the clashes that occurred

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and the, the adverse outcomes that resulted from them.

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It also highlighted, the ingrained role

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of patronage

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and networking within the selection of officers

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for particular warships,

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which was particularly important

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to their career progression.

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And crucially, what we find is the selection

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of the ship was actually more important than

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how they performed in that role.

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So promotion was not really decided

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by whether an officer did well or did badly.

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Now, an officer who did really badly,

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who did something very badly wrong,

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would taint their career,

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but the other side of the coin was not the same,

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that if they did really, really well in a posting,

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it didn't mean that they would then get accelerated

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to a better promotion line than they

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had, in the first place.

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Likewise, we find that with, ill officer,

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particularly those suffering, with mental health,

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issues, the systems in place

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to support them clearly were insufficient for the task.

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So what's really interesting is the Royal Navy did realize

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there were significant mental health issues,

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and they tried their best to support them,

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but a lot of the processes they adopted

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didn't work very well.

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So notably the, the social mechanisms

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that they used in home waters

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that were quite effective in home waters.

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So we've got literature on how effective they were

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during the First World War, for example,

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but those systems did not work very well when globally based

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and where ship surgeons

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or other offices were a very long way away from the

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specialists, back in UK hospitals that were meant

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to assist in terms of mental health.

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So that was, quite a problematic issue.

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And that then combined with,

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particularly on the China station, so one of the furthest,

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stations from home waters, with a culture

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of excess drinking.

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And, by access drinking, we,

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we very much mean borderline alcohol dependence

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or alcoholism, although obviously us trying to,

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diagnose with hindsight, particularly as a historian trying

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to diagnose is not helpful.

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But clearly we can identify

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that there were significant alcohol problems on the China

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station compared to, elsewhere.

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And that seems to have fitted into, this picture of,

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of mental health management into War of Royal Navy.

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Service, mortality, was, an issue,

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although at a far lower level than

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what would be seen in wartime.

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So if we look at some of the destroyer commanders later on,

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when they reached the Second World War, you were looking at,

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10% likelihood of dying in service,

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which is quite a significant

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percentage in the interwar period.

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What we're generally looking at is just over 1% risk

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of dying, in peace time service.

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And this, quite often, involved accidents

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or illnesses rather than hostile action.

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But there are some notable exceptions

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of which submarine service really stands out,

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where their risk of dying from,

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work-related accidents in particular was roughly three

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and a half times higher than their surface,

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surface based, contemporaries.

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Now, this fits with,

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previous research and understanding.

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Uh, if you look through the interal period,

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there are a number of, submarine disasters

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where they sink in accidents.

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Um, so HMS Poseidon Theus, M two,

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with significant losses of life.

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So this research really reinforces, that knowledge

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that submarine service was very dangerous.

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But going beyond the submarine service, we find

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that gumbo service was also quite dangerous,

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although not quite as bad as for submariners.

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So this was partly to do with,

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gunboats quite often being posted to,

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quite remote locations where they might have a higher risk

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of tropical diseases,

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and also where,

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immediate medical care was far worse than in other places.

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But you also find that,

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the gunboats were the peacetime frontline,

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that they're quite often dealing with bandit groups

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or trying to organize evacuations in the face of,

15:12.135 --> 15:14.575
civil wars or civil conflict,

15:14.595 --> 15:17.935
and in some cases, even facing direct violence in

15:18.145 --> 15:19.215
undeclared wars.

15:19.215 --> 15:22.415
So where Britain was, engaged in hostilities

15:22.445 --> 15:26.495
with another power, even if it wasn't officially a, a,

15:26.595 --> 15:28.655
war at the diplomatic level.

15:29.715 --> 15:32.215
So as a result, you do have a number

15:32.215 --> 15:35.335
of gunboat commanders, dying in service,

15:35.895 --> 15:38.095
although actually we tend to find that more often than not,

15:38.275 --> 15:39.815
they were wounded in service.

15:40.035 --> 15:43.495
So gunshot wounds to the leg, a lot of blunt force traumas,

15:43.895 --> 15:47.615
although it's quite difficult to, identify a lot

15:47.615 --> 15:50.735
of those cases because a gunshot wound was recorded in a

15:50.735 --> 15:53.015
personnel file, whereas from diaries

15:53.235 --> 15:56.255
and letters, it's clear that lots of them, did suffer,

15:56.675 --> 15:58.295
various forms of blunt flow trauma.

15:58.355 --> 16:00.495
So where they've been hit with a, a, a rifle

16:00.635 --> 16:02.455
or a bamboo pole, something like that,

16:02.595 --> 16:04.375
or, even like rocks thrown at them.

16:04.995 --> 16:06.695
Um, but unfortunately

16:06.695 --> 16:09.775
that wasn't recorded in their actual personnel files.

16:09.915 --> 16:13.175
It was, clearly assumed to be that commonplace.

16:13.235 --> 16:15.335
It wasn't worth recording. This.

16:16.125 --> 16:19.295
Then pattern of service related injuries

16:19.295 --> 16:23.055
and accidents, mirrors, the mental health

16:23.675 --> 16:25.535
and drinking related issues.

16:25.715 --> 16:28.455
So while the data we have, particularly

16:28.455 --> 16:29.615
for drink related issues,

16:29.995 --> 16:32.895
but also for mental health related issues is quite weak,

16:32.915 --> 16:37.445
it wasn't often recorded from those examples.

16:37.505 --> 16:41.605
We do have, they are overwhelmingly amongst gumbos

16:41.605 --> 16:43.445
and submarine, submarine offices.

16:43.655 --> 16:47.285
There are very, very few cases from destroyers

16:47.305 --> 16:49.485
or from cruisers or any, larger ships.

16:50.195 --> 16:51.375
And this is actually quite logical

16:51.375 --> 16:54.375
because the number of officers aboard a gumbo

16:54.375 --> 16:55.935
to a submarine was quite limited.

16:56.005 --> 16:57.935
They're quite junior, they're younger,

16:57.935 --> 16:59.135
they had less experience.

16:59.555 --> 17:02.135
And so all of the social mechanisms, once again

17:02.135 --> 17:03.415
that we saw in the home fleet,

17:03.415 --> 17:04.895
particularly board larger vessels

17:04.895 --> 17:07.015
where offices will keep an eye on each other

17:07.635 --> 17:12.255
and would perhaps notify, perhaps informally,

17:12.405 --> 17:14.215
note that an officer was struggling.

17:14.605 --> 17:16.335
That doesn't work very well when you're only dealing

17:16.335 --> 17:19.175
with one or two offices in quite a low remote location.

17:20.035 --> 17:22.375
And this then seems to have fitted into the drinking

17:22.375 --> 17:25.175
culture, where, to deal

17:25.175 --> 17:26.655
with the stresses and strains.

17:26.755 --> 17:29.695
And quite often that's simply the loneliness of being,

17:29.795 --> 17:33.135
the only officer in a specific location, that number

17:33.135 --> 17:35.095
of officers, turns to drink.

17:36.235 --> 17:38.015
And what we find in both mental health

17:38.475 --> 17:42.975
and drinking cases is that, this does not correlate

17:43.005 --> 17:44.455
with the ability of the officer.

17:44.715 --> 17:47.055
So there were some excellent officers

17:47.155 --> 17:48.895
who were clearly marked as ones

17:48.895 --> 17:49.925
For future promotion

17:50.345 --> 17:53.205
or where they had distinguished service in the first World

17:53.345 --> 17:56.965
War who struggled with, their, their de mental health

17:57.025 --> 17:58.045
or drink demons.

17:58.585 --> 18:01.205
And you had, other officers

18:01.205 --> 18:03.165
who were clearly not very good at their jobs,

18:03.385 --> 18:05.845
but actually managed to cope quite well with the stresses.

18:05.845 --> 18:08.365
So there's no correlation between ability

18:08.825 --> 18:10.245
and mental health or drinking.

18:10.785 --> 18:15.445
So the key takeaways from, this article is that,

18:15.865 --> 18:16.925
I think first

18:16.925 --> 18:19.725
and foremost, it's the importance of mental healthcare

18:19.825 --> 18:22.995
and process management being taken seriously

18:23.095 --> 18:26.795
by companies particularly, navy's,

18:27.055 --> 18:28.955
and, military organizations

18:29.095 --> 18:32.555
or other organizations in a particularly high risk,

18:33.045 --> 18:34.835
style settings and environments.

18:35.855 --> 18:39.275
So even the best officers would've benefited from defined,

18:39.615 --> 18:40.915
handover processes

18:41.295 --> 18:44.595
and some of the strongest needed help with their black dogs,

18:45.015 --> 18:46.395
their mental health struggles.

18:47.905 --> 18:50.885
In terms of our understanding of the history of

18:51.025 --> 18:55.285
how the Royal Navy operated, it really highlights,

18:55.465 --> 18:58.285
the role of patronage and networking,

18:58.665 --> 19:00.885
but at a far more granular level than we

19:01.205 --> 19:02.565
previously, understood.

19:03.505 --> 19:05.485
So a Red Sea sloop,

19:05.865 --> 19:09.405
or a middle Yanks gunboat was just as prestigious

19:09.505 --> 19:13.645
as a large modern cruiser, just simply relative to the age

19:13.745 --> 19:17.975
and seniority of the officer involved need

19:18.005 --> 19:19.095
that choice then

19:19.475 --> 19:22.975
of the vessel not only had an impact on their likelihood

19:22.995 --> 19:26.375
of promotion, but it also had a strong impact on the

19:26.375 --> 19:28.935
officer's risk of illness, of injury

19:29.275 --> 19:31.055
or death in peacetime service.

19:32.975 --> 19:35.035
So not only is this then un vital

19:35.175 --> 19:37.715
for our historical understanding of the period,

19:38.055 --> 19:40.235
but it also highlights that while some

19:40.235 --> 19:41.915
of these areas have been,

19:42.125 --> 19:44.515
quite well studied in more recent years

19:44.695 --> 19:48.035
for a contemporary present day application,

19:48.065 --> 19:51.515
that others perhaps deserve a little bit more research to,

19:51.695 --> 19:54.995
understand their implications for, for modern day,

19:55.475 --> 20:00.295
military practitioners altogether, the study

20:01.225 --> 20:04.055
highlights that, it's vital for our understanding

20:04.115 --> 20:08.215
of the periods that to develop a successful career

20:08.515 --> 20:12.975
as an officer in the Royal Navy, not only was a certain type

20:12.975 --> 20:16.215
of background required, as previous studies have

20:17.015 --> 20:20.055
somewhat highlighted, but the individual also needed

20:20.055 --> 20:22.135
to be very effective at networking.

20:22.155 --> 20:24.455
And indeed, sometimes just simply a little lucky

20:24.675 --> 20:29.455
to secure the right kind of post officers then had

20:29.455 --> 20:32.415
to dodge a variety of, physical

20:32.515 --> 20:34.815
and mental risks to their wellbeing,

20:35.635 --> 20:38.545
which PO posed a modest risk overall,

20:38.925 --> 20:41.145
but quite a pronounced one for,

20:41.295 --> 20:44.465
some particular commands in order to succeed.

20:45.785 --> 20:46.865
Moreover, tying

20:46.865 --> 20:49.125
This into our understanding of the Second World War

20:50.345 --> 20:54.125
in 1939, the Royal Navy had a sizable pool

20:54.305 --> 20:56.685
of recently retired experienced,

20:56.945 --> 20:59.485
and in some cases very talented officers

20:59.545 --> 21:02.525
who played a vital role in commanding warships

21:02.665 --> 21:07.245
during Britain's darkest hours, particularly 1940 and 1941.

21:08.515 --> 21:13.045
That represents then a notable silver lining to what was

21:13.045 --> 21:14.725
otherwise a functional,

21:14.905 --> 21:16.885
but somewhat deficient system

21:17.105 --> 21:20.045
for managing officers in the interwar periods

21:20.755 --> 21:24.725
that had evolved from, Victorian systems,

21:24.985 --> 21:28.285
but one that was really struggling with the realities

21:28.425 --> 21:29.445
of modern warfare.

Exploring Interwar Naval Officers and Their Impact

00:00:00 - We have a considerable amount of literature looking at the, the warships, the equipment that was used during the interwar period, we have far less looking at the people who actually employed that equipment, those warships in practice and delivered foreign policy around the world. So while we've had a number of studies that have now more recently looked at senior offices, so they're training their selection as well as the autobiographies and biographies of particularly successful
00:00:32 - and we've also got a small but growing selection of accounts, looking at, semen, particularly in the context of the incor mutiny of 1931. We have very, very little looking at the junior to mid ranking officers who are the ones on the scenes making key decisions and actually translating top level foreign policy into practice on the ground. And this stands in contrast with both histories
00:01:04 - and the Royal Air Force that are a little better in looking at these groups and how foreign policy was actually delivered in practice, but also in comparison with other militaries and NAS around the world. It also stands in stark contrast with a much better understanding we have of, the lives and experiences of civilian officials, who were the eyes and ears of the British Empire, who delivered the mechanics of actually operating the peace time, British Empire.
00:01:37 - to better understand how the system worked. In practice. The data, included, all of the commanding officers of warships posted to squadrons outside of home waters or the Mediterranean. So we excluded, home waters because they were under direct control of the admiralty. And we also, I also excluded, the Mediterranean because a lot of Mediterranean operations and the way they operated was, strongly associated,
00:02:08 - And so it came under much stronger centralized control. So we're looking at all of the ships posted around the, the world, that had a greater degree of, self-control, or at least localized, control in their operations. So globe Global Ford basing. Now of the 504 offices, not all of them had complete files. so only, about 98.7% of them could be included in the study,
00:02:40 - but within that 98.7%, some had, much, less complete personnel files, or where, the amount of detail was quite, quite limited. so in addition to the, the purely statistical, elements, the quantitative work, looking at the personnel files, I also drew in, letters, diaries, biographies, photograph albums as well to try

Royal Navy Officer Experience on China Station

00:03:10 - to the core quantitative findings. Now, of those 504 offices are roughly two thirds, had at least one posting on the China station. So there is quite heavy skewing towards, that fleet, which is not surprising because the China station was the Royal Navy's third largest fleet in this period. But there were sufficient officers who had not spent any time on China station for meaningful comparison with the other,
00:03:44 - Amongst, those offices, there was also quite a nice spread. So, they served aboard 167 different, warships. but that included a range of cruisers and destroyers, right down to gunboats and submarines as well. So really quite a range. And that also meant then that the study had quite a good mix of officer ranks, so particularly lefthand commanders, commanders and captains,
00:04:14 - So, this enabled a comparison and a contrast in terms of, the experience of offices of different ages and different levels of seniority and experience to see what impact that had on, their experiences during this period. So we're looking at the, the topic of, managing, command of, operations around the world, both in the period that, this study was looking at,
00:04:45 - a difficult balance that had to be maintained between, two key opposing elements. So, the, the first priority was the need to maintain a coherent strategy, led by commanders who fully understood what they were meant to be achieving and which tactics, to use, in delivering, those priorities. And as a result, they needed to also fully appreciate the local circumstances,
00:05:16 - with on a day-to-day basis. So that's all favored then them spending longer on the posting around the world. But on the other side, you then have risks associated with a longer posting. So there are numerous personal ones that, it has quite a toll on those officers personal lives that generally their wives and families were back in Britain or wherever in the world that they came from. And so therefore, spending two
00:05:47 - put quite a strain on those relationships. But also then you have issues of acculturation, so where they perhaps, become susceptible to local potential adversaries in undermining their effectiveness. there's also the risk of complacency that they get rather set in their ways. They don't look at new ways to do things more efficiently or more effectively. And also underlying health risks, both physical and mental, which were key areas of what this,

Influence of Ship Assignment on Naval Careers

00:06:20 - So in terms of what in practice, I found through this study, some of the findings were really to be expected. So if we take, the offices of the, cruisers in particular looking around the world, as we would expect the offices of the larger heavy cruisers, particularly the modern heavy cruisers posted to the China stations, the most prestigious of these forward based fleets, they were far more likely
00:06:51 - broadly speaking, admiral and above. they were much more reach, likely to reach that level, than their contemporaries who were serving a board or rather commanding the lighter cruises in less prestigious locations. So that one was entirely logical and very much expected. However, a really key finding from the study was that there were specific ships or commands that did not really fit with what might be expected. So, particularly among these smaller warships led
00:07:28 - to a disproportionate number of senior offices compared to other ships of their size. later on. Now, in one case, I found that, HMS Hollyhock a sloop that's largely served on the China station. it just appears to be a lucky ship. I I couldn't find any reason why the officers were so successful, but in other cases, it was clear that the ship was intended to have junior officers
00:07:58 - so, HMS tarantula, for example, on the West River out of Hong Kong, was clearly set aside for officers due for higher ranks, and almost all of them did reach higher ranks, excluding one or two who dealt with, personal or health issues in their careers. Now, the implications of which precise ship and officer was posted to command appears to also have been understood at the time.
00:08:28 - of Sloops and some of the older destroyers, for example, the pretty much the minute they finished commanding that ship, returned to Britain, many of them would actually, retire straight away. So roughly half of them retired four years before they were meant to because they appeared to have realized they've reached the apex of their naval careers and they were not going to go on to higher things. The the choice of ship was one that they knew it wasn't a,
00:08:58 - So that was a really fascinating, demonstration of the appreciation at the time that they actually, everyone knew what was going on with this system. So when we're looking at how operationally effective the system was, it was broadly functional at a corporate and individual, level, particularly in balancing, many of the key priorities, but it had some significant weaknesses. So on the plus side, the two year rotational model

Challenges in Royal Navy Officer Management

00:09:31 - and followed, helped officers get an understanding of their locations of the job that they were meant to do and to, deliver on those goals. What we also find is that for the most part, there were officers of sufficient experience and ability for them to manage crisis points in these locations. And so most scenarios were handled fairly well.
00:10:03 - between problems at an individual level and its implications for the Navy on an institutional level. So, for example, one really clear weak link was in the briefing of officers when they arrived to a new posting. quite often there was no, what we've nowadays call a handover process to make sure that the new officer understood what they were meant to do, who they should be speaking to,
00:10:33 - And this meant that, in many cases, it took months for them to get up to speed on their job. And this resulted a number of, flashpoints where officers with greater experience would most likely have been able to avoid some of the clashes that occurred and the, the adverse outcomes that resulted from them. It also highlighted, the ingrained role of patronage and networking within the selection of officers
00:11:05 - which was particularly important to their career progression. And crucially, what we find is the selection of the ship was actually more important than how they performed in that role. So promotion was not really decided by whether an officer did well or did badly. Now, an officer who did really badly, who did something very badly wrong, would taint their career, but the other side of the coin was not the same, that if they did really, really well in a posting,
00:11:36 - to a better promotion line than they had, in the first place. Likewise, we find that with, ill officer, particularly those suffering, with mental health, issues, the systems in place to support them clearly were insufficient for the task. So what's really interesting is the Royal Navy did realize there were significant mental health issues, and they tried their best to support them, but a lot of the processes they adopted didn't work very well.
00:12:07 - that they used in home waters that were quite effective in home waters. So we've got literature on how effective they were during the First World War, for example, but those systems did not work very well when globally based and where ship surgeons or other offices were a very long way away from the specialists, back in UK hospitals that were meant to assist in terms of mental health. So that was, quite a problematic issue.

Alcoholism and Risks in Naval Service

00:12:38 - particularly on the China station, so one of the furthest, stations from home waters, with a culture of excess drinking. And, by access drinking, we, we very much mean borderline alcohol dependence or alcoholism, although obviously us trying to, diagnose with hindsight, particularly as a historian trying to diagnose is not helpful. But clearly we can identify that there were significant alcohol problems on the China
00:13:08 - And that seems to have fitted into, this picture of, of mental health management into War of Royal Navy. Service, mortality, was, an issue, although at a far lower level than what would be seen in wartime. So if we look at some of the destroyer commanders later on, when they reached the Second World War, you were looking at, 10% likelihood of dying in service, which is quite a significant percentage in the interwar period.
00:13:40 - of dying, in peace time service. And this, quite often, involved accidents or illnesses rather than hostile action. But there are some notable exceptions of which submarine service really stands out, where their risk of dying from, work-related accidents in particular was roughly three and a half times higher than their surface, surface based, contemporaries.
00:14:11 - previous research and understanding. if you look through the interal period, there are a number of, submarine disasters where they sink in accidents. so HMS Poseidon Theus, M two, with significant losses of life. So this research really reinforces, that knowledge that submarine service was very dangerous. But going beyond the submarine service, we find that gumbo service was also quite dangerous, although not quite as bad as for submariners.
00:14:45 - gunboats quite often being posted to, quite remote locations where they might have a higher risk of tropical diseases, and also where, immediate medical care was far worse than in other places. But you also find that, the gunboats were the peacetime frontline, that they're quite often dealing with bandit groups or trying to organize evacuations in the face of, civil wars or civil conflict,
00:15:18 - undeclared wars. So where Britain was, engaged in hostilities with another power, even if it wasn't officially a, a, war at the diplomatic level. So as a result, you do have a number of gunboat commanders, dying in service, although actually we tend to find that more often than not, they were wounded in service. So gunshot wounds to the leg, a lot of blunt force traumas, although it's quite difficult to, identify a lot

Challenges in Naval Officer Wellbeing and Records

00:15:50 - personnel file, whereas from diaries and letters, it's clear that lots of them, did suffer, various forms of blunt flow trauma. So where they've been hit with a, a, a rifle or a bamboo pole, something like that, or, even like rocks thrown at them. but unfortunately that wasn't recorded in their actual personnel files. It was, clearly assumed to be that commonplace. It wasn't worth recording. This. Then pattern of service related injuries
00:16:23 - and drinking related issues. So while the data we have, particularly for drink related issues, but also for mental health related issues is quite weak, it wasn't often recorded from those examples. We do have, they are overwhelmingly amongst gumbos and submarine, submarine offices. There are very, very few cases from destroyers or from cruisers or any, larger ships.
00:16:51 - because the number of officers aboard a gumbo to a submarine was quite limited. They're quite junior, they're younger, they had less experience. And so all of the social mechanisms, once again that we saw in the home fleet, particularly board larger vessels where offices will keep an eye on each other and would perhaps notify, perhaps informally, note that an officer was struggling. That doesn't work very well when you're only dealing with one or two offices in quite a low remote location. And this then seems to have fitted into the drinking
00:17:25 - with the stresses and strains. And quite often that's simply the loneliness of being, the only officer in a specific location, that number of officers, turns to drink. And what we find in both mental health and drinking cases is that, this does not correlate with the ability of the officer. So there were some excellent officers who were clearly marked as ones For future promotion or where they had distinguished service in the first World
00:17:57 - or drink demons. And you had, other officers who were clearly not very good at their jobs, but actually managed to cope quite well with the stresses. So there's no correlation between ability and mental health or drinking. So the key takeaways from, this article is that, I think first and foremost, it's the importance of mental healthcare and process management being taken seriously by companies particularly, navy's,
00:18:29 - or other organizations in a particularly high risk, style settings and environments. So even the best officers would've benefited from defined, handover processes and some of the strongest needed help with their black dogs, their mental health struggles. In terms of our understanding of the history of how the Royal Navy operated, it really highlights, the role of patronage and networking,

Prestige and Risks in Royal Navy Careers

00:19:01 - previously, understood. So a Red Sea sloop, or a middle Yanks gunboat was just as prestigious as a large modern cruiser, just simply relative to the age and seniority of the officer involved need that choice then of the vessel not only had an impact on their likelihood of promotion, but it also had a strong impact on the officer's risk of illness, of injury
00:19:32 - So not only is this then un vital for our historical understanding of the period, but it also highlights that while some of these areas have been, quite well studied in more recent years for a contemporary present day application, that others perhaps deserve a little bit more research to, understand their implications for, for modern day, military practitioners altogether, the study
00:20:04 - of the periods that to develop a successful career as an officer in the Royal Navy, not only was a certain type of background required, as previous studies have somewhat highlighted, but the individual also needed to be very effective at networking. And indeed, sometimes just simply a little lucky to secure the right kind of post officers then had to dodge a variety of, physical
00:20:35 - which PO posed a modest risk overall, but quite a pronounced one for, some particular commands in order to succeed. Moreover, tying This into our understanding of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Navy had a sizable pool of recently retired experienced, and in some cases very talented officers who played a vital role in commanding warships
00:21:28 - That represents then a notable silver lining to what was otherwise a functional, but somewhat deficient system for managing officers in the interwar periods that had evolved from, Victorian systems, but one that was really struggling with the realities of modern warfare.

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The Personal and Operational Consequences of Global Forward Basing and Officer Rotation in the Interwar Royal Navy

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